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Real Estate Securitisation is a young and innovative field within Real Estate 
Financing. The applicability of the Asset-Securitisation with respect to real estate
cash flows hasn’t been analyzed in depth, yet.
This is where this dissertation sets its starting point. The concept of Real Estate
Securitisation is defined and differentiated from other forms of Securitisation.
Subsequently, a Research Framework is instituted, which is the basis for an Inter-
national Comparison of Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Secu-
ritisation markets in Singapore, the USA and Europe. The international part offers
a broad overview over the respective markets: Summary of all past Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions, description of applicable institutional framework 
(legal, tax, accounting, investor, rating, real estate), as well as the dominant 
borrowers/originators, assets and motives. The result out of the international 
comparison is an evolution model, which summarizes evolution drivers, core 
determinants of transactions and minimum requirements for the evolution of 
Real Estate Securitisation markets. Finally, those findings are applied to the case
of Germany.
In Germany, where the current situation in the real estate financing market is 
marked by a credit crunch, and an increasing need to diversify the property 
industry’s funding base, a shift from credit to capital markets is inevitable. In this
context, this study offers an added value to the following professionals:
• Borrowers/Originators, i.e. all sorts of Real Estate Companies
• Industrial Corporates that want to divest their real estate holdings
• Bankers and Lawyers working on Securitisation
• Regulatory and Legal Policy Makers shaping the institutional framework
Above that this dissertation offers a basis for future research and student edu-
cation. In this respect, students, professors and researchers in the field of real
estate finance and investment are the academic target group of this book.
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Preface I 
 
Preface 
Lower loan commitments and an increased risk awareness resulting out of the 
introduction of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) have led to an 
increasingly tense financing situation for the property industry in Germany, 
which is best described by the following quote: 
“Everybody is complaining about credit. Businesses because they cannot get it 
any more, and banks because they have granted too much.” 
The influence of this trend is not yet assessable. There is a great uncertainty 
going around in the industry and companies are thriving to substitute bank 
funding by non-bank funding (bank funding compared to capital market funding 
in Germany is 7 times higher than in the UK and about 4 times higher than in 
the US). Hence, alternative sources of financing are needed. 
Asset-Securitisation is a form of innovative capital market oriented financing. 
Fueled by the disintermediation trend from credit to capital markets, the overall 
market for Asset-Securitisation in Europe has grown from €3.0 bn in 1992 to 
over €230.0 bn in 2004. Nearly every asset and every cash flow is capable of 
being securitized. A famous quote states: 
“If it flows, securitize it.” 
This holds true for all kinds of assets ranging from trade receivables to real 
estate cash flows. In Germany, the Real Estate Securitisation market (i.e. 
Securitisation of real estate cash flows) is still in its infancy stage. 
The German banking industry is in transition: margins are low, there are 
sizeable amounts of non-performing loans (estimated at 5% of all outstanding 
loans) and the bank investors’ Return-on-Equity targets seem to be 
unreachable. The author compares this situation with the Banking Crisis in the 
US during the 1980’s, the near breakdown of the Japanese banking system in 
the late 1990’s and the credit crunch in Singapore during the Asian Financial 
crisis. In all cases the situation was comparable to the state that Germany is in 
today, and in all cases the primary result with respect to real estate financing 
was the institution of a Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securiti-
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sation market. This hints at the upcoming development of such a market in 
Germany, as it resolves out of the need for alternative sources of financing. 
The research work at hand creates a framework for the analysis of Asset-
Securitisation markets in general and Real Estate Securitisation markets in 
specific. The thesis is made up of four main parts: the first part defines and 
explains the principles and fundamentals of Asset-Securitisation. This chapter 
can be seen as an overview and an introduction to Asset-Securitisation.  
The next part argues real estate as a separate asset class within the universe 
of Asset-Securitisation and proposes a new coherent definition of Real Estate 
Securitisation. In this context Real Estate Securitisation is differentiated from 
other asset classes, especially from Mortgage-Backed Securities. The 
Research Framework provides the basis for the International Comparison. 
The International Comparison in Chapter 4 validates the instituted Research 
Framework and is made up of 3 case studies: Singapore, USA and Europe. 
This part is stringently structured. Each case study within the comparison 
follows the same setup, which is based on the research framework: market 
overview, display of institutional framework, identification of core determinants 
(assets, borrowers, motives), analysis. The breakdown of the case studies 
results in a Real Estate Securitisation Evolution Model, identifying patterns, 
drivers and minimum evolution requirements for markets to develop. The 
resulting findings are subsequently applied to the case of Germany. 
The EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL has awarded the author with a Dr. rer. 
pol., which is comparable to a Ph.D.. The appreciation of his research piece 
derives out of its great originality, the high relevance for the marketplace and 
the stringent setup of the analysis. The instituted Research Framework and the 
Market Evolution Model provide a great added-value for theory and practice. 
Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte HonRICS 
Prof. Dr. Stephan Bone-Winkel 
ebs Department of Real Estate 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
International University Schloß Reichartshausen 
Oestrich-Winkel  
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Foreword 
The Real Estate Financing World in Germany has changed dramatically over 
the past 5 years. The anticipation of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), 
the ongoing consolidation in the German Banking System, an increasing 
number of non-performing loan exposures in the system, the resulting large loss 
provisions and increased Return-on-Equity requirements for banks have led to 
a credit crunch and the need to create Capital Market oriented financing 
instruments. In sync with an international convergence of financial and capital 
markets the underlying dissertation investigates the applicability of the Asset-
Securitisation concept for financing Real Estate. 
The starting point of this research thesis is the current situation in Germany and 
Europe with respect to real estate financing and Asset-Securitisation. The 
dissertation combines this analysis with the concept of Real Estate 
Securitisation as a new asset class. A Research Framework and a Life-Cycle 
Model for Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation markets are established. In 
order to validate the research framework and to derive results for Germany, an 
international comparison analyses three different Real Estate and Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation markets in Singapore, the USA and Europe. 
The results are subsequently applied to the case of Germany. 
When I started with my first research on Real Estate Securitisation five years 
ago, there was no information nor research available on Securitisation or Real 
Estate Securitisation in Germany. This has changed during the course of my 
dissertation. Nonetheless, the market in Germany still has a long way to go, in 
order to compete with other international markets. The ongoing capital market 
convergence, however, will play its part in this process. 
Without the support of many people this research piece would never have 
become reality. First of all, I would like to thank my “academic father” and 
dissertation advisor Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte, who has been a great role 
model for me, and who has been my greatest supporter during my university 
career. He has not only advised me on my dissertation, but he has also shaped 
my personality and my academic development. His trust and believe in me, as 
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well as the great academic freedom that he has given me during my work at the 
Department of Real Estate and during the course of my dissertation has had a 
great effect on the success of this thesis. I would also like express my gratitude 
to Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck for being my co-corrector (second reviewer) and for 
reading this huge piece in such a short time. 
My special thanks I would also like to express to my American Mentor Prof. 
Glenn Mueller, Ph.D., without whom this dissertation would never have gotten 
to this point. He has spared no efforts to open doors for me and he has always 
had an open ear for my problems and thoughts. His guidance in personal and 
professional matters is invaluable. 
My third academic guidance in this dissertation has been Prof. David Ho, Ph.D., 
who has been a great supporter, especially during my research time in 
Singapore. Without his support, advice and network I would never have gotten 
this great insight into Real Estate and Capital Markets in Singapore. 
I would also like to thank the Real Estate Department at the National University 
of Singapore and at Johns Hopkins University for supporting my local research 
and for letting me use their research facilities. 
For their great insight from the practitioner’s side and their commitment, I would 
also like to thank and mention all of my interview partners: Sing Tien Foo, 
Joseph Ooi, Seck Wai Kwong, David Ho and Lawrence Yeo in Singapore – 
Darren Wolberg, Thomas E. Robinson, Sharon Lee Stark, Martin C. Mitsoff, 
Patrick Corcoran, Stephen H. Choe, Warren S. Ashenmil, Johannes 
Boeckmann, Tyler Yang, Thomas R. Boemio, Jason C. Cave and Richard A. 
Jacobs in the USA – and Rolf Steffens, Cyril Courbage, Leonard van Drunen, 
Clive Bull, Robert Rügemer, Paul Rivlin and Caroline Philips in London. Above 
that I would also like to express my special gratitude to the German Team at 
Deutsche Bank’s European Securitisation Group in London (Markus Schaber, 
Swen Mayer, Alex von Trotha, Rolf Steffens, and Sebastian Ottmann), who 
have hosted me in the summer of 2002 and have, thus, laid the foundation for 
my industry knowledge and the application-orientation of this dissertation. In 
this regard my special thanks goes to my friend Sebastian Ottmann, who has 
been my strongest and most important critic with respect to the practical 
applicability of my dissertation. 
Foreword V
Without the ongoing support of the ebs DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE with
its central core Simone Schlager, Brigitte Gruß and Gudrun Würdemann, this
work would never have become such a success. In this respect, I would also
like to thank all of my companions from the Department, who have
accompanied me during my time as research assistant at the EUROPEAN
BUSINESS SCHOOL.
The dissertation time has been a great experience but in parts it has also been
very tough. The reason, why it has always been bearable was that there was a
close group of people that suffered at least as much as I did. For their ongoing
encouragements and advice I would like to thank Markus Mentz, Lutz Niehüser,
Denise Sumpf, Verena Sturm, Christoph Holzmann, Tobi Müller, Vera
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Martina without whom I would never have learnt English well enough to write
this thesis in English. My brother Manuel, who is my closest friend and my
greatest critic (not only in dissertation matters). My parents Dagmar and Peter,
who have made great sacrifices in order to give their children the best
education possible. Without them I would not be where I am today. Last but not
least, my fiancée Sarah, who has not only suffered with me through my thesis,
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Problem 
The sale of receivables as such is relatively old. As far back as 1880, 
companies have sold receivables to each other. However, the transformation of 
receivables into tradable securities, which is described as ‘Securitisation’1 or 
‘Asset-Securitisation’, is a fairly young financial markets innovation.2  
In a classical Securitisation transaction a company sells a part of its – mainly 
homogenous assets – to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that is only created 
for the sake of the transaction. The SPV finances the purchase of the assets 
(usually receivables) by issuing securities on the capital market, which are 
backed by the SPV’s assets. The securities are amortized by the cash flows 
that are derived from the acquired assets.3 
The concept of Asset-Securitisation has its origins in the USA, where Asset-
Backed Securities (ABS) have evolved from Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS).4  The roots of Mortgage-Backed Securities5 in the United States go back 
to the emergence of the secondary mortgage market and the foundation of the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) during the 1930’s.6 The 
first issuance of securities was not until the 1950’s and the MBS market did not 
                                            
1 The spelling of Securiti s ation (Great Britain) and Securiti z ation (US) differs by continent. In 
this thesis the British English spelling is used. 
2 Although Securitisation as a financing product falls into the wider category of structured 
finance products, Securitisation and Asset-Securitisation respectively are nowadays often 
used exchangeable with the term Structured Finance. This thesis will stick to Securitisation or 
Asset-Securitisation. 
3 Cf. Seibert and Plohr (2001), p. B5. 
4 Rosar (2000), p. 5. 
5 In the USA the term Mortgage-Backed Securities usually refers to Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities. There is no generic term for the mortgage related Loan Securitisation, i.e. 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) are a total different asset class than 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS). In Europe the term Mortgage-Backed 
Securities is the generic term for all mortgage related Loan Securitisations including 
residential and commercial mortgage loans. Confer Chapter 4.3.2.1, p. 214. 
6 Cf. Brueggeman and Fisher (2001), p. 495. 
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really take off until the 1970’s.7 The Securitisation of Commercial Mortgage 
Loans into Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) only evolved in 
the mid-1980’s during the Savings & Loans crisis in the US.8 Today the 
secondary market for mortgage loans in the USA is highly developed. Loan 
Securitisation and especially Mortgage-Backed Loan Securitisation9 play a 
decisive role. During the past five years, securitised loans have become the 
major financing instrument to companies.10 
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Figure 1: US Asset-Backed Security Issuance 1982-200311 
Albeit the fact that Asset-Backed Securities as an asset class within Asset-
Securitisation only exists since 1985,12 the new issuance volume in the US has 
risen exponentially from $0.07 bn (1982) to $260 bn (2003).13  
                                            
7 Cf. Falcon (2003), p. 29; Kendall and Fishman (2000), p. 6. 
8 Cf. Baum (2000), p. 45. 
9 Mortgage-Backed Loan Securitisation essentially is the same as Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation. The common terminology in the market is Mortgage-Backed Securities, which 
is semantically wrong, because the asset that is securitised is the interest and principle of a 
mortgage backed real estate loan and not the mortgage alone. In this thesis Mortgage-
Backed Loan Securitisation will be referred to by Mortgage-Backed Securitisation or 
Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
10 Cf. Friedemann (2003), p. 9. 
11 Cf. Erturk, et al. (2004), p. 3. 
12 Even though the terminology differs from region to region, today the term Asset-Backed 
Security stands for both the generic term for all kinds of Asset-Securitisations as well as for an 
asset class within this framework. Cf. Chapter 2.1. 
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The same trend can be observed in many other financial markets around the 
world. Today, Securitisation has become a global structured finance product 
being utilized in countries on all five continents around the world: ranging from 
Australia to Venezuela and beyond.14 The global new issuance volume of 
structured products rose from $47 bn in 1990 to over $530 bn year-end 2002.15 
In Europe, as numbers from Deutsche Bank European Securitisation Research 
indicate, the market for Asset-Backed Securities has also proven to be a similar 
success story. In 1992 the new issuance for all asset classes was at close to $3 
bn and augmented to about $210 bn in 2003; from 2002 to 2003 it came to an 
increase of 30%.16 The market expects yet another increase of total issuance 
volume in 2004, amounting to more than $220 bn.17 
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Figure 2: European Asset-Backed Security Issuance (1992-11/2004)18 
The enormous growth of the market during the last five years can be attributed 
to mainly three things: the amendment of the legal and regulatory framework, 
the growing acceptance in the corporate and the banking market, and the 
                                                                                                                                
13 Cf. Erturk, et al. (2004), p. 2; Rose, et al. (2000), p. 1. These figures do not include single-
issue synthetic transactions, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), or home-equity loans. 
14 Cf. Leamy (2003), p. V; Preston (2001), p. IV. 
15 Excluding MBS; cf. Leamy (2003), p. VIII. 
16 Cf. Weber (2004), p. 3. 
17 Cf. Kullrich (2004), p. 2. 
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transparency of the market that has been brought forward by the rating 
agencies.19  
Apart from that the evolution of the market in Europe was stamped by a 
constant innovation of transaction structures and by unique transactions that 
have constantly opened up the Securitisation market for new asset classes.  
The most diverse asset classes have evolved over time. For example soccer 
clubs like Schalke 04 or Real Madrid have satisfied their financing needs by 
issuing Asset-Backed Securities (ABS).20 There have been a number of exotic 
Whole Business Securitisations (WBS):21 Pubs,22 Motorway Restaurants,23 
Hospital Operators,24 Nursing Home Operators,25 Funeral Homes,26 Ferries,27 
Railway companies,28 Utility Companies,29 Madame Tussauds,30 and Airports31 
like the London City Airports.32 
Characterized by the famous quote: “If it flows, securitize it.”33, today there is 
not one asset class (with predictable cash flows) that is not securitizable and 
that has not been considered for Asset-Securitisation.  
                                                                                                                                
18 Source: Deutsche Bank Securitisation Research Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004a), p. 4; Rajendra, 
et al. (2003), p. 5; Rajendra, et al. (2002), p. 5. 
19 Cf. Sampson (2001), p. 15. 
20 Cf. Dorendorf (2004), p. 21; Miles (2002). 
21 Depending on the rating agency, Whole Business Securitisations are also known as 
‘Corporate Securitisations’ ‘Corporate-Entity Securitisations’, ‘Corporate-Hybrid Transactions’. 
Cf. Bernous, et al. (2004), p. 1. 
22 Cf. Cox, et al. (2004), p. 1. 
23 Cf. Walker (2000), p. 55. 
24 Cf. Anonymous (2002l), p. 48; Katz (2003), p. 55. 
25 Cf. Anonymous (1999z), p. 1. 
26 Cf. Collingridge, et al. (2003), p. 245. 
27 Cf. Walker (2000), p. 55. 
28 Cf. Anonymous (2003p), p. 14. 
29 Cf. Unmack (2002). 
30 Cf. Hay (2000), p. 168. 
31 Cf. Anonymous (1999y), p. 13. 
32 Cf. Hay (2002). 
33 Cf. M. McCoy, Salomon Brothers, quoted from Paul (1994), p. 186. 
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Premier transactions like the Formula One Securitisation have proven the 
notion of the quote above and have demonstrated the various possibilities of 
Asset-Securitisation. The assets underlying the issued securities in the Formula 
One Asset-Backed Bond were future income from licence, advertising and 
merchandising rights originated by the Formula One Company. The only 
collateral was the going concern of the company.34 Another big Securitisation 
was the a ‘work in progress’ deal launched in 2001 by a European shipyard: 
Chantiers de l'Atlantique. The Chantiers de l'Atlantique transaction securitised 
future instalment payments for the delivery of three cruise vessels under 
construction for Royal Caribbean Cruise lines.35 The airport of Rome (Aeroporti 
di Roma) also used Asset-Securitisation, when it refinanced existing bank debt 
by issuing Asset-Backed Securities. The Securities were backed by future 
proceeds of the Rome airport, i.e. take-off and landing fees as well as rental 
income from the airport.36 
The last few years witnessed the growth of what are referred to as ‘Esoteric 
Asset Classes’37 within Asset-Securitisation. The observed expansion of new 
esoteric asset classes underlines the premise that if an asset can generate a 
predictable, steady stream of revenue, it may be a candidate for Asset-
Securitisation.38 
In Europe esoteric inventory Securitisations like the Champagne stock 
Securitisation have helped the structured finance market even up the way for 
the ongoing expansion of this financing instrument.39 Recent issuances of 
                                            
34 Cf. Anonymous (1998e), p. 8; Anonymous (1998f), p. 12; Anonymous (1999t), p. 7. 
35 Cf. Clifford Chance European Securitisation Group (2001), p. 37. 
36 Cf. Weiffenbach and Ghali (2003), p. 248. 
37 Esoteric Securitisations involve new complex asset classes that have traditionally been 
unused, as well as transactions and transaction structures that are very exotic or that will be 
one-time transactions. Cf. Seibert and Plohr (2001), p. B5. 
38 Esoteric Securitisations belong to Asset-Backed Securities i.n.S. These assets include 
municipal tobacco litigation settlements, tobacco lawsuit attorney fees, healthcare receivables, 
aircraft leases, mutual fund fees, trademark licenses, patent-related royalties, insurance-
related premiums, film receivables and music royalties, among others.  Cf. Rosenberg and 
Weiss (2003), p. 111. 
39 The Securitisation of the Champagne stock that was produced, stored and sold by the French 
Groupe Marne et Champagne a.r.l. (M&C) was characterised by one of the most innovative 
structures at that time. Cf. Clifford Chance European Securitisation Group (2001), p. 37. 
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securities collateralised by pools of limited partnership interests in private equity 
funds (Collateralized Fund Obligations – CFOs) have shown that the market 
has reached a very innovative level. This transaction has created growing 
interest among issuers, investors and other market participants in new asset 
classes in order to diversify their risks.40 
The above described examples show that the current development can be 
described as: „What started as true sales of large pools of homogenous assets 
has spread to allow the technique to be used for more diverse, unique asset 
types.“41 This is also true with real estate assets. There could be a whole lot of 
real estate assets, i.e. real estate receivables, real estate sales proceeds, real 
estate development proceeds or the Securitisation of whole buildings that could 
qualify under this definition.42 
And the reason, why this new innovative concept is important for the property 
industry in Europe and especially in Germany is that it seems to be the solution 
to the credit crunch experienced by the industry at the moment. It is aimed at 
providing companies and industry with urgently needed financing, which is 
provided directly from the capital markets.43 
Asset-Securitisation is not entirely new to Germany. As far as the ‘German 
Pfandbrief’ is recognized as a relative form of Asset-Securitisation, the historic 
roots go back to the 18th century, the time as the first Pfandbrief concept was 
invented. The Pfandbrief has been the superior funding instrument for German 
Mortgage Banks ever since. It is similar to a Mortgage-Backed Bond that is 
backed by the issuing institutes balance sheet; it is collateralized by mortgage 
loans that do not go beyond 60% Loan-to-Value. In the case of the bankruptcy 
of the issuing institute the Pfandbrief-Investors take over the mortgage loans 
that are backing the bonds. The difference to Asset-Securitisation is that the 
                                            
40 Cf. D'Souza (2003), p. 10; Flämig (2003a), p. 9. 
41 Patrice Jordan, managing director of global asset-backed securities, Standard & Poor’s, New 
York. Cf. Rose, et al. (2000), p. 1. 
42 Confer Chapter 3, p. 53. 
43 Cf. Hagen (2003), p. 12. 
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assets backing the security are not transferred to a separate Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV).44 
Asset-Securitisation as a general financing tool for corporates has, however, 
only gained momentum during the last three years. This is mainly due to the 
fact that those companies could always pick and choose among many financial 
institutions that were willing to provide financing with high loan-to-value ratios 
and very tight margins. Credit risk has until now been always underestimated.45 
Only with the new Basel Capital Accord (commonly known as Basel II) that will 
be coming into effect in 2006,46 this trend is changing. Banks are pushed to 
raise their margins and to better manage their risks and their credit side.47 Non-
performing loans and high loss provisions have urged the lending institutions to 
change their loan underwriting methods and criteria. 48 
Until 2003, the German banking industry denied the non-performing loan 
problem.49 However, the magnitude of the problem became obvious, when 
expected losses – many resulting from real estate loans – in bank portfolios 
became so high and the built-up pressure on the earnings became so strong 
that banks had to admit to non-performing loans and had to sell large portfolios 
at liquidation values.50 
Since 2003 there have been several portfolio sales of non-performing loans 
including:Sparkasse Görlitz,51 HVB Real Estate,52 Dresdener Bank,53 Delmora 
Bank.54 The German non-performing loan market is dominated by US private 
                                            
44 Cf. Hagen (2003), p. 12; Schiereck and Rauch (2002), p. 174. 
45 Kretschmar and Damaske (2003), p. 22. 
46 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003b), p. 1. 
47 Cf. Hommel and Lehmann (2002), p. 231. 
48 Cf. Anonymous (2003i), p. 1. 
49 Cf. Anonymous (2003c), p. 22. 
50 Cf. Schmid and Maier (2005), p. 19. 
51 Cf. Anonymous (2004j), p. 18. 
52 Cf. Anonymous (2004e), p. 26; Anonymous (2004h), p. 26. 
53 Cf. Anonymous (2004g), p. 19. 
54 Cf. Anonymous (2004g), p. 19. 
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equity firms.55 Lone Star, which acquired about half of the market to date, is the 
biggest player. In 2004, about €10 billion of non-performing loans were sold. 
Lone Star’s expectation for the market in 2005 is to go up to €15 to €20 billion, 
with a total of outstanding non-performing loans that ranges around €250 to 
€300 billion – approximately 5% of all outstanding loans in Germany.56 
Part of the problem for banks was that the risk of the loans never got 
adequately priced into their lending rates. As loans became non-performing, 
banks had to take on large loss provisions that had not been taken into account 
when calculating the loan margins. The latest example is the Hypo 
Vereinsbank, which has admitted to €15 billion of non-performing real estate 
loans, which has led to loss provisions of €2.5 billion.57  
As a result of this overall trend, the lending practice has changed dramatically in 
recent times to the disadvantage of property owners. Higher lending rates and 
lower loan commitments by lending institutions are the consequence. As a 
survey undertaken for this dissertation has shown:58 
• 66% of the surveyed lenders expect a higher lending spread, due to an 
increase in the risk premium; only 32% believe that the lending spreads 
are going to keep steady. 
• 40% of the respondents expect a lower loan commitment, 30% expect 
constant loan commitment and only 28% are willing to commit more 
loans than in the past.  
This trend magnifies the problems of the property industry. While property 
companies are seeking new ways of financing their acquisitions, developments 
or existing holdings, banks – due to Basel II – are increasingly becoming 
restricted in their lending capacities. Hence, the main problem is that property 
                                            
55 Cf. Anonymous (2003k), p. 1; Anonymous (2004f), p. 25. 
56 Cf. Schmid and Maier (2005), p. 19. 
57 Cf. Maier and Hegmann (2005), p. 1. 
58 Confer Chapter 5.1, p. 483. 
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companies are increasingly facing the challenge of getting good and affordable 
financing. The companies are confronted with a credit crunch.59 
Real Estate Securitisation might be the way out of the property companies’ 
financing dilemma and may help diversify their funding base; it could function as 
a means for the disintermediation of real estate lenders and therefore as an 
innovative financing alternative for the property industry.60 The concept of Real 
Estate or Property Securitisation,61 is positioning itself as an alternative-
financing product to classical real estate financing. It could function as a 
substitute for traditional mortgage financing as well as a complementary product 
to enhance traditional financing. For example, if a borrower  is facing restrictive 
financing policies from the banking side, he can directly access the capital 
markets.62 
Summing up the research problem, the dissertation is concerned with property 
companies that are experiencing difficulties to finance their commercial real 
estate. Thus the focus of this dissertation will be on the viability of capital-
markets oriented financing for commercial real estate assets as a substitute or 
a complement to traditional financing (i.e. Real Estate Securitisation). It will be 
derived from an international case study comparison that is subsequently 
applied to the case of Germany. Hence, two sets of subordinate research 
problems can be derived – Property and Asset-Securitisation related research 
problems. 
The property related research problem is summarized in the following: 
• There is a credit crunch observable in Germany. 
• Sources for traditional real estate financing are becoming less. 
• Real estate financing for certain properties will be tougher to achieve 
with the new Basel Capital Accord being implemented into the German 
banking system until 2006. 
                                            
59 Cf. Lorz (2003), p. 7. 
60 Cf. Pickersgill (2001), p. 125. 
61 Real Estate Securitisation and Property Securitisation are exchangeable terms. In order to 
avoid confusion, this thesis will stick to Real Estate Securitisation. 
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• Alternative sources of financing are needed for the property industry. 
The Asset-Securitisation related research problem is delineated below: 
• The Asset-Securitisation universe is expanding, but Real Estate does not 
exist as a separate Securitisation Asset Class, yet. 
• There is no consistent definition of Real Estate Securitisation neither in 
industry nor academic literature. 
• There exists no adequate theoretical research framework for neither 
Real Estate Securitisation nor Asset-Securitisation markets. 
• A Life-cycle model for the evolution of Real Estate Securitisation market 
is missing. 
Concluding this part the main propositions are:  
‘There is no adequate framework for the analysis of Asset-Securitisation 
or Real Estate Securitisation markets.’ 
and 
‘There are no adequate capital market oriented commercial real estate 
financing instruments for property companies in Germany. Nevertheless, 
there is a need for such products, given the external circumstances’.  
Consequently the two research questions that this doctoral thesis is aiming to 
answer are: 
1. What is an adequate framework for Real Estate Securitisation 
markets and how do such markets evolve? 
2. Why has the market for Real Estate Securitisation not evolved in 
Germany, yet, and how can the framework be adjusted to make Real 
Estate Securitisation viable in Germany? 
 
                                                                                                                                
62 Cf. Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 771. 
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1.2 Importance of the Study 
The importance of this research work becomes clear, when one looks at the 
following quote by Dr. Louis Hagen, Managing Director of the Association of 
German Mortgage Banks: 
“Everybody is complaining about credit. Businesses because they cannot get it 
any more, and banks because they have granted too much.”63 
The indications of an upcoming credit crisis in Germany are already 
observable64 but its influence on real estate lending is not yet assessable for the 
German property industry. However, there is a great uncertainty going around 
in the industry and companies are thriving to substitute bank funding by non-
bank funding.65  
Hardly any other banking subject has had such a great influence on such a 
broad section of Germany’s political and business community as have the new 
rules emerging from the new Basel Capital Accord.66 This sensitivity is closely 
tied to the vast significance that borrowed capital, i.e. bank debt, has for the 
German economy. The fear that the funds required for investments will either 
rise sharply in cost or may even become completely unattainable scares 
the German industry. Especially the commercial real estate sector is greatly 
influenced by this, since it has traditionally relied heavily on bank debt. But also 
the rest of the economy relies heavily on loans secured by mortgages (almost 
every other bank loan in Germany is collateralized by mortgages). In 
comparison to the US and the UK, German companies rely a lot more on bank 
lending than on alternative lending sources.67 
The relevance of this circumstance is very well documented Figure 3: 
International Comparison of Capital Markets Financing Utilization. 
                                            
63 Hagen (2003), p. 11. 
64 Even though the Basel Capital Accord does not come into effect until the end of 2006, the 
banks are urged to start following the Basel II Guidelines, if they want to choose the Internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approaches. Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003b), p. 1. 
65 Cf. Wolf (2004).  
66 Cf. Pitschke (2004), p. 273. 
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Figure 3: International Comparison of Capital Markets Financing Utilization68 
In Germany the share of bank loans vis-à-vis capital market financing is up to 
seven times higher than in the UK and about 4 times higher than in the USA. 
71% of all financings are bank financings, whereof mortgage loans make up 
31% and other bank loans make up 40%. Hence, in an international comparison 
Germany is a straggler and is having difficulties to follow the trend from credit to 
capital markets.  
Apart from the effects of Basel II, there are other factors that influence the credit 
commitment of the German Banking System. Traditionally German Banks have 
been very strong in loan underwriting, so that no alternative financing sources 
for debt finance could evolve. So the German Mortgage Banks have not only 
underwritten a lot of loans, but they have also priced those loans so 
competitively that no other instrument could compete.69  
This was only possible because of the Pfandbrief as the primary funding tool. 
This funding tool was a peculiarity of the German mortgage funding market that 
                                                                                                                                
67 Cf. Hagen (2002), p. 41. 
68 Cf. Hagen (2002), p. 41. 
69 Cf. Day and Moore (2003). 
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until the emergence of the UK covered bond market70 only existed in Germany. 
Thus, German banks and especially the Landesbanks (having a government 
guarantee) could always fund their loan commitments at very low rates and this 
explains, why the German real estate borrowing rates were always lower than 
in the neighbouring European countries.71 
So, in the aftermath of the extensive loan-underwriting phase of the 1990’s the 
German banks have lost a lot of money and are today sitting on a huge non-
performing loan exposure that is weighing heavy on their balance sheets.72 
Even though the German banking industry has for a long time not admitted to 
this, the non-performing loan problem in the German banking market is bigger 
than previously expected.73The expected total volume ranges from €100 to € 
300 billion,74 which could be an enormous boost to the Securitisation market, if 
the loans got securitised as in the case of the US.75 
The situation is best described by the following quote:  
“They [the German banks] are looking wounded and their competitive slim 
margins are expected to widen as they look to improve their cost of return on 
equity. Their performance will be further affected by problems of non-performing 
loans at home and regulatory changes, such as the Basel II Accord, which is 
forcing banks to adjust the levels of reserves they are obliged to hold.”76 
Therefore, the increasing cost of capital that German banks are incurring now is 
supporting other forms of lending, like Securitisation.77 But also the lending 
                                            
70 The European covered bond market evolved in the UK and really only exists since 2000. Until 
recently there was not even a legal framework in the UK. Cf. Day (2003), p. 74; Dreesbach 
(2003), p. B6. 
71 Cf. Weber (2003), p. 3. 
72 Cf. Morris (2002), p. 52. 
73 Cf. Anonymous (2003i), p. 1. 
74 Cf. Schmid and Maier (2005), p. 19. 
75 Cf. Anonymous, Die Welt (07 May 2004). 
76 Cf. Anonymous (2003a), p. 35. 
77 Cf. Anonymous (2003a), p. 35. 
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industry is increasingly turning to Securitisation to reduce their loan exposures 
and to lower the regulatory capital required under the Basel Capital Accord.78 
In addition to the effects of Basel II and non-performing loans, the consolidation 
in the German mortgage banking market is also an indicator for rising real 
estate financing margins in the future. Because the competition between the 
mortgage banks is declining, there will be a greater concentration, less 
competition and higher margins will be achievable for the lending institutes.  
Only a few years ago mortgage banks started to consolidate when 
HypoVereinsbank merged three of its mortgage banks to create HVB Real 
Estate. Rheinboden and Allgemeine Hypothekenbank also merged, while 
Eurohypo was formed from the mortgage banking divisions of Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank.79 
An empirical study that was conducted for this dissertation thesis in 2003 came 
to the conclusion that the recognition of the Securitisation and the Real Estate 
Securitisation concept among most German Real Estate Lenders is high; 
nonetheless the understanding of Real Estate Securitisation is quite low. The 
name recognition of Securitisation is very high with 94.1%; however, the market 
penetration of this concept is relatively low with only 37% of the responds 
admitting to use Asset-Securitisation. With Real Estate Securitisation the name 
recognition is also very high – 78.7%, nonetheless the understanding is mixed 
and concentrates on Mortgage-Backed Securities and Pfandbriefe, whereas the 
Securitisation of Real Estate Cash Flows is underrepresented. This leads to the 
conclusion that there is no common definition of this term. Hence, there is a 
need to derive one.80 
Moreover, 40% of the surveyed lenders expected less loan commitment in 2003 
compared to 2002 and even 52% believe that the new Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) will push them to restrict their loan commitments in the future. Given 
this result, it is important for German property companies to diversify their 
                                            
78 Cf. Friedrich (2004), p. B5. 
79 Cf. Anonymous (2003a), p. 35. 
80 Refer to Chapter 5.1. 
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funding sources and to find new ways of financing real estate, in case the bank 
lending capacities will decrease even more.81 
Japan, for example, a couple of years ago were in a similar position that 
Germany is in today. The restructuring of corporate Japan, which has forced 
some companies to adopt a new approach to their real estate holdings, as well 
as the well-documented ‘credit crunch’ caused by the problems engulfing the 
nation’s banks, has also forced many borrowers to look at previously-untried 
funding sources. This has led to a functioning Real Estate Securitisation 
market.82 
The same observations can be made in the three case studies (Singapore, USA 
and Europe) that are analyzed in the international comparison of this thesis. 
1.3 Purpose & Objective 
The focus of this thesis lies on the international comparison of Real Estate 
Securitisation markets in Asia (Singapore), North-America (USA) and Europe. 
As a result of this study, minimum requirements for the evolution of Real Estate 
Securitisation markets will be derived that will be tested for the case of 
Germany. The analysis of the viability of an alternative capital markets oriented 
financing instrument for commercial real estate in Germany will be the product 
of the application of this framework to Germany. 
Hence, the main objectives of this research work are: 
1. To merge the two concepts of Real Estate Finance and Asset-
Securitisation into Real Estate Securitisation and to justify real estate as 
a new asset class within the universe of Asset-Securitisation. 
2. To define Real Estate Securitisation. 
3. To develop a framework for the development of Securitisation Markets in 
general and to deduce a specific framework for the evolution of Real 
Estate Securitisation markets. 
                                            
81 Refer to Chapter 5.1. 
82 Cf. Lewis (2003), p. 196. 
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4. To validate the framework through an international comparison and to 
derive conclusions for the potential evolution of other Real Estate 
Securitisation markets. 
5. To apply the framework to Germany, in order to find out why there is not 
any significant level of Real Estate Securitisation in Germany, yet. 
6. To recommend what has to be done in order to make Real Estate 
Securitisation viable in Germany. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
This part is summarizing the research problem, importance and objective into 
the main hypotheses of the thesis. There are three hypotheses:  
1. A theoretical framework for Securitisation markets exists that is 
internationally valid and that can be applied to Real Estate Securitisation 
markets. Minimum requirements for the evolution of such a market can 
be derived from this framework. 
2. There is a need for Real Estate Securitisation in Germany. 
3. Real Estate Securitisation is viable in Germany. 
The above described hypotheses and coherences will be examined during the 
course of the dissertation thesis. 
1.5 Research Theory 
1.5.1 Research Approach 
The present thesis' appreciation of science derives from the perspective of the 
Applied Sciences/Application-oriented Science: 
 “Ich verstehe darunter die Tätigkeit von Hunderttausenden von 
wissenschaftlich gebildeten Menschen, die darauf gerichtet ist, mit Hilfe von 
Erkenntnissen der theoretischen oder Grundlagenwissenschaften Regeln, 
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Modelle und Verfahren für praktisches Handeln zu entwickeln, - für ein Handeln 
also, das man als <<wissenschaftsgeleitete Praxis>> bezeichnen kann.”83 
Applied Science or Application-oriented Science, as described by Hans Ulrich in 
the above quote, relates to research done by thousands of researchers that use 
cognition from fundamental research to generate rules, models and methods for 
practice, i.e. this can be called science-oriented practice. 
In applied science, new knowledge and solutions for practice is generated with 
the aid of knowledge from the fundamental or theoretical sciences as well as 
from practical experiences. Despite the fact that a strong scientific orientation 
towards application differs significantly from the perspectives of fundamental 
sciences and general practice, it remains connected with both and thus, can be 
classified in between (Figure 4: Classification of Applied Research ).84 
Figure 4: Classification of Applied Research 85 Own translation
The research process commits to several rules associated with different types 
of sciences. These differ according to the underlying research object and the 
research aim. Ulrich and Hill (1976) differentiate the sciences according to the 
following principles: the nascence and type of problems, research contribution, 
aspired propositions or statements, research regulative and research criteria 
(Figure 5). On the one hand, fundamental sciences, such as chemistry and 
physics, aim at developing explanatory models based on the objective reality 
under scrutiny. Applied sciences or application-oriented sciences, such as 
                                            
83 Ulrich (1984), p. 200. 
84 Cf. Thommen and Achleitner (2003), p. 50. 
85 Cf. Thommen and Achleitner (2003), p. 52. 
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sociology and education science, on the other hand, take practice as the 
constitutive starting point for their study of possible realities.86 
 
Figure 5: System of Sciences according to Ulrich and Hill87  
Relating the research problem derived in Chapter 1.1 to the application-oriented 
research approach of social science that has been described above, the 
following research criteria can be delineated:88 
Origin of Research Problem 
The problems tackled by application-oriented research origin out of the practical 
world, i.e. they originate outside the scientific world. The same holds true for the 
                                            
86 Cf. Ulrich (1981), p. 10. 
87 Cf. Ulrich and Hill (1976), p. 305. 
88 In the following mainly confer to Ulrich (1981), p. 1; Ulrich (1982), p. 1; Ulrich (1995), p. 167; 
Ulrich (1995), p. 179. 
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research problem underlying this dissertation. In this respect the central 
problem is not characterised by the validity of hypotheses or legalities or a 
theory per se, but the concrete applicability of different courses of action and 
models for applying science-conducted actions to the practical world. 
Use of Research 
The proposition of application-oriented science is to create cognition as well as 
methods, models and rules, which have a practical relevance and use.89 This 
thesis contributes to the practical world in such a way that it applies the 
financing method of Asset-Securitisation to the field of real estate financing. The 
resulting concept of Real Estate Securitisation is analysed on an international 
level (by the use of case studies) and subsequently applied to the case of 
Germany. The practical problem is that the German real estate financing 
environment is momentarily inflicted by a credit crunch and alternative ways of 
financing are needed. 
Value Judgement  
For Ulrich, the social science is essentially confronted with the problem of value 
judgements. Research guidance on utility criteria is always linked to judgements 
and interpretations of the researcher that uses them continuously during the 
course of his research. Hence, this piece of research includes inseparably 
normative elements, because it is conducted by a human and it is aimed at 
giving advice to economic agents. 90 
Interdisciplinarity 
The problems of acting subjects are a-disciplinary and do not orient themselves 
along the lines of fundamental science categories. Application-oriented 
research is, hence, directed at interdisciplinarity.91 This dissertation follows this 
perception, as it relates to social science as well as to cognitions from business 
studies with respect to the field of real estate. 
                                            
89 Cf. Ulrich (1981), p. 15. 
90 Cf. Ulrich (1995), p. 161. 
91 Cf. Ulrich (1982), p. 1. 
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The scientific discipline that creates the framework for this dissertation is the 
field of real estate, which is based on a broad and interdisciplinary approach 
founded by Graaskamp (USA) and Schulte (Germany).92 In their understanding 
of real estate, the core of real estate studies (“Immobilienökonomie”)93 is the 
explanation and composition of real life decisions of economic agents dealing 
with real estate. The interdisciplinarity results out of the openness of real estate 
studies to other scientific disciplines besides business studies and social 
science, such as economics, legal studies, spatial planning, architecture and 
civil engineering. Business studies are still the foundation for real estate 
studies, however, given the multi-dimensional character of real estate, a sole 
orientation at business and finance would stay short of a comprehensive 
cognition. 
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Figure 6: The House of Real Estate94 Own translation 
                                            
92 Cf. Graaskamp (1991), p. 40; Schulte and Schäfers (2005), p. 52. 
93 Prof. Dr. Karl-Werner Schulte, HonRICS is the pioneer of real estate education in Germany. 
He has been the founder of the house of real estate and the train of thought that has 
constructed and defined real estate (Immobilienökonomie) as an academic discipline in 
Germany. For a deeper appreciation of this achievement confer Schulte and Schäfers (2005), 
p. 49. 
94 Cf. Schulte and Schäfers (2005), p. 58. 
1.5  Research Theory 21 
 
With respect to the multi-dimensionality of real estate, the “House of Real 
Estate”, which was invented in 1993 to demonstrate the complexity and 
interdisciplinarity of real estate studies, shows that cognitions from the other 
scientific disciplines cannot be adopted without any adaptations relating to the 
problems resulting out of an interdisciplinary context. However, in contrary, real 
estate studies may have an effect on research and cognition of the 
neighbouring disciplines. 
The aim of real estate as an academic discipline is to explain and to support 
decision processes by supplying application-oriented solutions that result in 
enhancements for practical problems.95 In this problem-oriented fashion, real 
estate studies scrutinize premises and pre-conditions under which real estate 
institutions, objects, functions and processes interact with respect to real estate 
as a whole. In this context the self-understanding of applied science urges the 
process to not only explain reality (objective input), but also to implement 
recommendations for management decisions (subjective input).96 
Real estate as an academic discipline illuminates all kinds of management, 
institutional, and typological aspects of real estate. The ‘House of Real Estate’ 
arranges and demonstrates the overall composition of all aspects. In this 
dissertation the following aspects are under scrutiny (as highlighted in Figure 6): 
1. Management Aspects 
a. Real Estate Finance 
b. Real Estate Investment 
2. Institutional Aspects 
a. Real Estate Developers 
b. Real Estate Investors 
c. Real Estate Financial Institutions 
3. Typological Aspects 
                                            
95 Cf. Schäfers (1997), p. 5. 
96 Cf. Rottke (2004), p. 6. 
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a. Commercial Real Estate 
b. Residential (Income-Producing) Real Estate 
c. Industrial Real Estate 
d. Special Real Estate 
The focus of this dissertation, as outlined in the previous parts of this Chapter, 
is the field of real estate finance. The concept of real estate finance and Asset-
Securitisation are merged into Real Estate Securitisation, which represents a 
capital market oriented form of financing for the property industry. The resulting 
securities that are issued into the market are backed by all sorts of real estate 
assets. Hence, these Real Estate Asset-Backed Securities represent real estate 
investment alternatives for investors. Thus, real estate investment is the flip-
side of the Real Estate Securitisation coin. Therefore, Real Estate Securitisation 
relates to real estate finance as well as to real estate investment. However, as 
the field of real estate finance is the primary field of interest in this thesis, real 
estate investment only takes on a minor role in the analysis. 
Out of the management aspects result the institutional and typological aspects. 
The involved parties are real estate investors that are seeking the most efficient 
form of financing for their investments, real estate developers that are seeking 
funding for their development projects, and real estate financial institutions that 
may be disintermediated by Real Estate Securitisation, but that may, however, 
stay involved by becoming the arranger for such transactions. 
The typological aspects are all touched by this thesis as Real Estate 
Securitisation is not limited to just one property type. All property types offer 
potential for Securitisation, as long as they are income-producing, and thus 
incur stable and steady cash flows. 
1.5.2 Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this dissertation thesis is case study 
research. For validating the research framework and to develop theory about 
the construction and evolution of Real Estate Securitisation markets, three 
different markets (case studies) are surveyed (Singapore, USA, Europe). 
Justification 
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Case studies are a valid and necessary research tool and can be used to 
develop or test theory.97 As a research method it is generally defined as 
follows:98  
1. A method within social science research. 
2. It belongs to qualitative research strategies. 
3. It documents and illustrates real world events. 
4. Case study research is the right method to apply, if: 
a. The complexity of the research topic is high and multi-dimensional 
(e.g. Constitution and evolution of Asset- and Real Estate 
Securitisation markets) 
b. Primarily qualitative and subjective issues are considered  
c. The result of the issue is only measurable through the 
combination of several measurement results  
d. The issue is mostly unstructured and un-formalized  
e. Inductive-positivistic insight gaining process seems reasonable 
f. How and why: ex-post-analysis of evolution factors   
g. The typical case is representative, not the statistical notion 
Many of these attributes of the adequacy of case study research apply to the 
topic of the underlying thesis. The approach is qualitative, due to the lack of a 
model for Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation markets and the lack of 
available quantitative data. 
Adaptation to the underlying thesis 
The main rationale for using case study research is that the reality is too 
complex for simplified quantitative methods of aggregate behaviour. The 
concept of Real Estate Securitisation is too complex so that it cannot be 
grasped by the available data. The thesis is seeking to create an in-depth 
analysis of the inception, evolution and state of existence of Real Estate 
                                            
97 Cf. Eisenhardt (1989), p. 532; Jensen, et al. (1989), p. 3; Tufano (2001), p. 179. 
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Securitisation markets. In this context, the theoretical research model formed 
for Asset-Securitisation markets in general and Real Estate Securitisation 
markets in specific tries to explain the relevant market including the 
environments, the forces working on the environments, the actors and 
relationships between those economic agents. The aim is “to identify how 
forces and actors interact to produce outcomes.”99 
A case is “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context”.100 In 
this respect, three geographic locations are chosen (Singapore, USA, Europe) 
to come to a generalized evolution model. Thereby this dissertation is 
developing new theory about the evolution, drivers, environments and core 
determinants of Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation markets. The cases have 
been selected by representative selection criteria – each case study represents 
one market from each continent (Asia, North-America, Europe) that has 
developed a Real Estate Securitisation market. All markets have been surveyed 
in the same format and all markets followed a specific evolution process. Thus, 
the evolution model can be generalized and its the findings can be extended 
beyond the immediate case studies, so that it can be applied to the case of 
Germany.101 
Data Gathering 
Data gathering methods that can be applied in a case study research are 
comprised of:102  
1. Observations 
2. Interviews 
3. Document review and content analysis 
Hence, the data gathering process for this dissertation was also structured in 
this way. The first step for the empirical field work executed for this dissertation 
                                                                                                                                
98 Cf. Meyer (2003), p. 477. 
99 Lizieri (2003), p. 2. 
100 Lizieri (2003), p. 2. 
101 Cf. Lizieri (2003), p. 2. 
102 Cf. Mayer (2002), p. 34; Stake (1995), p. 114. 
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was an observation of the relevant market.103 The next step in the process were 
exploratory interviews that were executed with industry professionals in 2002. 
Out of the observation and the exploratory interviews resulted the research 
framework and the outline of this dissertation, which in turn lead to the 
composition of structured interviews. Those structured interviews were 
executed in 2003 in three locations: Singapore, USA and Europe.104 
1.6 Outline of the Research 
After delineating the research problems, the research questions, the importance 
and objectives of the research in the first chapter of the dissertation thesis, the 
second chapter goes into principles and fundamentals of Asset-Securitisation. 
The third chapter defines and differentiates Real Estate Securitisation. This part 
combines real estate related issue with Asset-Securitisation related principles 
into the concept of Real Estate Securitisation. In this respect, the thesis builds 
up a theoretical research framework for the analysis of Securitisation markets 
and the derivation of minimal requirements for the evolution of a Real Estate 
Securitisation market. It defines the different environments influencing the 
market and it classifies the three determinants of Real Estate Securitisation – 
Assets, Borrowers (Sellers/Originators/Sponsors)105 and Motives. 
Because no adequate research framework exists, yet, an international 
comparison (empirical study 1) including Asia (Singapore), North-America 
(USA) and Europe will be conducted in Chapter 4. This chapter will be 
subdivided into sub-chapters relating to the identified research framework: first 
the relevant market will be displayed, then the environments will be analysed 
and then core determinants will be identified for the specific markets. The 
purpose of this part of the study is to validate the research framework and to 
derive a Real Estate Securitisation Evolution Model (patterns, drivers, typical 
                                            
103 The observation of the relevant market was done through an internship at Deutsche Bank in 
London, which at the time had the biggest Asset-Securitisation group in Europe. 
104 A transcript of the structured interviews is attached in the appendix of this dissertation, p. 
547. 
105 There is a definition difference between seller, originator and sponsor, but in any case what 
is meant by any of these terms is the company that seeks financing, i.e. the borrower. 
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environments, typical determinants, minimum evolution requirements). This part 
will analyze the  typical determinants: the typical borrowers, the assets that they 
own or control and the motives they have concerning their real estate financing 
decisions. 
Subsequently, the results out of the international comparison will be applied to 
the case of Germany in Chapter 5. For this Chapter another empirical study will 
be examined (lender survey – empirical study 2). The lender survey was 
conducted with the 205 biggest real estate financing institutes in Germany 
(carried out in 2003). This was done to analyze the lenders’ perspectives of real 
estate financing, the implications of Basel II on real estate lending, and the 
impact on Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation. The results of 
the conducted survey, together with the analysis of the actual real estate 
financing environment, will be the empirical evidence that clarifies the need to 
create a feasible framework for Real Estate Securitisation in Germany. 
The following part will subsequently test the minimum requirements derived in 
Chapter 4.5.4 against the German framework for Securitisation. The summary 
of this analysis will depict obstacles and problems. After that, the thesis will hint 
at potential solutions, i.e. laws and regulations that have to be changed to 
create a viable framework in Germany. 
The dissertation thesis will close with a conclusion and outlook. The outline is 
summarized in the following illustration (Figure 7: Conceptual Dissertation 
Outline). 
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Figure 7: Conceptual Dissertation Outline 
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2 Fundamentals of Asset-Securitisation 
This chapter intends to lay the foundation for the analysis in the later chapters 
of this thesis. It shall give an overview about the basics and fundamentals of 
Asset-Securitisation. 
2.1 Defining Principles 
The definition for Asset-Securitisation in industry as well as academic literature 
is quite precise, whereas there is no clear definition of Real Estate 
Securitisation and how it differs from Mortgage-Backed (Loan) Securitisation. 
There exist different definitions in literature about Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities (CMBS), but those are mainly US-stamped and do not 
principally overlap with Real Estate Securitisation. However, the European 
definition of CMBS partly incorporates transactions that fit into the definition of 
Real Estate Securitisation. Hence, overlapping between Real Estate ABS and 
CMBS can be observed.106 
In Europe the defining terms for asset classes and transaction structures have 
evolved over time and are constantly changing, coined by industry needs. An 
empirical study conducted with the biggest 205 German credit institutes showed 
that a lot of people talk about Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation, but 
only few people can really define it.107 Therefore, there is no clarity, especially 
because European academic literature in this field is limited. 
2.1.1 Structured Finance 
The generic term for all Asset-Backed Security i.n.S., Collateralized Debt 
Obligation, Residential Mortgage-Backed Security and Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Security transactions in Europe is Asset-Securitisation or Asset-Backed 
Securities.  
                                            
106 Cf. Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 757. 
107 Refer to Chapter 5.1. 
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In the US the differentiation of terms is different than in Europe or Asia. Here 
the generic term under which everything can be summarized is Structured 
Finance. Most departments in US investment banks are organized in that way. 
The department is called Structured Finance Group and they deal with 
everything from ABS to CDO to CMBS (including Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation).108 
Securitisation or Asset-Securitisation is a form of structured finance. Structured 
finance also encompasses project finance, some types of equipment and cross-
border finance, and some other kinds of secured financing. One can also argue 
that certain types of derivatives would fit into the structured finance category. 
Examples would include structured medium-term notes and structured credit 
products that use credit derivatives such as synthetic collateralized debt 
obligations and credit-linked notes.109 
The common theme in a structured finance transaction is that the risk of the 
collateral somehow is modified or redistributed among different classes of 
investors by the use of a structure. Securitisation is primarily concerned with 
monetizing financial assets in such a way that the risk is tied primarily to their 
repayment, rather than to the performance of a particular project or entity.110 
2.1.2 Asset-Securitisation 
Asset-Securitisation can be defined as a process of packaging individual 
receivables, loans and other debt instruments, converting the package into a 
security or securities, and enhancing their credit status or rating to further their 
sale to third-party investors.111 The process converts illiquid individual assets 
(receivables or debt instruments), which cannot be sold readily to third-party 
investors into liquid, marketable securities. This creates a secondary market for 
the underlying receivables and other various illiquid assets.112 Each pool is 
backed by specific collateral rather than by the general obligation of the issuing 
                                            
108 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
109 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2003), p. 1. 
110 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 6. 
111 Cf. Raikes (2003), p. 34. 
112 Cf. Achleitner (2003), p. 413. 
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corporation. Investors purchase a proportionate share of the assets and the 
bundle of rights linked to the assets, not a general obligation typical for 
traditional corporate debt.113 
In short, Asset-Securitisation is the issuance of debt certificates that are 
secured by cash flows (receivables) from different kinds of assets. Hence the 
issued securities are called “Asset-Backed Securities” (ABS).114 
Thereby Securitisation or Asset-Securitisation is the generic term for any kind of 
Asset-, Loan- or Receivable-Securitisation.115 It is derived from the word 
security, because illiquid and sometimes even intangible assets that generate a 
constant cash flow are formed into a tradable security and are floated on the 
debt market. 116 
Securitisation as a financing product belongs to the group of structured finance 
products that summarizes various kinds of products that are innovative and 
require a fair amount of transaction structuring. In general Asset-Securitisation 
has similar characteristics to Asset-Factoring. There is also a true sale, which 
creates funding, however the purchase of the assets is not refinanced over the 
capital markets, but over the balance sheet of the buyer (factor).117  
Since Asset-Securitisations are complex structures that must create bankruptcy 
remote Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), there always has to be some sort of 
security in case the originator goes bankrupt, or the contracts that are the basis 
for future cash flows are not adhered to.118 
2.1.3 Asset Classes 
In the normal case of a receivable Securitisation the security for the transaction 
are the securitised assets themselves, i.e. the receivables. This is possible, 
because usually the underlying pool of debtors is very large and the debtors are 
                                            
113 Cf. Kendall (2000), p. 1. 
114 Cf. Kürn (1997), p. 17. 
115 The term Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) also functions as a generic term for all kinds of 
Asset-Securitisations. Cf. Kendall (2000), p. 2. 
116 Cf. Büttner (1999), p. 24. 
117 Cf. Bigus (2000), p. 465. 
118 Cf. Hug (2000), p. 57. 
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spread over various industries and regions. Consequently the probability of 
default is very low. However, in transactions that involve future cash flows such 
future lease receivables, that result out of contractual relationships with a higher 
degree of uncertainty and therefore higher default risk, additional collateral is 
required. On the loan Securitisation side, there can either be Securitisations of 
unsecured corporate loans (e.g. Collateralised Debt Obligations), where the 
credit of the borrowers, the loan agreements and the pooling diversification 
effectively function as the security for the investors, or there can be 
Securitisations of secured loans (e.g. Mortgage-Backed Securities), where the 
assets (the interest and principle of loans) are enhanced by additional collateral, 
such as a mortgage. 
Asset-Backed Securities 
The term Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) comprises securities and certificates 
of indebtedness representing payment claims against a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) established solely for the purposes of the ABS-transaction. The payment 
claims are ‘backed’ by a pool of ‘assets’, which are transferred to the special 
purpose vehicle and serve as security, largely for the benefit of the ABS-
Investors.119 
A comprehensive global definition for asset classes within the universe of 
Asset-Securitisation does not exist. There are three different main asset classes 
observable within Asset-Securitisation. Until now it is mainly Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (MBS), Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO) and Asset-Backed 
Securities in the narrower sense (ABS i.n.S.). However, but as the 
Securitisation market is mainly driven by innovation of new Asset-
Securitisations, the universe of asset classes is further expanding. The reason 
why it is defined as ABS i.n.S. is that the term Asset-Backed Security in Europe 
also functions as the generic term for all kinds of Asset-Securitisations. The 
asset classes shown below subdivide themselves into further sub-asset 
classes: Commercial MBS (CMBS), Residential MBS (RMBS), Collateralised 
                                            
119 Cf. Gehring (1999), p. 1. 
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Loan Obligations (CLO), Collateralised Bond Obligations (CBO) and other types 
of ABS that are backed by a range of different receivables as shown below.120 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) are mainly bank-originated securities that 
are backed by a pool of either residential or commercial mortgage loans. These 
securities therefore represent payment claims against an SPV that are backed 
by a pool of secured loans, i.e. mortgages that comprise cash flows from real 
estate loans. In short these securities represent derivative real estate cash 
flows.121 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) are securities that are backed 
by one or more pools of mortgage loans. CMBS are backed by loans secured 
by commercial properties, which may include multifamily housing complexes, 
shopping centres, industrial parks, office buildings, and hotels.122 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities are mainly bank-originated securities 
that represent payment claims against an SPV that are backed by a pool of 
secured loans, i.e. mortgages that comprise cash flows from real estate 
loans.123 In short these securities represent derivative real estate cash flows 
originated by banking institutions, whereas Real Estate Asset-Backed 
Securities represent original cash flows originated by non-banks, i.e. 
Corporates and Governments. This is explained in the next part. 
 
                                            
120  Cf. Skelton and Dornhofer (2004), p. 1; Taylor (2004), p. 2; Vrensen and Toft (2004), p. 3. 
121 Cf. Herrmann (2002), p. 175. 
122 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2003), p. 7. 
123 Cf. DeMichele and Adams (1999), p. 73. 
2.1  Defining Principles 33 
 
 
Figure 8: Differentiation of Asset-Classes with in Asset-Securitisation in Europe124 
Source: Authors Compilation 
                                            
124  Cf. Seymour (2004a), p. 1. 
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Real Estate Securitisation 
Broadly, any asset, which produces a predictable and dependable income 
stream or receivable, can be securitised. Because income will be required to 
service interest payments due on the securities, the existence of a steady or 
predictable income stream is a fundamental requirement. This holds true for 
real estate.125 
However, until now Real Estate Securitisation is not considered to be a part of 
the Asset-Securitisation universe. While there is no common and recognized 
definition of Real Estate or Property Securitisation,126 the underlying 
dissertation defines it as the Securitisation of real estate assets, i.e. real 
property or real estate receivables. Real Estate Securitisation comprises of the 
Securitisation of current and future real estate cash flows and receivables, as 
well as the Securitisation of property values (e.g. in the form of the real estate 
itself). The securities that represent the claims against the SPV that holds the 
real estate assets are referred to as Real Estate Asset-Backed Securities (RE 
ABS).127 
In short Real Estate Securitisation describes the financing of property through 
the Securitisation of real estate cash flows and property values without the bank 
as a lending intermediary. However, the bank will take part in the transaction, 
not as the lending institution, but as the arranger of the financing. Therefore the 
bank is not going to commit valuable equity. It will only earn the structuring fees. 
In this constellation the lending spread can be distributed between the 
originator, the arranger and the investors.128 
Whilst it is probably fair to say that the majority of Real Estate-Backed 
Securitisations are supported by mortgages loans, the market in Europe is 
seeing more and more transactions, which are based on real estate cash flows. 
                                            
125 Cf. Pickersgill (2001), p. 125. 
126 Real Estate Securitisation and Property Securitisation are exchangeable terms. In order to 
avoid confusion in this thesis only Real Estate Securitisation will be used. 
127 Cf. Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 771. 
128 Cf. Schulte, et al. (2002), p. 780. 
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Hence, the cash flows from the actual real estate are being securitised and not 
the cash flows from the real estate loans.129 
There were already several Real Estate Securitisations in Europe during the 
past 7 years, some in Italy and France, but most of them in the United Kingdom. 
The assets included: 
• Student Accommodation (Unite Finance One, Owengate Keele – UK). 
• Shopping Centres (Trafford Centre - UK) 
• Supermarket Chains (Sainsbury’s, Marks & Spencer’s - UK) 
• Government and Corporate Apartments (Annington - UK, Powerhouse 
Finance – France, SCIP I &II - Italy) 
2.2 The typical Asset-Securitisation Process 
2.2.1 A Generalized Transaction Structure 
Asset Backed Securities are complex financing tools, that originate cash flow 
and that create complicated transaction structures. It is this complexity, as well 
as the many involved parties that make the understanding of those transactions 
very difficult. Each Asset-Securitisation requires a ‘Taylor-Made Structure’. In 
this respect the arranger/sponsor has to take all the specific characteristics of 
the transaction into account, i.e. the originators’ needs, the assets that are to be 
securitised and the specific national regulatory and legal peculiarities. The 
range of assets, which are being securitised, continues to grow, however the 
concepts are generally the same, no matter what the underlying asset. 
Therefore this chapter will introduce a basic model structure that is similar 
across nearly every ABS transaction.130 
Starting point of an Asset-Securitisation are the assets that are to be 
securitised. These can be a multitude of different assets as they have been 
defined above. However, most of the time the securitised assets can be related 
to some kind of a receivable of a creditor towards a multitude of different 
                                            
129 Cf. Vrensen (2003a), p. 1. 
130 Cf. Bhattacharya and Fabozzi (1996), p. 1. 
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debtors. From these receivables there arise financial obligations, i.e. future 
cash flows of the debtor towards the creditor. In the following we will just refer to 
them as assets in general. The owner and seller of the assets is called the 
“originator” of the Securitisation.131 
To a transaction structure, there are usually two sides, the structural side and 
the operational side. In general the features of the structural side are essential 
for the process until the issuance of the securities, whereas the operational 
features are important for the functioning of the transaction in the time 
thereafter and until maturity. At the beginning of the transaction the originator 
will assign an arranger/sponsor that is in charge of putting the transaction 
together. First, the arranger sets up a transaction specific special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) on a nearly non-recourse basis. Simultaneously the arranger will 
assign the different parties involved, i.e. the Rating Agencies (which are, 
besides the arranger the most important party in the process), the Lead 
Manager / Issuer, the Credit Enhancers (Banks and Monoline Insurers), the 
Trustee and the Service Agent. Together with all of them the transaction 
structure will be put into place.132 
The first step in the transaction process is that the originator sells the assets 
that are to be securitised to the established SPV. The SPV is specifically 
founded for this one transaction and cannot be used for other transactions. 
Subsequently the SPV pools the assets, which will be the backing for the issued 
securities, as the term Asset-Backed Securities implies. The SPV should be a 
legally and economically independent entity that is incorporated in a mainly 
restriction-free and tax-neutral legal system. It should be an independent entity 
that is supplied with a minimum of equity; it is usually a trust that is incorporated 
in some offshore banking environment (e.g. Cayman Islands, Jersey, Curacao 
or Ireland). The sole purpose of the SPV is the purchase of assets and their 
refinancing. The SPV refinances itself by issuing ABS-papers on the capital 
markets.133 
                                            
131 Cf. Hug (2000), p. 35. 
132 Cf. Böhmer (1996), p. 30. 
133 Cf. Galvin (2003), p. 257; Moon (2003), p. 348; Pascoe and Adams (2003), p. 344. 
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Figure 9: Subdivision of Assets-Classes including Real Estate Securitisation 
Source: Authors Compilation 
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The issuance takes place in cooperation with a bank consortium (Lead 
Manager / Issuer) that is mostly comprised of investment banks, commercial 
banks or both. The bank consortium places the securities with mostly 
institutional investors. The cash flows from the asset-pool are subsequently 
used to pay interest and principal to the investors. The asset portfolio can, but it 
does not have to be the only underlying collateral for this transaction. The asset 
could for instance be a portfolio of loans and a supplement collateral could be 
the mortgages that are used to secure the loans; or the asset could be real 
estate rental cash flows that are secured by the underlying real estate itself as 
additional collateral. The transaction will be enhanced by credit enhancement 
measures (internal and external).134 
The involved rating agencies are in charge of the quality rating of the security, 
by examining the securitised assets and by testing the transaction structure. In 
general, the rating agencies provide the ABS transaction with a high rating, 
because of the high quality and the diversification of the assets. The investors 
take on the credit risk of the securitised assets, which is the key concept of 
Asset-Securitisation. However, in order to get a good rating, which is necessary 
for the originator to be able to place the issuance, credit enhancement 
measures are required to make the issued papers more attractive for investors. 
This makes it a distinctive feature of ABS, unlike corporate bonds, which are not 
secured.135 
A variety of internal and/or external credit supports are employed to increase 
the likelihood that investors will receive the cash flows to which they are 
entitled. Internal credit enhancements are subordination, over-collateralisation, 
excess spread accounts, reserve funds, whereas external credit enhancements 
are third-party or parental guarantees, Letters of Credit (LOC), Cash Collateral 
Accounts or the assent to repurchase the asset by the originator.136 
During the operational term of the transaction the asset portfolio has to be 
serviced. The service agent takes on this task. For the security of the investors 
                                            
134 Cf. Lindtner (2001), p. 12. 
135 Cf. Michaud (1996), p. 269. 
136 Cf. Fabozzi and Bhattacharya (1996), p. 1; Hsu and Mohebbi (1996), p. 277. 
2.2  The typical Asset-Securitisation Process  39 
 
an independent trustee is being appointed with the obligation to supervise the 
transaction and the following payments. He has the priority right to access the 
asset pool of the SPV. Moreover he responsible for the servicing of the main 
account and the transmission of cash flows to the investors.  
2.2.2 Participants in a Securitisation Transaction 
As explained in the previous chapter an ABS transaction involves many parties. 
Each party has different tasks and motives, it is important to understand what 
they do and why they do it. Therefore the following paragraph will go deeper 
into the tasks of the different participants:137 
Originator/Borrower/Seller 
The originator of an ABS transaction can be a bank or a corporate or the federal 
government of a country. The governments however have just only recently 
started to use the Securitisation technique as a financing tool to lower their 
deficits. The originator sells a part of its illiquid assets including all collateral 
attached to those assets on a non-recourse basis to an SPV. The assets have 
to be chosen using certain criteria that will be explained in a later part of the 
paper. Most of the time the originator also takes on the tasks of the “Servicer”, 
since he has originated the assets. 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
The task of the Special Purpose Vehicle is to buy the assets that the originator 
has generated in its business operations (e.g. receivables) or other fixed assets 
(e.g. real estate) that the originator wants to dispose of. It structures the assets 
and pays the originator a certain price for his assets. Then it refinances the 
purchase price by placing securities (“notes”) privately with institutional 
investors or publicly by offering the notes on the capital market. The notes are 
served by the cash flows of the assets upon which they are based. The assets 
are also available to the holders of the securities as a basis for liability 
(collateral). In the case of receivables for instance, the purchase price of the 
assets is based on the present value of the receivables portfolio minus the 
structuring costs. 
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The use of an SPV is critical to the creation of ABS, because the SPV stands 
between the originator of the underlying assets and the issuer of the securities. 
The key structural feature of an SPV, which enables it to insulate the trust form 
the originator, is bankruptcy remoteness. This is normally achieved by a true 
sale of the assets to the SPV by the originator. This means that the originator 
no longer has ownership rights to the assets, such that a trustee in bankruptcy 
of the sponsor would be unable to recover the assets or their proceeds. As a 
result, the ABS-issuing trust’s ability to pay interest and principal should remain 
intact even if the originator were to go bankrupt. 
Bankruptcy remoteness, along with certain other aspects of the SPV’s and 
trust’s structures and the extra support provided by credit enhancement 
measures, enable the ABS transaction to receive its own credit rating, 
independent of that of the originator. This is important for investors, because 
the originator may well have a lower credit rating than the rating carried by most 
ABS. 
Arranger/Sponsor 
The arranger sets up and administrates the SPV. Moreover his tasks include 
the structuring of the transaction and the coordination of the different parties 
that are involved in the deal. He determines the legal, credit enhancement and 
cash flow structures, and chooses the rating agencies. Most of the time 
Investment Banks function as Sponsors of ABS transactions; however some 
Corporates have their own divisions and subsidiaries that sponsor transactions 
(e.g. GE Capital). 
Service-Agent / Servicer 
The servicer is in charge of the debit accounting and to send reminders to the 
debtors. He takes care of the timely submission of incoming cash flows to the 
trustee. The servicer has to regularly account for his activities that are linked to 
the transaction. 
Trustee 
                                                                                                                                
137 Cf. Büttner (1999), p. 20; Rosar (2000), p. 15. 
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The trustee is the intermediary between the service agent and the investor. 
Usually the trustee is called into the transaction to secure the interests of the 
investors. The trustee regularly receives the payments from the service agent 
onto specific trustee accounts on previously specified dates. Depending on the 
payment structure of the ABS transaction the trustee pays out the cash flows 
directly to the investors or he invests the money until the next pre-specified 
interest and principal payment date. This way cash flows can be adjusted to the 
needs of the investors. 
Investor 
Generally the originator of an Asset-Securitisation has an information 
advantage towards other involved parties. These information asymmetries 
cause an inefficient investment decision on behalf of the investor. The agents 
on the capital market solve this problem by signalling the quality of the 
transaction. One part of this signalling game is the involvement of rating 
agencies as an independent third party. Through the use of the transaction 
rating, the originator can show the quality of his issuance by qualifying the 
issued securities for certain standardized rating classes. Institutional investors 
are used to base their investment decision on such ratings and therefore the 
rated notes have a high probability of being placed. 
Rating Agencies 
Rating is the risk and quality assessment of issues, issuers, debt, debtors, 
receivables, creditors and other assets. The rating agencies’ task is to screen 
and evaluate the full transaction and the involved parties. In the case of an 
Asset-Securitisation they determine if the issuer is legally and economically 
able to fulfil the requirements that are laid upon him by the issuance of the 
notes in time and to the full satisfaction of the investor. The quality of the 
transaction is determined by classifying the ABS rating in the usual bond rating 
letter scheme (e.g. ‘AAA’ for the best quality in an S&P rating). Three rating 
agencies exist that are able to do the ABS rating: Moody’s Investor Service 
(„Moody’s”), Standard & Poor’s („S & P’s“) und Fitch IBCA. Usually two out of 
the three agencies are chosen to work out an independent rating for the ABS 
issue. 
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2.2.3 Term vs. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduit Securitisations 
There are two different types of Securitisations depending on the maturity of the 
paper issued: Term Securitisations (maturity longer than 1 year) and Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Conduit Securitisations (maturity shorter 
than 1 year). 
Although they share many of the elements, term and ABCP conduit 
transactions operate and function differently:138 
1. Term Securitisations (Public & Private) 
In a typical term transaction, a single originator sells a specified pool of 
receivables into a Securitisation that has funded the purchase by issuing 
bonds backed by the pool. The type of SPV used to issue the debt is 
usually a function of the type of asset being securitized. In the US, 
amortizing assets such as auto loans rely predominantly on either a 
grantor or an owner's trust as the funding SPV. Although a grantor trust 
is slightly simpler to use and provides a cleaner answer to the issue of 
entity-level taxation, it suffers from certain operational drawbacks. 
Grantor trusts are extremely limited in their ability to reinvest collected 
cash flows and generally must pass all cash through to investors shortly 
after collection. Other important limitations include an inability to 
purchase new receivables after the initial sale (except for limited 
replacement of defective or ineligible receivables) and an inability to fund 
themselves using multiple senior interests. 
While these structures work well for assets with lives that span periods of 
years, they are ineffective for collateral with a life span of only weeks or 
months. In the term market, short-lived collateral like credit card or trade 
receivables is securitized using revolving trust structures. The life of a 
revolving structure is characterized by two phases. During the first, the 
revolving phase, receivable cash flow, net of interest and other 
expenses, is used to purchase new receivables. During the second 
phase, the payout or amortization period, net collected cash flow is used 
                                            
138 A comparison table of ABCP vs. ABS term deal is added in the appendix: ABCP vs. ABS 
Term deals , p. 548. 
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to retire debt. Because it can reinvest collected cash flows in new 
receivables and, subject to certain limitations, can issue multiple series of 
debt, the master trust is the form of SPV most commonly used for 
revolving term Securitisations.139 
2. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduit Securitisation (Public) 
“An asset-backed conduit is a special-purpose corporation that regularly 
buys interests in pools of financial assets from one or more sellers and 
funds these purchases by issuing commercial paper. Within the world of 
conduits are two major types: single-seller and multi-seller. As its name 
suggests, a single-seller conduit buys interests from only one seller and 
is usually a subsidiary of the conduit's sponsor. Single-seller conduits are 
self-administered programs that can be costly and administratively 
burdensome for the sponsor to operate. Still, single-seller conduits can 
be effective solutions for sellers that generate, and can spread costs 
over, a high volume of receivables. For these reasons, single-seller 
conduits make up a small fraction of the overall conduit market and most 
often are operated by very large finance companies. Multi-seller 
operations dominate the asset-backed conduit market. Again as the 
name suggests, multi-seller conduits invest in receivable interests and 
asset-backed securities issued by multiple sellers. Most multi-seller 
conduits are sponsored and administered by large commercial banks 
and the sellers are, more often than not, bank customers. Conduit 
Securitisations share some similarities with term transactions. Conduits 
can securitize virtually all types of assets found in the term market. They 
also must be structured to address many of the same bankruptcy, tax, 
and accounting issues that are faced by term Securitisations. As with a 
term transaction, a two-step sale structure can be used to create an off-
balance-sheet, bankruptcy-remote transaction that functions as debt of 
the seller for tax purposes. Beyond these similarities, conduit 
Securitisations differ from term transactions in numerous ways, 
particularly with respect to funding, methods of credit enhancement, and 
                                            
139 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 15. 
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the use of liquidity facilities. One obvious difference from term 
transactions is that conduit transactions are funded using commercial 
paper. Commercial paper funding costs and conduit program fees are 
passed on to the seller. Because the price of commercial paper is 
continually changing, funding costs change every time old ABCP 
matures and new ABCP is issued. From a seller's perspective, these 
changing costs are very similar to funding with floating-rate debt. 
Because this can create basis risk between the funding costs and the 
yield earned on the assets underlying the Securitisation, conduit 
operators often require that an interest-rate hedge be put in place for the 
life of the transaction. 140 
2.2.4 Asset Requirements/Asset Securitisation Criteria 
First of all an Asset-Securitisation legally requires a sale of the asset and the 
assignment of claims attached to those assets. Thereby the asset pool has to 
satisfy certain legal and economic distinguishing features to qualify for an ABS 
transaction. These will be explained in the following paragraph.141 
Assignability and Distrainability 
The originator of the asset can only sell those assets that are legally assignable 
to the buyer. Therefore the receivable for example shall not be strictly personal 
or there shall not be a clause in the underlying contract that forbids a cession of 
the receivable. Moreover the receivable must not be nonleviable. 
True Sale 
As long as the transaction structure does not comprise a synthetic 
Securitisation, the sale of the assets has to be a ‘True Sale’ and it must not 
qualified as a grant of a loan. In case the sale of the assets is determined to be 
a grant of a loan, this will lead to lengthening of the balance sheet and 
subsequently to a worsening of the capital-to-asset ratio. In addition the true 
sale is important in the case of the insolvency of the originator. If it turns out that 
there has been no true sale of the assets, then in the worst case the trustee in 
                                            
140 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 15. 
141 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 9. 
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charge of the bankruptcy of the originator would be able to recover the assets 
or their proceeds. The assets would fall into the bankruptcy estate of the 
originator and the SPV would not be able to pay the note holders anymore. In 
Germany the courts have ruled that in order to determine if the transaction is 
classified as a true sale, the criteria to determine a true or an untrue factoring 
should be used. 
Apart from the true sale criteria, certain other criteria has to be fulfilled for the 
transaction to qualify for an off-balance sheet treatment: 
• Legal isolation of the assets from the seller; the transferred assets are 
put beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors. 
• The new owner of the assets has the right to pledge or to exchange 
the assets. 
• The seller does not have the right to buy the assets back. 
Transaction Size 
Since Asset-Securitisations are of a complex nature that causes high fixed 
expenses, usually there has to be a minimum volume of assets to be 
securitised in order for the transaction to be economically feasible. In the 
current literature there is no unanimous definition of the minimum volume; 
however, the numbers range from €50m to €100 m, whereas in practice 
investment banks won’t start working on a transaction that has a size smaller 
than €250m. This is the benchmark for public transactions. If the originator 
decides to place the notes privately there have already been transactions made 
that have been a lot smaller than €250m. Nonetheless a minimum size of €50m 
has to be reached for the benefits of the asset-Securitisation to exceed the 
costs implied in a Taylor-made transaction structure. If one originator does not 
fulfil the minimum criteria, then there is also the possibility of pooling originators 
in a multi-seller model. 
Asset-Servicing Criteria 
The originator of the assets does not only have to separate the securitised 
assets legally from his estate but also technically. Therefore he needs to have a 
good electronic data processing by which he can separate the cash flow 
46 2  Fundamentals of Asset-Securitisation 
 
streams of the sold from the cash flow streams of the unsold assets. 
Subsequently the originator most of the times takes on the tasks of the service 
agent for two reasons: firstly because he already has all the data needed to 
service the assets, and secondly because he wishes that the relationship with 
the customer (in the case of receivables) is not stressed. Therefore the 
originator will function as the service agent and will book the securitised 
receivables on separate accounts. 
Asset Structure  
The first requirement for the asset structure is that there has to be some kind of 
cash flow related to the asset that is to be securitised: “If it flows, securitise it!” 
Moreover the asset pool should ideally have a multitude of nearly 
homogeneous and relatively small claims against as many as possible debtors. 
Apart from that there have to be a long history of data, so the credit risk of the 
underlying assets can be quantified. The main questions in this context are: 
What is the default rate of the assets? What is the prepayment rate of the 
assets? How many payments are delayed? 
A regional and demographic diversification as well as a high credit standing of 
the debtor or the assets is of high importance. Moreover the assets should have 
a certain seasoning (i.e. age) and the weighted average life of the assets (i.e. 
maturity) should exceed one year. 
2.2.5 Benefits of Securitisation 
In the USA today, Loan Securitisation and especially Mortgage-Backed Loan 
Securitisation play a decisive role. During the past five years, securitised loans 
have become the major financing instrument in the US. However, the limitations 
of Securitisation have also become evident. When the basic assumptions 
change, as is the case with the current downturn in the economy. Many people 
are no longer participating in the belief that working with a single bank gives 
them greater flexibility. But here as well, it is not the type of finance that is 
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decisive, but rather the entrepreneurial vision that can breathe life into a 
project.142 
Securitisation Benefits 
“Securitisation appeals to a broad range of companies, large and small, in many 
different industries. To grasp why it is a popular financing alternative, it helps to 
have an understanding of the many advantages Securitisation provides relative 
to more traditional sources of funding such as bank lines or corporate debt. The 
more significant advantages of Securitisation are discussed below: 
1. The Potential for Lower Funding Costs.  
Financial assets with predictable payment characteristics can, when 
pooled together, offer a more attractive risk and return profile than the 
credit of the company that originated them. Many financial assets can be 
used to structure securities of higher credit quality, and lower cost, than 
the originating company could issue on its own. Through Securitisation, a 
company can issue debt that is de-linked from its own credit ratings, and 
therefore often can achieve lower cost of funds for its operations.  
2. Source of Liquidity.  
Historically, the ability of small- and medium-sized firms to grow has 
been constrained by their limited ability to borrow from traditional 
sources. Because Securitisation provides a reliable and relatively 
unconstrained source of off-balance-sheet financing, it mitigates 
traditional funding constraints and can promote a company's growth.  
3. Diversified Funding Source.  
The use of Securitisation has not been limited to small or non-
investment-grade firms. To the contrary, many large, highly rated 
companies rely on Securitisation in conjunction with other forms of 
borrowing as a means of diversifying their funding sources. Securitisation 
is another arrow in the quiver of corporate treasurers. Treasurers often 
can craft a more cost-efficient capital structure by employing 
                                            
142 Cf. Friedemann (2003), p. 9. 
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Securitisation instead of, or in conjunction with, more traditional funding 
sources like bank loans or corporate debt. In addition to their cost 
efficiency, Securitisations also typically lack the types of restrictive 
financial covenants that often accompany bank loans or corporate debt.  
4. Off-Balance-Sheet Financing.  
Most Securitisations transfer assets and liabilities off the balance sheet, 
thereby reducing the amount of the originator's on-balance-sheet 
leverage. This off-balance-sheet financing can help improve the 
securitizer's return on equity and other key financial ratios. However, 
many equity and corporate debt analysts now consider both reported and 
managed (i.e., reported plus off the balance sheet) leverage in their 
credit analysis of securitizing firms.  
5. Less Public Disclosure Than Competing Methods of Financing.  
For privately held or non-U.S. firms, Securitisation provides a means of 
financing that does not require complete financial disclosure to investors, 
rating agencies, or regulatory authorities, as more direct forms of 
financing often do. Even for publicly issued Asset-Backed Securities 
transactions, issuer disclosure requirements are less cumbersome than 
those required for most other kinds of SEC-registered securities. In 
Securitisation, analytical scrutiny is shifted from the originating 
company's ability to pay to the structure of the transaction, the 
characteristics of the underlying assets, and the ability of the company 
(or its surrogate) to service the assets.”143 
2.3 Market Overview 
2.3.1 History of Securitisation 
The roots of Mortgage-Backed Securities in the United States go back to the 
emergence of the secondary mortgage market and the foundation of the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) during the 1930’s. Fannie 
                                            
143 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 7. 
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Mae was founded to purchase residential mortgages insured by the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA).144 
This was the beginning of the secondary mortgage market and the foundation 
for the creation of Mortgage-Related and Asset-Backed Securities. However, 
the first issuance of securities was not until the 1950’s and it did not take off 
until the 1970’s, when the MBS program of the newly founded Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) rapidly became the preferred 
means of funding single-family mortgages.145  
The Securitisation of Commercial Mortgage Loans into Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities (CMBS) only evolved in the mid-1980’s during the Savings & 
Loans crisis. At the end of the 1980’s the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) 
took over the thrifts’ commercial real estate assets and started securitising the 
real estate loans into CMBS. The RTC held huge asset pools and was therefore 
able to give high guarantees to get the market started and the securities 
marketable. The Corporation had tapped a new funding source and overall had 
a very important effect on the future development of Commercial Real Estate 
Securitisation. Today the secondary market for mortgage loans in the USA is 
highly developed. 146 
Securitisation or Asset Securitisation is not entirely new in Germany. As far as 
the German Pfandbrief is considered/recognized as a form of Asset-
Securitisation, the historic roots go back to the 18th century, the time as the first 
Pfandbrief concept was invented.147 In fact, the concept is precisely 235 years 
old. Frederick the Great laid the foundation for the issuance of Pfandbriefe with 
the Cabinet Order of August 29, 1769. The goal of this order was to help the 
landed gentry obtain cheaper agricultural mortgages by enabling the estates to 
issue Pfandbriefe on the basis of the mortgages granted. The mortgages serve 
as a cover for the Pfandbrief holders as are the issuing estates on a subsidiary 
basis. This basic concept of securitising mortgages has endured until today - 
                                            
144 Cf. Brueggeman and Fisher (2001), p. 495. 
145 Cf. Falcon (2003), p. 29; Kendall and Fishman (2000), p. 6. 
146 Cf. Baum (2000), p. 45. 
147 Cf. Schiereck and Rauch (2002), p. 174. 
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the Pfandbrief now has become an international capital market product with an 
outstanding volume of around €1.1 trillion.148 
2.3.2 Asset Differentiation 
There is a difference between the asset that is backing the Securitisation and 
additional collateral that is required by investors. This is due to the fact that 
some assets refer to cash flows that will only be originated in the future, 
however, the investors want to have some kind of security in case those cash 
flows do not come in the future. So in the case of the Securitisation of future 
real estate rental cash flows, the property itself has to function as collateral, in 
addition to the future rental receivables. Another form of additional collateral 
could be a mortgage on the property.  
This fact leads to an overlapping between Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities and Real Estate Asset-Backed Securities. Even though Real Estate 
Asset-Backed Securities securitise real estate cash flows and Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities securitise real estate loan receivables (i.e. interest 
and principle on a real estate loan), both might be secured by a mortgage. In 
both cases the securitised assets are secured by a mortgage and in both cases 
the mortgage serves as additional collateral for the investors. Nevertheless in 
Europe the case can be made that they differ from each other. 
The matrix below clarifies the relationships between the different asset classes. 
Here one can differentiate between who originates the transactions and assets, 
and between real estate and non-real estate assets. On the real estate side 
there are Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and Real Estate Asset-Backed 
Securities (RE ABS), while on the non-real estate side the asset classes are 
comprised of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) and Asset-Backed 
Securities in a narrower sense (ABS i.n.S.).  
Whereas Mortgage-Backed Securities are mainly bank originated, Real Estate 
Securitisation is non-bank originated, i.e. the sellers of the real estate assets to 
be securitised are no banking institutes, but corporates or governments. 
However, as discussed above the two asset classes overlap, since there are 
                                            
148 Cf. Hagen (2003), p. 12; Schiereck and Rauch (2002), p. 1. 
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transactions that are backed by real estate cash flows, but that are originated 
by banks and structured as secured loans. These transactions fall into the 
category of Real Estate Securitisation as well as into CMBS. 
Assets
Non-Real Estate Real Estate
BankOriginator
Non-Bank
Collateralized Debt
Obligation (CDO)
Asset-Backed Security
i.n.S. (ABS)
Real Estate
Securitisation (RE ABS)
Mortgage-Backed
Securities
(RMBS & CMBS)
 
Figure 10: Asset Differentiation149 
Asset-Backed Securities i.n.S. overlap with Real Estate Asset-Backed 
Securities, because there are receivables that belong into both categories, such 
as lease receivables. 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) overlap with all three other asset 
classes, since it is possible to securitise tranches (i.e. notes) from other Asset-
Securitisations into a CDO.150 
2.3.3 Synthetic vs. True Sale Securitisation 
When securitisation experts talk about assets or receivables in the context of a 
securitisation, they generally mean the right of one person to demand payment 
from another person under an existing contractual relationship, eg a mortgage 
loan or lease contract. The focus, therefore, is not on the contractual 
relationship between the originator and the customer, but on the monetary claim 
                                            
149 Following Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 773. 
150 Cf. Erturk and Gillis (2004), p. 2. 
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originated under an existing contract. The treatment of this claim differs in true 
sale and synthetic securitisations.151 
Synthetic Structures152 
In a synthetic securitisation, the underlying asset is not transferred from the 
originator to the purchaser. Instead, the credit risk relating to the asset is 
isolated and transferred to the purchaser by way of a credit default swap (or 
similar arrangement), but the asset itself remains with the originator and on its 
balance sheet. The main reason for such an exercise is to achieve regulatory 
capital relief for the originator. However, the disadvantages of synthetic 
structures are apparent. The asset will not be removed from the balance sheet 
and these structures are only of interest to credit institutions that are concerned 
about regulatory capital relief. 
True Sale Structures153 
In contrast, in a true sale the asset must be isolated from other assets and the 
originator’s estate. A true sale is a necessary requirement for removing the 
assets from the originator’s balance sheet and, in the case of banks, achieving 
regulatory capital relief. 
                                            
151 Cf. Kreppel (2003), p. 273. 
152 Cf. Anonymous (2002j), p. 58; Böhringer (2001), p. 53. 
153 Cf. Flämig (2003b), p. 17; Frühauf (2003), p. 17; Klüwer (2001), p. 35. 
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3 Principles of Real Estate Securitisation 
This Chapter is defining and describing Real Estate Securitisation. It intends to 
clear up definition issues and to distinguish Real Estate Securitisation from 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. Moreover it shall delineate what the costs and 
benefits of Real Estate Securitisation are. 
The analysis will lead to a theoretical Research Framework for Real Estate 
Securitisation. With this, the following chapter sets the scene for the 
subsequent chapters on the international comparison and the part on Germany. 
This thesis looks at how Asset-Securitisation and especially Real Estate 
Securitisation markets evolve and what are the patterns that this development 
can be attributed to. It will delineate for whom this will be interesting, for which 
real estate assets it will be applicable, and what the motives are to do such a 
transaction. For this it is important to understand the theoretical concept of Real 
Estate Securitisation. However, the pure form described in the following part 
does not exist in the industry perse. In this respect it shall be stated that Real 
Estate Securitisation and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation overlap 
strongly and are sometimes confused with one another. 
3.1 Defining Principles 
3.1.1 Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
Semantically, Mortgage-Backed Securitisation (Residential and Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities) should be called Mortgage-Backed Loan 
Securitisation as the underlying asset that gets securitised is not a mortgage or 
the property, but a loan that is backed by a mortgage. In this sense, the term is 
misleading. This is also important, when differentiating Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation from Real Estate Securitisation. 
In general, there are definition issues as in most cases Real Estate 
Securitisations are categorized under CMBS as in the case of Singapore. There 
US rating analysts have categorized Singapore Real Estate Securitisations as 
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CMBS, even though there were not even loans or mortgages underlying the 
issuances.154 
Going back to the primal structures of Mortgage-Backed Securities, there are 
essentially two types of Mortgage-Backed Securities. One is a pass-through 
certificate evidencing ownership of an interest in a mortgage loan or a pool of 
mortgage loans and the other type is an obligation secured by a mortgage loan 
or pool of mortgage loans, called pay-through security.155 
With pass-through structures principal and interest payments on the underlying 
mortgages (less service fees) are paid or ‘passed through’ to investors. Thereby 
investors are exposed to prepayment risk.156 The pay-through category on the 
other hand includes pay-through or cash flow bonds that are designed so that 
the required amortization from the collateral pool will at all times be at least 
equal to the payments of both coupon interest and scheduled principal on the 
bonds. The creation of those straight bonds was similar to the creation of 
corporate bonds and it limited the exposure to prepayment risk. They featured 
scheduled interest payments on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis, and they 
repaid principal at the end of the bond term. The issuer was required to 
maintain a specified amount of mortgages in the mortgage pool. If a mortgage 
was paid or foreclosed on, the issuer usually had to substitute similar 
mortgages into the pool.157 
A certain subset of pay-through bonds is Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
(CMO). CMOs were developed in an attempt to deal with both the potentially 
adverse tax consequences of issuing multiple issue Mortgage Securities, and 
with the unpredictability of prepayments in residential mortgages. Whereas pay-
through securities only have one series of securities, a CMO offering is divided 
into two or more issues, or ‘tranches’ each with a different maturity. Investors in 
                                            
154 Cf. Murra (2003). 
155 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 27. 
156 Government-insured or guaranteed single-family mortgages can be prepaid, or paid back 
prior to maturity, without penalty; conventional residential mortgages can usually be prepaid 
with relatively little penalty. As a result, investors in RMBS can unexpectedly receive 
substantial income from prepayments. This income needs to be reinvested, possibly at lower 
yields. Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 28. 
157 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 27. 
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the shorter maturity tranches usually receive lower yields than investors in 
longer-term tranches. CMOs often include a so-called accretion or ‘Z’ tranche 
on which interest is not paid until the other tranches have been paid in full. This 
is usually structured in the form of a Zero-Coupon Bond.158 
The attraction of a CMO security to investors is that:159 
1. It offers some call protection to investors in the later maturing issues,  
2. It combines the predictable cash flows of bonds with the relatively high 
yields of mortgage securities.  
3. It creates issues of different maturities from the same mortgage pool. 
Thereby issuers can market the securities to investors who have little 
desire to hold thirty-year mortgages in their portfolios, as they needed to 
do in the case of Mortgage-Pass Through Certificates. 
The CMO structure was the forerunner of today’s CMBS structures. The 
development of CMOs and their positive benefits spurred the development of 
today’s widely used sub-participation structures. 
3.1.2 Real Estate or Property Securitisation 
There exist different definitions about Property or Real Estate Securitisation in 
the literature. Even though there are not many sources. Most sources have 
originated out of Singapore and the Singapore structure,160 and out of Europe 
and the Operating Company transactions.161 There exist some sources in 
Germany.162 
Definition from Singapore: 
“[Real Estate] Securitisation refers to a contractual arrangement whereby real 
estate owners sell their real estate asset(s) to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
that issues debt instruments to finance the purchase. The debt instruments are 
                                            
158 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 28. 
159 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 10. 
160 Cf. Heng (2002), p. 36; Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 1; Quek (1996), p. 20; Sing, et al. (2003), p. 75. 
161 Cf. Pickersgill (2001), p. 125. 
162 Cf. Lehmann and Danielewsky (2003), p. 53; Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 771. 
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backed by cash flows generated from the real estate asset(s). The legal transfer 
or separation of the asset to a SPV is the key feature that distinguishes a [Real 
Estate] Securitisation arrangement from the traditional mortgage-backed or 
collateralised bond issues.”163 
Definition Europe: 
“Real Estate Securitisation is the Securitisation of predictable and dependable 
real estate income streams or receivables.”164 
Definitions Germany: 
“Real Property is a direct type of real estate financing... it is not based on the 
Securitisation of mortgage loans, but it is used as direct financing for real estate 
investments.”165 
“Real Estate Securitisation securitises direct cash flows from real estate, i.e. 
receivables from real estate lease contracts, future lease contracts, real estate 
values and future real estate sale proceeds.”166 
“Real Estate Securitisation is the transformation of illiquid real estate assets into 
tradable securities. Securitisable assets are all kinds of real estate receivables 
and physical real estate that incorporate a constant and predictable cash 
flow.”167 
Summarizing the previous definitions, the following statements can be derived: 
• Real Estate Securitisation is the transformation of illiquid real estate 
assets into securities – hence, this is why it is called Real Estate (real 
estate assets) Securitisation (tradable securities). 
• Real Estate Securitisation (sometimes also called Property or Real 
Property Securitisation) can be used as a divestment vehicle or as a 
direct financing instrument. 
                                            
163 Ooi, et al. (2000). 
164 Pickersgill (2001), p. 125. 
165 Lehmann and Danielewsky (2003), p. 53. 
166 Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 771. 
167 Schulte (2005), p. 618. 
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• Transactions are based on and backed by solid and predictable cash 
flows derived from real estate assets or real estate operations. 
• Real estate assets can be physical assets as well as non-physical 
assets, including receivables from real estate lease contracts, future 
lease contracts, real estate values and future real estate sale 
proceeds (inter alia). 
In its definition, Real Estate Securitisation is close to Future Flow Asset-
Securitisations like Whole Company Securitisations. This is why some industry 
people use this Analogy to compare Real Estate Securitisations to Asset-
Backed Securities i.n.S..168 However, Real Estate Securitisation are really 
overlapping with both: CMBS and ABS i.n.S. – it could fall in either category 
depending on what the asset and the collateral are. 
If used as a divestment vehicle, Real Estate Securitisation essentially allows 
property assets to be taken off the balance sheet and thus improving the 
liquidity of companies as well as enhancing their return on capital. Typically, 
capital markets for real estate can be classified into two categories: equity and 
debt capital markets.  
The motivation for tapping into real estate capital markets can be one of the 
following: 
1. Source of finance. 
2. Mortgage originators wish to sell mortgages, replenish funds to originate 
new mortgages. 
3. Geographic flow of funds from regions with surplus funds to regions with 
high demand for housing. 
4. Deregulation in financial institutions,  
5. Corporate restructuring. 
Typically, there are two types of Real Estate Capital Markets: Equity and Debt. 
Real Estate Securitisation is often confused with equity capital markets, but it 
belongs to the category of debt. 
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Equity Capital Market 
1. Listed Property Companies 
2. Open-ended Funds (only to a certain degree) 
3. Property Trusts 
4. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT)     
Debt Capital Market 
1. Mortgage Backed Bonds   
2. Mortgage Backed Securities  
3. Real Estate Securitisation (Real Estate ABS) 
In Mortgage Backed Bonds (MBB), an agency creates mortgage pools and 
issues bonds based on these pools of mortgages. The mortgages are pledged 
as collaterals, and the agency retains ownership of the mortgages. MBBs are 
similar to covered bonds. 
Mortgage Backed Securities are also pools of mortgages bought by investors 
and each mortgage in the pool is serviced by originator. However all payments 
(interest and principal) are passed-through to investors. MPTs are also known 
as Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). 
In Real Estate Securitisations, special purchase vehicles (SPV) are used to 
purchase property assets using funds raised by debt instruments. The debt in 
the Real Estate Securitisation is backed by cash flows generated from the real 
property.169 
Real Estate Securitisation as a Concept for Disintermediation of Lending 
Institutions 
In recent times financing for real estate companies has become more and more 
difficult because banks have become very cautious with loan origination. This is 
due to the fact that a lot of banks have made an enormous amount of bad loans 
during the last decade and now those big bad loan portfolios weigh hard on the 
                                                                                                                                
168 Cf. Yang (2003), Interview 16, p. 554. 
169 Cf. Sing, et al. (2003), p. 22. 
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banks’ balance sheets.170 However, Capital markets dictate that banks are 
more bottom line oriented. Therefore a lot of big commercial banks have 
decided to go away from the classic lending business and go into fee income 
business. This goes in hand with a second big trend, a trend that has been 
going on in the financial industry for many years. It can be described as the 
disintermediation of financial intermediaries; lending banks as such 
intermediaries will be more and more cut out of the lending process as they only 
function as an intermediary between the borrower and the capital market. 
Therefore the current trend in the banking industry can be described as a shift 
from credit to capital markets. 
From Credit to Capital Markets
Desintermediation of lending institutions
Borrower Lender Capital Market Investor
Credit Market
Capital Market
Borrower Capital Market Investor  
Figure 11: Disintermediation of Lending Institutions 
Real Estate Securitisation is a classic case of a disintermediation in the real 
estate lending industry. The reason why this is happening is twofold:  
1. Firstly, many banks have made bad real estate loans in the times of the 
economic upturn that have had a detrimental effect on the banks’ ROE 
as discussed above.  
2. Secondly, investors are always willing to get a higher return for the same 
amount of risk. So if the banks are disintermediated the usual lending 
spread can be distributed to the investor, the arranger and the borrower.  
                                            
170 Cf. Schmid and Maier (2005), p. 19. 
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Hence, this is a win-win situation for all the parties involved: the banks as 
arrangers make more fee income, investors get more return for the same 
amount of risk, and the borrowers get better financing conditions than before. 
Banks will not allow disintermediation 
In a lot of cases, in the past the loans have been very competitively priced – 
way under the risk-weighted price. Under Basel II, especially for ‘Income 
Producing Real Estate’ and ‘High Volatility Commercial Real Estate’ this will 
become a big problem, as risk weightings can be well above 100% in most 
cases.  
Even though mortgage lending under Basel II will become more difficult, 
because the margins on the loans have to be adjusted to mirror the higher risk  
and the higher equity exposure, and even though there will be increasing 
disintermediation of banks and the borrower will go directly to the capital 
markets. Banks will not be bypassed totally, as they will not allow that to 
happen. Most probably the previous lenders will become the arrangers in future 
Real Estate Securitisation transaction. Hence, the participating banks will in the 
future increasingly make fee income.171 
3.1.3 Asset vs. Collateral 
In order to distinguish between Real Estate Securitisation and Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation, it is important to distinguish between the asset and the 
collateral in a Asset-Securitisation transactions. Usually the assets that get 
securitised and that are underlying the transactions serve as the only security to 
the investor. In the case of real estate, this security becomes a new dimension. 
In Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation transactions, the asset is the 
commercial real estate loan that is backed by a mortgage. In this case the asset 
is the real estate loan supported by the interest and principal payments on the 
loan and backed by an additional collateral – a mortgage. The mortgage and 
the fact that it serves as additional collateral to the investors distinguish CMBS 
                                            
171 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
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from CDOs and is the reason why CMBS are called CMBS and not Collaterlized 
Real Estate Loan Securitisations.172 
For the case of Real Estate Securitisation, the assets are real estate cash 
flows, but per se there is no additional collateral underlying the transaction. 
However, without collateral investors are not going to buy the securities.173 In 
the case of future real estate cash flow Securitisations the assets are not 
secured whatsoever. If the tenant defaults, then the investors will not get their 
money back.174 Therefore, the transaction has to be enhanced with additional 
collateral in the form of a mortgage or the transfer of the property itself. 
In the case of a future lease Securitisation (e.g. Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation) the circumstances can be described as follows: 
“We take the lease, but we still take a mortgage on the property, because we 
need to perfect an interest in that lease cash flow in the US in most states you 
have to secure this by a lien on the property. And I do not know what the 
property law is like in Germany, but we need to perfect the claim to the cash 
flow. So you take a mortgage on the property as well and you take an absolute 
assignment of the leases – the rents.” 175 
So, there is the necessity for additional collateral and first lien mortgages seem 
to be the best and cost efficient way to satisfy that need: 
“Ultimately, the defaults and loss severity is contingent on the mortgage and the 
property and being able to reach that property in a credit event. And that is what 
it is all about. If it becomes a market of unsecured claims or the transactions are 
done in a synthetic manner – where the banks keep the first lien, then in case of 
credit events the whole situation can become very slippery. Things may not 
work the way they are supposed to be – the bankruptcy judge may throw his 
hands up and give everybody (secured creditors and unsecured creditors) the 
same. In US experience, recovery by secured creditors has been pretty good 
even in bankruptcy courts. But that’s not true for the experience of unsecured 
                                            
172 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
173 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
174 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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creditors in bankruptcy courts. So in the history of courts and laws and 
structures – first lien is decisive in those kinds of credit situations.”176 
Eventually, it does not matter if the transaction is secured by a mortgage or the 
building itself; in one way or another the collateral is the real estate (i.e. the 
building): 
“You are paying somebody money and you are taking collateral and holding it 
as a security. A mortgage means you can have the title to the property if the 
borrower does not pay. If he pays you do not get the title, but you get your 
money.”177 
3.2 Classification and Differentiation 
In order to really understand the concept of Real Estate Securitisation, the 
theoretical difference between Real Estate Securitisation (Real Estate ABS – 
RE ABS) and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) has to be clarified. For this 
purpose the following paragraphs deduce the differences between the two. 
Figure 9 shows a categorisation of Securitisation transactions into type of 
originator and type of asset. In general, there are three major groups of 
originators: banks, corporates and the government. On the asset side, a 
distinction between ‘Receivables and Loans’ and ‘Real Estate Assets’ is made.  
It is observable that the full range of ABS asset classes as defined in the 
chapter above can be found in the graph: ABS i.n.S., CDO, MBS. But also a 
new category has been included into this graph: RE ABS. Whereas CDOs and 
ABS i.n.S. represent receivable or loan Securitisations, MBS and RE ABS stand 
for real estate related Asset-Securitisations. In this case the difference between 
RE ABS and MBS is mainly who originates the asset and what is the asset. 
MBS are backed by real estate loans that are mainly originated by banks, 
whereas Real Estate Securitisation in its generic sense represent securities that 
                                                                                                                                
175 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
176 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
177 Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
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are originated by corporates or the government and that are backed by real 
estate cash flows or real property. 
Mortgage-Backed Securities
–
Securitisation of Real 
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Asset-Backed Securities in 
a narrower sense
–
Securitisation of Receivables 
or customer loans in order to 
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Figure 12: Categorization of Asset-Securitisation Transactions 
This second figure (Figure 13) shows an alternative presentation of the different 
categories. It also makes the distinction between ‘Receivables and Loans’ and 
‘Real Estate Assets’, but it looks at the nature of the originated cash flow. In 
Securitisations there can be original (i.e. primary) cash flows, or there can be 
derivative (i.e. secondary) cash flows.  
The difference between the two is for example: receivables of a company depict 
original or primary company cash flows, whereas cash flows from interest and 
principal of a company loan are rather derivative company cash flows. 
Moreover, Securitisations of derivative cash flows are done by banks whereas 
Securitisations of original cash flows are done by non-banks. Also the motive 
for the Securitisation is different. Derivative cash flow Securitisations usually 
follow the motive of regulatory capital relieve, whereas the Securitisation of 
original cash flows rather represents the motive of solvency generation. 
So in the ‘Receivables and Loans’ category, receivable Securitisations are 
backed by original company cash flows and loan Securitisations are backed by 
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derivative company cash flows. In the ‘Real Estate Assets’ category this fact 
represents the major difference between Real Estate Securitisation and MBS. 
MBS depict derivative real estate cash flows whereas Real Estate 
Securitisations are backed by original/primary cash flow from real estate assets. 
This distinction is very important because for an investor it might have different 
implications, if he invests into original or derivative cash flows. Also for the 
structuring of the transaction there are differences concerning the security for 
the investor. 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
–
Securitisation of derivative real estate cash 
flows, i.e. interest and principal payments 
from real estate loans
(in order to relieve regulatory capital)
Collateralized Debt Obligations 
–
Securitisation of derivative corporate cash 
flows by securitising corporate loans and 
bonds
(in order to relieve regulatory capital)
Original vs. Derivative Cash Flows
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)
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ts Real Estate ABS 
--
Securitisation of original real estate cash 
flows, e.g. rent receivables, future property 
reversion values
(in order to create solvency)
Asset-Backed Securities in a narrower sense 
–
Securitisation of original receivable cash flows, 
e.g. Customer loans, trade receivables 
(in order to generate solvency)
Original Cash Flows
 
Figure 13: Original vs. Derivative Cash Flows 
In essence, MBS derive from bank originated real estate assets that are backed 
by derivative real estate cash flows, whereas Real Estate ABS derive from 
Corporate or Government originated real estate assets that are backed by 
original real estate cash flows. Therefore one can demark Real Estate 
Securitisation as real estate backed transactions that are not originated by a 
bank and that refer to original or primary real estate cash flows. 
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3.3 Benefits vs. Limits 
Using Asset-Securitisation for financing real estate is very interesting for the 
property industry, because capital market investors often value cash flows 
differently than mortgage banks. Moreover they are more willing and also more 
able to take on specific risks that mortgage banks cannot take on. Hence with 
Real Estate Securitisation, the LTV-ratios on the capital market could be higher 
than in traditional mortgage bank financing. Also, due to the transaction 
structure, the overall interest rate on that transaction could be lower than it 
would be on a traditional mortgage loan. Apart from that Real Estate 
Securitisation has grown to increasing popularity with ABS-investors in recent 
times because it is also often used as a divestment vehicle in connection with 
principal finance and whole company Securitisation. 
Of course, there are not only benefits associated with the use of real estate 
Securitisation as an alternative financing source, but there are also limits that 
restrict the use of this financing tool. Both will be delineated in the following 
paragraphs. 
Benefits178 
There can be benefits for both the originating company and those who will 
ultimately invest into Real Estate ABS, i.e. the institutional investors. 
Benefits for the originator: 
• Securitisation can lead to higher leverage, i.e. higher loan to value ratios 
(LTV) than would normally be achievable using more traditional financing 
methods. Typically, standard bank lending will assume LTV ratios of 
between 60-70%. A well-structured Securitisation can realise LTV ratios 
of 90-95%. A company can therefore unlock more capital than might be 
the case through normal bank lending arrangements. 
• Real estate Securitisation may lower the cost of debt for the borrower 
compared to traditional sources of financing. The lower percentage of 
equity invested raises the return on invested capital. 
                                            
178 Cf. Rügemer and Siemes (2002), p. 773; Schulte (2005), p. 620. 
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• Real estate Securitisation is an Alternative to traditional sale and 
leaseback deals as a means of raising capital from an existing corporate 
real estate portfolio. The main benefit with this is that the originating 
company can retain ultimate ownership of the income producing assets 
and simply create or assign an appropriate interest for the purposes of 
Securitisation. For example, a property company might create a long 
leasehold interest in its freehold portfolio so as to divert the income 
stream to the newly created leasehold interest. 
• It allows non-investment grade companies to access the capital markets. 
• The structure is individually tailored to suit the originating company and 
can therefore be adjusted to meet the nature of each portfolio. 
• Investors are comfortable with the concept and the security, which the 
structure will create. 
• For the originator it should be possible to achieve a coupon which is 
below the rate, which would be, payable on a standard bank facility 
where a fixed number of percentage points above EURIBOR is usual. 
• The focus is shifted onto the income generation of the asset, i.e. cash 
flow rather than the volume of the asset or the company itself. This 
allows segregation of good assets from what otherwise may be a poorly 
performing company or sector of the economy whose lack of profit might 
otherwise make fund raising difficult. Therefore issuers with a below-
investment-grade unsecured debt rating are able to sell investment-
grade, even triple-A-rated debt. The debt costs far less than a non-
investment-grade firm would be able to access in the capital markets on 
an unsecured basis. 
• Real Estate Securitisation diversifies the sources of capital, reduces the 
size of the balance sheet and frees up capital associated with the 
securitised real estate assets. The released capital can be put back to 
work and the originator may replace the securitised real estate assets 
with new ones. A higher volume of origination would, therefore, provide 
the issuer with the potential to generate higher revenues and earnings. In 
effect, this allows the issuing corporation to leverage off its capital base. 
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• In general, for investment-grade companies the non-recourse sale of 
assets enables the issuers to reduce the exposure to higher risk-
weighted assets, and to fund portfolio growth through off-balance sheet 
treatment. 
• Change of perception on the market and a possible gain of prestige due 
to the fact that the company is going new ways and is financing its real 
estate over the capital markets. Thereby a part of independence from the 
traditional lending institutions will be gained. 
• Possibility to gain the upside potential of the property without really 
owning the real estate anymore. 
Benefits for the investor: 
• For the investor Real Estate Securitisation creates a relative value gain, 
because the coupon on the notes is usually well above that payable on 
comparable bonds, hence making it an attractive investment. 
• The issued Real Estate ABS notes are rated at their issuance and 
underlie a constant monitoring by the rating agencies. 
• Real estate assets represent a very stable asset base and have a good 
reputation on the market. 
• New assets and new structures that might be tailored to the needs of the 
investors create a better diversification of the investors’ portfolios. For 
example, in Germany Real Estate ABS would represent a perfect 
substitute product to the existing real estate investment vehicles that 
have all proven to be ineffective for international institutional investors. 
• Investing in original real estate risk without having to administer and 
manage the property. 
Limits179 
The limits of the Securitisation transactions can be found on the cost side and 
on the legal and structuring side. Depending on the country of origination there 
                                            
179 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
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are tax as well as legal challenges. For example in Germany, for a real estate 
Securitisation where real estate receivables are sold to an SPV and the real 
estate is transferred to the SPV because it serves as additional collateral, a 
transfer tax of 3.5% applies. This does not only apply once, but twice, once the 
real estate is transferred back to the originator after the notes have matured 
and the transaction is finished. Taking this extra cost of 7% into account, does 
not make the real estate Securitisation look very favourable. So therefore the 
local tax rules are very important in the structuring of a real estate ABS 
transaction. Apart from that the biggest legal problem is the achievement of the 
bankruptcy remoteness of the SPV. It is for that reason that most of the time the 
real estate has to be transferred as additional collateral. In most countries there 
are different bankruptcy laws and especially in Europe it is a real challenge to 
structure a transaction of such sort. 
Moreover the new accounting rules concerning Securitisation within IAS and 
especially US GAAP (after Enron) are making it very difficult for companies to 
reach off-balance sheet treatment. This makes especially those transactions 
very difficult, where the originator wants to achieve an off-balance sheet 
treatment, but does not want to sacrifice the upside of the portfolio.  
Finally, issuers need to weigh the cost of the transaction, which can be very 
high, versus the benefits of a real estate Securitisation. The costs are not only 
up-front legal and structuring fees, but also issuing and administrative costs. 
Therefore it is essential that a minimum volume as defined earlier is reached. 
3.4 Research Framework for Real Estate Securitisation 
3.4.1 Overview 
The Research Framework for Real Estate Securitisation that is defined in the 
underlying dissertation thesis is based on the hypothesis that there are different 
environments and determinants that influence Securitisation markets. This 
framework can be adapted to Real Estate Securitisation markets, so that there 
are six different environments influencing the market and its transactions. 
Furthermore, there are three different determinants that influence Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions. 
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The environments shaping the market and its transaction structures are: 
• Regulatory/Legal Environment 
• Tax Environment 
• Accounting Environment 
• Investor Environment 
• Rating Agency Environment 
• Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment 
Those environments act on the three determinants of a Securitisation 
transaction, which are  
• The Assets that are used for the Securitisation transaction, 
• The Borrowers initiating the transaction, 
• And the Motives for choosing that financing alternative. 
The relationships between the market, the environments and the determinants 
are very well documented by the illustration in Figure 14. 
The different environments influence each other and act on the determinants. 
The environments are externally given to the borrower who needs to choose, if 
he wants to use Real Estate Securitisation as a financing alternative to a 
traditional financing. His decision is influenced by the motives that he is 
following with his financing strategy. If for example, his main objective is to 
achieve off-balance sheet financing, then the accounting environment is 
influencing if he is going to do a Securitisation transaction or not. Then there 
are different real estate assets (e.g. cash flows, development proceeds, real 
estate values) that the borrower can choose from. This decision may be 
dependent on the investor and rating agency environment; if the rating agencies 
do not approve the assets and the transaction structures, then the transaction 
will not go through, and if investors do not like the assets then, they will not buy 
the bonds, and the transaction won’t go through neither. 
On another page the Accounting Environment is influencing the other 
environments as well. It has an effect on the regulatory/legal environment (i.e. 
legal structuring, the rules governing the market), the tax environment (because 
70 3  Principles of Real Estate Securitisation 
 
tax and accounting are closely linked) and on the rating agency environment 
(because it alters the view that rating agencies take). This example shows that 
in essence all environments are somehow dependent on each other and are 
influencing each other. 
Each environment is changed and shaped by certain drivers. One driver for 
example for the regulatory environment in the US was the Savings & Loans 
crisis in the 1980’s and the foundation of the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC). Drivers for environments in different geographic regions differ, but 
common denominators can be derived. 
Eventually what will follow out of the combination of different environments with 
the determinants of Real Estate Securitisation in a specific region/country will 
create an appropriate transaction structure. Each transaction structure is 
different and the ultimate structure depends on whichever angle one looks at 
the Securitisation. Multiple similar structures can be grouped into overall 
transaction schemes.  
3.4.2 Market 
The Demarcation of the relevant market is important. A market can be classified 
by geography, asset class and determinants (originators or transaction 
schemes). The focus of this thesis is the Asset Securitisation market in general 
and Real Estate Securitisation market in specific. From an asset-class 
perspective, the Real Estate Securitisation market overlaps closely with the 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market. From a geographic 
perspective this dissertation will look at four different markets: Singapore, the 
USA, Europe and Germany. 
Markets evolve in certain patterns and are fuelled by certain evolution drivers 
that lead to the inception but also to the ongoing development of the market. 
Resulting out of this relationship are minimal requirements that need to be 
fulfilled for the markets to evolve. 
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Figure 14: Theoretical Framework for Real Estate Securitisation Markets 
Source: Authors Compilation 
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In this respect, the influence of different environments on the market and on the 
determinants of the market are important. Rating Agencies like Standards & 
Poor’s and Moody’s have long accepted the importance of those different 
environments and determinants that influence the evolution and inception of 
Securitisation markets, as can be displayed exemplarily by the following 
analysis for the Chinese Securitisation market:180 
“Standard & Poor’s has defined that Laws and Regulations are needed for a 
Firm Foundation of the market. Before a significant Securitisation market can 
exist in China, the country needs a strong judicial system and clear-cut body of 
laws to form the foundation of a viable Securitisation framework. In recent 
years, new laws have been enacted, notably security and trust laws, but there 
still remains uncertainty about the implementation of existing laws, and in 
particular, creditors' enforcement rights and the efficiency of the judicial 
process. In this regard, a draft bankruptcy law was submitted for review in June 
2004, suggesting a desire by the authorities for quicker reforms. If adopted, this 
law will supersede a patchwork of antiquated regulations and laws that lack 
clarity and details. The new law is intended to apply to all enterprises (with 
some specified exceptions). Presently, not only does China lack a clear-cut set 
of laws (including tax laws) specifically governing Securitisation, it is still 
unclear which regulatory body would oversee Securitisation transactions. 
Structural, legal, and tax issues faced in China could be resolved by 
exploring solutions applied elsewhere, especially in those Asian jurisdictions 
that have enacted specialized Securitisation laws. The willingness of 
legislators to move in the direction of reform that favours creditor rights and 
to establish laws to facilitate Securitisation is critical to ensuring the orderly 
development of this new market.”181 
Even though it has long been universally accepted that there are environments 
and market drivers, there has been a lack of a comprehensive model or 
research framework to mirror this. This thesis is setting up a framework for this, 
as described below. 
                                            
180 Cf. Lam (2004), p. 6. 
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3.4.3 Environments 
The environments do not only pose the framework specifically for Real Estate 
Securitisation but also for the overall Asset-Securitisation market in general. 
Regulatory/Legal 
Regulatory guidelines on Securitisation that are issued for banks are usually 
also proxies for non-bank Securitisations (see Singapore, Italy, etc.). The 
Regulatory and Legal Environment are prerequisites for the institution of a 
functioning Asset-Securitisation market. There needs to be certainty about what 
is allowed, what can be issued, who needs to be informed, who is allowed to do 
it. Legally it is important to be able to institute bankruptcy remote structures and 
to be able to truly sell and transfer the asset 
Tax 
Tax is a critical decision criterion, when an investor is allocating his funds. The 
tax on the asset level, on the SPV level as well as the interest tax is of 
enormous concern to the investor. Hence, investors usually seek for loopholes 
in tax legislation, which leads to very complex and ‘hard to understand’ 
structures and company/legal constructs. It is hence important for investors to 
have predictable tax guidelines. For policy makers, it is important to build up tax 
structures that help attract originators, arrangers and investors alike. 
Accounting 
The accounting environment is influencing the Asset-Securitisation market in 
the sense that the more favourable the asset sale is on the sellers/originators 
balance sheet the more transactions will happen, i.e. the bigger the market will 
grow. In reverse the bigger the accounting hurdles, the more unlikely it is for 
Real Estate Securitisation transactions to happen. 
Rating Environment 
The Rating Environment includes the influence of the rating agencies on 
structured finance markets as well as the level of ratings used in Securitisation 
issues. Rating Agencies through their influence on structures/transactions 
                                                                                                                                
181  Wong and Lam (2004), p. 1. 
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strongly shape the structures used and the evolution of markets. It is a 
hindrance to new innovative methods and structures. If rating agencies do not 
give their consent for transactions the bonds cannot be placed in the global 
financial markets. 
Investor  
Investors are crucial to the success of Securitisation transactions. If they do not 
understand the issuances and if they do not buy the bonds, then the market will 
never evolve. The investor demand is a driving force and is dependent on what 
alternative investment products exist in the market. Assets, as well as the 
structural features of the bonds (interest, principal and maturity) should match 
investor preferences and should help to fulfil the investor’s investment 
objectives. Basically everything is securitisable as long as investors buy it: 
“Your list of assets is pretty long, and as long as investors buy it, you can 
securitize basically everything.”182 
Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment 
The Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment is essentially the residual of all 
environments in the market. It catches the local and cultural peculiarities, as 
well as the situation on the real estate market. It is indisputable that the state of 
the real estate market has a great effect on the timing and the inception of Real 
Estate Securitisation.  
There are big regional differences – Real Estate Securitisation in Asia is 
different than in the US or Europe. There are different implications for different 
countries and regions.  
3.4.4 Core Determinants 
In Real Estate Securitisation transactions different originators hold different 
assets and might have various motives of doing a Real Estate Securitisation. 
Therefore the different assets, borrowers and motives specific to Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions are described in the following. 
Borrowers/Originators/Sellers 
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There are various originators of real estate related cash flows and real estate 
assets in the property industry. Depending on the type of incorporation, the core 
competencies and the business model of those potential borrowers, it can be 
delineated for whom a Securitisation transaction might be feasible or not. 
• Corporates, that have defined real estate as a non-core business and 
that try to disinvest their real estate holdings in order to raise shareholder 
value. 
• Corporates, that have defined real estate as a core business and that are 
looking to finance or refinance their existing holdings. 
• Real estate holders that are looking at financing or refinancing their 
existing real estate. The following list belongs to that category: 
o Open-ended real estate funds 
o Closed-ended real estate funds 
o Listed property companies 
o Real estate specialty funds (for insurances etc.) 
o Opportunity Funds 
• Real Estate Investors that are financing new acquisitions by issuing 
Asset-Backed Securities. 
• Real Estate Sellers, that are trying to generate solvency for a sale that 
will only take place sometime in the future (advance sale) 
• Governments that have solvency problems but that also have a lot of real 
estate holdings. In the European Union, member countries are only 
allowed to take on a certain amount of debt (Maastricht Criteria). 
Therefore the governments are looking for ways to access solvency 
without raising the national debt (compare Italian Treasury Real Estate 
Securitisation). 
• Real estate project developer 
                                                                                                                                
182 Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
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• Suppliers of Multi-Seller Platforms; those enable a pool of small 
originators to pool their assets. 
Assets 
All the assets for a Real Estate Securitisation are cash flows that are derived 
from real estate, in one way or another. Those assets can be summarised in the 
following categories: 
• Real estate rental receivables. 
• Contractually defined future cash flows from real estate leases (secured 
either by the real estate itself, a mortgage or by a leasehold construct). 
• Future cash flows derived from real estate in project finance and 
infrastructure projects (e.g. Cash Flows from Toll roads or income from 
other public infrastructure projects). 
• Ticket sales from football stadiums and multi-purpose arenas. 
• Real estate sale and leaseback payments. 
• Future real estate sale proceeds. 
• Corporate Real Estate Sale and Leasebacks. 
• Cash flows from real estate backed Whole Company Securitisations (e.g. 
Pub deals), where the assets are the cash flows from the company, but 
the collateral is the real estate of the company, and one cannot do 
without the other. 
• Future proceeds from real estate development projects. 
Those findings can be put into a new subdivision of asset classes as shown in 
Figure 12. 
Motives 
Type of Motive / Motivation of the Borrower/Asset-Originator 
In general, there must be some kind of motive or a goal that an originator 
follows by using a Securitisation as a financing instrument; otherwise it would 
not be utilized.  
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Figure 15: Subdivision of Assets-Classes including Real Estate Securitisation 
Source: Authors Compilation 
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Usually originators want to have all the following goals and motives satisfied; 
however, that is not always possible. Contradictions of goals often occur: 
• Off-Balance Sheet Financing 
• Funding 
o by selling future real estate cash flows 
o by selling the real estate itself 
• Development of new financing sources and opening up a new investor 
base 
• Capital market financing without having a rating 
• To get a cheaper financing if the asset rating is better than the corporate 
rating 
• Realisation of balance sheet reserves 
• Higher loan to value ratios (LTV) 
• Opportunity to realise future real estate cash flows today (at a present 
value) 
• Improvement of the Return on Equity (ROE) and increase of the 
shareholder value 
• Increase of the company’s solvency 
• Use of Securitisation as a balance sheet management tool 
Transaction Schemes/Structures 
Transactions Schemes are abstracted transaction structures. They rather show 
the generalized pattern of potential transactions rather than the specific 
structure. The specific transaction structures result out of the specific 
combination of transaction schemes, borrowers/originators/sellers, assets and 
motives. This process is determined and influenced by the market, the 
environments and the drivers of the market. 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has merged Real Estate Financing and Asset Securitisation into 
the concept of Real Estate Securitisation. It has introduced the concept and has 
distinguished it from Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. 
As there does not exist a specific research framework for Asset-Securitisation 
and Real Estate Securitisation, yet. This chapter has established a research 
framework:  
The framework is constituted by the relevant market and the following identified 
environments and core determinants: 
The environments shaping the market and its transaction structures are: 
• Regulatory/Legal Environment 
• Tax Environment 
• Accounting Environment 
• Investor Environment 
• Rating Agency Environment 
• Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment. 
Those environments act on the three determinants of a Securitisation 
transaction, which are: 
• The Assets that are used for the Securitisation transaction, 
• The Borrowers initiating the transaction, 
• And the Motives for choosing that financing alternative. 
The framework will be validated by the international comparison, which will be 
the basis for the analysis of the German market. 
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4 International Comparison - Validation of 
Research Framework 
The use of the international comparison is threefold:  
1. It is validating the research framework for Securitisation markets, by 
showing that:  
a. Securitisation markets are influenced by regulatory/legal, tax, 
accounting, rating agency, investor and real estate/local/cultural 
environments, 
b. there are 3 core determinants in every Real Estate Securitisation 
that have an influence on the transaction schemes used in such 
transactions, 
c. and drivers can be identified that make a Real Estate 
Securitisation market evolve. 
2. It is underlining Real Estate Securitisation as an asset class. 
3. It compares the Real Estate Securitisation Markets in Singapore, US and 
Europe in order to derive statements that will lead to the constitution of a 
model and that will help to better analyse why there is not a market for 
Real Estate Securitisation in Germany and what can be done to change 
this. 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 International Asset-Securitisation 
The importance of Securitisation in the global structured finance markets is 
enormous and can be best described by a quote of Joanne W. Rose, executive 
managing director of Standard & Poor's Structured Finance Ratings group in 
New York:183 
                                            
183 Rose, et al. (2000), p. 1. 
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“Asset Securitisation is one of the most significant financial innovations in the 
global capital markets, substantially enhancing the management of assets and 
liabilities by individuals and corporations. It is a very robust market and it is 
broadening both in terms of asset classes and the use of Securitisation 
techniques in other forms of financing. Most exciting is the growth occurring 
outside the U.S. and the developments that are different from U.S. structures.” 
This quote highlights that in 2000 the high significance of global Securitisation 
markets outside the US had already been identified. Today Securitisation as a 
structured finance product has spread over all of the 5 continents as illustrated 
below and visualized in Figure 16: The Spectrum of Global Securitisation: 
America (North- and South-America)184 
United States,185 Canada,186 Argentina,187 Bolivia,188 Brazil,189 Chile,190 
Colombia,191 Mexico,192 Nicaragua,193 Panama,194 Paraguay195 and 
Venezuela.196 
Africa 
South Africa197 
                                            
184 Cf. Sheridan, et al. (2003), p. 40. 
185 Cf. Bonjour and Falk (2003), p. 56; Borod and Hutton (2003), p. 57; Dorris (2003), p. 79; 
Finkelstein (2003), p. 63; Gambro (2003), p. 51; O’Connor and Jr (2003), p. 64; Rosenberg 
and Weiss (2003), p. 111; Sakai (2003), p. 68; Schneider (2003), p. 97; Symonds Jr and 
O’Toole (2003), p. 107; Telpner (2003), p. 85; Thompson and Weaver (2003), p. 36; Wildman 
and Lewton (2003), p. 74. 
186 Cf. Fingerhut (2001), p. 17; Witherspoon (1999), p. 21. 
187 Cf. Dell'Oro Maini and Noblía (2003), p. 118. 
188 Cf. Rojas (2003), p. 123. 
189 Cf. Junqueira Sampaio Meirelles and Bentivegna (2003), p. 126. 
190 Cf. Eyzaguirre and Carraha (2003), p. 132. 
191 Cf. Fradique-Méndez and Arciniegas (2003), p. 137. 
192 Cf. Otto, et al. (2003), p. 143. 
193 Cf. Rodríguez and Arias (2003), p. 147. 
194 Cf. Watson III (2003), p. 151. 
195 Cf. Breuer (2003), p. 155. 
196 Cf. Luján (2003), p. 158. 
197 Cf. Anonymous (2002k), p. 96; Aris, et al. (2002), p. 26. 
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Figure 16: The Spectrum of Global Securitisation  
Source: Authors Compilation 
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Asia198 
China,199 Hong Kong,200 India,201 Indonesia,202 Japan,203 Korea,204 Malaysia,205 
Philippines,206 Singapore,207 Taiwan208 and Thailand.209 
Australia/Pacific 
Australia210 and New Zealand.211 
Europe212 
Austria,213 Belgium,214 Bulgaria,215 Czech Republic,216 Finland,217 France,218 
Germany,219 Hungary,220 Ireland,221 Italy,222 Latvia,223 Lithuania,224 
                                            
198 Cf. Wong, et al. (2003), p. 170. 
199 Cf. Thomas and Chen (2003), p. 180. 
200 Cf. Showering and Mazzochi (2003), p. 183; Sing, et al. (2003), p. 31. 
201 Cf. Nath (2003), p. 187. 
202 Cf. Santoso and Boer (2003), p. 192. 
203 Cf. Egawa (2003), p. 164; Lewis (2003), p. 196; Sing, et al. (2003), p. 32. 
204 Cf. Bulmer (2003), p. 202; Sing, et al. (2003), p. 32. 
205 Cf. Showering and Rath (2003), p. 207. 
206 Cf. Ledesma and Jirasetpatana (2001), p. 1; Morales (2003), p. 216. 
207 Cf. Janssen and Pinsler (2003), p. 219. 
208 Cf. Mazzochi, et al. (2003), p. 223. 
209 Cf. Jennings-Mares and Thammavaranucupt (2003), p. 227. 
210 Cf. Cox, et al. (2003), p. 174. 
211 Cf. Murphy (1996), p. 581; Wetherell (2003), p. 212. 
212 Cf. Clifford Chance European Securitisation Group (2001), p. 36; Collingridge, et al. (2003), 
p. 243; Herrmann (2001), p. 25; Jeffrey (2001), p. 15; Rajendra, et al. (2003), p. 234; 
Sampson (2001), p. 1; Weiffenbach and Ghali (2003), p. 247. 
213 Cf. Fabian, et al. (2003). 
214 Cf. Deux (2003). 
215 Cf. Spasov (2003). 
216 Cf. Krauss, et al. (2001). 
217 Cf. Westerlund, et al. (2003). 
218 Cf. de Kergommeaux and Saint Marc (2003); de Kergommeaux and Saint Marc (2001). 
219 Cf. Krauss (2001), p. 58; Kreppel (2003), p. 273; Lamers (2003), p. 25. 
220 Cf. Deri (2003). 
221 Cf. Galvin (2003). 
222 Cf. Ago and Battaglia (2001); Danusso and Castorino (2003). 
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Luxembourg,225 Netherlands,226 Norway,227 Portugal,228 Poland,229 Romania,230 
Spain,231 Sweden,232 Switzerland,233 Turkey234 and United Kingdom.235 
4.1.2 Study Setup 
The international comparison is made up of three case studies: relating to Real 
Estate Securitisation Singapore, the United States of America and Europe. As 
there is very little information on Real Estate Securitisation, the analysis is 
based on 23 recorded and transcribed structured interviews that were 
conducted in Singapore (July/August 2003), in the United States 
(August/September 2003) and in Europe (November 2003). The transcripts of 
those interviews are enclosed for reference in the appendix of this thesis. In 
addition newspaper, magazine and journal articles (if available) were used to 
give a comprehensive picture of the respective markets, their evolution, the 
overall framework for Asset-Securitisation in and the core determinants of the 
respective market. Two of the interviews used were required to be made 
anonymous. A complete list of interview partner and companies involved can be 
observed in Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3. 
                                                                                                                                
223 Cf. Smilgaine (2003).  
224 Cf. Stasevicius and Reciunas (2003). 
225 Cf. Schmitt and Lazard (2003). 
226 Cf. Crans, et al. (2003); Kellermann (2001). 
227 Cf. Winther (2003). 
228 Cf. Pereira and Mendes (2003); Smithson and Maia de Loureiro (2001). 
229 Cf. Krauss, et al. (2001). 
230 Cf. Nestor (2003). 
231 Cf. Berricano and Rojas (2003). 
232 Cf. Högström and Rydin (2001); Högström, et al. (2003). 
233 Cf. Kroll (2001); Rayroux and Kühni (2003). 
234 Cf. Pekin, et al. (2003); Pettit (2001). 
235 Cf. Croke, et al. (2003); Geberbauer and Hebburn (2001). 
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Name  Position Division Company Country 
Johannes 
Boeckmann  
Managing 
Director  
Real Estate 
Investment 
Banking  
Eurohypo AG, 
North America  
USA 
Thomas R. 
Boemio  
Senior 
Supervisory 
Financial 
Analyst  
Division of 
Banking 
Supervision and 
Regulation  
Federal Reserve  USA 
Jason C. 
Cave  
Chief  Policy Section  Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
Corporation  
USA 
Stephen H. 
Choe  
Vice 
President  
Real Estate 
Debt Markets  
Deutsche Bank 
Securities Inc.  
USA 
Patrick J. 
Corcoran  
Director  Real Estate 
Structured 
Finance  
JP Morgan  USA 
Warren S. 
Ashenmil  
Managing 
Director  
Structured 
Finance  
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc. 
USA 
Richard A. 
Jacobs  
Managing 
Director  
Structured 
Finance  
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc.  
USA 
Thomas E. 
Robinson  
Managing 
Director  
Investment 
Banking  
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc. 
USA 
Martin C. 
Mitsoff 
Managing 
Director  
Research & 
Strategy 
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc. 
USA 
Sharon Lee 
Stark 
Managing 
Director  
Fixed Income 
Capital Markets 
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc. 
USA 
Darren M. 
Wolberg  
First Vice 
President  
Institutional 
Mortgage 
Securities/CMBS 
Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc. 
USA 
Tyler Yang, 
Ph.D.  
President   Integrated 
Financial 
Engineering  
USA 
Chart 1: Interview Partners in the United States 
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Name  Position Division Company Country 
Joseph Ooi  Assistant 
Professor 
Department of 
Real Estate  
National 
University of 
Singapore  
Singapore 
(Asia) 
David Ho Kim 
Hin  
Associate 
Professor  
Department of 
Real Estate  
National 
University of 
Singapore  
Singapore 
(Asia) 
Sing Tien Foo  Research 
Director  
Centre for Real 
Estate Studies  
National 
University of 
Singapore  
Singapore 
(Asia) 
Franklin Heng  President  Real Estate 
Investment 
Ergo Tru Asia  Singapore 
(Asia) 
Lawrence 
Yeo  
CFO  CapitaLand 
Commercial 
Limited  
CapitaLand 
Inc. 
Singapore 
(Asia) 
Seck Wai 
Kwong  
CFO  Board of 
Directors 
Singapore 
Exchange  
Singapore 
(Asia) 
Anonymous  N/A N/A N/A Singapore 
(Asia) 
Chart 2: Interview Partners in Singapore 
 
Name  Position Division Company Country 
Clive D. Bull  Vice 
President  
Real Estate 
Structured 
Finance  
JP Morgan 
Securities Ltd. 
Europe 
Leonard Van 
Drunen 
Managing 
Director 
Real Estate 
Structured 
Finance  
JP Morgan 
Securities Ltd. 
Europe 
Caroline 
Philips  
Managing 
Director  
Securitisation - 
Real Estate 
Investment 
Banking  
Eurohypo AG, 
London  
Europe 
Paul Rivlin  Managing 
Director, Joint 
CEO  
Real Estate 
Investment 
Banking  
Eurohypo AG, 
London 
Europe 
Robert 
Rügemer  
Director  German 
Coverage  
AMBAC 
Assurance UK 
Limited  
Europe 
Rolf Steffens  Managing 
Director  
Securitised 
Products Group 
Deutsche 
Bank AG  
Europe 
Anonymous N/A N/A N/A Europe 
Chart 3: Interview Partners in Europe 
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The interview structure was derived out of the research framework. The 
questions were separated into two categories: 
1. Transaction specific questions on borrowers/sellers/originators, assets 
and motives for Real Estate Securitisation transactions.  
2. Environment specific questions on regulatory/legal, tax, accounting, 
rating agency, investor and real estate/local/cultural environments. 
The interview question guide can be observed below. 
List of Interview Question: 
Part 1: Transaction specific questions (borrowers, assets, motives): 
1. Have there been Real Estate Securitisations in Singapore/US/Europe? 
How were these deals structured? Why? 
2. Who are the typical sellers in Real Estate Securitisation transactions in 
Singapore/US/Europe? 
3. What are the common securitised commercial real estate assets? 
4. What are the common motives for doing these transactions? 
5. Are the transactions off-balance sheet? 
6. Are there any embedded options inherent in these transactions? 
7. How were they placed, i.e. public or private placement? 
8. Who took the Junior “first loss/equity piece”? Is it difficult to place those? 
9. Were the transactions all rated? Also the private placements? 
10. What would be the most important motivation for corporates to do Real 
Estate Securitisation in Singapore/US/Europe?  
a. Financing of real estate / Refinancing of existing loans 
b. Sale of real estate  
c. To get the assets off the balance sheet 
d. Capital markets exposure (broadening the financing of the company) 
e. Getting a capital markets financing without having a corporate rating 
f. Getting investment grade funding while having a non investment 
grade rating 
g. Non-recourse loan 
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Part 2: General questions concerning the US/Singapore/European Market 
(regulatory/legal, tax, accounting, rating agency, investor and real 
estate/local/cultural environment): 
1. What is the tax treatment on the SPV level as well as on the investor 
level? Which taxes apply in the transaction? 
2. Have there been offshore Real Estate Securitisation transactions? Why? 
3. Has there been a change in the regulatory environment to favour Real 
Estate Securitisations (laws or regulations)? If so what were those and 
when did they happen? 
4. Is it legally possible to set up a bankruptcy remote structure? Was it 
always that way, or did any laws change this? 
5. Are there accounting issues with US Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions? Has this changed since the collapse of Enron? 
6. Are there any peculiarities in the US market compared to Europe? 
7. Do you think the real estate/local/cultural environment played a role in 
the structure of these Securitisation transactions? 
8. What are the investors preferences when it comes to US Real Estate 
Securitisations? 
9. What is your outlook for the US Real Estate Asset-Securitisation market 
in the future? 
Chart 4: Interview Question Guideline - International Comparison 
As explained above, information sources on Real Estate Securitisation are few. 
Therefore, the information gathered by the conducted interviews is enhanced 
with additional information in order to derive a most complete picture of the 
respective market. In addition to the sources quoted above, Rating Reports 
from the three Rating Agencies (Fitch Ratings, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s 
Investor Service) are used to enhance the data and information. Specific market 
data (e.g. new issuance volume, division of asset classes etc.) is also gathered 
from Rating Agencies’ Special Reports as well as from selected Investment 
Banks’ Securitisation Research Reports. 
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The three following chapters (4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) relating to the different case 
studies will all have the same chapter structure that goes back to the research 
framework delineated in chapter 3.4. The chapters will go into detail on the Real 
Estate and Asset-Securitisation markets in Singapore, the US and Europe.  
Each sub-chapter will first do a literature review on the respective markets and 
will delineate sources of information on the evolution of that market. Then a 
market overview will demonstrate the evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation 
market, drivers influencing that development and the state that the market is 
currently in. It will start with a brief description of market specific definitions and 
terminology and then it will give an introduction to the market, followed by a 
summary of identified Real Estate Securitisation transactions. The market 
overview chapter will set the scene for the subsequent analysis of the specific 
environments.  
The analysis of the different environments influencing the evolution and 
inception of Real Estate Securitisation markets will explain the framework for 
Securitisation in the respective countries.  
The subsequent part will review the core determinants 
(borrowers/originators/sellers, assets, motives) in the analyzed region and will 
relate those to the transaction schemes used. The sub-chapters will conclude 
with an analysis summary of the respective market. 
Eventually this chapter will combine the conclusions and findings of the three 
case study sub-chapters into a result analysis, which is made up of the 
following parts: 
• Market Evolution Patterns 
• Influence of Environments on the Market 
• Typical Core Determinants 
• Minimum Evolution Requirements for Real Estate Securitisation 
Finally the ‘Chapter Summary’ will conclude the international comparison. 
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4.2 Singapore 
Since there is not much information and data on Asset-Securitisation and 
especially Real Estate Securitisation transactions in Singapore,236 most of the 
information used in the following part is based on the author’s compilation of 
pieces of information from different sources, such as structured interviews, 
newspaper and magazine articles, and rating as well as company reports. 
This Chapter will briefly go over academic literature on Asset-Securitisation and 
Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore. Subsequently, it will give an overview 
of the Singapore Asset-Securitisation market, which is essentially the Real 
Estate Securitisation market, because in the beginning of the market real estate 
was the only asset class utilised. This sub-chapter will go into the evolution of 
the market and the identified transactions up to date. Then the different 
environments will be highlighted and analysed. Finally, the analysis of the core 
determinants will put together the picture and show who the originators and 
borrowers were in Singapore, which assets they used and for what motives. 
The analysis will also investigate the different kinds of transaction structures 
and will conclude with a summary. 
4.2.1 Literature Review 
There are several journal articles, conference papers, research project reports 
and bachelor as well as master theses written on the topic of Asset-
Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore. The Department of 
Real Estate within the School of Design and Environment at the National 
University of Singapore (NUS) has been very active in the field of Real Estate 
Securitisation research – especially regarding the Singapore experience. So 
nearly all of the academic sources on Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate 
Securitisation in Singapore origin out of the NUS Real Estate Department. 
                                            
236 It is difficult to gather data, because there are no official institutions in Singapore gathering 
information on private transactions. The first deals were all private transactions and there are 
no compulsory publications for those deals. Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Ooi (2003), 
Interview 4, p. 554. 
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The first study done on this topic was a master thesis case study evaluating the 
feasibility and advantageousness of Securitisation for commercial real estate 
companies. This was followed by publications on three different equity and debt 
Securitisation vehicles utilised in Singapore: Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs), Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBB) and Asset-Backed Securitisations. In 
these publications the importance of a secondary real estate market for 
Singapore as well as the feasibility and utilisation of the different ways of raising 
funds were analysed.237 
Moreover, two other bachelor and master theses were written that go into the 
governance of Securitisation transactions as well as the benefits of using Real 
Estate Securitisation as a source of funding.238 
In addition to that, several studies evaluated the first Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions including the embedded option structures utilised by Singapore 
Corporates and Developers. Most of the research at that stage covered the 
unique structural aspects of those transactions. Especially the valuation of 
embedded options and the adequate pricing of the issued bonds were in the 
focus of Singapore researchers. Using bonds in Securitisation transactions was 
not new,239 but the way they were utilized in combination with the underlying 
asset in accordance with the motives followed by the originators and borrowers 
was new and unique to Singapore. So, this led to an immense academic 
interest and a big amount of application-oriented research.240 
This was accompanied by different research projects carried out by the Centre 
for Real Estate Studies at the National University of Singapore. The studies 
included an analysis of equity and debt Securitisation,241 a compilation of the 
feasibility of different real estate financing alternatives in Singapore (including 
debt financing, equity financing, sale-leaseback financing, Real Estate 
                                            
237 Cf. Ong, et al. (2001), p. 1; Ong, et al. (2000), p. 54. 
238 Cf. Heng (2002), p. 1; Tay (2002), p. 1. 
239 Cf. Bhattacharya (2001), p. 1127; Dialynas, et al. (2001), p. 1103; Fabozzi, et al. (2001), p. 
773; Johnston (2001), p. 759. 
240 Cf. Lim (2000); Sing, et al. (2003), p. 173; Tan (2000); Yong (2002). 
241 Cf. Ong, et al. (2001), p. 1. 
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Securitisation and REITs)242 and a comprehensive final report on Asset-Backed 
Securitisation in Singapore. This report summarizes all the research done up to 
that point concerning Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore, including its 
potential, risks, governance, credit enhancements, values, options and 
pricing.243 
The latest research on Asset-Securitisation in Singapore goes away from Real 
Estate Securitisation into the field of Mortgage-Backed Loan Securitisation. 
Here, the feasibility of Residential and Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation as well as the potential interest from the bank originator and 
investor side are analysed.244 
Even though there has been quite a bit of research on Asset-Securitisation in 
Singapore, what has been missing, however, is a framework for analyzing this 
market. There is no comprehensive study putting together the evolution of the 
market into a model that shows how the different environments have influenced 
the originators/borrowers, assets and motives (i.e. the core determinants). 
Moreover, no complete study has been made identifying the drivers fuelling the 
evolution of the market and the development of the different environments. 
Apart from that a comprehensive compilation of all Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions analyzing the structural features as well as the parties involved, 
their assets and motives is missing. 
4.2.2 Market Overview 
4.2.2.1 Evolution and State of the Market 
The analysis of Asset-Backed Securitisation, as Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions were first called in Singapore, shows the typical evolution of such a 
market. Thereby the structures in Singapore come the closest of all other 
analyzed structures to the concept of Real Estate Securitisation introduced in 
Chapter 3. This is the reason why this chapter will be overweight compared to 
the other chapters on the USA and Europe. 
                                            
242 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 1. 
243 Cf. Sing, et al. (2003), p. 1. 
244 Cf. Sing and Ong (2004), p. 159; Sing, et al. (2004), p. 1; Tan (2001), p. 1. 
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Singapore: 
Singapore is a city-state located at the southern end of the Malaysian peninsula 
that covers a total area of 647 square kilometres and has a population of 4.2 
million. Singapore is Southeast Asia’s educational and financial capital. Its 
‘AAA’ rating is supported by its high per capita GDP and persistent current 
account surpluses of 20% of GDP or more. Besides flexible monetary and 
exchange rate policies, the robust public finances – with recurrent fiscal 
surpluses of over 5% of GDP and large public sector net assets – have helped 
Singapore contain the fall-out from the Asia crisis. Since then, Singapore has 
started to implement a wide range of reforms and economic restructuring in the 
financial sector. However, the government still retains a pervasive involvement 
in the economy, especially through its control over Government-Linked 
Corporations (GLC).245 
History of Asset-Securitisation: 
The evolution of Real Estate Securitisation is the result of Singapore’s unique 
institutional structure. The secondary investment market was dominated by 
equities while the debt market was on the whole under-developed. Real estate 
was traditionally regarded as a direct investment. So, on the one hand the 
potential for a secondary real estate market in Singapore was immense, 
especially regarding the asset rich balance sheets of Singapore’s government-
linked developers at the time. And on the other hand the traditional source of 
funding for property companies in Singapore was the banking market that led 
into a credit crunch following the Asian Financial Crisis. Moreover, the problem 
with bank lending was that lenders were reluctant to provide medium or long-
term fixed rate interest funding.246 
Therefore, the development of a secondary real estate market was linked to 
that of the debt market. In this respect, the concept of property-backed debt 
Securitisation was not exactly new to Singapore. The very first Mortgage-
                                            
245 Cf. Tan and McCarthy (2004), p. 6. 
246 Cf. Ong, et al. (2001), p. 9. 
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Backed Bond (MBB)247 was issued in 1986. It was a time of recession and 
restrictive loan commitment policies. Hence, government officials were very 
receptive for new ideas to keep the real estate market growing: “They said let 
us try it!”248 The first company to issue such a security had to go through a lot of 
trouble and negotiations. Company acts and regulations had to be changed. 
Once the new rules and changes were instituted the issuance of Mortgage-
Backed Bonds became easier and made this market grow. This opened an 
investor market, which from the beginning had been very narrow – coined by 
insurance companies and some corporates. Private investors and foreign 
investors were not to keen on investing in Singaporean securities at the time, 
because of tax issues that were not resolved until 1998.249 
In fact, the first Mortgage-Backed Bond was issued in 1986 by Hong Leong 
Holdings Ltd, which pledged a first legal mortgage on the Hong Leong Building 
to investors in a MBB transaction. Then in the 1990s, the Far East Organization 
stood out as one of the most active issuers of Mortgage-Backed Bonds in 
Singapore.250 However, the regulatory instance of Singapore – Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) – had been stringent on its approval of the sale of 
such mortgage-backed bonds, restricting its approvals to sophisticated 
investors; retail investors were not allowed to invest at all. Bonds in 
denominations of S$250,000 were commonly issued. Due to the small 
circulation and lack of an active secondary market, these bonds were usually 
held to maturity. A secondary market for those bonds did not exist. Even though 
the bond market was still strongly underdeveloped, MBB issues provided a 
                                            
247 Traditional Mortgage-Backed Bonds differ from Real Estate Securitisation/Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities in the sense that the asset pools are not separated from the 
originating company's balance sheets, whereas in the case of the later the assets are sold to 
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that finances the acquisition by issuing bonds. 
248 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
249 It was until 1998 that changes were made to promote the bond market – this was when the 
Approved Bond Intermediaries (ABI) came into being and an exemption from income tax for 
foreign investors and a 10% income tax for domestic investors was instituted, which promoted 
the evolution of the bond market. Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
250 Cf. Anonymous (1998c), p. 11. 
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platform for Real Estate Securitisation, as investors became more familiar with 
fixed-income instruments and real estate-backed bonds.251 
In addition to the history of real estate debt Securitisation, regulations had been 
ambivalent towards the establishment of Equity Securitisation in the form of 
property funds. Hence, Asset-Securitisation as a form of Debt Securitisation 
appeared to be the most successful vehicle at the time. This was spurred in part 
by the unique accounting rules of the Singapore Accounting Standards, but also 
by the realignment strategies of all major real estate developers. 252 
In order to understand the general background of what fuelled the evolution of 
Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore, it is important to look at the general 
environment in Singapore at the time, when the first Real Estate Securitisation 
took place in Singapore in 1999. There were two main drivers: 253  
1. The Asian financial crisis. 
2. A stronger orientation of real estate developers and property companies 
towards an asset-light approach - companies wanted to lighten their 
balance sheet. They rather wanted to get away from holding real estate 
in order to channel their capital to development properties. In general, 
the primary motive for the first companies to do Real Estate 
Securitisations was that they wanted to sell their real estate. Asset-
Securitisation was just another way to disinvest their real estate holdings, 
i.e. another divestment vehicle. Instead of an outright sale the companies 
looked at securitising the real estate. Thereby the first transactions took 
advantage of unique accounting rules in Singapore. 
The primary reason for choosing Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment 
vehicle for their investment properties over an outright sale was that the 
transactions resulted in a higher price for the sellers. It was difficult at the time 
                                            
251 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2000). 
252 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p.  554. 
253 Cf. Anonymous (2003), Interview 1, p. 554. 
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to find buyers who were able to bring up huge sums of money required to by 
‘trophy’ properties.254 
Specificity of the Market: 
The specificity of Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore resulted out of the first 
structures that were used at the dawn of the market. The way that the first Real 
Estate Securitisations worked in Singapore was as follows:255  
An investment property was sold to a Special Purpose Vehicle – a 
company incorporated in Singapore – which issued bonds that were 
backed by the cash flows and the value of the underlying property to 
finance the purchase. The bonds were additionally collateralized by a 
mortgage over the property and were usually enhanced with preference 
shares attached to them. The coupon for the bond was financed out of 
the property’s rental income stream and the principal amount was to be 
paid out of the sales value of the property at maturity or before. In the 
first transactions the sellers usually subscribed to the junior tranche of 
the bonds and were granted an option to buy back the property at a later 
stage.256 
Real Estate Securitisation transactions opened up property owners an 
alternative way of raising money in tough times, while structuring it as off-
balance sheet financing.257 
However, the investors at first were not keen on buying bonds under those 
transactions, since they were looking at achieving high returns.258 This is why 
originators in the first stage of Real Estate Securitisation transactions had to 
improve the coupon for the senior bondholders. To do that they either had to 
raise the rents significantly, or they had to accept a haircut on capital values 
(i.e. a reduced sales price), or they to accept a very low yield on the junior 
                                            
254 Cf. Rashiwala (1999c). 
255 Cf. Chow (2003). 
256 Cf. Rashiwala (1999a). 
257 Cf. Rashiwala (2001). 
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tranche to the benefit of the senior tranche holders. Hence, the seller typically 
subscribed for the higher-risk junior bonds, which received least priority in the 
event of a default and that often received a relatively low interest.259 
There were three features that made the early Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions unique to Singapore are described below:260 
1. Firstly, there was an explicit option in the Securitisation agreement that 
entitled the originator to lease back the property wholly or partially from 
the SPV for a period not longer than the bond maturity. In return, the 
originator guaranteed to pay the SPV rentals and other income, which 
were equivalent to or exceeded its interest obligations to the 
bondholders.  
2. Secondly, the Securitisation agreements incorporated explicit call options 
that allowed the bond originator to claim the capital appreciation in the 
property. The call option was an American-type option exercisable 
anytime within a pre-specified period before the expiration of the bond. 
The call option gave the bond originator the right to buy back the building 
at a discount to the prevailing market valuation but at no less than the 
original purchase price of the SPV. In the early cases 65 to 75% of 
property appreciation was granted to the originator. The remaining 25 to 
35% capital gains retained by the SPV was redistributed to the 
participating bondholders by way of preference shares attached to the 
bonds. If the option were not exercised at the date of maturity, the 
special purpose vehicle would then sell it to other parties or issue new 
bonds to fund the redemption of the expiring tranches. 
3. Thirdly, a put option was added into some of the early deals in order to 
provide a downside risk protection for the bondholders. In the 268 
Orchard Road deal, for example, a put option clause was included into 
the transaction requiring the originator (DBS Land) to buy back the 
                                                                                                                                
258 In 1999, the yields – especially of office properties – were low, due to high asset values. 
Office yields ranged around 4.5-4.7%, which was lower than yields required by institutional 
investors. Cf. Ooi, et al., Business Times Singapore (27 April 2000). 
259 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Rashiwala (2001). 
98 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
building at its ‘face value’ plus a premium. The premium of the put option 
was usually measured at a certain percentage of the capital appreciation 
realised when the option is exercised. In the case of 268 Orchard Road 
this was 35%. 
Depending on the deal structure, both the original owner (junior bondholder) 
and all other bondholders could gain from a capital appreciation. The 
participation of bondholders in the upside of the property was structured into the 
deals by the issuance of preference shares that were attached to the bonds. 
This was a strong peculiarity of the Singapore Securitisations, because it 
allowed debt instruments to be issued with an equity component attached to it. 
This way a 100% bond structure was established to hold the real estate.261 
The main Securitisation motive for most companies – especially for the former 
DBS Land262 – was to get the properties off-balance sheet. Since, in the 
beginning, the assets were considered ‘sold’, the companies could remove 
them from their balance sheets and retire debt related to the properties, thus 
lowering the gearing ratio.263 
However, the transactions in Singapore also showed that Real Estate 
Securitisation is not attractive to all property owners. The transactions do not 
necessarily lead to cheaper funding than bank loans because of the long-
standing relationship that developers – especially in Singapore – have with their 
house banks.264 
Apart from the bank relationship, the financing conditions in a Real Estate 
Securitisation depend heavily on the assets being securitised. Those have to be 
acceptable to bond investors. The coupon rate attached to the bonds depends 
on the quality of the property and the structure of the deal. Most critical is the 
ability of the SPV to service coupon payment, i.e. a sufficient property cash flow 
                                                                                                                                
260 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2000). 
261 Cf. Heng (2003), Interview 7, pp. 554. 
262 After the merger with Pidemco Land in 2000, DBS Land is today called CapitaLand. Cf. Yeo 
(2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
263 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
264 Cf. Rashiwala (2001). 
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and the amount of bonds issued vis-à-vis the valuation of the asset, i.e. an 
adequate value of the property. Hence, the poorer the asset quality, the higher 
the coupon rate and the more difficult it is to place the issuance. The owner of a 
non-prime property would end up paying a higher interest rate for bonds or 
raising less money under a Real Estate Securitisation deal than he would under 
a bank loan. This is the reason why the securitised properties in Singapore 
were all ‘Trophy Properties’.265 
Since cheap funding was not a motive in the early deals, monetization of the 
asset and off-balance sheet funding were the main drivers: 
"If the purpose is to take the asset off the balance sheet (and lower gearing), an 
Asset-Securitisation may be worthwhile. But if the issuer has no problem with 
keeping the assets in its books and just needs another source of funding, a 
bank loan may be a cheaper source of funds."266 
In any case, with Real Estate Securitisation the Singaporean developers had 
the option to diversify their funding sources. This was especially important in the 
credit crunch of 1999, following the Asian financial crisis.267 
Evolution of Real Estate Securitisation: 
DBS Land – Singapore’s biggest government-linked developer – was the 
pioneer of Asset-Securitisation in Singapore. In 1999, DBS Land had raised 
S$1.3 bn by securitising three office buildings. By doing that the company 
became the first listed developer to securitise entire buildings.268 This helped 
the company to improve cash flow and gearing, and reduce money tied up in 
what were ‘low yielding’ properties.269 
As mentioned before, in the beginning, the placement structure for most 
transactions was as follows: the senior tranche was placed out to institutional 
investors and the junior tranche was taken on by the originator of the 
                                            
265 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
266 Ng Kwan Meng, Senior Vice President, Overseas Union Bank in: Rashiwala (2001). 
267 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554. 
268 Cf. Anonymous (2000c). 
269 Cf. Anonymous (2000a). 
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transaction, i.e. the developer, who thus still had the control over the properties 
by the use of buyback options and preference shares.270 
In fact, the companies that securitised their real estate assets in 1999 
considered the assets technically and legally sold. For them Real Estate 
Securitisation was, therefore, not a financing exercise but a divestment 
exercise. The view of the market in the earliest stage of the market can be 
described as Jeanne Wong271 put it in an article in early 2000:272 
1. Firstly, the Securitisation of the real estate assets (as in the case of 268 
Orchard Road, Robinson Point, and 6 Battery Road for DBS Land) was 
usually in line with the company’s strategy to divest their lower yielding 
investment properties. It was not embarked upon as a fund-raising 
exercise.  
2. Secondly, these securitised assets were not regarded as long-term 
loans. Their legal titles had been transferred to independent special 
purpose vehicles (SPV) administered by a trust. Hence, the originating 
companies, i.e. the sellers did not exercise any control over the SPV.  
3. Thirdly, the granting of put options to investors did not pose a problem 
for the developers. Under those structures, the company only needed to 
buy back the property, if the bondholders would exercise the put option. 
This was only valuable to bondholders in the case of declining capital 
values. However, in the case of rising capital values – as was assumed 
by most developers at the time – the companies could capitalize on the 
appreciation in value of these securitised properties by exercising the call 
option. The company could buy back these assets, resell them and 
realise a share of the capital appreciation. This would then nullify the put 
option.  
4. Fourthly, the properties were sold at independently determined market 
values. The SPVs funded the purchase of the properties by issuing 
                                            
270 Cf. Chow (2003). 
271 Senior Manager, Corporate Communications, DBS Land. 
272 Cf. Wong (2000). 
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bonds – usually 2/3 in Senior Bonds and 1/3 in Junior Bonds. The 
originators were holding the Junior Bonds that had a value to them, 
which could be realised when disposed of at a later stage. Hence, the 
originators considered themselves as investors in the bond issue and not 
as equity holders in the real estate. 
5. Finally, the auditors at the time had confirmed that the treatment of these 
transactions in the developer’s accounts complied with the Singapore 
Accounting Standards. 
In the second stage of the market (2000/2001) this view changed. After the 
Singapore Accounting Board partly accepted the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), the early Securitisation transactions were considered more a 
form of refinancing than a form of divestment of assets. For example, the first 
three buildings securitised by DBS Land in 1999 – 268 Orchard Road, 6 Battery 
Road and Robinson Point –273 all came with buyback and put options. 
After a management change, ahead of DBS Land's merger with Pidemco Land 
to form CapitaLand, the thinking changed and hence the properties and the 
liabilities came back on balance sheet. This was done under an accounting 
reversal in July 2000. Because of the put options incorporated in the 
transactions the group had in effect held contingent liabilities for the properties 
and had, therefore, not truly sold the properties. DBS Land had also subscribed 
for all S$460 million274  of junior bonds in the three transactions, holding 100% 
of the first default risk.275 
This circumstance was also the reason, why there was only one transaction in 
2000, following 7 transactions in 1999. The only one transaction in 2000 (Wilby 
Residence), was not arranged because of the company seeking to do balance 
sheet management, but it was purely motivated by the company being 
                                            
273 Robinson Point was securitised for $193 million; 268 Orchard Road, $184 million; and Six 
Battery Road, $878 million. Cf. Rashiwala (2002d). 
274 DBS Land had taken up all the junior bonds of all three transactions, which amounted to 
35% of the total transaction volume of S$1.3 bn over all three transactions. In effect, DBS 
Land had only sold 65% of its buildings to outsiders, who had first recourse to the buildings 
and a put option to guarantee their principal. Cf. Anonymous (2000a). 
275 Cf. Rashiwala (2002e). 
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desperate to sell the property due to Singaporean regulatory rules requiring the 
Hong-Kong company to sell its development within two years of completing its 
projects.276 
So after having to deal with stricter accounting guidelines and with the 
Securitisation transactions being on-balance sheet again, DBS Land’s 
successor company CapitaLand exercised the options to buy back the 
properties when they became due in 2002 and 2003.277 
It was an opportune time to refinance and the company was looking to secure 
the best terms for all funding exercises. CapitaLand saved on interest costs by 
switching to bank loans - taking advantage of the low interest environment, 
achieving annual interest expense savings of S$12-16 million assuming a 4.5% 
and 4% refinancing cost respectively:278 
“They [the issued bonds] were just too expensive and they were boomerang 
bonds, because they came back on balance sheet. But also it did not fit into our 
future strategy – as I said, we want to free up the properties.”279 
So, over time the structural features of transactions changed. In a second stage 
of the market, transactions were originated to sell the assets and to get the 
properties off-balance sheet, i.e. Securitisation as a divestment rather than a 
financing exercise. Such deals as Wisma Atria, Capital Square and Compass 
Point, were ‘true sale’ Real Estate Securitisation deals, leaving no control or 
liability (buyback or put option) to the originator.280 
Other innovative off-balance financing structures were invented for residential 
condominium development projects. Under those transactions future sales 
proceeds and sales receivables in the form of progress payments were 
securitised. This allowed for bringing forward future gains as well as the 
                                            
276 Cf. Rashiwala (2000a). 
277 Cf. Chow (2003). 
278 Cf. Rashiwala (2002e). 
279 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
280 Cf. Chow (2003). 
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replacement of projects, making it possible to capitalise on prevailing low 
interest rates to tap long-term funds.281 
State of the Singapore market today: 
"There are a lot of office blocks for sale. If you cannot sell it the traditional way, 
then securitise it."282 
Today the Singapore market has moved on to a third stage. Developers are still 
trying to liquefy their real estate assets and the secondary real estate 
investment market has moved into an upswing between debt (Real Estate 
Securitisation) and equity (Real Estate Investment Trusts) Securitisation.283 
CapitaLand, which is still 61%-owned by the Singapore government, is yet 
leading the way for financial innovation in Singapore. And it remains focused on 
its goal of being ‘asset-light’, looking for ways to maximize its property-
developing potential without tying up valuable bank loans.284  
"We want to look at not only the cheapest source of funds but also the global 
investors' risk appetite for the Asian property play. To date, we have seen very 
keen interest in CapitaLand's fund-raising activities." 285 
This way CapitaLand from 2000 to 2004 has monetised more that $5 billion of 
assets through Real Estate Securitisation, Direct Sale of properties and the 
Flotation of the first retail (CapitaMall Trust) and office (CapitaCommercial) real 
estate investment trust (REIT).286 The later was launched in May 2004 after the 
developer re-valued its office portfolio and wrote down the properties’ values to 
levels that translated into yields that were acceptable to institutional investors. 
The REIT is backed by a property portfolio consisting of 7 prime quality real 
estate assets including two of the properties that had been previously 
disinvested in a Real Estate Securitisation and were then brought back on 
balance sheet: 6 Battery Road and Robinson Point. The S$2.02 bn acquisition 
                                            
281 Cf. Chong (2001). 
282 Donald Han, Manging Director, Cushman & Wakefield Cf. Chow (2003). 
283 Cf. Lam (2004a), p. 4. Cf. Lam and Cheng (2003), p. 4. 
284 Cf. Lane (2004). 
285 Wen Khai Meng, Deputy CEO, CapitaLand Financial. Cf. Lane (2004). 
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of the portfolio by CapitaCommercial Trust was financed by a CapitaLand 
sponsored special-purpose vehicle that sold US$341 m in Singapore’s first 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) issuance.287 Other recent 
deals in this stage have demonstrated the increasingly diversifying asset base 
within Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore. Deals included a Securitisation 
of rental lease receivables from the Siemens Center Building, which is still 
under construction, a CapitaMall Trust CMBS issue, and a deal involving the 
sale of contracts for the purchase of yet to be completed apartment units in a 
residential housing project.  
Spurred by this development Singapore developers are today reassessing the 
potential of the structure as they position themselves for a recovery in the real-
estate market and for expansion in Singapore and overseas. The revived 
interest goes along with the upswing of the Singapore property market. 
Developers are still seeking to get low yielding properties off their balance 
sheets, to internationally diversify their investor base and to boost their return 
on capital by focusing on development over ownership. However, even though 
Securitisation is a way for developers to unlock the value of their properties, the 
property values are dependent on their occupancy rates and rental yields. So 
only high yielding properties will bring high monetisation values.288 
Asset-Securitisation in Singapore continues to be largely focussed on property 
assets: the former structures are being substituted by internationally recognized 
CMBS structures. CMBS as well as Securitisations of residential development 
proceeds are on the rise and given the circumstance that banks are required to 
off-load their non-core assets will also bring more rated transactions to the 
market. Yet, there also remains to be a large number of Real Estate 
Securitisation deals in Singapore, which are not rated but launched on the local 
domestic market. The potential keeps on growing, as cost of funding will go up 
and capital availability will become scarcer.289 
                                                                                                                                
286 Cf. Rashiwala (2003d). 
287 Cf. Rashiwala (2002e). 
288 Cf. Lane (2004). 
289 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Murra (2003). 
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“Singapore is emerging as a genuine player in the small but relatively 
sophisticated real estate finance market that is developing across Asia-Pacific. 
While capital markets in Japan and Hong Kong (and to a lesser extent, 
Australia) have played visible roles in real estate financing for many years, 
Singapore, with over US$1 billion in capital raised since 2002, is increasingly 
seen as a factor in the REIT and securitized real estate market arena.”290 
4.2.2.2 Identified Transactions 
The Citations cited in the footnotes that are adjacent to the transaction name 
are relating to the sources that the author is using in compiling all the data 
relating to the specific transaction described. A summary of all the information 
given is shown in the analysis of the core determinants in Chapter 4.2.4. 
NOL – Neptun Orient Lines:291 
Originator/Borrower 
In March 1999, publicly listed Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) Shipping Company 
originated the first Asset-Securitisation in Singapore. The company, which is a 
government-linked company, (GLC) securitised its prime piece of real estate – 
the Headquarter building at Alexandra Road. This transaction was a watershed 
deal for the local property market at the times of the Asian Financial Crisis. It 
was also a sign for changing times: high interest rates, high asset values and 
low loan commitments by banks. Hence, there were no buyers that could 
finance large asset acquisitions – Real Estate Securitisation was an alternative 
divestment vehicle: “In good times property purchases did not need to be 
financed with bonds.” 292  
The arranger, DBS Bank,293 set up a special purpose vehicle, called Chenab 
Investments Ltd (CIL), whose special purpose was to facilitate the financing of 
the transaction. In essence Chenab Investments Ltd was the buyer that 
                                            
290  Scott and Hunt (2004), p. 1. 
291 Cf. Anonymous (2003), Interview 1, p. 554; Anonymous (1998b); Choong (1998); Kong 
(1999b); Raj (1998). 
292 Choong (1998). 
293 DBS Bank is a Government-Linked Bank and stands for Development Bank of Singapore. It 
is one of four big commercial banks in Signapore. 
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acquired the building and funded the purchase through the issue of S$185 m 
worth of 10-year fixed rate mortgage-backed bonds to DBS Bank, which in turn 
placed them out to key investors in Singapore. 294 
Asset 
The asset was the flagship office building on Alexandra Road, that NOL sold to 
the SPV and leased it back under a 10-year lease agreement with Chenab 
Investments Ltd. 295 
Transaction Structure 
The structure of this transaction was the first and the pre-eminent structure for 
the first stage of Real Estate Securitisation transactions in Singapore. The bond 
issue was fully subscribed by DBS Bank, which in turn sold the bonds to 
investors. The bonds were separated into 70% senior bonds (6.75 % fixed 
interest) and 30% junior bonds (7.25 % fixed interest). The originator NOL 
subscribed to the junior tranche of the bonds, which granted them the 
opportunity to repurchase the building between the third and fifth years at 
market rates. A typical Singaporean Real Estate Securitisation transaction 
feature enhanced the structure – the potential gain upon the sale of the building 
was shared by all bondholders through the issue of 185 preference shares that 
were attached to the bonds. So if the building were sold during the 10-year 
duration of the bonds, investors would stand to benefit from any capital gains to 
be made. 296 
Motives 
The sale of NOL’s Headquarter formed part of the company’s announced plan 
to pare down its S$5 bn debt burden through the disposal of non-strategic 
assets. So the primary motive was that the originator wanted to divest his real 
estate assets. The proceeds were supposed to be used to retire NOL debts as 
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295 Cf. Choong (1998). 
296 Cf. Raj (1998). 
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well as buy strategic assets in NOL’s core business – shipping and 
transportation.297 
"We are in the transportation business, not in real estate… while we intend to 
maintain our office in Singapore, we do not need to own the building when the 
funds can be better deployed elsewhere." 298 
Century Square:299 
Originator/Borrower 
In June 1999, DBS Bank arranged the second Real Estate Securitisation in 
Singapore. Under this transaction the originator First Capital Corporation (FCC) 
– a real estate developer that is today called GuocoLand – securitised the 
S$200 m Century Square Shopping Centre. FCC sold its shares in Century 
Square Development Ltd, which was the owner of the Century Square building 
to Pemberton Development Ltd. - a special purpose vehicle solely set up for 
refinancing the acquisition by issuing bonds in the Singapore market. 300 
Asset 
The securitised Century Square shopping mall is a retail asset that is lying next 
to the Tampines Metropolitan Rapid Transport (MRT) Station. The mall has 
close to 200,000 sq ft and was completed in 1995. At the time of the 
Securitisation the property had an estimated value of S$ 200 m and was built 
on a site that had 89 years of its 99-year lease left. It had two major tenants: 
Metro and Shop N Save.301 
Transaction Structure 
The transaction’s SPV Pemberton that bought the shares in Century Square 
funded its purchase through the issue of seven-year bonds in three tranches. 
                                            
297 Cf. Kong (1999b). 
298 Lua Cheng Eng, deputy chairman and group president, Neptun Orient Lines. Cf. Choong 
(1998). 
299 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Anonymous (1999b); Anonymous (1999e); Anonymous 
(1999l); Anonymous (1999q); Anonymous (1999s), p. 18; Chong (2002c); Chu (1999b), p. 10; 
Chu (1999c), p. 7. 
300 Cf. Anonymous (1999q). 
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108 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
The use of a mezzanine tranche in between the senior and the junior tranche 
was new to the structure that was already utilized in the NOL deal. The senior 
tranche constituted 50 percent of the total issue; the mezzanine tranche was 35 
percent and the junior piece that was also taken on by FCC constituted 15 
percent. The Asset-Securitisation exercise resulted in a gain of about S$50 m 
for FCC, of which the company deferred S$30 m in view of its participation in 
the tranche C bonds through its nominee company.302 
The transaction structure – like in the NOL deal – granted the holder of the 
junior bonds the right to call the transaction. In 2002, GuocoLand exercised this 
call option and sold Century Square Shopping Centre in Tampines for $225-230 
million making a net profit of about $24.7 million.303 
Motives 
At the time the main motive was to remove the property from FCC’s balance 
sheet, to park the property and make a profit on it at a later stage. The group 
redeployed the funds by initiating new projects. This was in line with the group's 
'divestment of non-core and non-strategic assets' – strategy. 304 
Robinson Point:305 
Originator/Borrower 
The third Real Estate Securitisation transaction came to the market in mid-1999 
(July), shortly after the launch of the Century Square deal. Like the previous 
transactions this one was again arranged and structured by DBS Bank. The 
originator in this case was a real estate developer called DBS Land that today is 
known as CapitaLand (DBS Land/CapitaLand are both government-linked 
corporations). Under this deal, the property was sold to a company specially set 
                                            
302 Cf. Anonymous (1999b). 
303 Cf. Chong (2002c). 
304 Cf. Anonymous (1999e). 
305 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Anonymous (1999g); 
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up to acquire the asset. The company called Visor Ltd. issued S$193 m worth 
of bonds together with 19,300 preference shares to fund the acquisition.306 
Asset 
The asset was a 21-storey office building called Robinson Point, which is one of 
Singapore’s prime office buildings. The transaction was supported by current 
and future rental cash flows and future sales proceeds from the property. The 
issuance was secured by the transfer of the property to the SPV. The building 
was leased back by DBS Land for 10 years, which meant that a well-defined 
cash flow stream supported the issue.307 
Transaction Structure 
Visor Ltd. – the SPV created by DBS Land launched a S$193 million bond-cum-
preference share issue, setting aside S$20 million worth of senior bonds for 
retail investors in Singapore. This was a new feature to the transaction structure 
that was used in the two previous transactions. It led to a diversification of the 
investor base. The S$105 million in non-retail senior bonds and S$68 million in 
junior bonds were also placed out to investors within Singapore. Additionally 
every 10,000 bonds taken up came with non-detachable preference shares. 308 
The junior bonds were subordinated to the senior bonds. The structure was 
chosen in such a way that the senior bonds would still have been fully covered, 
even if the property value had fallen to S$125 million. 309 
DBS Land – the investor in the junior bonds – retained an option to buy back 
the building at a later stage (between year 4 and year 10). Moreover the 
developer also gave the guarantee that it would buy back the building at a 
predefined price and pay off all the bonds at the end of the 10 year period in the 
event that the building was not sold to a third party. Hence, DBS Land de facto 
granted a put option to the investors. At the times this was a new feature, but it 
                                            
306 Cf. Anonymous (1999j). 
307 Cf. Anonymous (1999g). 
308 Cf. Keng (1999). 
309 Cf. Anonymous (1999i). 
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was a yet another step in developing a standardized structure for the Singapore 
market.310 
Motives 
The prime motive was surely a stronger orientation towards an asset-light 
approach – the company wanted to lighten its balance sheet and channel its 
capital to development properties instead of getting stuck in holding real 
estate. Therefore DBS Land disinvested low-yielding prime property and 
worked on its balance sheet by using the proceeds to lower the leverage ratio. 
By doing that DBS Land took advantage of unique accounting rules that 
allowed the company to retain part of the junior tranche.311 
Apart from the two prime reasons another motive was to diversify the investor 
base:  
“We believe that retail investors should be given an opportunity to subscribe for 
these bonds, … this is the first time that retail investors are given an opportunity 
to buy into a premium office building in Singapore.”312 
Silverlac Investment (Clearwater Development)313 
Originator/Borrower 
Whereas previous Asset-Securitisation exercises involved the issue of bonds 
that were backed by investment properties and secured directly by a physical 
asset (an office building), Pidemco Land became the first Singapore property 
developer to securitise future proceeds from condominium sales of a residential 
project development (August 1999).314 Pidemco Land that after the merger with 
DBS Land is now called CapitaLand was a property developer with ties to the 
                                            
310 Cf. DBS Bank (1999b), p. 7. 
311 Cf. Anonymous (2003), Interview 1, p. 554. 
312 Eric Ang, Managing Director and Head of Capital Markets, DBS Bank. Cf. Anonymous 
(1999k). 
313 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554; Anonymous (1999n); Chew (1999); Chu (1999a); 
Pidemco Land (1999); Tan (1999); Tempkin and Chu (1999). 
314 Cf. Pidemco Land (1999). 
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Singapore government. Hence – as in the case of Neptune Orient Lines and 
DBS Land – Pidemco Land was a government-linked corporation (GLC).315 
Asset 
The assets that were securitised in this development deal were future sales 
proceeds in the form of progress payments from a well-received condominium 
project, a development called “The Clearwater”.316 Progress payments are 
instalments that homeowners pay in until construction of the building is 
completed.317 The proceeds of the bond issue were used to refinance the land 
costs of the development and the construction costs of the 420-unit 
condominium project, which was at the time of the transaction 95% sold.318 
Transaction Structure 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi International (Singapore) was the arranger and innovator in 
this first transaction of its kind. The bank set up a special purpose corporation 
wholly owned by Pidemco – called Silverlac Investments – that issued S$100 m 
of three-year, 4.75% fixed-rate bonds, which were 30% oversubscribed – this 
underlined the great interest of investors in new investment alternatives. The 
deal was placed on-shore with local corporations and some foreign companies 
based in Singapore. The unrated deal was solely sold to domestic investors, 
because they took comfort from the fact that the bonds were fully secured by 
consumer-originated receivables (progress payments). Moreover, Pidemco 
guaranteed to meet cost overruns during development and insured that it would 
receive its Temporary Occupation Permit by mid-2002.319 Hence, local investors 
liked the innovation and the quality of the structure. They were content with the 
yield and understood the cash flow and security behind the transaction. The 
transaction structure was the first of a series of residential-securitised bond 
                                            
315 Cf. Chu (1999a). 
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issues, which were done in the same way subsequently to the Silverlac 
Securitisation.320 
Since Asset-Securitisation in Singapore at the time was still very new and only 
a few property-backed transactions had been completed, there were structural 
issues. The key legal and structural requirements in a Securitisation are that the 
SPV that issues the bonds is bankruptcy-remote and independent from the 
borrower/originator. This is normally incorporated into such deals to protect 
investors and issuers. The fact that Silverlac was a wholly owned subsidiary of 
the originator indicates that Singapore's Real Estate Securitisation market was 
then still evolving:321 
"Even though this is not a full-blown Securitisation, it's still a first step in the 
development of Singapore's market. It may have also achieved the same 
objectives of balance sheet management and cost of financing for the 
Originator/Borrower." 322 
Motives 
The transaction was a new form of innovative financing and followed three 
main motives: It freed up credit capacity to the developer’s land bank, it gave 
the company more control over its liabilities compared to bank loans and it 
diversified the lending base – the capital markets offer more depth.323  
Apart from freeing up its debt capacity and allowing the group to buy more land 
for its landbank, Pidemco had been trying to match its assets to liabilities better, 
especially for its medium-term residential projects. Off-balance sheet was also a 
motive; however, it was not possible, yet – there was no impact on Pidemco's 
gearing because Silverlac was owned by the group and therefore its debt was 
still on the group's balance sheet. The main reason for owning the issuing SPV 
was that the market was not familiar with the structure at this early stage. 324 
                                            
320 Cf. Pidemco Land (1999). 
321 Cf. Tan (1999). 
322 Christopher Chau, director of international structured finance, Fitch Ratings, Hong Kong. Cf. 
Tempkin and Chu (1999). 
323 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
324 Cf. Chew (1999). 
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268 Orchard Road:325 
Originator/Borrower 
The originator in this deal – as in the Robinson Point transaction – was the 
government linked real estate developer DBS Land (today CapitaLand). With its 
second transaction of the year (September 1999) the company manifested its 
position to be the pioneer in Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore. DBS Bank 
also manifested its position as a market leader in arranging Asset-Securitisation 
transactions.326 
Asset 
The asset – as in the previous transaction – was an office building. The interest 
and principle on the issued bonds were supported by rental cash flows and 
future sales proceeds from DBS Land’s 20-storey freehold office block at 268 
Orchard Road, formerly known as Yen San Building.327 The block was valued at 
S$1,330 per square foot, based on its net lettable space of 131,600 sq ft.328 
Transaction Structure 
Under this deal, the same semi-standardized structure as in earlier deals of 
1999 was utilized. Baronet Ltd – the SPV – bought the freehold Orchard Road 
building from DBS Land. It funded the purchase by issuing S$184 m worth of 
10-year fixed rate bonds underwritten by DBS Bank. In exchange DBS Land 
signed a 10-year leaseback agreement. This assured all bondholders well-
defined and stable cash flow streams over the course of the transaction. In 
exchange the bondholders granted DBS Land an option to repurchase the 
building at a discount to market value between year 4 and year 10. This was 
subject to a minimum of the original purchase price of S$184 m. On the other 
hand, Baronet has an option to put the building back to DBS Land at the end of 
the 10th year to the benefit of the bondholders.329 
                                            
325 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Anonymous (1999d); 
Chu (1999d), p. 5; DBS Bank (1999c), p. 1; Elias (1999); Rashiwala (1999c). 
326 Cf. Montague-Pollock (2001). 
327 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Elias (1999). 
328 Cf. Rashiwala (1999c). 
329 Cf. DBS Bank (1999c), p. 7; Elias (1999). 
114 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
Motives 
The Securitisation programme formed part of DBS Land’s continuing 
restructuring strategy to deemphasise its investment in office buildings. The 
primary motives for using Asset-Securitisation were to refinance borrowings and 
to use prime assets to help improve their balance sheet and bring their 
gearing ratio down. At the time Securitisation offered several advantages over 
traditional bank refinancing. For one, as the asset was considered "sold", the 
company could take it off its balance sheet and retire whatever debts are 
incurred for the property. As a result, the company's borrowings are reduced 
and, correspondingly, its gearing ratio. On top of this, if the company subscribed 
for the bonds, these were treated as an asset in its books - thus improving its 
net tangible assets position. This situation adhered until the regulatory 
instances took a new view as will be described in a later part.330 
Tampines Centre:331 
Originator/Borrower 
After being the arranger for five out of the first six transactions, DBS Bank in 
late 1999 (November) became an originator itself. DBS Bank is a publicly 
traded, but Government-Linked Corporation.332 
Asset 
The asset was DBS Tampines Centre, a commercial and retail building next to 
Tampines MRT station. The issuance was supported by were rental cash flows 
and future sales proceeds from the property, as in the previous transactions. 
DBS Tampines Centre had a 99-year lease, which started from 1990, and it has 
a lettable floor area of 177,500 sq ft. The transaction was carried out at a price 
of S$1,014 per sq ft. 333 
Transaction Structure 
                                            
330 Cf. Rashiwala (1999c). 
331 Cf. Anonymous (1999o); Eng (1999). 
332 Cf. Anonymous (1999o). 
333 Cf. Eng (1999). 
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DBS Bank sold the building at S$180 m to a special purpose vehicle called 
Tampines. The vehicle then issued S$180 m worth of seven-year fixed rate 
bonds together with 18,000 preference shares for the purchase. The preference 
shares guaranteed the investors a participation in the upside of the property in 
case of rising property markets or the appreciation of the building. Hence, they 
would benefit in case the building was sold during the course of the transaction 
or at maturity. The building was leased back to DBS Bank on a seven-year 
agreement. The bonds, which were secured by the building, were issued in two 
classes – S$108 m senior bonds and S$72 m junior bonds. Out of the senior 
bonds, S$20 million were offered to retail investors. The senior bonds are 
offered at par with a coupon of 5.625 %. For the occasion that bondholders 
wished to cash out earlier if property market conditions declined, an option of 
early redemption was incorporated (put option) from the beginning of the sixth 
year. Opposite to other earlier transactions, DBS Bank did without a call 
option.334 
Motives 
In late 1999, DBS Bank had for the first time turned to securitising property 
assets as part of its plan to focus on core banking and financial services. It 
was clearly a move in line with the bank’s intention to divest non-core assets. 
The primary motive was hence to monetize on the asset and to use Asset-
Securitisation as a divestment tool.335 
Six Battery Road:336 
Originator/Borrower 
Being the strongest originator in 1999, developer DBS Land (today CapitaLand) 
was also the originator in the largest Sing-Dollar corporate bond issue to be 
offered in Singapore in 1999 (November). The Government-Linked Corporation 
sold 6 Battery Road for S$878 m in an Asset-Securitisation. It was the third 
                                            
334 Cf. Eng (1999). 
335 Cf. Eng (1999). 
336 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554; Anonymous (1999f); Anonymous (1999o); DBS Bank 
(1999a), p. 1; Rashiwala (1999b). 
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office building to be divested by DBS Land this way, after Robinson Point and 
268 Orchard Road.337 
Asset 
The asset – again – was an office building supported by predefined rental cash 
flows and a future sale proceeds. The office building that was formerly known 
as Stanchart Building and is now known as 6 Battery Road. It is a 42-storey 
trophy office building at Raffles Place with a total lettable space of 45,033 
square metres.338 
Transaction Structure 
DBS Land sold Six Battery Road office tower for S$878 m. The transaction was 
funded by a special purpose vehicle through the issuance of 10-year fixed rate 
bonds that had preference shares attached to them. Each $10,000 
denomination had one preference share attached for the sole purpose of 
distributing any upside in the dividend, which might arise from potential gains 
when the building would be sold. The bonds, arranged and underwritten by 
DBS Bank, was made up of $550 million of senior bonds at an annual coupon 
rate of 6% and $328 million of junior bonds at 6.5% a year.339 
As in the earlier transactions, retail investors were also given the opportunity to 
participate.340 The remaining senior bonds were placed out to institutional 
investors. The entire tranche of the riskier junior bonds that had call options 
attached to them was taken up by DBS Land. All bonds were listed on the 
Singapore Exchange.341  
Motives 
The main motives were balance sheet management, asset monetization and 
diversification of funding sources. DBS Land’s striving can be best described 
by DBS Land senior manager Christopher Tang: “The move is in line with the 
                                            
337 Cf. Anonymous (1999o). 
338 Cf. Rashiwala (1999b). 
339 Cf. DBS Bank (1999a), p. 7. 
340 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
341 Cf. Anonymous (1999f). 
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group's decision to deemphasise our investment in office buildings, re-invest in 
higher yielding assets and businesses, and deliver higher shareholders' 
returns".342  
Wilby Residence:343 
Originator/Borrower 
Publicly listed car distributor Tan Chong International Ltd out of Hong Kong was 
the third non-real estate company (i.e. corporate) after Neptune Orient Lines 
and DBS Bank to use Real Estate Securitisation as a means of divesting its real 
estate assets in Singapore. It was the only deal in 2000 (September). This was 
a sign that the market – after the high issuance volume of 1999 – was in an 
orientation phase.344 
Asset 
Tan Chong sold 180 out of 181 units at its freehold luxury condominium Wilby 
Residence in Singapore for S$146 m in order to realise its gains on the 
investment. Wilby Residence is a project that was completed by Tan Chong in 
September 1997 on a site that used to be a parking deck for the distributor of 
Subaru and Nissan cars. 345 The sale was refinanced by the means of Asset 
Securitisation. The price worked out to S$730 per square foot for the completed 
condo, which was at the lower end of market expectations for an en-bloc 
disposal.346 
Transaction Structure 
Overseas Union Bank set up the structure for the deal under which Hong Kong-
listed Tan Chong’s wholly owned subsidiary Tan Chong Realty Wilby for 
S$146m to Brizay Property Pte Ltd, a Singapore incorporated special purpose 
vehicle. Tan Chong committed itself to subscribing for the junior tranche of the 
bonds. The group also took on a call option to buy back the property between 
                                            
342 Cf. Anonymous (1999o). 
343 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Anonymous (2000b); Anonymous (2004d); Chong (2004); 
Rashiwala (2000a); Rashiwala (2000b); Rashiwala (2001). 
344 Cf. Anonymous (2000b). 
345 Cf. Rashiwala (2000a). 
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year 4 and year 10. However, a put option by the bondholders to sell the 
property back to Tan Chong was not granted.347 
Motives 
Under Singapore laws Tan Chong had to dispose of the property by 15 
September 2000. The reason was that the group was deemed a foreign party 
and such an entity had to dispose of property developments within two years of 
completing its projects. Hence, the primary motive for the company was to sell 
the building, but to keep a hand on it, since the property was located directly 
beside the company’s car showroom. This is the reason why the group insisted 
on an option to buy back the property at a later stage.348  
The second reason for Real Estate Securitisation was balance sheet 
management. Tan Chong International made a profit of S$53.4 m. The 
proceeds were used for developing the group's existing landbank and for 
general working capital. The property was removed from Tan Chong's balance 
sheet. Asset-Securitisation at the time offered the highest price in a sluggish 
real estate market. 349 
In 2004, Tan Chong wrapped up the transaction, by making use of its call 
option. It paid S$185 m for the residential property, an amount nearly 27 
percent higher than the S$146 m that the company raised in 2000. The reason 
why Tan Chong exercised the option was that it wanted to redevelop its car 
showroom together with the residential property. Moreover the company bought 
back the property in anticipation of further improvement and appreciation in the 
Singapore property market.350 
Raffles City:351 
Originator/Borrower 
                                                                                                                                
346 Cf. Anonymous (2000b). 
347 Cf. Rashiwala (2000b). 
348 Cf. Rashiwala (2000a). 
349 Cf. Rashiwala (2000b). 
350 Cf. Anonymous (2004d). 
351 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Cameron (2001a); Cameron (2001b); Ng (2001); 
Rashiwala (2000c); Yin (2001). 
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Raffles City was not only the largest commercial property Asset-Securitisation in 
2001, but also the first deal in a new era of Real Estate Securitisations in 
Singapore. Raffles Holding – a subsidiary of CapitaLand’s hotel company – 
originated the deal that was underwritten and placed by DBS Bank in June 
2001, about 1 year after the last Real Estate Securitisation deal came to the 
market.352 
Asset 
The asset that was securitised was a 55% share in the Raffles City complex. 
The bonds were supported by the property’s cash flows from rental income and 
future sales proceeds that originated out of property. The purchase price was 
based on a S$1.79 bn valuation for the whole complex.353 The shares in Raffles 
City Pte Ltd, which owns the Raffles City complex, secured the transaction. 
Raffles City, which was owned and developed by Raffles Holding, is a mixed-
use development that incorporates a shopping complex, hotels and Raffles 
Holding’s Headquarter. The Raffles City complex is centred around Singapore’s 
highest hotel: the 73-storey Westin Stamford Hotel.354 
Transaction Structure 
“This is the closest it comes to a true Securitisation.”355 
The structure was deemed to be the first “real” Real Estate Securitisation in 
Singapore and was different from the earlier structures arranged by DBS Land. 
At first sight the Raffles Holding deal did not look different from previous 
structures. The originator, which previously owned 100 % of the Raffles City 
complex sold 55 % of its shares in the property to a special purpose vehicle 
called Tincel Ltd. Tincel, issued S$984.5 m of senior bonds and junior 
subordinated 10-year bonds, and 29,550 preference shares. The Interest rate 
was 5 % for the senior bonds and 7.4 % for the junior bonds per annum. The 
bonds were serviced by a current yield of around 5.74% from existing Raffles 
City leases. About 70% of the issue was senior bonds, including $50 million for 
                                            
352 Cf. Rashiwala (2000c). 
353 Cf. Ng (2001). 
354 Cf. Cameron (2001a). 
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retail investors. The other 30%, or $295.5 million were junior bonds, which have 
a higher coupon of 7.4% because of their higher risk exposure. Every $10,000 
of junior bonds came with one preference share, which is entitled to excess 
profits earned by Tincel. Both the senior and junior bonds were listed on the 
Singapore Exchange for which DBS Bank committed itself to provide the 
liquidity for.356 
The difference in this case was that the bond investors did not have a put option 
to sell the junior bonds back to Raffles on maturity and Raffles did not have a 
call option to collapse the structure. Hence, this was an outright sale for Raffles 
Holding. The bonds were placed with four to five cornerstone investors. 357 
The interest rate on the junior bonds was part of the reason why this 
Securitisation was different from the previous ones. In other Securitisations one 
found that the property yields were much lower as in the case of Raffles, and 
after having paid the senior bonds the structure ended up with a yield that 
would not be effective enough to attract junior bondholders. So in most cases 
this was the major reason why the original owner, i.e. the originator had to buy 
back the junior bonds. Apart from that in the first transactions the junior bonds 
were supplemented with call options on the properties, so that the original 
owner had the option to collapse the structure, when they wanted to have the 
property back. The primary intention there was to park the property instead of 
divesting it. In the case of Raffles Holding the divestment and the concentration 
on core business were the primary drivers for not choosing an earlier structure. 
Motives 
Raffles was seeking to become a pure-player in hotel business. So the main 
goal for Raffles Holdings was to divest part of its prime real estate in order to 
generate liquidity for acquiring businesses in its core activity field. With the 
divestment proceeds from Raffles City, Raffles Holding funded its S$439 m 
purchase of the Swissotel chain.358 Overall the Securitisation exercise gave 
                                                                                                                                
355 Eric Ang managing director and joint head of investment banking, DBS Bank. Cf. Ng (2001). 
356 Cf. Ng (2001). 
357 Cf. Chow (2003). 
358 Cf. Cameron (2001b). 
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Raffles an extraordinary gain of S$350m that it also partly used to cut its 
gearing. The company repaid loans and improved the working capital. So 
balance sheet management was also a prime motive.359 
Peridod Investments:360 
Originator/Borrower 
CapitaLand’s residential development subsidiary called CapitaLand Residential 
was the borrower in the second residential Real Estate Securitisation deal in 
Singapore. This deal also stood for the beginning of a new era – it was the first 
rated deal in Singapore, it was the first transaction arranged by 
HypoVereinsbank’s Singapore branch and it was the first time that bonds were 
not solely placed on-shore, but with international investors outside of 
Singapore.361 
Asset 
The assets securitised by CapitaLand were development receivables in the 
form of progress payments and future sales proceeds generated by three 
residential development projects: The Loft, Palm Grove and Sunhaven. The 
transaction is secured by mortgage loans that are collateralized by the funds 
available in the three project accounts from the progress payments generated 
by the currently sold units and future progress payments from unsold units. At 
the initiation of the transaction 75% of total units had been taken up, which 
translated into $346 million in revenue.362 
Transaction Structure 
Through its special purpose vehicle Peridot Investments CapitaLand 
Residential issued a S$200 m transaction of six-year progress-payment 
securities bond. The Fitch-rated fixed-rate bonds were the first rated bonds 
backed by money collected through progress payments on units in uncompleted 
housing projects in Singapore (the Clearwater transaction was not rated and 
                                            
359 Cf. Ng (2001). 
360 Cf. Chong (2001); Park and Kearns (2001), p. 1. 
361 Cf. Park and Kearns (2001), p. 2. 
362 Cf. Park and Kearns (2001), p. 1. 
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solely placed on-shore). Progress payments are the typical method of payment 
for uncompleted homes in Singapore, and the clearly defined rules and 
regulations provided protection comfortable for investors. 363 
The deal was also the first deal that had a typical Securitisation sub-ordination 
structure: divided into four tranches, $160 million of the bonds had ‘AAA’ 
(3.71%) – the remaining tranches were rated ‘AA’ (3.83%), A (4.09%) and ‘BBB’ 
(4.79%) respectively. 364 
Motives 
Primarily the issue allowed the replacement of projects, making it possible to 
capitalise on prevailing low interest rates to tap long-term funds. This leads to 
the two prevailing motives in such Securitisations: low interest rate and long-
term funding – sourcing funds through the bond issue saved CapitaLand 50-70 
basis points, or S$1 million, a year over the maturity of the deal, compared with 
traditional bank finance. Moreover balance sheet management was a motive: 
proceeds from the issue were used to refinance debt and strengthen the 
company’s land bank. An additional benefit became the fact that half of the 
bonds were taken up by international funds. So a diversification of the 
investor base was also a motive in this transaction. Loan-to-Value was not an 
issue in this deal, since the bond raised only S$200m compared to S$500 m in 
revenues once the project was 100% sold.365 
Wisma Atria:366 
Originator/Borrower 
The Seller of Wisma Atria shopping centre is Wisma Development Pte Ltd., a 
subsidiary of Al Khaleej, which is the Singapore investment arm of Emirates 
Bank International of Dubai. The speciality of this deal was that the transaction 
had an additional sponsor: ERGO – a German insurance company that might 
                                            
363 At the time a seven-year AAA-rated bond issue by the Singapore government yielded 
between 3.17 per cent and 3.19 per cent. Cf. Chong (2001). 
364 Cf. Park and Kearns (2001), p. 2. 
365 Cf. Chong (2001). 
366 Cf. Anonymous (2002c); Chong (2002b); Chow (2004); Rashiwala (2002a); Rashiwala 
(2002f); Rashiwala (2002g). 
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eventually take over the prime shopping mall after the wrap up of the 
transaction. This transaction was hence a first time transaction, because it 
functioned as a disinvestment vehicle for the former owners of the property as 
well as an acquisition financing for the sponsor. Consequently, the transaction 
was deemed to be a true (off-balance sheet) Asset-Securitisation. It was 
arranged and managed by United Overseas Bank (UOB) Asia.367 
Asset 
“It was Wisma's strong rental yields that made it an ideal candidate for Asset-
Securitisation, despite the slight downturn in the property market.”368 
The asset underlying the transaction was the Wisma Atria shopping mall a 
224,200 sq ft of strata-titled retail and office space that is situated along 
Orchard Road, Singapore's main shopping belt.369 The Wisma space involved 
99,600 sq ft of offices and 124,630 sq ft of specialty shops. The Wisma's site 
had a remaining ground lease of 61 years at the time of the transaction and the 
property was sold at a high net rental yield of about 8.5%.370 Under the S$451 
m Asset-Securitisation the mall was valued at about S$2,911 per square foot, or 
a total of S$366 m, and the office tower at about $850 per square foot, or S$85 
m.371 
Transaction Structure 
Under the deal, Wisma Development sold the space to special-purpose vehicle 
Upperton Holdings' subsidiary Aspinden Holdings for some $S451 m. Upperton 
in turn issued $451 million of five-year, fixed-rate unlisted bonds, in three 
classes to fund the acquisition. These were S$288 m of senior bonds with a 
4.94 % coupon; S$50 m of 7 % junior A bonds; and S$113 m of 8.85 % junior B 
                                            
367 Cf. Anonymous (2002c). 
368 Michael Sng, Managing director, UOB Asia. Cf. Anonymous (2002c). 
369 Cf. Anonymous (2002c). 
370 The equivalent yield for a similar mall with a full 99-year lease would be about 6.5 to 7 per 
cent. Cf. Rashiwala (2002g). 
371 Cf. Rashiwala (2002a). 
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bonds. Insurance companies, financial institutions, asset managers, cash-rich 
corporations and others subscribed for the senior and junior A tranches. 372 
The speciality in this deal was that one group of investors – ERGO and its 
associates – sponsored the transaction and held the junior B bonds These 
bonds were stapled with preference shares with a conversion option that would 
allow ERGO and its partners to own 100 % of the Wisma space at the end of 
their five-year term. In exchange, ERGO and its fellow junior B bond holders 
would have to redeem the two other classes of bonds - senior and junior A - 
issued under the Securitisation. The Securitisation deal was not rated, as it was 
a private placement.373 
Motives 
The seller’s main objective was to sell the asset and to achieve the highest 
price possible. The transaction was a clear disinvestment – the company 
wanted to monetize on its asset. Wisma Development completely sold its stake 
in the asset. It did not buy back a single bond and it did not guarantee rental 
income on the asset. Neither was there any option requiring it to buy back the 
asset later. The transaction was a true sale of the whole asset to the benefit of 
ERGO that used the Securitisation vehicle as an innovative off-balance sheet 
acquisition vehicle.374 
Jasmine Investment Corporation:375 
Originator/Borrower 
The Jasmine deal that was originated by Keppel Land Realty Pte Ltd and 
Sherwood Development Pte Ltd – both are subsidiaries of government linked 
Singapore developer Keppel Land Limited. Being a Government-Linked 
Corporation, Keppel Land became yet another innovator in Asset-Securitisation 
in Singapore. The transaction was another first timer deal: first time that Keppel 
Land initiated a deal, first time that bonds were denominated in a foreign 
                                            
372 Cf. Rashiwala (2002f). 
373 Cf. Anonymous (2002c). 
374 Cf. Rashiwala (2002g). 
375 Cf. Anonymous (2002a); Anonymous (2002m); Cheng (2002); Chong (2002a); Park and 
McCarthy (2002). 
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currency and first time that all three rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch Ratings) rated the transaction. The deal was arranged by 
HypoVereinsbank’s Singapore Branch. 
Asset 
The notes were backed by property receivables from sale and purchase 
agreements (the assets) on 455 apartments in three condominiums in 
Singapore: Amaranda Gardens, Butterworth 8, and The Edgewater.376 The 
three projects together have a total development size of 458 residential units. 
Most of the condominiums were sold before the transaction was initiated and 
only 3 units remained unsold at the closing. Under the deferred payment 
scheme, buyers of the sold units have paid 10% of the purchase price as 
deposit to the developers. The underlying receivables therefore consist of 90% 
of unpaid purchase price of the sold units and the full purchase price of the 
unsold units. The total value of the underlying receivables was expected to be 
S$355.7 million, which was the primary source of principal repayment to the 
note holders. 377 
Transaction Structure 
Jasmine Investment Corporation Ltd. issued three classes of notes with total 
issuance proceeds of US$144 m from the Class A notes and S$45 m from the 
Class B and Class C notes. After converting the US$144 m into Singapore 
Dollars, the total issuance amount is equal to S$302 m. The notes had a legal 
maturity of June 2007 and an expected maturity of December 2005. The ‘AAA’ 
US dollar notes were priced at 33bp over Libor. A potential currency mismatch 
between the underlying Singapore Dollars denominated receivables and the US 
Dollars denominated Class A Notes was mitigated by a currency swap with 
HVB Singapore. The Singapore dollar tranches pay fixed rate coupons with 
launch spreads of 58bp on the double-A tranche and 86bp at the single-A level. 
The average yield is 2.8%.378 
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The issuer used the note issuance proceeds to purchase the underlying 
receivables from HVB Singapore which in turn acquired the sale proceeds 
receivables generated from the sales of the residential units from the two 
property developers.379 In Singapore, developers are entitled to receive cash 
while properties are being built. The developer receives 10% of the purchase 
price initially from future occupants, a further 75% once a temporary occupation 
permit (TOP) is obtained, and the remainder as the project reaches 
completion.380 This transaction offered bondholders greater certainty, because 
under the deal money had been committed for almost all of the future 
apartments. If construction costs would overrun by up to 12%, Keppel were 
obliged to cover this expense. The arranger also provided a S$66 m 
construction guarantee that covers up to 65% of any construction costs that 
exceed the budget.381 
Motives 
The primary motives for Keppel Land were clearly the wish to liquefy the 
assets and thus to get cheap construction financing. Another strong reason 
for this transaction was the diversification of the funding base – a big part of 
the transaction was denominated in US $.382 
Compass Point Shopping Centre:383 
Originator/Borrower 
In November 2002, Beverage, property and publishing company Fraser & 
Neave (F&N) sold its retail property Compass Point Shopping Centre at 
Sengkang in a Real Estate Securitisation. The arranger in this deal – which is 
typical for the applied structure – was DBS Bank.384 
Asset 
                                            
379 Cf. Anonymous (2002a). 
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The asset was comprised of a shopping centre property, which was sold to an 
SPV for S$335 m. The rental income and future sales proceeds to pay off the 
bonds were derived and secured by the Compass Point Shopping mall. The 
property has 270,000 square feet, which works out to S$1,243 per square foot 
of net lettable area, or a net yield of about 6.7% on the property.385 
Transaction Structure 
Under the transaction the SPV Sengkang Mall Ltd. issued two tranches of 10-
year bonds: S$201 m in senior bonds and S$134 m in junior bonds with 
attached preference shares that carried annual coupons of 4.88 % and 8 % 
respectively. In this subordinate structure senior bonds had priority over junior 
bonds in principal and coupon payments. F&N's wholly owned unit Centrepoint 
Properties and insurance company Prudential UK subscribed for 45% and 
51.12% respectively of the $134 million junior bonds.386 
In this typical DBS Bank structure junior bondholders do not only receive a 
higher annual coupon of 8% but also get to keep the full upside of any capital 
appreciation when the property is eventually sold (through the means of 
preference shares). They will also pocket any excess rental income after all the 
bondholders have been given their coupon payments – they de facto hold the 
equity position of the property in a bond structure. Special to this structure was 
that the majority junior bondholder, Prudential UK, had been given the right to 
exercise an option to purchase the Compass Point mall after the third year. 
Whereas there were no options for Centrepoint (the other junior bondholder) or 
any other F&N entities to buy back the mall. F&N/Centrepoint was also not 
guaranteeing Compass Point's rental income. Hence, this was a true sale of the 
shopping centre asset and it can be viewed as a sale to the sponsor of the 
transaction Prudential UK, which was using Asset-Securitisation as an 
innovative acquisition financing. 387 
Motives 
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“This fits [the company’s] strategy of realising development gains at the right 
time while retaining management control.” 388 
So the prime motive of the deal was to divest the asset and improve the 
balance sheet, while following the group's strategy of placing greater emphasis 
on asset-light, fee-based businesses and improving asset productivity.389 
Fraser & Neave also considered floating the mall in a Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT), floating a trust would have involved a few more of F&N's shopping 
centres and released more funds that F&N would have had to invest into new 
investments that would have needed to yield higher returns than what it was 
achieving by leaving the money in the malls. Apart from that a retail property 
trust would have meant for F&N/Centrepoint to take a haircut on current values 
of some of the other malls to ensure attractive yields for potential unit holders. 
This was and still is a general problem for all property holders in Singapore – 
the values are too high, the yields too low and nobody wants to take a hit.390 
Capital Square:391 
Originator/Borrower 
Capital Square was Keppel Land’s second Real Estate Securitisation deal and 
the company’s first deal incorporating office space (November 2002). Keppel 
Land’s subsidiary Capital Square Pte Ltd, which owned Capital Square, sold the 
property at S$505 m or a nearly 6% yield to a special purpose vehicle set up by 
DBS Bank. The speciality of this deal was once again that the transaction had 
an additional sponsor: ERGO – the German insurance company that had 
already been a sponsor in the Wisma Atria deal took on the same position in 
this transaction. DBS Bank was the arranger and manager of the issue in this 
deal that used the typical DBS Bank structure. 
Asset 
                                            
388 Han Cheng Fong, Managing Director, Fraser & Neave. Cf. Tan (2002). 
389 Cf. Tan (2002). 
390 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554; Rashiwala (2002c). 
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The asset was a property called Capital Square that resided on a 99-year 
leasehold office block in the Raffles Place area. The structure was supported by 
rental income and future sales proceeds originated from and backed by the 
property; it was secured by the real property held by the SPV to the benefit of 
the investors. The Property was completed in 1998 and comprises a 16-storey 
Grade A office building with a seven-level multi-storey car park (Capital Square 
One) and two blocks of conservation buildings (Capital Square Two and Capital 
Square Three). The Property has an outstanding tenant profile which includes 
major tenants like Citibank N.A., Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Capital 
Group (Singapore) Pte and Barclays Bank PLC, and was nearly 100% occupied 
at closing.392 
Transaction Structure 
The transaction structure is similar to DBS Bank’s previous arranged 
transaction: Compass Point. Under the deal at hand Queensley Holdings 
Limited, a special purpose vehicle, issued S$505 m of 7-year bonds together 
with 808 preference shares for the purchase of the 100% stake in Capital 
Square Pte Ltd. There were two classes of bonds, S$303 m Senior Bonds and 
S$202 m Junior Bonds, together with 808 preference shares. The Junior Bonds 
rank below the Senior Bonds in terms of principal and interest payments.393 
The Issue was structured with a number of credit enhancements, which made it 
superior to a normal straight bond issue. In addition to having the Property as 
collateral, holders of Senior Bonds also had a security buffer of 40% as they 
rank ahead of the Junior Bonds (subordination). The Junior Bonds were fully 
subscribed by Capital Plaza Holding GmbH & Co. Singapur KG, a special 
purpose vehicle set up by ERGO Versicherungsgruppe AG to purchase the 
Junior Bonds. These junior bonds were stapled with preference shares in the 
SPV. The bonds also had embedded options that gave ERGO the opportunity 
to sell the building after the third year. If the building were not sold, ERGO could 
refinance the senior bonds or redeem them at the end of their 7-year tenure. 
There was neither any option for Keppel Land or the senior bondholders to buy 
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the property back. This deal was essentially an acquisition of Capital Square by 
ERGO financed by an innovative Real Estate Securitisation structure.394 
Motives 
As in the case of Compass Point, the prime motive for the originator of the deal 
was to divest the asset and improve the balance sheet, while following the 
group's strategy of placing greater emphasis on asset-light, fee-based 
businesses and channelling the capital into developments instead of in holding 
real estate. The sponsor Ergo on the other hand used the Securitisation 
structure as an innovative off-balance sheet acquisition vehicle.395 
Aragorn Investment Corporation Limited:396 
Originator/Borrower 
HypoVereinsbank (HVB) Singapore in December 2002 arranged the second 
international Securitisation of residential property receivables for CapitaLand 
Residential Limited, a residential development subsidiary of government-linked 
corporation CapitaLand.397 
Asset 
The transaction was a Securitisation of receivables from purchase payments 
from contracted buyers of condominium units of a residential project, known as 
‘The Waterina’, located near Singapore's central business district that is due to 
be completed in March 2006.398 
CapitaLand Residential Limited had sold the units of the yet-to-complete project 
to the individual buyers under a deferred payment scheme and is entitled to the 
payment from the buyers (the receivables). The developer sold its rights to the 
receivables to the issuer for an upfront consideration of S$ 197.8 m and a 
deferred consideration of S$69.2 m. The bonds were secured by the underlying 
                                            
394 Cf. Sen (2002). 
395 Cf. Anonymous (2002f). 
396 Cf. Anonymous (2002g); Anonymous (2002i); Anonymous (2003g); Cheng and Ma (2002); 
Cheng and Ma (2003b). 
397 Cf. Anonymous (2003g). 
398 Cf. Anonymous (2002i). 
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deferred purchase price and progressive payment receivables from the 398-unit 
luxury residential project.399 
Transaction Structure 
The issuer – a special purpose vehicle called Aragorn Investment – issued two 
triple-A tranches of US$28 m and US$72 m, and two subordinated tranches of 
S$10 m. The arranger HVB subscribed for the US$28 tranche. The bonds are 
expected to mature in March 2005 with final maturity in March 2008. 400 
Of the 398 units, 338 had been sold under the deferred purchase price scheme, 
a further 15 under the progressive payment plan, and 45 remained unsold at 
closing.401 The unpaid portion of the purchase price of the sold units, together 
with the 45 unsold units, constitute the receivables in this transaction for a total 
projected amount of about S$267 million, compared to the issuance amount of 
S$198m equivalent. Under the progressive payment scheme, 65% of the 
purchase price will be paid in instalments based on the progress of the 
construction, and the remaining 15% will be paid after the temporary occupation 
permits (TOPs) are granted. Under the deferred payment scheme, the entire 
remaining 90% of the purchase price will be paid on or after the date when 
TOPs are granted. The project’s expected TOP date is set for February 2005 
and the legal TOP date is set for March 2006.402 
Motives 
The two dominating motives for CapitaLand Residential to use Real Estate 
Securitisation as an innovative financing instrument were cheaper financing 
and a diversification of funding sources. Obviously the company also wanted 
to unlock the fixed value of its development and liquefy the asset and to 
balance out its balance sheet, but cheaper construction funding from a 
different source than a bank was the primary motive.403 
                                            
399 Cf. Anonymous (2002g). 
400 Cf. Anonymous (2002i). 
401 Cf. Cheng and Ma (2002), p. 2. 
402 Cf. Cheng and Ma (2003b), p. 3. 
403 Cf. Anonymous (2002i). 
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Cobalt Asset Management:404 
Originator/Borrower 
The Sponsor and ultimate borrower under this first ‘Credit Tenant Lease’ 
transaction in Singapore was Siemens – a German corporate. The developer of 
the property was M+W Zander a German developer and contractor. This first 
transaction in February 2003 was once again arranged and managed by 
HypoVereinsbank Singapore.405 
Asset 
The deal was backed by a long-term credit tenant lease (the asset) in eastern 
Singapore's Siemens Center signed by Siemens AF (SI). The bonds being 
issued were serviced by the corresponding lease cash flows that are secured 
by the credit of the parent company Siemens AG – a Aa3-rated corporate. The 
transaction was additionally collateralized by a mortgage over the whole 
property (Siemens Center).406 
Transaction Structure 
The issuer in this transaction was Cobalt Asset Management Ltd a special 
purpose and bankruptcy remote company incorporated with limited liability in 
Singapore. In February 2003, the issuer issued S$45 m of fixed rate notes due 
June 2019 to fund the construction of the Siemens Center. Construction of the 
property was completed in May 2003 with the grant of the temporary occupancy 
permit (TOP) by Singapore's relevant authority. The practical completion was 
achieved on June 30, 2003. Interest payments and principal repayment of the 
notes largely depends on rental collections from the Siemens Center. Under the 
Siemens lease, the lessee rented about 82% of the floor area for 15 years. 
Siemens AG unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed the lessee's payment 
obligations under the Siemens lease. In addition, the issuer also entered into 
other lease agreements with potential tenants for the remaining 18% of the floor 
area. In the event that the issuer defaulted under its obligations, the trustee 
                                            
404 Cf. Anonymous (2003d); Anonymous (2004i); Cheng and Ma (2003a), p. 3; Murra (2003). 
405 Cf. Anonymous (2003d). 
406 Cf. Anonymous (2004i). 
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could exercise its enforcement rights and use the proceeds from liquidating the 
building and the other issuer's assets to pay down the notes.407 
Motives 
Clearly this first ‘Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation’ transaction was a new 
innovative way of financing the construction of the new Siemens Centre. 
Generally in a ‘Credit Tenant Lease’ deal, the company would sell securities 
backed by long-term rental income from a property in order to fund the property 
purchase or construction. That structure would suit a company looking to sell 
property it acquired to house certain operations in favour of focusing on core 
activities but still wants to occupy that same space.408 
Siemens prime motives for such a transaction was cheap construction 
financing combined with long-term funding and a high Loan-to-Value that 
originated out of the long lease and the high credit of the parent company. 
Balance sheet management definitely as well as a diversification of funding 
sources also played a role.409 
Silver Maple Investment Corporation:410 
Originator/Borrower 
The borrower of this transaction launched in June 2003 was CapitaMall Trust 
(CMT), which was formerly known as SingMall Property Trust. CMT was 
Singapore's first listed real estate investment trust (REIT). The vehicle, which 
was launched in 2002, invests in income-producing commercial properties in 
Singapore and has shopping centres as a predominant focus. CMT was 
initiated by CapitaLand Limited to spin off its real estate assets. So CapitaLand 
was the ultimate sponsor of the transaction. The transaction was the first 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities deal in Singapore. CMT borrowed the 
money to finance acquisitions of its first properties. 411 
                                            
407 Cf. Cheng and Ma (2003a), p. 3. 
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Asset 
The assets underlying this transaction are loans (credit facilities) that are 
secured by mortgages over the acquired properties. Interest and amortization of 
the bonds originate out of interest and principle from the mortgage loans. As of 
the issue date, the borrower owned 3 commercial properties in Singapore - 
Junction 8 Shopping Center, Tampines Mall, and Funan-The IT Mall. The retail 
properties had an aggregated appraisal value of S$935 m.412 
Transaction Structure 
The issuer under this transaction was Silver Maple Investment Corporation Ltd, 
a special purpose company incorporated with limited liability under the laws of 
Singapore. The shares of the issuer were held on behalf of a charitable trust. 413 
The CMBS was issued in a secured medium-term notes program, under which 
the issuer had entered into a credit facility agreement with the borrower, 
CapitaMall Trust. Under this agreement, the issuer issued notes to finance 
CMT's acquisition of commercial properties in Singapore and to fund CMT's 
routine capital expenditure and working capital requirements. Each of the series 
of notes issued from the MTN program matched the terms of each credit facility 
advanced to the borrower. Consequently, the issuer's ability to meet payment 
obligations to note holders derived from the borrower's ability to meet payment 
obligations under the credit facility agreement, which eventually depended on 
the rental income of the commercial properties the borrower owns and 
operates. Mortgages over the properties supported the credit facilities advanced 
by the issuer. The issuer also benefited from the assignment of the borrower's 
right, title and interest in the tenancy agreements, the management 
agreements, the insurance policies, the insurance proceeds, and rental 
collection accounts.414 
Motives 
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The motives for choosing Asset-Securitisation as a means to finance the 
acquisition of the first three assets from the ultimate sponsor of the transaction 
– Capitaland Limited, was to get cheap, long term funding from capital market 
sources (diversification of funding sources).415 
Ngee Ann City:416 
Originator/Borrower 
The originator of this transaction – that was very comparable to Wisma Atria 
and Capital Square – was Metro Holdings, a Singaporean retailing company. 
The reason that this transaction was similar to the two mentioned above was 
that Ergo Insurance Company was again sponsor in the deal and hence 
investor in the junior bonds. The Ngee Ann City deal in August 2003 was the 
last time that the typical ‘DBS Bank’ transaction structure was used. Moreover, 
it was the last time that DBS Bank arranged a Real Estate Securitisation.417 
Asset 
The asset was a 27% stake in Ngee Ann City, an office and retail complex on 
Orchard Road. Interest and amortization on the bonds were accounted for by 
rental income and future sales proceeds originated from the stake. The stake 
was valued at S$538 m and had an annual net income before property tax of 
about S$35 m, resulting in a yield of about 5.8% after property tax.418 
Transaction Structure 
The transaction’s special purpose vehicle, Orchard Square Capital Assets Ltd, 
bought Metro Holding's stake in the mall and financed it by issuing bonds. The 
SPV raised S$560.25 m through a bond and preference share issue. Orchard 
Square's five-year bond issue was divided into S$154 m secured fixed rate 
senior A bonds, S$178 m secured fixed rate senior B bonds, and S$228.25 m 
secured fixed rate junior bonds, together with 913 detachable redeemable 
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preference shares. Metro’s subsidiary Sun Capital Assets Pte Ltd subscribed 
for 30 percent of the junior bonds, while the remaining 70 percent were taken 
up by an investment consortium led by Ergo Tru Asia Pte Ltd, a subsidiary of 
Ergo Insurance Germany. The junior bonds pay an interest of 7.5% per 
annum.419 
Motives 
The reason for Metro Holdings to divest its 27-per-cent stake in Ngee Ann City 
by the means of Asset-Securitisation was balance sheet management. After 
anchor tenant Takashimaya had decided not buy Metro, the holding was forced 
to lower its gearing.420 Once again this transaction was a true sale of the asset 
to the benefit of Ergo that used the Securitisation vehicle as an innovative off-
balance sheet acquisition vehicle.421 
Riviera Investment:422 
Originator/Borrower 
The last Real Estate Securitisation transaction of 2003 (September) was the 
first deal arranged by Standard Chartered Bank. It incorporated a Securitisation 
of pre-sold apartments for Centrepoint Properties Ltd – a subsidiary of Fraser & 
Neave – to refinance its condominium development project: Cote d'Azur.423 
Asset 
The assets securitised in this case were receivables from sales proceeds of a 
612 unit residential development in the eastern part of Singapore. The project 
was launched in 2002 and is scheduled for completion in December 2005. At 
closing 593 units (97%) had been sold, the majority of purchasers had already 
paid the required 20% of the balance before completion. The remaining 
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(2003c). 
423 Cf. Anonymous (2003o). 
4.2  Singapore 137 
 
progress payments will be paid only when the project is completed in early 2005 
(deferred payment scheme). 424 
Centrepoint sold the project at an average of S$595 per square foot. Based on 
the saleable area of 788,235 sq ft, the total contracts were worth S$469m 
(US$279m). The total cost of the project was estimated at S$104.7m and the 
cost to complete was S$76m.425 
Transaction Structure 
Riviera Investment Ltd., a special purpose vehicle (SPV) incorporated under the 
laws of Singapore set up for the Securitisation, issued US$162 million of bonds 
at par and lent the money raised to Centrepoint, which used it to refinance the 
acquisition of the condo site and pay for the project's construction. The SPV 
retained a portion of proceeds to pay the coupon to bond holders.426 
The deal was comprised of one single tranche of triple-A rated three-year bullet 
notes, priced at 30 to 35 basis points above the three-month London Inter Bank 
Offered Rate (Libor).427 The bonds were rated by Fitch Ratings. The rating 
reflected the mitigation of the construction risk through the completion 
guarantee, sufficient cash flow generated from payments made by the buyers of 
the condominium units, and the sound capital and legal structure. The rating 
addressed the timely payment of interest and the ultimate repayment of 
principal of the bonds by final legal maturity in December 2006.428 
Motives 
“Securitisation enables the company to bring forward cash flows from the 
deferred payment scheme and is expected to reduce the financing costs for the 
project in view of lower interest rates…This is part of the company's ongoing 
financial management efforts to improve profitability.”429 
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Fraser & Neave took advantage of low interest rates and refinanced its 
development of Cote d'Azur condo by securitising its future sales proceeds. The 
move allowed the company to bring forward cash flows, to lower project's 
financing costs and to improve its balance sheet.  
CapitaRetail Singapore:430 
Originator/Borrower 
In February 2004, BNP Paribas and Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. arranged 
the second CMBS deal in Singapore, which was the first deal to have a €-
denominated tranche.431 The originator of the Securitisation was – once again – 
CapitaLand. CapitaLand’s commercial property business unit CapitaLand 
Commercial had set up a private retail property fund, namely CapitaRetail 
Singapore, to hold three suburban retail properties. Instead of acquiring the 
malls directly, CapitaLand established this Securitisation structure for 
CapitaMall Trust (CMT) to purchase the malls at a later stage.432 
Asset 
The assets in this transaction were mortgage loans granted to CapitaRetail 
Singapore Limited. The issued notes were serviced by interest and principle 
payments the secured cross-collateralised bullet loans to three property trusts, 
each established to purchase a single retail property. The three shopping 
centres in this transaction were: the Riverdale Mall (independent valuation 
S$67.8 m), Lot One Shoppers Mall (S$253.3 m) and Bukit Panjang Plaza 
(S$167.6 m). 433 
Transaction Structure 
The issuer of the transaction was CapitaRetail Singapore Limited, a special 
purpose vehicle incorporated under the laws of Singapore. It issued five classes 
of bonds, all four-year soft bullets with expected maturity in February 2008 and 
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legal maturity in August 2009. Two classes of bonds (A and B) were €-
denominated, carrying floating rates (indexed to 6-month Euribor), and two 
classes (C and D) were S$-denominated, carrying fixed rates. The vehicle had 
also issued the most subordinated Class E bonds (equity piece) in December 
2003 already.434 
There was a €67.5 m class rated ‘AAA’ by all three agencies, €13.5m of ‘AA’ 
notes, S$33 m of ‘A’ bonds and an S$83m unrated tranche. The S$ 213 m 
equity piece was placed out to international and local investors. CapitaMall 
Trust435 took S$58m of ‘E' bonds (incl. call options and preference shares). 436  
The issuer used the bond proceeds from Class A to Class D to re-
finance/finance the funding of three existing mortgage loans, one to each 
property trust. In return, it held all the security interest over the assets of the 
property trusts. It used the mortgage payments it received to pay the obligations 
on the bonds. The property trusts used the mortgage loans proceeds to re-
finance the properties’ acquisitions. Each property trust owned one property 
and used the mortgage loan proceeds to re-finance the existing debt secured 
by the property. It had also issued units to make up the equity portion. The units 
had been subscribed by the SPV, using the proceeds from the issuance of the 
Class E bonds. The units entitled the issuer to excess cash flow of the property 
trusts. The issuer also had a call option under which it would be able to call 
either part or all of the senior notes on any interest payment date occurring on 
or after the third anniversary of the closing date. This would happen when 
CapitaRetail Singapore could offer the three malls for sale to CapitaMall 
Trust.437 
Motives 
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"CapitaRetail Singapore will not only increase CapitaLand's fee-based income 
stream, but can also provide immediate yield-accretion to CMT [CapitaMall 
Trust] unitholders as well as a subsequent pipeline of deal flow for CMT."438 
The key motive of this Securitisation exercise for CapitaLand was to get the 
three retail properties of the books and monetize on them, without giving up 
the influence over the properties. Initially the company wanted to divest the 
malls via its retail trust CapitaMall, but the yields were too low. So this 
Securitisation, in which CapitaMall Trust also participated, was a way to park 
the properties. The plan was to improve the tenant mix and to boost their rental 
yields to a level that would be attractive enough for CapitaMall Trust to buy the 
malls.439 
Silver Loft Investment Corporation:440 
Originator/Borrower 
In March 2004, property company CapitaLand closed Singapore’s first office 
properties CMBS, lead and arranged by HVB. The four times oversubscribed 
issuance was Singapore's largest CMBS. It financed CapitaLand's plan to spin 
off its Singapore commercial property portfolio into a new real estate investment 
trust (REIT), CapitaCommercial Trust (CCT).441 The issue was rated by all three 
international ratings agencies – Fitch Ratings, Moody's Investor Service and 
Standard & Poor's.442  
Asset 
The transaction was a commercial real estate mortgage loan Securitisation 
involving four secured loans to CapitaCommercial Trust, a newly established 
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REIT in Singapore. Hence, the assets underlying the transaction were 
mortgage loans supported by principal and interest charges on the loans. The 
loans were secured by first-registered mortgages over four individual 
commercial office buildings, one mixed-use commercial and retail complex, and 
two individual commercial car-parking facilities located in Singapore. The 
subject properties were: Capital Tower, 6 Battery Rd, Robinson Point, Starhub 
Centre; Bugis Village, Market St Car Park and Golden Shoe Car Park.443  
Transaction Structure 
Silver Loft Investment Corporation Limited – a special purpose vehicle 
incorporated under the laws of Singapore – issued 4 classes of notes, which 
were all US$-denominated, carrying floating rates indexed to 3-month Libor. 
The issuer used the note proceeds from Class A1 to A4 to fund 4 term loan 
facilities, which were extended to Bermuda Trust (Singapore) Limited as the 
trustee of CapitaCommercial Trust under a facility agreement. In return, the 
issuer held all security interests over the assets of CCT and used the payments 
it received under the term loan facilities to pay the obligations on the notes. 
CCT used the term loan facilities to partially finance its acquisitions of 7 
properties as well as for general working capital purpose. The notes were 
swapped into Singapore Dollars and lent to CCT.444 
Motives 
"We were able to tap the global capital markets on extremely competitive terms. 
We also capitalised on the excellent interest rate window which allowed us to 
achieve a very low blended rate to the benefit of CCT." 445 
The CMBS issuance functioned as an innovative financing tool for 
CapitaCommercial Trust to acquire CapitaLand’s office portfolio. The primary 
motive was to get the best achievable financing conditions – under this 
structure CCT got long-term Singapore dollar funding as well as a prudent 
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interest rate. Moreover the diversification of funding sources and the tapping 
of international debt capital markets were dominant goals.446 
Arwen Investment Corporation Limited:447 
Originator/Borrower 
The Securitisation of two high-end condominiums in April 2004 was the third 
deal done by CapitaLand that was backed by sales receivables from 
development projects. CapitaLand raised US$155.6 m in a Real Estate 
Securitisation transaction arranged by HVB Singapore.448 
Asset 
The securitised assets in this transaction were receivables of future payments 
to be received from the sale of yet to be completed units of two high-end 
residential projects known as ‘The Botanic on Lloyd’ and ‘The Imperial’ in 
central Singapore. The transaction was backed by sales receivables from the 
two residential properties. While the 187-unit Imperial was about 85% sold, the 
66-unit Lloyd Road project was about 65% sold at closing.449 
Transaction Structure 
The bonds were issued as US-dollar denominated notes by Arwen Investment 
Corporation Ltd, a special purpose company incorporated under the laws of 
Singapore. The issuer issued 3 classes of notes. The total issuance amount on 
the closing date was the equivalent of S$262 million, of which S$59.8 million 
had been deposited into a construction escrow account and S$16.8 million into 
an expense escrow account. The remaining amount (after upfront issuance 
expenses) had been paid to the developers, CapitaLand Residential Realty Pte 
Ltd and Imperial Realty Limited, as part of the purchase price for the 
receivables.450 
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The notes were distributed internationally and had an expected maturity in 
October 2006. CapitaLand listed the notes on the Singapore Exchange and the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange.451 
Motives 
CapitaLand’s main motives were to get optimal long-term Singapore dollar 
funding and a prudent interest rate structure. A low cost funding was 
achievable due to the fact that over 80% of the notes were rated ‘AAA’.452 
4.2.3 Environments 
The Development of the Real Estate Securitisation market in Singapore can be 
divided into 3 evolution stages:  
• Stage 1 (1999/2000): Experimental Stage 
• Stage 2 (2001/2002): Ripening Stage 
• Stage 3 (2003/2004): Growth Stage 
The different environments influencing the Singaporean Asset-Securitisation 
market constituted the framework for this evolution. At the time real estate was 
the only asset class driving the Asset-Securitisation market in Singapore. 
4.2.3.1 Regulatory/Legal Environment 
Regulatory 
The regulatory and legal environment in Singapore is very favourable for Asset-
Securitisation. This circumstance is mainly due to the approach of the 
government to open up the financial market and the open mindset of its 
regulatory authority, namely the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is the de-facto central bank and 
regulatory instance in Singapore overlooking the financial markets.453 In 
January 1998, deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong took over as chairman of 
MAS, and announced a major shift in regulatory policy with a 'lighter touch' 
                                            
451 Cf. Moody's Investor Service (2004). 
452 Cf. Tan (2004). 
453 Cf. Sing, et al. (2004), p. 1. 
144 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
approach, moving away from rule-based regulation, towards a risk-weighting 
approach. In this context he re-organised MAS and set up a Financial Sector 
Promotion Department (FSPD) within MAS.454 
In the following period, the chairman initiated a policy review that culminated in 
a dynamic new strategy announced in August 1998. The objective was to turn 
Singapore into the leading debt securities market in Asia outside of Japan.455 
The new policy was aiming at raising the profile of the Singapore market and 
making it a viable alternative market for raising funds. The move represented a 
significant step towards achieving Singapore's ambition of becoming a leading 
debt trading centre in Asia. The government's objective was to reform the fiscal 
and regulatory systems in order to give freer rein to market dynamics. 
Moreover, the initiative intended to increase the market's depth and liquidity 
through more government bond issues,456 to widen the market by encouraging 
Government-Linked Corporations and other financial institutions to issue bonds 
and to setup a MAS sponsored Mortgage-Backed Securitisation vehicle. The 
new policy not only gave local banks and corporates the tools to manage their 
balance sheets more effectively, but it also attracted capital markets activity to 
Singapore.457 
Also in 1998 the MAS recognised the potential and the benefits of Asset-
Securitisation for Singapore and the government authority came to the decision 
that it wanted to develop this part of the debt market in Singapore.458 Especially 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation and the institution of a Mortgage Corporation 
seemed to fit in with Singapore’s strategy to become the leading market for 
bonds, derivatives and other new financial instruments in Southeast Asia.459 
                                            
454 Cf. Montague-Pollock (1999), p. 7. 
455 Cf. Anonymous (1998d). 
456 There was a debt market before this initiative, but it was very small and illiquid. As Singapore 
had consistently run sizeable budget surpluses, the government had found little incentive to 
borrow. Issuance tended, therefore, to be sporadic, at the short end of the curve and offered 
generally low yields. This resulted in thin liquidity and the lack of a yield curve based on which 
other debt instruments could realistically be priced. 
457 Cf. Anonymous (1999u), p. 14. 
458 Cf. Hay (1998), p. 3. 
459 Cf. Tharmalingam (1999). 
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Existing strict banking secrecy laws in Singapore, however, made it difficult for 
banks to issue Mortgage-Backed Securities. Section 47 of the Banking Act, 
which dealt with banking secrecy, became a major obstacle to Securitisation 
originated by banks and financial institutions. Under this section banks were not 
allowed to disclose borrower details.460 
As Securitisation demands a high degree of transparency, banks that wanted to 
issue Mortgage-Backed Securities needed to provide detailed information about 
the underlying loans in order to satisfy the conditions for credit ratings.461 This, 
however, was breaching Section 47. While banks could insert a clause in new 
loan documents to obtain express consent from customers for such disclosure, 
this was not possible to be done for older loans, effectively limiting the pool of 
assets available to banks for Securitisation.462 
Therefore, MAS also needed to review and make changes to the Banking Act to 
allow transaction participants greater access to portfolio details, which was not 
done lightly, but given its determination to smoothen the path for the 
development of the debt market, MAS did every effort possible to find a way to 
overcome this obstacle.463 
At the time Singapore did not have any laws governing Asset-Securitisation. 
This is why the Monetary Authority also drew up draft guidelines and published 
those in January 1999. Although there were not any laws in place then, it was 
not a problem for most companies to undertake this type of financing. It was 
only banks that were subject to strict regulations.464 
This is the reason why the first wave of Real Estate Securitisations in 1999 was 
such a success. The companies were allowed to remove commercial buildings 
from the balance sheet, revalue them and securitise them by offering 10-year 
bonds at a fixed coupon rate. In absence of final guidelines MAS only required 
                                            
460 Cf. Montague-Pollock (1999), p. 7. 
461 In a loan Securitisation deal, buyers and rating agencies require intimate details of the 
assets on offer to assess potential risks and rewards. 
462 Cf. Kong (1999a). 
463 Cf. Anonymous (1999p). 
464 Cf. Chan (1999). 
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the transactions to include a clear identification of the asset, the true separation 
of the asset from the originating company's balance sheet and the 
enhancement of the transaction through the sale of the asset to a special-
purpose vehicle. 
The final rules on Asset Securitisation for Banks (MAS 628) came into effect on 
06 September 2000.465 It suggested conditions for Securitisation to be treated 
as a true sale and rules for banks to be able to participate.466 
The key propositions for all participating institutes are as follows: 
1. Prior Approval from MAS: “Any bank proposing to act as seller or 
manager, either solely or jointly with other parties, in a Securitisation 
transaction must seek prior approval from the Authority.”467 
2. Supervisory Considerations: “As a result of their involvement in 
Securitisation transactions, banks will incur operational, legal and/or 
other risks. To ensure that banks conduct Securitisation transactions in a 
prudent manner, the Authority may impose supervisory limits on the 
volume or types of assets, which may be securitised.”468 
3. Disclosure Requirements: “Any bank participating in a Securitisation 
transaction must take reasonable steps to disclose to investors the 
nature and extent of its contractual obligations in the Securitisation 
transaction.”469 
4. Separation Requirements: “In order to limit a bank's reputational risks 
with respect to a Securitisation transaction, there must be clear 
separation between the bank and the SPV.”470 
Additionally the guideline included:471 
                                            
465 Even though the rules were addressed at banks, they became a proxy for all kinds of 
originators. They also regulated how banks had to behave as arranger. 
466 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 2. 
467 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 2. 
468 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 2. 
469 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 3. 
470 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 3. 
471 Cf. Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000), p. 4. 
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• Requirements for Banks as Sellers 
• Requirements for Banks Providing Servicing, Credit Enhancement and/or 
Liquidity Facilities 
• Requirements for Banks as Investors 
Despite of this guideline MAS accepted that no two Securitisation deals were 
the same and adopted a flexible approach that looked at each transaction on a 
case-by-case basis:472 
"MAS is very committed to getting this market kick-started and they are not 
going to stand in the way of any deals…”473 
Finally in May 2001, MAS also resolved the banking secrecy obstacle by 
issuing the Bank (Amendment) Bill. The bill allowed banks to disclose the 
required credit information during the sale of the mortgages in Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Security transactions. Additionally the bill required all local 
banks to divest their non-core assets, most of which are property, within three 
years; another spur for the Real Estate Securitisation market.474 
Legal 
The legal system is important for foreign investors, as those only buy bonds 
from jurisdictions with a transparent legal system and one in which the banks 
have precise data on the historic performance of asset pools. Singapore fulfils 
these criteria.475 
The common law system (historically based on English law) provides a sound 
legal platform for Asset-Securitisation transactions.476  There are no obstacles 
concerning the transfer of assets, the incorporation of SPV’s or bankruptcy 
issues. Singapore is a reliable bankruptcy and legal environment.477 
                                            
472 Cf. Choong (1998). 
473 Martin Taylor, Head of Debt Product Origination and Sales, HSBC Markets, Singapore. Cf. 
Montague-Pollock (1999), p. 7. 
474 Cf. Anonymous (2002n). 
475 Cf. Anonymous (1999w). 
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Today, most of the recommendations, concerning the promotion of the bond 
market and the inception of an Asset-Securitisation market, are in place. With 
the government promoting its bond market and its Government-Linked 
Corporations issuing bonds backed by property assets, Singapore has become 
Southeast Asia's leading market for Real Estate Securitisation issues.478 The 
regulatory environment, the Monetary Authority’s open mindset, and the sound 
legal environment played a substantial role in this evolution. 
4.2.3.2 Tax Environment 
As with the regulatory environment, the tax environment in Singapore is also 
very favourable for Real Estate Securitisation. It was a strong driver in the 
evolution of this market.479 In sync with its regulatory promotion of the debt 
market, the government has also stimulated the issuance of Asset-Backed 
Securities from the tax side. Additionally, there is no capital gains tax in 
Singapore. Hence, this environment has created a lot of interest from domestic 
as well as international investors.480 
In this regard the tax treatment of fixed income securities was changed. The 
change included a concessionary tax rate of 10 percent on income earned from 
trading for financial institutions in Singapore and a similar 10 percent tax rate on 
interest income for domestic investors, which was less than half the standard 
corporate tax rate of 26 percent at the time. Additionally the authorities 
exempted offshore investors481 who did not have a permanent establishment in 
Singapore from paying withholding tax on interest payments.482 
In addition the Inland Revenue Authority – that is in charge of gathering the 
taxes – implemented tax changes that have also made the market more 
attractive to issuers and arrangers of Real Estate Securitisations. Under this 
special rule exemptions were granted on fee income derived from arranging, 
                                            
478 Cf. Lam (2004a), p. 4. 
479 Cf. Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 554. 
480 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
481 International investors whose countries have a double taxation treaty with Singapore benefit 
from this rule, since they neither have to pay taxes on interest income in Singapore, nor in 
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482 Cf. Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 554. 
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under-writing and distributing debt securities in Singapore. This made it more 
profitable for banks to underwrite debt securities in Singapore and reduced the 
cost of the arrangement to the borrowers.483 
Moreover the stamp duty – the tax that applies to the sale of the property from 
the originator to the SPV –484 can be reduced to a minimum, when the asset is 
transferred in a share deal. In a normal real estate transfer the tax would be 
3%, but it is reduced to 2% if the seller sells company shares instead of the title. 
In this context the SPV issuing the bonds will not buy the property, but it will buy 
shares of another Asset-SPV that holds the property. Hence, this leads to a 
reduction in stamp duty.485 
The MAS’s Financial Sector Promotion Department was also strongly involved 
in the creation of this tax exemption as a part its task in promoting the debt 
market: 
“Tax issues, for instance, vary across transactions, and the MAS is prepared to 
help financial institutions address tax questions with the Inland Revenue 
Authority.”486 
4.2.3.3 Accounting Environment 
When the government decided to push the bond market and kick off Asset-
Securitisation in 1998, auditors still followed the Singapore Accounting Rules 
that made the city state a favourable accounting environment for off-balance 
sheet Asset-Securitisation.487 
Off-balance sheet treatment for their real estate was the real estate developer’s 
primary objective in the beginning of the Singapore Asset-Securitisation market. 
This became especially evident in the first stage (1999/2000), as there were 7 
transactions in one year. Part of the reason why there were so many 
transactions was that it was possible for real estate developers to achieve off-
                                            
483 Cf. Anonymous (1999u), p. 16. 
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balance sheet treatment for their real estate and hence to lower their leverage 
ratios, while using Real Estate Securitisation as a financing vehicle. 
However, this situation dramatically changed after the Enron scandal in the US. 
Enron took its toll on off-balance sheet deals in Singapore. Since the 
revelations that Enron had used Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) in securitised 
deals, auditors in Singapore – mindful of the sudden demise of Arthur Andersen 
– took a very conservative view on Asset-Securitisation deals.488 
“It's an obstacle to business right now. More deals are failing post-Enron than 
before…What is important is that they [the auditors] need to be consistent with 
other markets; at the moment, I do not think they are.”489 
Hence, auditors put the multi-billion dollar market in Asset-Securitisation at 
stake that Singapore regulators had been trying to develop since 1998. The 
accounting development changed the market place so that the structures used 
in the second stage (2001/2002) of the Real Estate Securitisation market’s 
evolution were put under an enormous scrutiny by Singapore accounting firms 
and as a consequence of this the transactions became more adapted to 
international rules.490 
The key measure, judging if an Asset-Securitisation was on- or off-balance 
sheet became the distribution of risk, which was more prudent and closer to 
international accounting standards. Under this new accounting policy the 
question that had to be answered was:  
“Whether the risks and the rewards that come with the asset have been 
passed on to the new owner, or still remain to a great extent with the 
original owner.”491 
Whereas in this second stage more and more transactions were structured in 
such a way that they could truly be considered off-balance sheet by 
international standards, the first stage was stamped by ambivalent off-balance 
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sheet structures492 that later came back on-balance sheet, as was the case with 
DBS Land’s transactions that were originated in 1999 with the intention to 
relieve the company’s balance sheet.493 
The reason why DBS Land encountered several accounting changes and as a 
consequence had to put the properties back on-balance sheet was that after the 
assets were sold to the SPVs, the company still held contingent liabilities (put 
options) as well as call options on its properties. In this process the company 
had to reclassify billions of Dollars on the balance sheets – the company had to 
book its redeemable convertible cumulative preference shares as debt instead 
of equity. In accordance with this measure DBS Land also had to put its three 
divested and securitised office buildings back on its balance sheets. 
Consequently, the moves made the company’s bottom-line deteriorate and it 
had a major impact on its debt-to-equity ratio,494 which is a key financial ratio for 
property companies.495 
This measure suggested that the Real Estate Securitisation transactions in 
1999 were not meant to be divestment sales but financing arrangements. As 
ownership had not been transferred irrevocably, these issues were not exactly 
true asset sales, but rather a unique form of long-term financing under an 
Asset-Securitisation structure whose interest payments for the next 10 years 
were financed by rental proceeds from the office buildings.496 
This above analysis shows that the accounting environment played a vital role 
in the inception and evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market in 
Singapore. It is a proof for the importance of accounting as integral part of the 
overall environment that influences Asset-Securitisation markets. 
                                            
492 The structures were first considered off-balance sheet and approved by the international 
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4.2.3.4 Rating Environment 
In 1998, in accordance with the promotion for the bond market, the MAS 
considered to build up a homegrown rating agency for rating bond transactions 
in the Singapore market. The institution was part of the recommendations made 
to the Monetary Authority. However, the MAS sensibly decided against such an 
agency, figuring that it would lack credibility.497 
As a consequence, rating and rating agencies did not play a role in the first 
stage and in most of the second stage of the Singapore market. The 
transactions were placed on-shore with institutional investors that were very 
comfortable with the properties securitised (well-known trophy properties leased 
out to ‘AAA’ tenants on long leases), the originators (mostly Government-Linked 
Corporations) and the bond issuers (mainly DBS Bank, later also 
HypoVereinsbank Singapore).498 
Hence, the rating environment was partly favourable in the sense that domestic 
investors in Singapore did not require a rating. This made the transactions 
cheaper for the originators as well as more unique from a structural standpoint. 
It gave a greater flexibility to arrangers to tailor the transactions to the needs of 
borrowers and investors in the domestic Singapore market. 
From the international rating agencies’ standpoint these unrated transactions 
were not true asset sales. To them the originators have typically issued debt in 
a single tranche with a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of around 60% (i.e. the senior 
tranche), the remainder (i.e. the junior tranche) they considered to be equity-
funded. Historically, Singaporean investors have not required ratings although 
the agencies believe that this is changing. For the future, the agencies are of 
the opinion that investors will be better served in a market where differences in 
property types, risks and rewards are distinguished through credit ratings and 
debt tranching. They believe that as investors become more familiar with ratings 
and the methodology used by all international ratings agencies, rated deals will 
become more prevalent. 499 
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It is evident that rating agencies predict more rated transactions, since they 
want to generate new business. However, with this development Singapore will 
lose its unique flavour and structural flexibility, as the standardised international 
CMBS structures will be increasingly implemented.  
4.2.3.5 Investor Environment 
The Investor Environment was very advantageous for the initiation of the Real 
Estate Securitisation market and it was helpful for the successful evolution of 
the market in general. In the beginning of the market the main question was: 
Will there be enough demand to absorb all these new issues? 
Most of the new issues were over-subscribed, even though they were placed 
privately. This was supported by a strong domestic investor base: There were 
10 large insurance companies in Singapore and about 10 to 20 domestic bond 
fund managers that were all keen to buy Singaporean bonds of good quality, 
bearing in mind that there were not many good quality bonds in the region at 
the time. On top of that, each bank in Singapore ran a private banking and 
asset management business, and they were always keen to sell bonds to their 
own clients. Furthermore, there was also a strong demand from the corporate 
sector, including Government-Linked Corporations.500 
In addition to raising interest for the market with institutional investors, the 
government tried to raise the interest of retail investors (private investors, non 
institutional investors) in order to put the bond market demand on a broader 
foundation. This was encouraged by the fact that 10% of pre-specified bond 
issues were reserved for retail investors, in contrast to normal bonds, which 
were sold to 'qualified' institutional investors only in denominations of more than 
S$200,000. Retail demand was also encouraged by the ease of subscription as 
investors could purchase the securities through the Singapore banks' ATM 
network. 501 
Within the debt market Real Estate Securitisation bonds were especially 
interesting to investors because they benefited from higher yields – compared 
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to ordinary bond issues – and additionally the investors had the chance to 
participate in future capital appreciation of the properties. Another specialty to 
Securitisation transactions was the sub-participation of two different bond 
classes. Investors could choose various risk exposures, as the bonds were 
issued in low-risk senior tranches and higher-risk junior tranches. Hence, the 
higher the risk, the higher the interest rate and the higher the participation in 
potential capital appreciation of the property. This was also the reason, why in 
the first Securitisation deals, the originators, i.e. the sellers of the property 
assets, subscribed for bonds in the junior tranche, which carried the highest risk 
as well as the lowest priority in the event of a default. This provided a comfort 
zone to senior bondholders and for the originators it provided the opportunity to 
still hold the residual interest in the asset and to be able to control the asset. 
Therefore the position of the originator did not change much: the company was 
still holding the equity position, still had the control over the asset and still 
participated in the upside.502 
Another speciality unique to the first and second stage deals in Singapore was 
the additional credit enhancement through predictable cash flows. While there 
were no guarantors for the bonds, the originating company (often a 
Government-Linked Corporation) usually signed a 10-year leaseback 
agreement with the Special Purpose Vehicle, which assured all bondholders of 
a well-defined cash flow stream. This was a quasi guarantee for the investors 
and represented an additional security that made the Real Estate Securitisation 
issuances desirable for investors.503 
Investors did not only benefit from credit enhancement, but also in the 
appreciation of the property through preference shares attached to the bonds. 
So in the case the real estate was sold during the next 10 years duration of the 
bond, the investors would stand to benefit from any capital gains to be made.504 
Besides showing that this underlines that Real Estate Securitisation – especially 
in the first stage – was not intended to be a true divestment of assets, but an 
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innovative financing that gave investors the chance to diversify their portfolio 
and invest into prime real estate that they did not have a chance to invest in 
previously. 
The above elaboration shows the significance of the investor environment on 
Real Estate Securitisation. While investors were important for the success of 
the market, the market was also important for the success of the investor side. 
Investors were seeking new investment opportunities that they did not have 
before, and hence it was crucial for the market to address the requirements of 
the investor side. The issues offered unique opportunities for investors as well 
as for originators. For investors the Real Estate Securitisation securities offered 
features that were not achievable with ‘plain vanilla’ bonds and for originators 
this offered the chance to innovatively finance their property assets, by partly 
divesting the asset while not giving up the control. 
"The issue is structured with a number of credit enhancements, which make it 
superior to a straight bond issue. Besides having the building as collateral, 
senior bondholders also have a security buffer of 35%."505 
4.2.3.6 Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment 
The real estate, local and cultural environment played a vital role in the 
evolution of the market in Singapore. The first Real Estate Securitisation deals 
in – what was then – a nascent Singapore debt market were coined by local 
peculiarities that were fuelled by a special cultural environment in a real estate 
market that had never before experienced a downturn. 
“…international investors do not understand the Singapore market. The 
transactions were tailored to fit Singapore requirements and Singapore funding 
sources… The local real estate market plays a very important role.”506 
The NOL deal and the subsequent other real estate deals were regarded as the 
first real Asset-Securitisation transaction locally and demonstrated how debt 
structures established elsewhere could be adapted to suit local conditions. 
Especially the first transaction by Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) was ground 
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breaking. The deal contained vital elements of a classic Securitisation 
transaction but yet lacked other prominent features due to local peculiarities. 
Under the general structure invented in the NOL case, the asset – NOL Building 
– was clearly separated from the company and sold to an SPV, which was 
specially set up to buy the building. When the sale was completed the SPV 
issued (usually) 10-year fixed-rate bonds – backed by the building – to the 
arranger, who in turn placed out the bonds to major local investors.507 
While this general structure was similar to that used in Securitisations 
elsewhere, the first Singapore transactions departed from the usual pattern in 
that they were both unrated and did not carry any external guarantees. 
Whereas in most instances, credit ratings were regarded as crucial to the 
success of a Securitisation deal,508 in Singapore they were not. The feeling was 
that issues were too small to be targeted at offshore market.509 They were only 
targeted at the domestic market and hence did not need to be rated, especially 
when the government was involved. The government enjoyed – and still enjoys 
– an excellent credit standing.510 Moreover government-linked institutions also 
dominated the domestic investor base. In the NOL case, the originator was a 
Government-Linked Company and the arranger was a Government-Linked 
Bank. So the government linkage of all companies involved played a crucial role 
in getting the market lifted off the ground.511 
Beyond the government involvement, for originating companies it was not very 
favourable to go through a rating process. Ratings incurred additional (high) 
costs and invited a scrutiny, which many local corporations did not find 
comfortable and still do not find comfortable. This is also underlined by the fact 
that most companies in Singapore do not even have a corporate rating. Hence, 
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even though the Monetary Authority of Singapore recognised the benefits of 
ratings for a transparent market, it left the decision to the originators.512 
The second feature that the deals in the first stage were lacking was third party 
guarantees that are commonly seen in Securitisation deals. A lot of structures 
contained a limited guarantee or a full guarantee or both, provided by financial 
guarantee firms, so called Monoline Insurers.513 While obtaining a guarantee 
always incurs costs, it provides credit enhancement and makes the Asset-
Backed Securities more attractive to a wider pool of investors. Again, as in the 
case for ratings, the involvement of the government through the Government-
Linked Corporations had precluded the need for a guarantee in the deals.514 
In a nutshell, the local environment that was influenced by the cultural mindset 
specific to Singapore had an enormous impact on the evolution, as well as on 
the structures utilised in the first and second stage of the market. The clear 
driver was the involvement of the government and the well-defined goal to 
make Singapore into Southeast Asia’s leading competence centre for financial 
innovation. The NOL transaction and all other property Securitisations following 
in 1999 had a “uniquely local flavour” and paved the way for all other kinds of 
Asset-Securitisation in Singapore. 
On the other hand the development in 1999 was also fuelled by Singapore’s 
position in the Real Estate Market Cycle, i.e. the position in the financial as well 
as the physical cycle of the commercial real estate market in Singapore.515 
1. Physical Cycle:516 
a. In Southeast Asia the major centres – Singapore, Hong-Kong and 
recently Shanghai – went through great boom times. First Hong-
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514 Cf. Kong (1999b). 
515 For further information on financial and physical cycles of real estate markets confer Mueller 
(1995), p. 47; Mueller (1999), p. 131; Mueller (2002), p. 115. 
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Kong, then Singapore and now Shanghai. A boom of economic 
growth – high GDP growth – fuelled mainly by Foreign Direct 
Investments attracted a lot of multi-nationals, financial services 
and major manufacturing companies. The companies all needed 
offices, so the office demand grew rapidly. This drove up rents 
and capital values. Over the years there was no downturn in 
space demand and as a result the total return was driven by 
capital gain and not by yields. Landlords could demand high rents 
on short leases and the capital values were constantly on the rise. 
However, as the centre of economic activity shifted from 
Singapore to Shanghai, China and occupancies and rents 
dropped dramatically leaving owners with high cost properties that 
suddenly had very low yields that were not made up by capital 
appreciation at the end of the holding period any more. Property 
values in Singapore kept dropping and put property owners under 
pressure, because owning real estate became very expensive. 
However, developers were reluctant to accept low valuations; 
somebody “needed to take a hit”, but owners were not prepared to 
do that.517 
b. Asset prices, including commercial and residential real estate – 
after years of above average growth in asset values – were on a 
decline. The equity, especially in highly leveraged real estate 
projects, was melting down and debt financing was hard to 
achieve.518 
c. The market was in a deep recession – 4th quadrant of the market 
cycles model – pictured by increasing vacancy and new 
completions. There was negative demand growth but also 
construction completions – especially of high-grade properties – 
that pushed vacancy even higher.519 
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d. This situation coincided with another development. Companies – 
Corporates as well as Developers – were desperate to sell their 
real estate in order to relieve their balance sheets from high debt 
burdens. The first transactions (NOL) provided a good example 
case for this development because NOL – Government-Linked 
Company – was at that point going through very difficult times and 
it needed to liquidate its assets. Real Estate Securitisation was an 
optimal way for them to raise cash, while still being able to occupy 
the building. They wanted to monetize on their assets and get the 
assets off-balance sheet in order to reduce debt levels. So most of 
the Singaporean development companies looked at their property 
portfolios seeking opportunities to sell if possible and if not to use 
the opportunity of vehicles like Asset-Securitisation to get them 
off-balance sheet. The clear intention was to unlock the values 
from the assets. This put a lot of pressure on the physical real 
estate market.520 
2. Financial Cycle:521 
a. 1999 was the time after the Asian financial crisis had hit the 
region. Capital flows into real estate were down. Banks did not 
lend any money and developers as well as investors did not have 
the capital base to be able to fund huge asset purchases with high 
equity ratios. Additionally to that, most of the real estate loans that 
were taken up in 1994/1995 matured around 1999.522 1999 was a 
very unfavourable year for refinancing. Interest rates were high 
due to the Asian Financial Crisis and companies found it difficult 
to refinance their real estate bank loans. This even amplified the 
situation of most developers that did not have a strong equity 
                                            
520 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
521 The financial market cycle mirrors capital flows to real estate and especially to new 
construction. Capital flows to real estate have influences external to those affecting the 
physical real estate market. Capital Flows are the major factors affecting prices in real estate. 
This is why the physical and the financial cycle both influence the observed real estate 
market. Cf. Mueller (2002), p. 123. 
522 Loans in Singapore usually have a maturity of 5 years. 
160 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
base, and hence reached very high debt ratios in 1999. There was 
a credit crunch.523 
b. The public market was not developed, yet, and the domestic 
private market did not have the financial resources to generate 
great capital flows into real estate. International institutional 
investors were not comfortable with direct investments in 
Singapore, especially following the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Demand was down, no investor could afford to buy properties at 
such high price levels – bearing in mind that there was no 
affordable financing achievable.524 
c. The Singapore real estate market was at crossroads, regarding 
capital flows into real estate. Bank loans were very hard to come 
by. However, developers needed to relieve their balance sheets 
and address the high debt problem. Real Estate Securitisation 
came as a way to tap new funding sources and channel ‘fresh 
capital into the sluggish real estate market’. Using the 
Securitisation structure, the originators bypassed an outright sale 
of the asset in a market that did not have the capital flows to buy. 
This fuelled the development of the first ‘public’ capital market for 
real estate in Singapore.525 
This leads to the conclusion that the evolution of Real Estate Securitisation was 
dependent on the real estate market cycle. It was fuelled by declining demand, 
increasing supply in prime office space, and hence high vacancies. The trough 
in the financial cycle was fuelled by the credit crunch due to the Asian Financial 
crisis, and hence low loan commitments by banking institutes. Additionally high 
capital values, low yields, a weakening physical market and feeble capital flows 
into real estate made it a difficult environment to sell real estate. As private debt 
and equity were scarce, the only way to divest was to drastically lower the asset 
price, but companies were reluctant to sell their assets in such a bad market – it 
                                            
523 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554. 
524 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
525 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
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would have resulted in extraordinary losses. They were looking for innovative 
ways to finance their real estate off-balance sheet or divest it at high valuations. 
Real Estate Securitisation opened an alternative public vehicle to do that. 
This suggests that there is an optimal timeframe for the initiation of Real Estate 
Securitisation markets and for developing creative structures and initiating 
groundbreaking transactions. In Singapore, this was successful at a time, when 
the market was in a downturn; banks did not lend money and capital flows from 
the private market declined. 
"It is a difficult climate to sell in and few people want to buy. And among those 
who want to buy, they do not have the means to buy the whole building. So 
Securitisation is the best option here… "526 
4.2.4 Core Determinants 
The information referred to in the following analysis is based on the author’s 
compilation of different sources relating to Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions in Singapore. The information is derived out of structured 
interviews, newspaper and magazine articles, and out of rating and company 
reports. Which sources relate to which transaction can be observed in the 
footnotes behind the transaction names depicted in Chapter 4.2.2.2.  
4.2.4.1 Borrowers 
The Originator/Borrower Analysis first shows the deal reference information: 
transaction and special purpose vehicle name, issue date and arranging bank 
(see Chart 5, Chart 6, Chart 7). Then it delineates all the details relating to the 
company owning the assets, i.e. the seller of the assets, who is usually called 
the borrower or originator. This data consists of the originator name, the type of 
company (Corporate, Real Estate Developer or Investor), the ultimate holding 
company (Private, Public or Government-Linked Corporation) as well as an 
indication if the originator is listed on the stock exchange and if the originator 
and the transaction are rated. 
 
                                            
526 Cf. Anonymous (1999r), p. 8. 
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Stage 1 (1999/2000) – Originator/Borrower Analysis (Chart 5): 
Most of the Real Estate Securitisation transactions in the first stage were 
structured in 1999 – there was only one transaction in 2000. The innovator 
of the market and the dominant arranger at the time was DBS Bank – a 
Government-Linked Bank. 
The leading originator of assets in 1999/2000 was DBS Land (today called 
CapitaLand) – also a Government-Linked Corporation. DBS Land also stood 
for the leading type of originator: Real Estate Developer – keeping in mind 
that most real estate developers in Singapore at the time were investment 
developers. This changed over time to being service and trader developers, 
as the government who was – in most cases – the ultimate owner loosened 
its grip. However, this circumstance offers an explication, why real estate 
developers and not real estate investors were so much involved in this 
development at this stage. There were essentially no companies holding 
investment real estate in Singapore except for the Government-Linked Real 
Estate Developers. This is mainly due to a very unique institutional 
framework in Singapore. 
All the companies were listed on the stock exchange, but none of those 
companies had a corporate rating. This counts for all transactions observed 
in Singapore. Since most companies, even the publicly listed companies are 
government-linked, there is no need to get a corporate rating; the 
government has a ‘AAA’ credit rating. Investors in Singapore listed 
companies get a comfort from this fact. 
The first stage of transactions was very much characterized by its 
exclusiveness; the transactions were mostly privately placed and not rated. 
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Stage 2 (2001/2002) – Originator/Borrower Analysis (Chart 6): 
In stage 2 there were only two transactions in 2001; in return however, there 
were 5 transactions in 2002. The reason was that the new approach to off-
balance sheet financing and stricter criteria led to a new innovation process 
that needed time – the ice in the market had to be broken once again. 
In this stage, DBS Bank was still successful, but HypoVereinsbank 
Singapore (HVB) also moved into the market becoming DBS Bank’s biggest 
competitor – HVB brought international know-how into the market. The 
reason that a foreign bank could build a stronghold in the Singapore market 
also underlined the government’s commitment to open up the financial 
markets to international players. This development resembled the early 
stages in both Japan and Taiwan, as locally based originators and 
international arrangers joined together to promote the market. It has the 
advantage that by doing this local real estate expertise is coupled with 
experience in global capital markets.527 
The market in that phase was once again dominated by Government-Linked 
Corporations, with CapitaLand (the successor of DBS Land and Pidemco 
Land) continuing to hold its position as leading originator in Singapore. 
New and innovative to this stage of the market was that in June 2001 the 
first Real Estate transaction got rated (Peridot Investments). Altogether in 
2001/2002, three out of seven transactions got rated. 
 
                                            
527 Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004a), p. 5. 
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Chart 5: Singapore – Stage 1 – Originator/Borrower Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Chart 6: Singapore – Stage 2 – Originator/Borrower Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Stage 3 (2003/2004) – Originator/Borrower Analysis (Chart 7): 
After 2002 being a strong year for Real Estate Securitisations, 2003 and 
especially 2004 (with already 3 transactions in April) followed this trend. 
HypoVereinsbank’s Singapore (HVB) branch became the dominating 
arranger of Real Estate Securitisation transactions in Singapore. This was 
supported by HVB’s role as an innovator in this market.  
Also, CapitaLand once again was the leading borrower under Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions. In this stage CapitaLand was only the borrower 
and not the originator of the assets because the underlying assets were not 
the real estate, but mortgage loans over the real property. Essentially the 
company did not sell their real estate assets, but the bank that arranged and 
originated the transaction sold the mortgage loan. 
The latest trend in this stage was that REITs were involved in the latest 
stage of transactions. This can once again be attributed to CapitaLand, who 
was also the innovator in Real Estate Equity Securitisation in Singapore, as 
they issued the first two REITs (one retail, one office). The newly issued 
REIT’s used Real Estate Securitisation for acquiring their first real estate 
assets. 
Apart from the REITs, real estate developers still kept going strong as 
borrowers and originators. Another development that took place in the thirst 
stage was that Government-Linked Corporations played a more insignificant 
role than in the previous stages. This can be attributed to the REITs that are 
publicly held as well as other public companies gaining faith in the market. 
There was even one deal initiated by a non Singapore company, namely 
Siemens. 
In the third stage rating became a prime feature in Real Estate Securitisation 
deals, as six out of seven transactions are rated. This will also be the trend 
going forward, as international investors will only be willing to invest into 
securities if those carry a rating. 
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Chart 7: Singapore – Stage 3 – Originator/Borrower Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Summary 
Two Government-Linked Corporations became the innovators in the dawn of 
the Real Estate Securitisation market in Singapore. DBS Bank became the 
dominating arranger in the dawn of the market, while DBS Land/CapitaLand 
became the dominating originator throughout all three stages of the 
evolution of Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore. 
While DBS Land/CapitaLand was dominating throughout the whole 
development, DBS Bank only was active in the first half of the evolution. The 
unique standardised structure that they created during that time was tailored 
towards the originators’ needs, however it was neither off-balance sheet 
qualified nor was it internationally recognized. This is why in the second half 
of the evolution was dominated by another innovator: HypoVereinsbank 
Singapore. This arranger brought international perspective into the 
transactions without losing the unique Singapore ‘flavour’. This lead to the 
development that deals were rated and partly denominated in another 
currency. In the beginning (stage 1) no transaction was rated, in the last 
stage (stage 3) nearly all transactions were rated. 
The primary originator category was Real Estate Developers, as the biggest 
developer in Singapore DBS Land/CapitaLand was the dominating 
originator. However, especially in the first stage corporates were originators, 
which can be related to the real estate and financial market situation in 
1999. Over time this changed. While developers kept staying strong, the 
newer wave of borrowers comes from the Real Estate Investor category and 
in the last stage out of the Singaporean REIT market. This will be a trend 
that will keep on going strong in the future, as newly issued REITs will rely 
on Securitisation as an acquisition financing vehicle. So REIT Securitisation 
is actually fuelling the growth of Real Estate Securitisation.528 
                                            
528 Singapore developers want to free up funds for higher-yielding investments. Part of their 
divestment strategy is to issue REIT shares in exchange of their own shares and thereby 
divest their real estate holdings. Developers want to move away from being an asset rich real 
estate holding company to an asset light real estate developing and managing company. In 
order for the trusts to be able to acquire those properties, they need to get high volume long-
term financing. 
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4.2.4.2 Assets 
The Asset Analysis goes into detail on the assets that are securitised in the 
observed Real Estate Securitisation transactions. As Chart 8, Chart 9 & Chart 
10 show, the Asset Analysis is made up of the type of asset backing the 
transaction, the cash flows generated from the asset that are supporting the 
bonds and the security of the investors over the asset or additional collateral 
respectively. Since all of the underlying assets or the collateral is real property, 
the property name as well as the type of real estate (Office, Residential, Retail) 
and the category (Investment, Development or Corporate Property – 
Construction or Acquisition Financing) are analysed. 
Stage 1 (1999/2000) – Asset Analysis (Chart 8): 
The assets that were sold in the first stage were mainly physical assets 
(prime real estate – ‘trophy’ properties), except for one transaction that 
incorporated sales receivables from a yet to be finished residential 
development project. Hence, except for this one transaction, all deals were 
supported by cash flows resulting out of the physical assets, i.e. rental cash 
flows and future property sales proceeds. The real property usually 
functioned as a security to the investors of the bonds except for the case of 
the residential development, where an additional mortgage over the property 
functioned as additional collateral. 
The types of real estate were predominantly Office (3 transactions), then 
Residential (2), then Retail (1) and one mixed use property – Office & Retail. 
The property category – which stands for the distinction of Corporate, 
Investment or Development Property – was dominated by Investment and 
Corporate Property. The reason why Corporate Property was so strong lies 
in the fact that corporates in desperate need to lower their gearing ratios 
sold their non-core assets usually under Sale-Leaseback structures. The 
development on the Investment Property side can be mainly attributed to 
CapitaLand being the dominating originator. This Government-Linked 
Company kept all its real estate developments after completion as 
investment properties. The specificity of the CapitaLand deals was that all 
Investment Properties were sold under a Sale-Leaseback structure, where 
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CapitaLand functioned as the general tenant of the property. This gave 
additional comfort to the investors. 
Stage 2 (2001/2002) – Asset Analysis (Chart 9): 
In the second stage condominium sales receivables became a strong asset 
type. 3 out of 7 transactions were backed by those assets, supported by 
cash flows from progress payments and secured by mortgages over the 
underlying properties. All other transactions involved the Securitisation of 
physical assets, i.e. buildings, of which the Raffles City transaction was an 
exception. Here not the whole real estate asset was securitised, but a 55% 
stake in the Asset-SPV that held the property under a share structure. The 
bond was still supported by rental cash flows and future property sales 
proceeds as in all other physical asset deals; however, in this case shares in 
the SPV functioned as a security to the investors and not the property 
directly. 
Whereas in the first stage only single ‘trophy’ properties backed the 
transaction, the second stage was coined by the introduction of multiple 
property deals – especially in the residential development category. This is 
also supported by the fact that development properties became the second 
strongest property category. Except for the Raffles City deal, which was also 
more an Investment Property deal than a Corporate Property deal, 
Investment Property dominated the scene. The reason for Corporate 
Property not being that strong anymore can be attributed to the different 
times in 2001/2002 compared to the first stage in 1999/2000. Corporates 
were not as desperate to sell anymore. 
The reason why the development Securitisations could incorporate 
receivables from progress payments of yet to be built residential 
development projects is that the risks in terms of non-property market risks 
are very little. Construction prices are stable and contractor credit risks are 
manageable.529 
 
                                            
529 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
4.2  Singapore 171 
 
 
Chart 8: Singapore – Stage 1 – Asset Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Chart 9: Singapore – Stage 2 – Asset Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Chart 10: Singapore – Stage 3 – Asset Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Stage 3 (2003/2004) – Asset Analysis (Chart 10): 
The third stage was stamped by strong innovation with respect to assets 
backing Real Estate Securitisation transactions in Singapore. Two new 
asset types were introduced in 2003 – both were not physical real estate 
assets: Credit Tenant Leases and Single Borrower Mortgage Loans.  
In the case of the Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation, the originator used the 
rental cash flows from a long-term lease with Siemens to fund the property’s 
construction. The lease with Siemens, a firm with investment grade credit 
functioned as security to the investors. However, to support the transaction 
with additional collateral a mortgage over the property (Siemens Center) 
was transferred to the SPV. 
The second new asset type also involved a mortgage over the underlying 
properties. There were three transactions – all initiated by CapitaLand – that 
were structured as Single-Borrower Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (CMBS). In all cases the issuing vehicle granted mortgage loans 
to the borrowers, which service the bonds with interest and principal 
payments. Interest and principal from the mortgage loans were determined 
by the rental cash flows originating from the underlying properties. In all 
cases the loan/loan facilities represented the assets of the issued bonds and 
the mortgage over the properties served as a security to the investors. In all 
three cases the borrowed funds were used as acquisition financing for the 
underlying properties. 
Mortgages as security or additional collateral dominated the third stage of 
the market; real property secured the transaction only in one case (Ngee 
Ann City). In this stage retail and residential were strong real estate types, 
while the category was dominated by construction (for development 
property) as well as acquisition financing (for investment property). 
Summary 
Physical real estate assets, i.e. buildings were the assets in the first stage. 
This incorporated that the real property was transferred to the SPV to the 
security of the investors and that the bonds were serviced by the cash flows 
from rental income and future sales proceeds. As this was a structure 
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unique to Singapore and tailored towards Singapore originators and 
investors, it was not a global product. As the market oriented itself more 
towards global investors, the structures were innovated and new assets 
evolved that securitised cash flows derived from real estate: Receivables 
from condominium sales, Credit Tenant Leases and Single Borrower 
Mortgage Loans became new asset types over the course of the evolution. 
While in the beginning corporate property was strong, it did not play a role in 
the later stages. This mirrors the same trend as in the originator analysis. As 
originators and assets are linked the same reasoning as in the originator 
analysis counts. The corporates that owned property needed to lower their 
gearing. Hence, they wanted to sell their corporate property. Since that was 
not possible in an outright sale, the companies used Real Estate 
Securitisation instead. 
Overall Investment Property was the strongest category before 
Development Property. The reason was that most developers kept their 
developments that then became investments. A property only counts as 
Development Property as long as it is developed and not completed – once 
it is completed it becomes investment property. As in the beginning only 
completed trophy properties were securitised, Development Property did not 
play a big role. However, as the market evolved and investors got 
comfortable with Real Estate Securitisation structures Development Property 
grew stronger, driven by the use of the concept as an alternative 
construction-financing vehicle. Apart from construction funding the concept 
was also used as acquisition financing – especially Singapore REITs used 
the vehicle for their initial property acquisitions. 
While in the first stage office was the real estate type dominating Real 
Estate Securitisations, in the second and third stage residential and retail 
became dominant. Residential property was a strong real estate type 
because Real Estate Securitisation was a good vehicle to refinance 
condominium developments. The reason why retail properties were strong 
lay within the yields achievable in retail properties compared to office 
properties in Singapore. Once the first Real Estate Securitisations were not 
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considered off-balance sheet any more, it was not favourable to securitise 
office properties anymore, due to low yields.530 
4.2.4.3 Motives 
The Motive Analysis answers the question of why a company should perform a 
Real Estate Securitisation exercise. Looking at the motives one can see the 
different motivations of companies over different stages of the market. It mirrors 
the evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market in Singapore. The Motive 
– Analysis fulfils two tasks (see Chart 11, Chart 12 & Chart 13): 
1. It categorizes the use of Real Estate Securitisation (as a 
divestment/monetization vehicle or as innovative financing instrument). 
2. It demonstrates the motives for doing such a transaction. 
Stage 1 (1999/2000) – Motive Analysis (Chart 11): 
Looking at the first stage it becomes evident that one of the primary motives 
for originators was to sell their physical real estate asset, while keeping a 
hand on it and its potential future appreciation.  
All but one transaction was initiated in order to liquefy/monetize the asset. 
Hence, Real Estate Securitisation was primarily used as a divestment and 
monetization vehicle,531 instead of an innovative financing vehicle. To the 
pressured real estate developers, Real Estate Securitisation was a way to 
sell the asset at times where nobody could afford to buy the properties at 
such high prices. So, Securitisation filled the gap in time, where sales 
objectives could not be achieved otherwise.532 
The primary two motives in the first stage were ‘Sale to generate liquidity 
and liquefy/monetize on the asset’ and ‘Balance Sheet Management / Off-
                                            
530 While property yields in Singapore were generally low, on average, industrial and retail 
properties provided higher rental yield than office and residential properties. In particular, the 
rental yield of retail properties over a 14-year period was relatively high with an average of 
6.7%. The average yield for office and residential properties over the period was around 4.5-
4.7%. Cf. Ooi, et al. (2000). 
531 The difference between divestment and monetization is that in the earlier case the intention 
is to really sell the asset and give up the control over it, while in the later case the originator 
intends to unlock the capital tied up in the property without giving up the control over it – i.e. 
monetizing on the property. 
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Balance Sheet Financing’. As mentioned before those motives were driven 
by the development in the real estate as well as the financial markets in 
Southeast Asia after the Asian Financial Crisis. Gearing of real estate 
developers was high as were interest rates at the time. The only way to 
lower gearing was to monetize balance-sheet assets. In fact ‘Balance Sheet 
Management’ was the biggest motivation for companies in the first stage of 
the market.533 
There were three cases (marked bold on the table), where Real Estate 
Securitisation was intended to be used as a divestment vehicle, but 
eventually it turned out that it was purely an innovative way of financing 
properties in an off-balance sheet manner in times where interest rates were 
high and traditional loan commitments were low. All three transactions were 
originated by DBS Land (today CapitaLand). Those three transactions first 
were considered off-balance sheet divestments and later on-balance sheet 
financings. 
One odd case was Wilby Residence, because Tan Chong International was 
forced to sell the development by the Singapore Government. Under 
Singapore law foreign developers have to sell their real estate developments 
within two years of completion. Hence, the primary motive for Tan Chong – 
since the property was located directly beside the company’s car showroom 
– was to sell the building, while keeping the option to control and buy it back 
at a later stage. 
Another special case was Silverlac Investments, because here future 
receivables from condominium sales were securitised to refinance the 
acquisition and construction of the project. The motives in this case were 
‘Balance Sheet Management’ and ‘Sale of the Asset’ to unlock the fixed 
value of the company’s development. Moreover cheaper construction 
funding from a different source than a bank was also an important motive.534 
                                                                                                                                
532 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
533 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
534 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
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Chart 11: Singapore – Stage 1 – Motive Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Stage 2 (2001/2002) – Motive Analysis (Chart 12): 
Whereas in the first stage Real Estate Securitisation was primarily used as a 
divestment and monetization vehicle, the second stage displayed a shift 
towards its use as an innovative financing tool. Still there were two 
transactions that were pure divestments and two transactions that were 
divestments and innovative financings at the same time, but especially the 
residential sales receivables transactions (Peridot, Jasmine, Aragorn) used 
the construct as an innovative development-financing instrument. 
The two interesting cases with regard to the variability of the Real Estate 
Securitisation concept were Wisma Atria and Capital Square. Both 
transactions functioned as real estate asset divestments for the originators. 
However, at the same time the vehicle also functioned as an acquisition-
financing instrument for the de facto buyer of the properties. ERGO 
insurance was the main investor in the junior tranches and became the 
sponsor of this transaction that gave ERGO the option to call the transaction 
and buy the outstanding senior and junior bonds in order to fully acquire the 
property at a later stage. So, for ERGO this structure proved to be an 
innovative financing. The motives for the originators were clearly to sell the 
assets and to use the proceeds to improve their balance sheets. 
The three residential development transactions that used Securitisation as 
an innovative development financing also had similar motives. They sold 
their condominium sales receivables in order to get cheaper funding for their 
development projects. Instead of going to a bank to get land acquisition and 
construction financing, the companies sold receivables derived from future 
progress payments of a portfolio of condominium buyers. Essentially they 
sold pooled consumer receivables to the capital markets. Backed by sound 
contractual agreements and secured by a mortgage over the properties, the 
investors were comfortable with the risk and accepted low margins that lead 
to low funding costs for the developers. So cheap financing became a 
dominant motivation for choosing Real Estate Securitisation. Above that 
diversification of funding sources and the chance to bring forward future 
development proceeds in order to unlock capital was very attractive for 
residential developers. 
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Chart 12: Singapore – Stage 2 – Motive Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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Stage 3 (2003/2004) – Motive Analysis (Chart 13): 
In the third stage of the market, Real Estate Securitisation moved away from 
being a divestment vehicle to becoming an innovative financing instrument. 
Even though there were two transactions that used the vehicle as a 
divestment as well as an innovative financing, most deals just used the 
concept as a financing tool, which was also mirrored by the assets 
(receivables, leases) and collateral (mortgages) used in these transactions. 
The ‘Diversification of Funding Sources’ was a very important motive in all 
transactions that used Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative financing 
tool. Real estate developers in Singapore traditionally relied strongly on the 
banking market for funding. They became scared in 1999, when banks 
lowered their real estate debt exposures. Thus, they realized that in the 
following years they would need to hedge that risk by diversifying their 
funding sources. 
‘Cheap Financing’ became the strongest motive in the third stage of the 
market. Not only represented the capital market another funding source for 
developers, it also became a market for affordable financing – especially for 
residential construction funding. 
There were many different transactions in this stage. The two REIT 
financing transactions Silver Maple and Silver Loft became a novelty in the 
market because they represented acquisition financing for the REITs 
properties before the trusts were issued. Another acquisition financing case 
was CapitaRetail, in which CapitaMall Trust eventually has the option to buy 
three properties that were spun-off by CapitaLand into three separate 
privately placed trusts that financed this acquisition by issuing CMBS. This 
actually represents a way of deferring an acquisition by parking it in trusts 
financed under a Securitisation structure. For CapitaMall trust this was the 
best way to do it, since the REIT is an investor in the junior tranche and has 
an option to buy the properties at a later stage. 
The Ngee Ann City Securitisation was once again sponsored by ERGO. It 
had the same structure and the same motivation as the previous ERGO 
transactions in the second stage. 
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Chart 13: Singapore – Stage 3 – Motive Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation  
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So, all in all the third stage showed that Real Estate Securitisation is a 
universal instrument that can be tailored to suit the originators’ and 
borrowers’ needs and motives. In all four acquisition-financing cases (Silver 
Maple, Silver Loft, CapitaRetail and Ngee Ann City) the financing of the 
acquisition of property was the primary goal of the transaction, but the 
mixture of additional motives made all transactions unique and determined 
their structures. 
Summary 
In the beginning (first half of the evolution) the use of Real Estate 
Securitisation as a divestment and asset monetization vehicle was the 
originators’ focus, this changed during the second half, where Real Estate 
Securitisation was primarily used as an innovative financing tool. Also 
depending on the use of Real Estate Securitisation, the originator and the 
type of asset chosen, the motives can be grouped and they change from 
one group to another. 
Under the corporate and developer asset divestments transactions 
involving physical real estate assets, the motives were the creation of 
liquidity for the originator by monetizing the asset and balance sheet 
management by getting the asset off the balance sheet. For the deals that 
were meant to be divestments as well as financing the motives also included 
diversification of funding sources and long-term financing. Especially for the 
ERGO transactions the motives were to arrange innovative acquisition 
financing that offered them off-balance sheet character and options to call 
the transaction. 
Under the innovative financing deals the motives varied primarily by asset 
type. For the development financing by Securitisation of sales receivables, it 
was a quick way to refinance the project. The motives were cheap financing, 
diversification of funding sources and the opportunity to liquefy the asset by 
bringing forward cash flows from deferred payment schemes. For the CMBS 
deals the motives were cheap financing, diversification of funding sources 
and longer term financing. 
Overall the following conclusions can be derived: 
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• Higher LTV was not a motive in all transactions, but one (Credit Tenant 
Lease).535 
• Cheap financing became more important as the market evolved. 
• Sale and monetization of assets was very high motive under the asset 
divestment deals in the beginning of the market. 
• Balance-Sheet Management and off-balance sheet financing were 
important motives throughout all transactions. 
• The opportunity to bring forward development proceeds was a strong 
motive for using Real Estate Securitisation as development financing. 
Thereby the developers intended to monetize on the asset and to reduce 
money/capital tied up in projects in order to use the money for acquiring 
new land for the companies’ landbanks. 
• Longer term financing was a motive for all transactions using the vehicle 
as innovative financing.536  
• Different transactions had different motives that were dependent on the 
different originators, assets and transaction structures. 
4.2.4.4 Transaction Schemes 
The Transaction Schemes Analysis goes into detail on the structural features 
used in Real Estate Securitisation structures in Singapore. The change in 
features lead to a change in structures fuelled by a change in motives and 
utilised assets – so structural features and transaction structures mirrored the 
evolution of Real Estate Securitisation as it went through three stages of 
development. 
The analysis is divided into 5 different categories describing each individual 
transaction structure: Issued Notes (parameters of issue), Placement (private or 
public, on-shore or off-shore), Embedded Options (yes or no, call options or put 
                                            
535 In the Singapore context a higher Loan-to-Value was not a driving motive as often 35 to 40% 
of the bonds were usually held by the originators. So only 60 to 65% Loan-to-Value was 
achieved. Cf. Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 78. 
536 Whereas the banking market only offered 3-5 year funding, the Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions offered 7-10 year funding. Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554. 
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options, exercised or not), Profit Sharing (preference shares stapled to the 
bonds or not) and Off-Balance Sheet treatment (on- or off-balance sheet 
financing). 
The emphasis in this analysis lies on features unique to Singapore transactions 
– embedded options and profit sharing. This has not been observed in any 
other Asset-Securitisation market so far. The applicability and success of those 
features will infer if those features might apply to other yet to be developed Real 
Estate Securitisation markets.537 
Stage 1 (1999/2000) – Structure Analysis (Chart 14): 
The issuance volume in the first stage ranged from S$ 100 m (Silverlac) to 
S$ 878 m (Six Battery Road) with the majority of the transactions being 
around S$ 200 m. The reason for this lies in the fact that only single 
properties were securitised, which limits the maximum size of the transaction 
to the value of the underlying property. 
All notes were denominated in Singapore Dollars and the SPV’s were all 
incorporated on-shore.538 The interest payment was set up as a fixed rate 
and the amortization was a bullet amortization at maturity of the bonds. The 
bonds maturities ranged from 3 years for the residential condominium sales 
receivables Securitisation to 10 years for the office property Securitisation. 
Even though there were 2 deals with a 7-year term, the majority of the 
transactions mature after 10 years. The development deals always have a 
short term, since they function as construction financing, which is dependent 
on the timeframe of the construction that is usually not longer than 5-6 
years. 
The typical structure in the beginning of the market incorporated only two 
tranches: a senior and a junior tranche, where the junior tranche was sub-
                                            
537 For a more in-depth description of transaction structures confer Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 
554. 
538 This counts for all transactions in all three stages. The reason for this was that Singapore 
made it possible to structure the SPV’s tax neutral and the government incited favourable tax 
treatments for bond investors – especially for offshore investors. Singapore wanted to create 
a favourable Asset-Securitisation environment in Singapore that let the market develop 
onshore. 
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ordinate to the senior tranche. In one case (Century Square Shopping Mall) 
there was also a Mezzanine tranche in between the senior and junior. The 
junior tranche held all the risk and was a structural buffer for the capital of 
the senior bondholders. Hence, the junior bondholders held the equity 
position in the real estate even though they owned bonds, i.e. debt and not 
equity. This structure until now has been unique in the global Securitisation 
markets. In exchange for the associated risk the junior bondholders were 
usually granted a call option that allowed them to collapse the structure,539 
as well as preference shares that were attached to the junior bonds to share 
the participation in the upside of the property. This led to the result that in all 
but one transaction the originator, i.e. the previous owner of the building 
invested in the junior bonds. This gave the senior bondholders a certain 
comfort because the originator best knew all the risks associated with the 
property. However, for the originator this also had accounting implications. 
In the first stage all bonds were place onshore and mostly in private 
transactions (not listed on any exchange). The reason was that the market 
was still in a pre-mature stage – investors, originators, arrangers and 
regulators did not have any experience with this product. Local investors, 
however, got comfort from knowing the properties as well as the originators. 
This facilitated the placement and the deal structure. As mentioned earlier, 
the deals therefore did not need to be rated and the structure became more 
flexible and tailored to the needs of the local investors. The only three deals 
that were placed publicly, at least partly over the exchange were the DBS 
Land deals. The reason for the public placement was that the company 
wanted to sharpen its profile with private investors (non-institutional clients) 
and hence placed a retail tranche (to retail customers) over the exchange. 
The gross of those deals were also placed in private placements with 
insurances, banks, asset managers and corporates. Another reason for the 
retail tranche was that the developers wanted to put the bond issue on a 
                                            
539 The junior bondholders could call the transaction and pay off the senior bondholders at a 
pre-defined price, or they could make the SPV sell the property to a third party, pay back all 
bonds and distribute the profit to preference share holders. If the junior bondholders did not 
exercise the call option, the SPV would be allowed to sell the property to a third party, pay 
back the bonds and distribute the profit to the preference share holders. 
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broader investor basis and get retail investors interested in Singapore 
property securities. This paid off for CapitaLand, when they first issued a 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). 
Looking at embedded options it becomes evident that they were a distinct 
structural feature in the first stage of transaction structures. They were 
incorporated in all transactions that securitised the physical real estate 
asset. The only transaction without options was the sales receivables 
transaction. The options embedded were call options for the junior tranche 
holders. Additionally, four transactions incorporated put options for senior 
bondholders that were able to collapse the structure and put the property 
back to the originator at a pre-defined price. Since those were contingent 
liabilities for the originators those features had accounting consequences. 
Whereas the auditors under Singapore GAAP first considered the 
transactions off-balance sheet, they became on-balance sheet at a later 
stage, when the Singapore accounting environment moved closer towards 
international accounting standards. Then the put options were considered 
liabilities and there was not any transfer of risk associated with the property. 
Added to the fact that the ownership was also not 100% transferred (due to 
junior tranche) and control could also be taken over (by call options), the 
properties and the bonds had to be reconsolidated. 
As mentioned above additional upside in the properties – either by surplus 
cash flow or by appreciation at sale – could be shared beneath the 
bondholders (especially beneath the junior bondholders). This was done by 
preference shares that were stapled to the bonds. The feature was unique to 
Singapore and has not yet been duplicated anywhere. Six out of eight 
transactions took advantage of this feature. 
The strong participation of the originators in the junior tranches and the use 
of preference shares and options stapled to them put the transactions under 
enormous scrutiny by accountants. Especially the put options were a ‘thorn 
in the accountants side’. After the Enron scandal those structures are not 
considered off-balance sheet anymore. 
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Chart 14: Singapore – Stage 1 – Structure Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Stage 2 (2001/2002) – Structure Analysis: 
The second stage of the Singapore Real Estate Securitisation market was 
coined by two things: internationalisation (bonds denominated in foreign 
currency and placed off-shore) and structural innovations (including off-
balance sheet treatment). 
Apart from innovation the second stage also brought forward bigger 
transaction sizes. For one this happened because multiple property deals 
entered the market, but also because the properties securitised became 
bigger. Above that investors became more comfortable with the assets, the 
market and the structures and hence they were more recipient for larger 
deals. The biggest issuance by far was Raffles City, which is a huge mixed 
use ‘trophy property’ in the heart of Singapore. The average deal size also 
increased to around S$ 350 m. 
There were two important international issuances: Jasmine and Aragorn 
Investment – both had a tranche denominated in US Dollars. Moreover both 
had floating rate interest as well as fixed rate interest. The reason for this is 
that international investors prefer floating rate interest, whereas in Singapore 
nearly all transactions carry fixed rate interest. 
The internationalisation led to structural innovations, because now that 
bonds were also placed offshore, the structures became more international. 
This incorporated that the transactions were rated by rating agencies on the 
one side, but also that they had more than two tranches on the other side – 
subordination by usage of different rated tranches (from ‘AAA’ to unrated). 
The remaining transactions kept holding on to the standardised senior/junior 
tranche structure instituted by DBS Bank in the first stage. 
The majority of transactions were still placed privately, but the gross of the 
transactions were not solely placed onshore anymore – 5 out of 7 were also 
marketed internationally. 
There were three transactions (Wisma Atria, Compass Point, Capital 
Square) that followed the standardised structure (incl. embedded options) 
and one transaction that was also structured as the transactions in the first 
stage, but without embedded options (Raffles City). While the primary 
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intention in previous deals of the first stage was to park the property instead 
of divesting it, in the case of Raffles Holding the divestment and the 
concentration on core business were the primary drivers for adapting the 
earlier structures. Moreover, the interest rate on the junior bonds of this deal 
was part of the reason why this Securitisation was different from the ones in 
the first stage. In other Securitisations one found that the property yields 
were much lower as in the case of Raffles, and after having paid the senior 
bonds the structure ended up with a yield that was not effective enough to 
attract junior bondholders. So in most cases this was the major reason why 
the original owner, i.e. the originator had to buy back the junior bonds. 
Hence, the new thing about these transactions of the second stage was that 
the junior tranche was placed out with third party investors and the 
originators only took minority stakes in those transactions, if any at all. This 
made the structure evolve to what the market called a “full blown off-balance 
sheet Securitisation”.540 
The residential development Securitisations (Peridot, Jasmine, Aragorn) 
seemed to follow the same track as the Silverlac transaction in the first 
stage; however, they were not the same as they were influenced by new 
structural features (multiple rated tranches) as well as US dollar 
denominated tranches that were placed with international investors. 
The international orientation, the increased number of rated transactions 
and the structural innovations in the second stage led to an increased off-
balance sheet consideration of the issued transactions – 6 out of 7 
transactions were attested to be off-balance sheet. 
 
                                            
540 Cf. Walker (2000). 
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Chart 15: Singapore – Stage 2 – Structure Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Stage 3 (2003/2004) – Structure Analysis : 
The internationalisation that started in stage 2 progressed in stage 3. Five 
out of seven transactions incorporated tranches that were denominated in a 
different currency than Singapore Dollars. Three transactions did not even 
have any Singapore Dollar denominated tranches. Riviera, Silver Loft and 
Arwen Investment issued only US Dollar notes. In sync with this 
development all internationally placed transactions either had pure floating 
rate interest or a mixture of floating and fixed. The US Dollar denominated 
tranches had pure floating charges. This is a proof of the fact that 
transaction structures are usually geared towards the investors they target. 
They cater for the individual investor needs in the region that the notes are 
sold to.  
In this third stage nearly all transactions were tranched by international 
standards and they were rated by rating agencies. The originators/borrowers 
usually did not participate in the transactions anymore. There were only two 
transactions that were outliers in this movement. One was Cobalt Asset 
Management – a credit tenant lease Securitisation, which had a small size 
(only S$ 45 m), only one ‘AA’ tranche with a fixed rate interest and a 16-year 
term, which was very unusual for Singapore standards. The other 
transaction seemed to be a relic from the first and second stage; it was 
Ngee Ann City, a transaction following the same route as the Wisma Atria 
and Compass Point deals under the formerly standardised DBS Bank 
structure. Here again this was a structure geared towards ERGO’s needs. 
The deals at this stage were primarily publicly placed over an exchange. 
Except for one transaction they were not solely placed on-shore anymore. In 
accordance with international standards and the rating agencies’ criteria, 
there were no options embedded in the transactions, except for one special 
case (CapitaRetail). The structures (except for Ngee Ann City) represented 
pure bond structures without any upside shared by preference shares. This 
runs in sync with the motive analysis showing that those transactions were 
pure financings rather than asset divestments. This is also mirrored by the 
fact that 5 out of 7 transactions were true off-balance sheet transactions. 
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Chart 16: Singapore – Stage 3 – Structure Analysis 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Summary: 
The market started off with smaller transactions that were very unique in 
their structure. The structure – created by DBS Bank in early 1999 – was 
tailored towards the needs of the originators (highly geared real estate 
developers and Singapore corporates) and aimed at the premature 
Singapore bond market. The structures were not only unique in the way they 
were structured, but also in the way they evolved. The evolution was mainly 
carried by local requirements and needs rather than by internationally 
recognized standards. This allowed the market participants 
(arrangers/originators/investors) to invent a structure that offered features 
not observed in Real Estate Securitisation transactions before. Those 
structures were differentiated by embedded options (put options for 
investors and call options for originators) as well as by preference shares 
that helped to distribute potential rental cash flow surpluses or property 
appreciation at sale. The originators usually invested in the junior tranche 
(essentially the equity position in the deal) and carried the first loss risk. In 
exchange they kept the upside of the property and were able to keep control 
of it. The singular aspect was that this was all created under a bond 
structure that has not yet been duplicated anywhere else. 
One disadvantage of this first structure is that it was not considered off-
balance sheet by international standards. This led to 3 transactions being 
called by DBS Land, but it also fuelled the development of similar structures 
that could be considered off-balance sheet as observed in stage 2. 
Once the market had been opened by those ‘trophy’ property 
Securitisations, larger transactions incorporating other asset types came to 
the market bringing with them new structural innovations. This included the 
residential development sales receivables that became rated and 
denominated in foreign currencies as well as the single borrower CMBS 
transactions initiated by CapitaLand for its newly issued REITs. Also a rated 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation transaction was an innovation to the 
market, whose proceeds were used for construction funding of a property 
leased out with a long-term lease to Siemens. 
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4.2.5 Analysis 
The Singapore Asset-Securitisation market has been dominated by real estate 
related transactions since its inception. While this can be partially attributed to 
the small population of Singapore and the historical makeup of the mortgage 
market the situation is partly attributed to the ceiling on banks’ exposure to the 
property sector. Following the Asian Financial Crisis, the Singapore government 
has actively encouraged banks to reduce their exposure to the property sector. 
This has increased further as the banking market has been consolidated to 
three domestic banks in recent times. Coupled with the desire for property 
companies to become asset-light, this has initiated a number of both unrated 
and rated Real Estate Securitisations in the Singapore market. Transactions 
have included unique local structures securitising physical real estate assets, 
Securitisations of preconstruction sales receivables, credit tenant lease deals 
and standard CMBS type transactions. 
The shift towards rated CMBS transactions has created international interest 
and provided new momentum to the market. International investors are now 
increasingly looking to Singapore CMBS to achieve highly rated Asian property 
exposure. In this context, Singapore has also recently witnessed the 
emergence of CMBS as an acquisition-financing tool for Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) assets. More activity is expected to be seen in this area as the 
REIT market develops.541 
However, as the property market picks up and valuations return to previous 
levels, the unique local Real Estate Securitisation structures out of the first and 
second stage are also expected to revive.542 As demonstrated in this chapter, 
this type of Securitisation is a unique opportunity for companies, which have 
large property assets on their balance sheets to unlock and enhance the value 
of their properties. It offers a set of structural features to the originators 
depending on their motives. Even though the market got started in times, when 
the property market was in a trough, property companies are now only looking 
                                            
541 Cf. McCarthy, et al. (2003), p. 7. 
542 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
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to this sort of divestment vehicle, in times when property values are up.543 This 
way they can maximize their real estate monetization amount and issue the 
highest bond volume possible.544 
The objective behind the Government’s promotion of the debt market and the 
introduction of Asset-Securitisation was to widen the range of financial products 
available to investors, consistent with Singapore’s efforts to make the city-state 
a leading financial centre.545 
In the following the results of the previous analysis in this chapter will be 
summarized. 
Who was involved? 
The Government through its Monetary Authority and the Inland Revenue 
Service reformed the regulatory and tax framework for originating and investing 
in bonds (including Asset-Backed Securities). Especially in Singapore the 
government plays an important role in the regulatory environment. This was in 
part driven by the cultural environment. The government and its great credit 
rating was – through its subsidiaries – a facilitator of the evolution. 
The Government-Linked Corporations (GLC) were strongly involved in the 
market and they still play a crucial role in the evolution of the Real Estate 
Securitisation market in Singapore.546 The government through its holdings took 
the initiative to promote this instrument in the market – for example in the first 
stage DBS Bank was the leading arranger and DBS Land was the leading 
originator.547 After the merger with Pidemco Land, DBS Land became 
                                            
543 Property companies were only receptive to use Real Estate Securitisation in the real estate 
market downturn of 1999 because there was no other way to sell or refinance their real estate 
asset holdings. Market conditions were very uncertain, it was not easy to find buyers but also 
prices were way below valuations for outright sales, lower than what could be achieved in a 
Securitisation transaction. 
544 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
545 Cf. Hein (2004), p. V11. 
546 Cf. Ooi (2003), Interview 4, p. 554; Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
547 The successor company of DBS Land, which is today called CapitaLand, is still 61%-owned 
by the Singapore Government. Cf. Lane (2004). 
4.2  Singapore 197 
 
CapitaLand and is today the most active real estate developer in Singapore’s 
Real Estate Securitisation market.548  
In the first half of the evolution the development was carried by local arrangers, 
such as DBS Bank. As time went by, the market matured and oriented itself 
towards international issuances. This lead to internationally experienced 
arrangers building a stronghold in arranging Real Estate Securitisations (e.g. 
HypoVereinsbank). 
At first Rating Agencies were not involved. Transactions had a unique 
structure and investors that were comfortable with the structure and the 
properties underlying the issuance did not require a rating. The more mature 
the market became, the more internationally oriented it got, and hence the more 
transactions became rated. The rating agencies’ standard Securitisation 
templates changed the Singapore structures and the way that Real Estate 
Securitisations were done since the dawn of the market. 
Which assets? 
The selection of assets, property types and property categories by originating 
companies were mainly determined by the underlying properties’ performances, 
i.e. rental yields and asset values. 
• Assets types included physical income-producing real estate assets 
(commercial buildings), receivables (from condominium sales proceeds), 
Credit Tenant Leases and Mortgage Loans (Single-Borrower CMBS). 
• Cash flows supporting the issued bonds consisted of cash flows resulting 
from the physical real estate assets (rental cash flows and future sales 
proceeds), progress payments, lease cash flows from credit tenant, and 
interest & principal on mortgage loans. 
• The transactions were secured by different kinds of Collateral: real 
property, construction mortgages on developing property, credit from tenant 
& mortgage, mortgage over underlying property. 
                                            
548 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
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• Property types of underlying real estate were in the first stage 
predominantly Office properties, then in the second and third stage primarily 
Residential and Retail properties.549 
• The underlying Properties’ Categories were mixed, but dominated by 
Investment Property and Residential Development Property. In the early 
stages Corporate Property also partly played a role. 
Why do assets qualify? 
Assets have to be acceptable to bond investors – coupon rate of the bonds 
depends on the cash flow generation potential of the underlying properties. 
Hence, sufficient property cash flows are needed to service the bonds. 
Moreover the ratio of outstanding bonds vis-à-vis the property value has to be 
adequate. Thus:550 
o The poorer the asset quality, the lower the principal amount raised by 
the bonds, the higher the interest on the bonds and the more difficult 
it is to place the bonds. 
o Only high yielding properties have a high monetization value. 
o ‘Flagship’ office or retail properties as well as pre-sold residential 
properties in prime locations represent securitisable assets. 
o In the case of Real Estate Securitisation whose assets are 
receivables from yet to be built residential development projects the 
following criteria has to be fulfilled: 
? The project has to be substantially sold, and  
? its construction cost has to be fixed. 
o Only properties with good occupancy and stable income – 
outperforming the market – fit the Real Estate Securitisation scheme; 
a minimum level of asset and cash flow quality has to exist. 
                                            
549 Retail assets in Singapore had a history of strong yields due to Singapore being Southeast 
Asia’s leading shopping destination. Hence, the first Real Estate Securitisation transactions 
were supported by trophy office buildings with long leases and high rental rates as well as 
prime retail properties with strong yields, i.e. shopping malls on Orchard Road. 
550 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
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o Rental yields have to be strong for properties to be securitised. For 
low yielding properties this means that either rents have to be raised 
or property values have to be written down to levels that translate into 
yields acceptable to investors.551 
“To cut a long story short, the reasons why we won’t do Securitisations going 
forward is that we would get hurt with a huge haircut and we do not want that. 
Senior bondholders and junior bondholders would require a certain yield for this 
structure, but here in town the current yields range between 3-4%.”552 
What motives? 
Motives change with the use of Real Estate Securitisation either as a 
divestment vehicle or as an innovative financing instrument. They also depend 
on the asset and the property type. 
• If an originator uses Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment vehicle, 
then the creation of liquidity, the monetization of the property and balance 
sheet management are the primary motives. For some originators this way 
of divestment may be one of the few options to dispose of large investment 
property holdings.553  
• However, if a property company uses the concept as an innovative 
financing instrument, then diversification of funding sources, cheaper and 
longer term financing at a fixed rate as well as the opportunity to bring 
forward cash flows from future receivables are the main motives. 
Overall a higher Loan-to-Value ratio cannot be observed as a motive, but the 
diversification of funding sources is an effective motive in any case, especially 
in times of rising interest rates and a deteriorating bank lending market.554 
                                            
551 This is what happened before the launch of the first Singapore Office REIT 
CapitaCommercial – rent levels were raised and asset values were adjusted. It made the 
REIT issuance an oversubscribed success. Cf. Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 554. 
552 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
553 The development in the physical real estate market made listed property companies realise 
that for their share prices to perform, they need to invest into landbanks and development 
projects and not into holding investment properties. Real Estate Securitisation is a useful way 
to divest of investment properties and invest into residential development sites. 
554 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
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Transactions are not attractive to all property owners because the transactions 
do not necessarily lead to cheaper financing – Securitisation transactions are 
expensive and only make sense if the company overweighs motives other than 
cheap financing. 
Generally, when using the structure for securitising physical assets, Real Estate 
Securitisation offers several advantages over traditional bank financing. So, the 
originator has the choice: 
• If the company needs to lower the leverage ratio and wants to get the 
property off-balance sheet, then a Real Estate Securitisation might be the 
right way.555 
• If the company does not care about keeping the property off- or on-balance 
sheet, then bank loans might be cheaper, faster and more convenient 
But even if Real Estate Securitisation is chosen to divest the asset, then off-
balance sheet treatment is not guaranteed. So, it comes down to two scenarios: 
• If divesting the asset, but sharing the upside and being able to control the 
asset at a later stage are important to the originator, then the originator has 
to accept that the transaction will be on-balance sheet.556 
• If the originator wants to divest the asset, without keeping any interest in the 
property, then the property will go off-balance sheet.  
Hence, it is a conflict of objectives; everything at the same time is not 
achievable. All in all off-balance sheet treatment must not be the primary driver 
for choosing Real Estate Securitisation. The tougher the accounting rules are, 
the harder it will get to achieve off-balance sheet financing. But even if it might 
not be achievable anymore, there may be other motives that will none the less 
lead to Real Estate Securitisation transactions.557 
                                            
555 Once the asset sale is considered as a ‘true sale’, the company can take it off its balance 
sheet and retire whatever debts are incurred for the property. As a result, the company's 
borrowings are reduced and, correspondingly, its gearing ratio goes down. 
556 Control by the use of options and upside participation by investing into the junior tranche and 
the use of preference shares. 
557 Cf. Sing (2003), Interview 5, p. 554. 
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Especially in Singapore, developers were and still are seeking to divest low 
yielding properties and to channel their capital into high yielding development 
projects – thereby boosting their return on capital. The motives for choosing 
Real Estate Securitisation to fund development projects are straightforward. 
Developers want to  
o reduce their cost of construction funding,  
o unlock the value tied up in development projects,  
o use the proceeds to upgrade their landbank,  
o and realize the money from one project and put it into the next one.558 
“Securitisation enables the company to bring forward cash flows from the 
deferred payment scheme and is expected to reduce the financing costs 
for the project in view of lower interest rates…This is part of the 
company's ongoing financial management efforts to improve 
profitability.”559 
What structures/schemes? 
The unique structural features out of Singapore Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions (primarily out of the first half of the development) included:560 
• Sale-Leaseback agreements with Government-Linked Corporations that 
implicitly guaranteed predictable cash flows to investors. So the first Real 
Estate Securitisation transactions can be viewed as sale-and-leaseback 
transactions with a Securitisation component. 561 
• A two-tranche structure, featuring a 2/3 senior tranche and a 1/3 junior 
tranche. 
• Embedded options562 
                                            
558 Cf. Anonymous (2004i). 
559 Rashiwala (2003c). 
560 Cf. Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 554. 
561 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
562 For further information on how options can create value, confer Hommel, et al. (2001). 
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o Call Options for originators/junior bondholders giving them the right to 
collapse the structure and call the deal. 
o Put Options for senior bond investors, de facto guaranteeing their 
principal amount. 
• Preference Share stapled to the bonds (primarily to junior bonds) that gave 
the bondholders the opportunity to benefit from surplus rental income and 
future property appreciation. 
• Originators’ participation in junior bonds, i.e. taking subordinate and first 
loss position. The junior bonds even sometimes had a lower interest than 
the senior bonds, due to low yields on the properties. This made the bonds – 
especially the junior bonds – behave like equity but be accounted for as 
debt. 
Structures change in different stages of the development cycle. In the case of 
Singapore, the first stage was stamped by unique local structures (standardized 
DBS Bank structure), which were improved and amended in stage two. Also, in 
stage two new structures evolved that consolidated their position in the third 
stage (residential sales receivable transactions). The third stage was even 
characterized by new and internationally recognized structures (Single 
Borrower CMBS). 
Which role played which environment? 
All environments played an important role in the evolution of the market and the 
overall framework in Singapore was favourable. This fact is ultimately supported 
by Singapore’s position in the Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) Global Real Estate 
Market Transparency Index.563 
• Regulatory and legal environment was most important: 
                                            
563 The Jones Lang LaSalle index maps different countries and regions with respect to legal 
factors, tax and other regulatory burdens, governance and disclosure of listed investment 
vehicles, quality of market fundamental research, and availability of investment performance 
indices. It relates the resulting transparency scores to each country’s per capita GDP. One 
rule that can be derived is that the more per capital GDP a country has, the better the 
transparency score. Singapore with a high per capita GDP has an enormous transparency 
and ranges among the US, Europe and Australia. Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004a), p. 2. 
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In 1998, the government broke a new path and formulated a strategy to turn 
Singapore into the leading debt securities market in Asia outside of Japan. 
For this the Monetary Authority of Singapore announced a shift in regulatory 
policy towards a ‘lighter touch’. The overall goal of the government was to 
reform the fiscal and regulatory systems in order to give a freer rein to the 
market dynamics. Additionally the legal system in Singapore provided a 
sound platform for Real Estate Securitisation, allowing an easy transfer of 
assets, the incorporation of bankruptcy remote SPVs, and having a reliable 
bankruptcy code. This spurred capital markets activity in Singapore. 
• Tax environment was important: 
In addition to the new regulatory approach, the Inland Revenue Service 
(IRS) adopted favourable tax rules for bond investments, exempting foreign 
investors from paying tax on interest income and lowering the tax rate to 
10% for local investors. This also was favourable for the development of the 
market and international interest in Singapore Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions. 
• Accounting environment played a decisive role: 
The accountants had an enormous influence on the evolution of the market. 
In the first stage – under Singapore GAAP – they attested Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions as ‘true sale’ divestments, and hence considered 
the structures as off-balance sheet. With an ongoing orientation towards 
international standards and the impact that the Enron scandal had on the 
accounting environment worldwide, the accountants approach to Real 
Estate Securitisation transactions changed one hundred-eighty degrees to 
being very conservative. This initiated a period of orientation (November 
1999 – June 2001), in which only one transaction took place. This 
orientation phase – also influenced by final regulatory guidelines on Asset-
Securitisation (September 2000) – spurred a structural evolution that 
culminated in new ‘true’ off-balance sheet structures and new securitised 
asset types. 
• Investor and rating environment made the structures unique to Singapore. 
The deals were adapted to originators’ needs and were tailored to fit local 
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investors’ requirements. While the strong local investor base was important 
for the evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market, the market was 
also important for domestic institutional investors as they were lacking 
investment alternatives in local bonds and real estate. 
• The Real Estate Environment was the leading driver behind the inception 
of the securitised market. The Cultural Environment and the Local 
peculiarities influenced the spreading of the market as well as the structural 
setup. 
“I think the Singapore market developed totally different from how the US or 
Europe developed. It is a very localized development, mainly fuelled by the 
originators wanting to sell their properties, influenced by the bond incentives 
available with the transactions being entirely on-shore having no rating at all. 
I think the US is such a large market. It is an established market and it has a 
very established property market – that is a different environment.”564 
What were the drivers? 
Three main drivers for the evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market in 
Singapore in 1999 can be identified: 
o The Asian Financial Crisis – resulting in high interest rates, low loan 
commitments by banks (credit crunch), strong need to refinance loans 
that matured, high real estate asset values and no buyers that could 
afford to buy and finance large assets. 
o The strong involvement of the government in the financial markets 
and its stringent objective to make Singapore Southeast Asia’s 
leading centre of financial innovation and debt trading. 
o A management policy shift by local developers away from the 
asset-rich and leading to an asset-light approach. 
Subsequently to the Asian Financial Crisis the Singapore Government has 
started to implement a wide range of reforms and economic restructuring in the 
                                            
564 Anonymous (2003), Interview 1, p. 554. 
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financial sector. The government decided to develop the bond market and make 
Singapore a leading ‘financial supermarket’ in Asia. 
One driver that is still valid and will become even more important in the future is 
that the Banking (Amendment) Act requires local banks to divest their non-
core assets – including by large properties – by July 2006. So, whereas the 
divestment of physical assets for corporates was a main driver in the beginning 
of the market, this change in laws might be driver for the future development of 
Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment vehicle for banks. 
Drivers changing and fuelling the different environments throughout the 
development of the Real Estate Securitisation market:565 
o Regulatory Environment: Government initiated ‘lighter touch’ 
approach with respect to regulating the financial markets. 
o Tax Environment: Government decided to push the debt market by 
offering tax incentives to bond investors, arrangers and originators. 
o Accounting Environment: The adoption of international accounting 
standards by Singapore accountants. 
o Investor Environment: A strong appetite for local bonds, especially 
Real Estate Asset-Backed Securities and the acceptance of ‘local 
flavoured’ features to Real Estate Securitisation structures.  
o Rating Environment: The ongoing internationalisation of issuances 
and structures in the second half of the development led to an 
increased involvement of rating agencies. 
o Real Estate/Local/Cultural: The downturn of the real estate market in 
the physical cycle and the trough in the financial cycle. Additionally 
the local mindset and structures that were tailored at local originators’ 
and investors’ needs, including the acceptance of unrated issuances. 
“Moreover, Singapore has many advantages, including location, availability of a 
skilled workforce, 'AAA' sovereign rating, and clear legal system. The marriage 
                                            
565 Drivers change environments and environments in turn influence the core determinants 
(originators/borrowers, assets, motives), which then determine utilized structures. 
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of these factors with relevant tax benefits is making Singapore the preferred 
location [for these kinds of transactions]…”566 
What role plays the timing? 
“In good times property purchases did not need to be financed with bonds.” 567 
The evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market is dependent on the real 
estate market cycle.568 A timeframe for the favourable initiation of such a market 
can be derived from the physical and the financial market: 
When the physical real estate market is in a decline and capital flows into 
real estate are scarce, but real estate companies need to sell their 
assets, or refinance in a high interest rate environment, then this spurs 
the development of Real Estate Securitisation. So, in times where yields 
are low, asset values are high, banks do not want to commit financings 
(credit crunch), no investor can afford to buy and no asset holder wants 
to sell, then there is potential for new financing vehicles.569 
It can be concluded that there is a favourable timing for all kinds of asset types 
within Real Estate Securitisation. In the earlier days with the physical real estate 
market being down and a credit crunch burdening real estate companies, the 
divestment of physical real estate assets by the way of Real Estate 
Securitisation was the only feasible way to get out of the credit crunch.  
So, whereas in the beginning physical assets were securitised, in the second 
and third stage other non-physical assets (residential condominium sales 
receivables, leases and mortgage loans) took over. This was mainly spurred by 
timing and the state of the real estate market as yields were low and originators 
were not prepared to “take haircuts”570 on physical asset Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions. However, the structured interviews showed that this 
                                            
566  Scott and Hunt (2004), p. 1. 
567 Choong (1998). 
568 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
569 This statement is supported by the evolution of similar markets in the USA, Japan and 
Australia. Here deals started at or near cyclical property market “bottoms. Cf. Corcoran and 
Iwai (2004a), p. 1. 
570  Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554. 
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is only momentarily – physical asset Real Estate Securitisation will come back 
once the capital values have come down and the real estate market picks up. 
This shows that the evolution shown in Singapore is by far not over and that its 
structures are not primarily dependent on its balance sheet consideration but 
rather on the real estate market cycle.571 
“It [the occurrence of physical asset Real Estate Securitisation] is rather a 
cyclical thing than a question about off- vs. on-balance sheet financing.”572 
What else played a role in making the market successful? 
Already in 1986, the first Mortgage-Backed Bond transactions were initiated. In 
this period the government started to change laws and make those transactions 
possible. The ultimate decision to push the market and hence open up the bond 
market for local investors failed to appear. However, the institution of Mortgage-
Backed Bonds, created a pre-phase market that helped the Asset-Securitisation 
market evolve in 1999. 
Moreover, the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s openness to views from the 
market place played a huge role in fostering a vibrant but orderly Real Estate 
Securitisation market.573 In response to concerns raised by industry players, the 
dialogue between the central bank and the industry has emerged as a key 
feature in the liberalisation of the financial sector.574 
Apart from that, Singapore’s standing among the Asian countries played an 
important role in developing a successful and internationally recognized debt 
market:  
o The Singapore dollar is a relatively liquid instrument among Asian 
currencies in the world markets. 
o Local banks are considered well managed. 
                                            
571 Cf. Yeo (2003), Interview 2, p. 554; Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554; Sing (2003), Interview 
5, p. 554; Heng (2003), Interview 7, p. 554; Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
572 Cf. Seck (2003), Interview 3, p. 554. 
573 The Monetary Authority of Singapore is effectively the Singapore Central Bank. 
574 Cf. Kong (1999a). 
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o The Monetary Authority of Singapore's (MAS) regulatory supervision 
is highly regarded. 
4-Stage Model for Real Estate Securitisation 
From the preceding breakdown of the Asset-Securitisation framework and the 
analysis of Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore, a 4-stage model for the 
evolution of Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore can be derived (Figure 17): 
Stage 1 (1999/2000): Experimental Stage 
a. New structure development (unique, but poorly conceived) 
b. Market opening: small market (more private than public 
transactions) 
c. Small market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Local development 
i. Local originators/borrowers (e.g. DBS Land) 
ii.  Local arrangers (e.g. DBS Bank) 
iii. Local investors 
e. High structural uniqueness – very strong innovative activity 
f. High structural flexibility / unstandardised 
g. High costs / expensive transactions (high interest expenses & very 
high structuring fees) 
h. No transactions rated 
• Stage 2 (2001/2002): Ripening Stage 
a. Structure ripening/enhancement (still unique, but rethought and 
adapted) 
b. Market broadening (increasing public transactions) 
c. Growing market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Starting internationalisation 
i. International arrangers (HypoVereinsbank) 
ii. International investors 
iii. Rating agency 
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e. Still relatively high structural uniqueness, but decreasing – 
innovative activity still strong 
f. Relatively high structural flexibility / partly standardised 
g. Costs are less, but still higher compared to traditional bank 
financing 
h. Transactions partly rated 
Experimental Stage
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Ripening Stage
Growth Stage
Standardisation Stage
Market
Sophistication
High
Structural Uniqueness
1999 Time2001 2003 ???
Low
 
Figure 17: 4-Stage Evolution Model for Real Estate Securitisation Markets – applied to the case 
of Singapore 
• Stage 3 (2003/2004): Growth Stage 
a. Structure evolution/assimilation (international standards) 
b. Strong market growth (more public than private transactions) 
c. Relatively large market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. International recognition 
e. Strongly decreasing structural uniqueness – slow innovative 
activity, assimilation to internationally recognised structures 
f. Structural flexibility is declining rapidly – increasing 
standardisation 
g. Costs decrease and can compete with traditional bank financing 
h. Transactions mostly rated 
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• Stage 4 (to come): Standardisation Stage 
a. Structure standardisation (all transactions are the same) 
b. Matured market (predominantly public transactions) 
c. Large market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Global product 
e. No innovative activity – bulk transactions 
f. No structural flexibility – total standardisation / high covenants for 
borrowers/originators 
g. Costs are lower than with traditional bank financing 
h. All transactions are rated  
All in all Singapore valued the development of its financial sector so highly that 
it was almost inevitable that Asset-Securitisation developed. However, the 
overall Singapore Asset-Securitisation market is not as mature as in Europe or 
the USA, yet. The market is still on the rise. Despite the success of Real Estate 
Securitisation in Singapore, neither RMBS nor bank originated Portfolio-CMBS 
have developed in Singapore, yet;575 both are major asset class in the other 
markets.576 When the first transactions finally emerge in Singapore, chances 
are that the structure employed will also have a uniquely local flavour. It will 
show that in the debt market as elsewhere, the ability and willingness to adapt 
is key. 
                                            
575 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities as well as bank originated Securitisations of 
commercial mortgage loan portfolios (Portfolio CMBS) do not belong into the asset class of 
Real Estate Securitisation transactions. 
576 Cf. Sing and Ong (2004), p. 167; Sing, et al. (2004), p. 5. 
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4.3 USA 
The Real Estate Securitisation market in the USA is de-facto represented by the 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) market. There are certain 
parts of the market that overlap with the definition of Real Estate Securitisation 
delineated in chapter 3 of this thesis; however, there are also portfolio 
transactions incorporated in the US Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security 
market that do not fall into the boundaries of Real Estate Securitisation, such as 
Conduit-CMBS and Conduit-Fusion CMBS. Nevertheless, Real Estate 
Securitisation and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation will be used as 
exchangeable expressions in the following chapter. 
Even though the Mortgage-Backed Securities market in the US is not 100% 
congruent with the definition of Real Estate Securitisation, the evolution of the 
(Residential) Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) and the subsequent 
development of the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities market (incl. 
Single Property CMBS, Large Loan CMBS, Conduit-CMBS, Conduit-Fusion 
CMBS and Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation) can be taken as a proxy for the 
development of Real Estate Securitisation markets in general. Therefore, the 
analysis of the development of this big market reveals circumstances that 
favour the development of such markets. This in return has great implications 
for the development of a Real Estate Securitisation market in Germany as 
analysed in chapter 5.577 
4.3.1 Literature Review 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) are a fairly young asset class 
within Asset-Securitisation. The market only really got off the ground during the 
late 1980’s, fuelled by the tax reform act of 1986, the savings and loans crisis 
and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). So, this was also the time when 
the first research was conducted on Real Estate Securitisation and Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
                                            
577 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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CMBS research really grew out of Mortgage-Backed Securities research,578 
although both today are perceived as different asset classes. One main 
structural innovation in Mortgage-Backed Securities research fuelled the 
evolution of CMBS; this was the development of Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligations (CMO’s) in the early 1980’s.579 
Most of the research at that stage was industry originated, the authors were 
practitioners (mostly investment bankers, rating agency analysts and lawyers) 
analyzing the market, but also trying to explain their ideas and putting their 
ideas to trial.580 The biggest innovation during that time was the rating model 
introduced by Standard & Poor’s in 1985.581 The rating of Securities backed by 
commercial property was also what the first studies were mainly concerned 
with.582 Apart from that the phenomenon of financing real estate over the capital 
markets was in the centre of interest.583 
The academic Asset-Securitisation world was literally non-existent. First 
academic publications on Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities came out of 
fixed income handbooks.584 It took until 1996 for a first textbook in Asset-
Backed Securities585 and until 1997 for a first textbook on Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities586 to come out. Frank Fabozzi, an adjunct 
Professor of Finance at Yale University, was the innovator in that field. It was 
he, who edited those first two books that were basically practitioner’s 
                                            
578 The Handbook of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities was the first book on Asset-
Securitisation, as residential mortgages were the first asset class within the field of 
Securitisation. Cf. Fabozzi (2001), p. 1. 
579 Cf. McConnell and Muller (1988), p. 92. 
580 Cf. Adler (1987), p. 19; Chu (1985), p. 29; Franzetti (1991), p. 65; Healey and Walter (1988), 
p. 7; Hu (1987), p. 13; Kane (1991), p. 15; Kane (1992), p. 18; Levitin (1987), p. 26; Manolis 
and Meistrich (1986), p. 17; O'Connor Jr. (1986), p. 16; Ori (1991), p. 49; Pastore, et al. 
(1988), p. 52; Ross and Kane (1985), p. 7; Zacamy and Zwaryczuk (1987), p. 17. 
581 Cf. Ross and Kane (1985), p. 7. 
582 Cf. Kehr (1988), p. 21; Pastore, et al. (1988), p. 52. 
583 Cf. Books (1988), p. 17; Chu (1985), p. 29; Healey and Walter (1988), p. 7. 
584 Cf. Fabozzi (1997), p. 1. 
585 Cf. Fabozzi and Bhattacharya (1996), p. 1. 
586 Cf. Fabozzi and Jacob (1997), p. 1. 
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handbooks; the CMBS book was even co-sponsored by Nomura Securities. 
Most of the authors were practitioners.587 
The evolution of the US CMBS market can be described by a life-cycle model. 
So can the evolution of literature covering and analyzing this market. Whereas 
in the beginning the general ideas of financing real estate over the capital 
markets were in the focus of researchers, the more mature and sophisticated 
the market got, the more sophisticated the research got. Once the structures 
were setup and the tax and accounting environments were fixed, the research 
was trying to describe and map into which direction the secondary market could 
develop.588 Eventually, the focus shifted towards investment analysis: 
prepayment,589 default590 and pricing studies.591 
As described above, Real Estate Securitisation in its pure form as described in 
Chapter 3, does not exist in the United States. However, there are two very 
innovative papers by Richard A. Graff that relate to the same underlying idea 
inherent in the concept of Real Estate Securitisation. The theoretical ideas 
brought forward in those papers is that the ownership of economic benefits from 
current leases of real estate can be separated from ownership of economic 
benefits from future leases; thereby splitting up the value of the real estate into 
a current lease value and a future lease value representing different risk/return 
characteristics for investors. Even though the concept of Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation has evolved in the US over the years, the Graff concept has not 
been accepted by the industry and has not yet come to any practical 
relevance.592 
                                            
587 CMBS research is still a field that is very much dominated by industry researchers 
(investment banks and rating agencies) and industry participants. 
588 Cf. Adams (1995), p. 63; Benjamin and Baker (1994), p. 67; Forsell (1994), p. 46; Forte 
(1996), p. 8; Gorlow, et al. (1993), p. 22; Kane and Alpart (1995), p. 35; Olasov (1995), p. 10; 
Rubin (1996), p. 61; Schneider (1996), p. 14; Wratten (1996), p. 1; Wright and Miller (1997), p. 
26. 
589 Cf. Schwartz and Torous (1993), p. 431. 
590 Cf. Jacob, et al. (1996), p. 1; Shilton and Teall (1994), p. 219; Vandell (1992), p. 55. 
591 Cf. Archer and Ling (1993), p. 373; Saderion, et al. (1994), p. 151. 
592 Cf. Graff (1999), p. 183; Graff (2001), p. 213. 
214 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
As with the Singapore market, there exists no adequate framework for 
analyzing the Real Estate Securitisation market and its evolution in the US.593 
There is no comprehensive study putting together the development of the US 
market into a model that shows how the different environments (especially tax, 
accounting, investor and rating) have influenced the borrowers, assets and 
motives (i.e. the core determinants). Moreover, no complete study has been 
made identifying the drivers fuelling the evolution of the market and the 
development of the different environments – there have been articles on the 
different separate environments, but the research was missing a 
comprehensive study. Apart from a complete overview, there has been 
thorough research on the different transaction schemes that are part of the US 
CMBS universe. 
It would go beyond the scope of this study to analyze all the literature written on 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities in the United States. Therefore the 
following sub-chapters will only relate to literature that was written on the 
different aspects of the CMBS market, the environments, the core determinants, 
and the drivers influencing this development in America. Moreover, articles 
identifying landmark transactions as well as typical borrowers, assets and 
motives will be analysed. 
4.3.2 Market Overview 
4.3.2.1 Definitions and Terminology 
One important task before starting to get into the market overview and the 
different transactions is to lay out the terminology and the definitions for the 
different transaction schemes and sub-asset classes in the USA. Above that 
there are terminology differences between the USA, and Europe and Asia. 
Those shall be delineated and explained in this part. 
Securitisation definition in the US 
Generally, in the US the term Securitisation stands for pooling of assets and 
selling an undivided interest or beneficial interest in the underlying asset pool. 
So, it is congruent with the definition of Asset-Securitisation. Therefore it is the 
                                            
593 Cf. Chapter 4.2.1, p.90. 
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generic term for everything that industry participants summarize under 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities and 
Asset-Backed Securities.594 
However, industry people as well as academics often mean Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITS), when talking about Real Estate Securitisation. But, 
when investors buy a REIT, they are buying equity shares in a “kind of mutual 
fund”. It is not an Asset-Securitisation as defined above. The difference to 
CMBS or ABS is that investors are not buying an undivided interest in an 
underlying asset pool, which is a debt instrument. So, using the term Real 
Estate Securitisation without saying what the structure is (i.e. CMBS or REIT) 
creates confusion. In this thesis, the term Real Estate Securitisation relates to 
CMBS and not to REITs595 
Real Estate Securitisation in the US 
In the past it has typically been loans secured by real estate that have been 
securitized as opposed to real estate assets themselves. There have been a 
few cases where there was real estate securitised, but this was in non-
performing loan transactions, where some of the assets were real estate owned 
(REO) assets. Real estate owned assets are properties that have been 
foreclosed upon but not yet disposed of. Non-performing CMBS deals typically 
have a mix of sub-performing, defaulted loans and REO assets.596 
Even though there is a long list of securitisable real estate assets in the US and 
sponsors can securitise basically everything that has a stable cash flow, it is 
typically the interest and principal payments on commercial mortgage loans that 
get securitised.597 The mortgage loan related Securitisation market is dominant, 
lease cash flow and receivable Securitisation is very small.598 
                                            
594 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
595 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
596 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
597 In the US, a lot of people talk about the Securitisation of mortgages, when referring to 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. Semantically, this is not completely right since, it is 
not the mortgage that gets securitised, but the interest and principal payments from a loan 
that is backed by the mortgage as collateral. In some interviews the interviewees talk about 
mortgages, but what they really mean is mortgage loan. So for the text of this thesis the term 
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There have not been any future real estate cash flow Securitisations in the US. 
Typically, there is always a mortgage loan securing the real estate. Usually, 
companies want to retain their properties on their balance sheet and just use 
Securitisation (CMBS) as a method of financing during their holding period.599 
“If we finance real estate through Securitisation in the US, there are really only 
two ways to do it: CMBS and CTL. Again, all we are doing is using debt to 
finance it. Now if you are using equity – people here haven’t really securitized 
pure equity, because there are all kinds of equity vehicles – big funds and 
REITs that are publicly traded, that we use to invest into real estate for equity 
purposes.”600 
Mortgage-Backed Securities 
In Europe and Asia the term Mortgage-Backed Securities is the generic term for 
all transactions securitising interest and principal payments from mortgage 
loans (residential and commercial).601 Whereas semantically it is right to put up 
Mortgage-Backed Securities as the generic term that covers residential (RMBS) 
as well as commercial mortgage assets (CMBS), in the US the term Mortgage-
Backed Security has become synonymous with residential mortgage assets 
(RMBS). If industry people talk about commercial mortgage assets, they will say 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS). The reason for Mortgage-
Backed Securities standing for RMBS is obvious, because the first assets that 
were securitised in Mortgage-Backed Security transactions were residential 
mortgages.602 
Asset vs. Collateral 
It does not matter if the collateral in the SPV is a mortgage or the property itself; 
in both cases it is a Securitisation. Because if the borrower sold the property to 
                                                                                                                                
mortgage loan is used. Also confer Chapter 3.1.3 above, for the differentiation of asset and 
collateral. 
598 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
599 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
600 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
601 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 28. 
602 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
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the SPV then the property is in there and that is a secured collateral, i.e. the 
same as a physical mortgage. In both cases it is one property, a single building, 
that is placed into the trust and the cash flows are derived from its tenants. 
Those cash flows are utilized to pay the bonds that are out there.  
“It all falls under the category of CMBS.”603 
So, the concept of Real Estate Securitisation compared to Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities in that sense is not much different. It is a different 
definition, but the underlying cash flow is what matters, and that is a real estate 
cash flow. In essence, there is no difference if the property is owned outright by 
the SPV or if the SPV holds a physical mortgage over the same building. In 
both cases, it is just a Securitisation of the cash flow and in the US “People still 
call it CMBS” 604 
“It is still a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security, not because there is a 
mortgage per se, but because there is real estate behind it.”605 
Since there is a hard asset underlying this security, it may also be called an 
Asset-Backed, a Collateral-Backed or a Real Estate-Backed deal.606 
Different meanings of the term Conduit607 
In US literature the term ‘Conduit’ is not clearly defined. There are two different 
meanings that can be derived: 
1. Conduit is a generic term and stands for all transactions that securitise 
mortgage loans though a specific intermediary, a vehicle that is pooling 
securitisable mortgage loans. Those loans have specifically been 
originated for Securitisation purposes and are underwritten in a very 
standardised way. It does not matter what size the loans have. In this 
context, if the term Conduit is used, it basically characterises the vehicle 
                                            
603 Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
604 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
605 Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
606 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
607 Cf. Wheeler (2001b), p. 407. 
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that is pooling the mortgage loans in order to securitise them at a later 
stage.608 
2. If the term Conduit is used in combination with CMBS, i.e. as the term 
Conduit-CMBS, then this stands for a certain transaction scheme/type 
within the field of CMBS. In Conduit-CMBS deals mortgage loans of a 
certain size are securitised. Those loans are small mortgage loans on 
commercial properties and have an average size of $6 million.609 
Conduit Vehicle 
Conduits are vehicles that are usually set up by Wall Street firms. The vehicles 
are set up specifically to originate loans that are going to be securitised in the 
capital markets. Conduits are departments within an investment bank – they are 
not separate entities. Conduits are usually run by the firms’ CMBS groups – one 
of the things that CMBS groups do is that they have a real estate loan vehicle 
(Conduit).610 
“So it is a Conduit into the capital markets.”611 
So, a conduit is a vehicle that bundles mortgages into securities and sells them 
on the capital market, usually to insurance companies, pension funds, and other 
large investors. As such, those vehicles provide banks that do not have capital 
market capabilities with access to the capital market. Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were the first mortgage conduits.612 
Commercial conduit lenders fall into three categories:613 
1. Big commercial banks (Bank of America or First Union) 
2. Major Wall Street investment banks (Merrill Lynch or Deutsche Bank) 
3. Smaller, independent, off-Wall Street loan aggregation groups (Conduits) 
                                            
608 Cf. Gichon (1999), p. 6. 
609 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
610 Cf. Dunlevy (1999), p. 126. 
611  Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
612 Cf. Peterson (1999), p. 56. 
613 Cf. Appendix: Conduit Lenders in the US as of 1999, p. 551. 
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Conduits can warehouse small commercial mortgage loans that get securitised 
in Conduit-CMBS transactions, but also large commercial mortgage loans that 
get securitised in Large Loan CMBS transactions or in Conduit-Fusion 
transactions (Combination of Conduit-CMBS and Large Loan CMBS). Single 
Property Transactions do not need a Conduit.614 
Single Property / Single-Borrower Transactions 
The equivalent to the Singapore structure, where office buildings and shopping 
malls are sold to an SPV that in return issues bonds in the market to finance 
that purchase, in the US is called a Single Property deal.615 
Multi-Property – Large Loan Transactions 
Once it is more than one building and more than one borrower, but a small 
number (e.g. 5 to 10) of office buildings, then the transaction category becomes 
a large loan deal. But it still falls under the category of CMBS.616 Large Loan 
transactions incorporate mortgage loans made to developers, commercial real 
estate operators and investors on institutional quality real estate. The minimum 
size of a loan in a Large Loan transaction is $20 million, but the gross of the 
loans that are made is usually not below $60 million.617 Typically, what is not a 
Conduit-CMBS type loan is considered a large loan. They are too big for a 
typical Conduit execution.618 
Conduit-CMBS Transactions 
The term Conduit-CMBS loans or Conduit loans stands for small commercial 
mortgage loans on income-producing property. Loans that get originated for 
Conduit-CMBS transactions can vary in loan size. However, on average the 
classical Conduit deal by US standards incorporates 100 loans at $6 million a 
piece.619 The commercial mortgage loan conduits represent a source of 
                                            
614 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
615 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
616 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
617 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
618 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
619 Conduit-CMBS loans are not all exactly $6 million – the size usually ranges from $4 million to 
$8 million. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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financing that has replaced much of the thrift lending and small volume 
insurance loans.620 
Conduit-Fusion CMBS transactions 
Conduit-Fusion CMBS are “hybrid” or "fusion" Conduit-CMBS deals. The deals 
have differing underlying collateral, which includes larger loans (greater than 
$50 million) combined with smaller loans (average loan size is approximately 
$4-6 million). The higher loan concentration prompts investors to perform more 
due diligence than normally performed on a standard conduit deal.621 
Participants in the Conduit-CMBS process 
The nomenclature in the US is different than in Europe or Asia. The term 
arranger that is very common in Europe and Asia is not used in the US. In US 
Conduit-CMBS transactions, the arranger most of the time would be 
characterised as the sponsor of the Conduit, which in return would be the issuer 
of the securities. The originator on the other hand can be the sponsor, i.e. the 
Conduit originates and underwrites the mortgage loans that it securitises, or it 
can be another commercial bank, insurance company, mortgage broker, thrift 
institution or pension fund.622 The borrower of the transaction is a company that 
is seeking financing for its real estate. The borrower is the owner of the real 
estate asset and the originator is the firm (usually an investment bank) that 
makes the mortgage loan that gets securitised in a Conduit-CMBS 
transaction.623 
Part of the reason why the nomenclature in the US is different from Europe and 
Asia is that the market is fundamentally different. Whereas in Europe (and 
especially continental Europe) and in Asia (except for Japan) the mortgage loan 
assets that are securitised result out of the balance sheet holdings of 
commercial banks, in the US the securitised mortgage loans are underwritten 
for the sole purpose of Securitisation. This is also the reason why still most 
                                            
620 Cf. Fabozzi and Dunlevy (2001), p. 141; Gichon (1999), p. 7. 
621 Cf. Gichon (1999), p. 7. 
622 Cf. Fabozzi and Ramsey (2001), p. 550. 
623 There are cases, where Conduits underwrite mortgage loans and there are cases where the 
Conduit only buys mortgage collateral. Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
4.3  USA 221 
 
European CMBS are Portfolio and Balance Sheet CMBS, whereas in the US 
nearly 80% of all CMBS transactions are Conduit-CMBS.624 
Above that, once one starts to securitise cash flows, one gets into a different 
workflow and has to look at the terminology from a different angle. This angel 
will lead back to the terminology introduced in Chapter 2.2. So in the case of 
current or future lease receivables, there is no loan to be underwritten and 
securitised, but there is a current or future receivable that is originated by the 
borrower/Sponsor (i.e. the originator) and then sold to an SPV (i.e. the Issuer) 
that funds itself by issuing bonds. The transaction is arranged by the investment 
bank (the arranger) that also sets up the SPV.625 
All in all, for a lot of the above-described cases it comes down to semantics. 
Practitioners do not see the need of clearing this up. The terms that are used 
are determined by the industry that creates, structures and sells the product. 
Once the industry uses it, it is the dominant terminology even if it is semantically 
wrong. 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
A Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation (CTL) securitises a credit tenant loan. A 
credit tenant loan is linked to a sale-and-leaseback agreement. A credit tenant 
lease backs a credit tenant loan and stands for a triple-net626 or bondable lease 
with an investment grade tenant. This is why this kind of financing sometimes is 
also called ‘Net-Lease Financing’.627 
Usually, the term Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation refers to a single tenant 
Securitisation. When talking about the Securitisation of credit tenant leases the 
following terms are used interchangeably: Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation, 
Credit Tenant Loan Securitisation and Sale-Leaseback Securitisation.628 
                                            
624 Cf. Rivlin and Philips (2003), Interview 23, p. 565; Corcoran and Iwai (2004b), p. 6. 
625 See Chapter 2.2 above. 
626 The term “net-net-net lease” or “triple net lease” is used to refer to a lease that required the 
tenant to pay for property taxes, insurance, and maintenance in addition to rent. In this case, 
the tenant bears the entire risk of unexpected changes in operating expenses. Cf. 
Brueggeman and Fisher (2001), p. 259; Sirmans (1989), p. 402. 
627 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
628 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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The Credit-Tenant Lease Securitisation market is generally considered an 
outpost of the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market. One reason 
for this is that, even though the lease cash flows are securitised, there is also a 
mortgage on the property underlying the CTL transaction.629 Therefore, Credit 
Tenant Lease Securitisation is a subset of the CMBS,630 even though most of 
the transactions do not show up in the CMBS statistics. This is because unless 
the transaction is either quoted on the exchange or has done a 144-A election, 
the industry standard does not call it CMBS. The business is still a very much 
dominated by local banks like William Blair or Legg Mason Wood Walker that 
have played a strong role in establishing this market.631 
From a cash flow perspective CTL would be closer to an Asset-Backed Security 
than to a Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security. The reason is that it is a 
lease that gets securitised, the transaction relies heavily on the credit of the 
Lessee/Tenant and the deal is not real estate driven. So, it could also be 
considered an ABS. However, the transaction structure (interest and principal in 
a mortgage loan) and the underlying mortgage makes it qualify as a CMBS.632 
4.3.2.2 Evolution and State of the Market 
In order to describe the development and inception of the Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities market in the US, one has to look at the evolution 
of the secondary mortgage market in general and in that respect also at the 
coming about of the Residential Mortgage-Backed Security market. The 
evolution of the overall Asset-Securitisation market in the US is closely linked to 
the secondary mortgage market. Residential Mortgages were the first asset 
class within the universe of Asset-Securitisation.633 
So, whereas in Singapore the Securitisation of commercial real estate got the 
Asset Securitisation market lifted off the ground, in the US the creation of a 
                                            
629 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
630 Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation is usually also a part of the CMBS group. Cf. Ashenmil 
(2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
631 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
632 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
633 Cf. Melicher and Unger (1989), p. 99. 
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secondary market for residential mortgages and the issuance of securities 
backed by residential mortgages was the spark for the inception of the Asset-
Securitisation market. Asset-Backed Securities and Receivable Securitisation 
only came about in 1984.634 
As in Singapore, government agencies have played a crucial role in getting the 
market off the ground in the USA. They supplied affordable financing for house 
owners and thereby the government influenced and supported the development 
of Mortgage-Backed Securities as an innovative financing and funding tool.635 
In an effort to reduce the credit risk to home mortgage investors (loan 
originators), the National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA).636 This agency was authorized to insure lenders against 
loan defaults. Additionally, the FHA promoted long-term (30-40 years), self-
amortizing mortgage loans as an alternative to the standard 5-10 year balloon 
home mortgage of the time. Also, the FHA established a set of rigid 
underwriting criteria for loans that qualified for FHA insurance, so that they 
could gather all the important information and limit their credit risk exposure. 
With that the agency created a national mortgage-lending standard. Then in 
1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) was 
chartered to purchase and resell FHA loans. Essentially this was the start of the 
secondary mortgage market. It was the first time that liquidity was introduced 
into the home loan market.637 
Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac 
Thirty years after the creation of Fannie Mae, the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968 strengthened the secondary market by splitting 
Fannie Mae into two entities: the new Fannie Mae and the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). Under the new law, 
Fannie Mae was to act as a quasi-private corporation of the US government 
                                            
634 Cf. Brueggeman and Fisher (2001), p. 495. 
635 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 58. 
636 For a timeline on the evolution of the secondary mortgage market and the institution of the 
Mortgage-Backed Securities market, confer Appendix: Milestones the US Secondary 
Mortgage Market, p. 552. 
637 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 9. 
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with the charge of purchasing conventional home loan mortgages (loans not 
insured by the FHA). The second entity Ginnie Mae was to guarantee securities 
issued by private entities that were backed by pools of FHA, Veterans 
Administration (VA), and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) home 
mortgage loans. Hence, Ginnie Mae enabled loan originators to package their 
mortgages together and issue securities against them. The public secondary 
mortgage market was born.638 
The first Securitisation transactions of that sort allowed investors to purchase 
undivided interests in loan pools called "pass-through securities".639 The 
transactions were underwritten by investment banks. Because each mortgage 
in those transactions implicitly was backed by the Federal Government, these 
securities were perceived as (credit) risk free, much like government securities. 
Lenders used this new funding instrument in order to recycle their funds and 
use them to make new loans.  
In those transactions, Ginnie Mae guaranteed the loans against default, thereby 
eliminating a major cause of unpredictable cash flows from mortgages. Also, 
they insured timely principal and interest payments to holders of all securities 
backed by FHA, VA, and FMHA mortgages. So, the entity absorbed the impact 
of mortgage prepayments (caused by home refinancing, natural disaster, or 
bank foreclosure) on the predictability of mortgage-backed security cash flows. 
This largely eliminated a traditional stumbling block for the growth of the public 
secondary mortgage market.640 
The third government agency that totally lifted the public market off the ground 
was founded in 1970 by the Emergency Home Financing Act. The creation of 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac) 
enlarged the secondary market for conventional mortgages. Along with Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac purchased conventional loans directly from loan originators, 
pooled them together and issued a new version of pass-through securities 
                                            
638 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 10. 
639 The name of the security resulted out of the structure because payments of both mortgage 
principal and interest were passed through the vehicle directly to the investors. Cf. Hu (2001), 
p. 21. 
640 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
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called Participation Certificates (PC). The two quasi-private corporations, used 
their own mortgage pools as collateral, issued securities directly without going 
through an investment bank and offered a corporate guarantee of timely 
principal and interest payments, which was really a government guarantee. The 
Wall Street firms provided the demand, by facilitating the purchase of the 
residential mortgage-backed securities. So this structure basically solved the 
homeowners' problem of capital availability.641 
The market went into the next stage as Freddy Mac, in June 1983, introduced a 
new Mortgage-Backed Security called the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation 
(CMO). The CMO was designed to better suit the different investors’ needs and 
thereby further increase home mortgage liquidity. This was mainly done by 
mitigating the prepayment risk of conventional mortgages. CMOs allowed 
distribution of cash flow to be prioritized among various bond classes, instead of 
distributing the cash flow of the underlying mortgage pools equally among 
investors (as pass-through securities did). By creating distinct classes of bond 
holders (‘tranching’), mortgage pools were ‘engineered’ to distribute 
prepayment risk differently to investors with different attitudes toward risk and 
different needs of returns. Additionally, the tranching offered a range of terms-
to-maturity.642 The introduction of CMOs with different bond classes and 
tranching increased investor demand.643 
The Securitisation market started with residential mortgages, because those 
assets were very homogenous, they were underwritten in a standard manner 
and the cash flows as well as the defaults were very predictable. The key 
concept always stayed the bankruptcy remoteness of the assets in the SPV and 
the effective security interest. So that, if there were problems with the 
issuing/originating bank, the investors only had to look at the assets and the 
performance of the assets and not at the originator. They could always get to 
the assets and sell them. It was a very safe asset for investors to invest in. So, 
                                            
641 Cf. Lowell (2001), p. 30. 
642 For more information on CMO structures, pricing, valuation, regulatory and risk assessment 
issues confer Fernald, et al. (1994), p. 88. 
643 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 10. 
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all that spurred Securitisation and made the capital market investors 
comfortable with the concept of Securitisation.644 
The Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security Market – First Transactions 
In the early 1980’s the market started to develop into the direction of 
commercial property. At the time, there were still mainly bank-originated 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities as an asset class on the Securitisation 
market, but commercial mortgage loans as another asset type started to 
develop in 1984.645 
Salomon Brothers, a Wall Street Investment Bank, became the innovator in the 
first Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security deals. The transaction that is widely 
considered the beginning of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities market 
occurred in early 1984. It was a Single Borrower transaction that developed 
when Olympia & York (O&Y), a Canadian developer that was the biggest real 
estate developer in New York City at the time, approached Salomon Brothers 
seeking to raise nearly $1 billion. Salomon structured and privately placed $970 
million worth of unrated 15-year floating rate bonds with 40 institutional 
investors, which was about four times more than had been raised in any 
previous real estate financing. The offering priced initially at 175 basis points 
over the 91-day Treasury bill rate. The collateral for this transaction was three 
prime Manhattan office buildings – 237 Park Avenue, 1290 Avenue of the 
Americas and 2 Broadway. The notes were supported solely by the intrinsic real 
estate values of the properties (secured by a one blanket first mortgage on all 
three buildings) and were without any recourse to O&Y.646 
Because the deal was custom-made to meet O&Y’s needs and specifications, 
there was no market immediately in place. The market had to be developed 
around this new product and, for a while, Salomon Brothers accepted a 
principal risk until the market was found and established. Investors in this first 
transaction included savings and loan associations, commercial banks, 
                                            
644 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
645 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
646 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 18. 
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insurance companies and pension funds647, i.e. the whole universe of 
institutional investors in US real estate. They were attracted to the O&Y offering 
by the following factors that, from then on, became the key propositions for 
investing into CMBS:648 
• Liquidity – even though there was no active trading in the securities the 
investors had the opportunity to sell their participations if they needed to. 
• Strong yields – compared to corporate bonds of the same credit quality 
the yields on these instruments were higher. 
• Credit quality – the opportunity to finance some of the world’s best 
highest quality real estate (in New York City). Something that had been 
unattainable for some investors. 
• Diversification – a chance for institutional investors to diversify their 
investment portfolio. 
• Asset-Liability Matching – for many insurance investors this new 
investment vehicle presented a chance to obtain long-term asset match 
for their long-term liabilities. 
Following this issuance, in December 1984 Salomon Brothers arranged another 
first time deal. It was a Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO) for Penn 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. It was the first CMO that was secured by commercial 
(income producing properties) as opposed to the traditional CMOs that were 
collateralized by single-family mortgage loans.649 
As these offerings, were not rated, privately placed and were partly based on 
guarantees of the issuer (i.e. not on a stand-alone basis), there was a need for 
universal standards. As a consequence, Standard & Poor’s – accepting the 
peculiarities and complexities of CMBS – developed a credit-rating system for 
the evaluation of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities that the agency 
introduced in late 1984. This made guarantees void, as the issued securities 
                                            
647 At the time Pension Funds were the largest source of new long-term debt in the United 
States. Cf. Christiansen and Elebash (1987), p. 83. 
648 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 18. 
649 Cf. Ross and Kane (1985), p. 8. 
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were credit rated by Standard & Poor’s and were backed by and purely 
dependent on the pool of underlying mortgage loans. This in turn lead to 
investor confidence in the issuances and made a broad spectrum of rated and 
publicly placed offerings possible (from secured mortgage loans on New York 
City skyscrapers to small town office buildings).650 
These first Single Property/Single Borrower Real Estate Securitisation became 
a spur for the market. Together with the institution of Standard & Poor’s rating 
criteria, major property owners gained access to traditional capital markets as a 
source of financing for investment-grade real estate. Before that real estate 
finance for multi-tenanted office buildings had been a “one-on-one” deal 
business with a single lender and a highly structured and heavily negotiated 
process the size of the financings were limited and the funding costs were high, 
reflecting the concentration on one borrower and one asset. The availability of 
long-term debt financing had been restricted to banks and insurance companies 
and the total financing amount were low. With the introduction of CMBS, this 
environment changed and another financing source was added by the capital 
markets. As a consequence, the total financing amount attainable on a single 
mortgage loan rose:651 
“Five years ago, a $100 million mortgage would have been considered large. 
Today, mortgages of $200 million are routine and even $500 million is not 
uncommon.”652 
One macro-economic reason, which led to the first transactions and the 
evolution of CMBS in 1984, was that the real estate industry was also going 
through a credit crunch fuelled by the Savings & Loans’ crisis. As the number of 
lenders for large projects was limited and the general financing environment 
(with fewer lenders) had a negative impact on financing costs, the ability to 
negotiate favourable terms declined. As real estate developers recognized that 
real estate lending rates were far higher than risk-adjusted rates available for 
corporations in the capital markets, they put pressure on traditional lenders by 
                                            
650 Cf. Ross and Kane (1985), p. 7. 
651 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 17. 
652 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 17. 
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trying to disintermediate them through direct real estate debt issuances in the 
capital markets. This was the start of the development of a public real estate 
debt market (i.e. CMBS market) in the US.653 
In May 1985, another landmark transaction was structured, when American 
Express Company approached Salomon Brothers with the request to finance 
the purchase of American Express's new world headquarters, a 2.3 million 
square-foot office tower that was part of Olympia & York's downtown New York 
City development known as the World Financial Center. American Express was 
seeking $500 million to finance this single property (appraised at $700 million) 
over the capital markets. It become the largest single property financing at the 
time. The company wanted debt that was non-recourse to the greatest possible 
extent, as well as the lowest cost of funds. Even though American Express had 
a great corporate credit that they could have used its to finance the building 
over a corporate bond issue in the capital markets, Salomon Brothers 
suggested that a competitive cost of funds could be obtained on a partially non-
recourse basis by using CMBS, rated under the newly developed rating 
technology. The proposed transaction posed serious problems, as the building 
was unfinished and still under construction, and it was to be owner-occupied. 
To overcome these problems, Salomon Brothers came up with a new structure 
that was similar to CMOs. They employed a five note, segmented debt 
structure: four of the fully-amortizing notes were guaranteed by the corporate 
credit of American Express to compensate for the lack of leases in the building; 
the fifth note, an $85 million (proceeds) zero coupon offering, was secured only 
by a first mortgage on the building. The entire financing got rated ‘AA’ rating by 
Standard & Poor's. The savings to American Express added up to about 50 
basis points on the issue, while raising $9 million more than the $500 million it 
was seeking.654 
Segmenting the debt on large financings over the capital markets introduced a 
new technology crucial to the development of the modern CMBS market. It 
improved rate savings and increased flexibility. The cash flows available from a 
                                            
653 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 17. 
654 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 20. 
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property could now be used to make payments on a series of notes which, in 
aggregate, had the same amortization and debt service as a single whole loan. 
The bonds were designed with short, medium and long maturities that were fully 
amortized from available cash flows. The amortizing notes were matched by a 
zero coupon to simulate the desired loan. 
Finally, in late 1985 the next logical step was taken towards a new structure and 
the kick-off for the broad CMBS market: the Securitisation of seasoned, multi-
tenanted office buildings. Salomon Brothers structured and closed the first two 
transactions in that segment within one week of each other: 
1. Olympia & York Maiden Lane Finance Corp. (a subsidiary of O&Y) 655 
The first multi-tenant stand-alone real Securitisation was a $200 million 
CMBS issuance 10-year bonds, rated ‘AA’ by Standard & Poor’s. The 
deal was collateralized by the 59 Maiden Lane complex in the lower 
Manhattan financial district; an office building consisting of a combination 
of three structures, including a 44 story office tower and two 18-story 
buildings. It had about one million rentable square feet of space. The 
building was 99% occupied, with three tenants leasing about 95 % of the 
rentable square footage. These tenants were the Home Insurance 
Company, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and The Chase 
Manhattan Bank. The two largest tenants, had leases that expired well 
after 1995 – the maturity of the proposed ten-year notes. This assured 
investors a very stable income stream with limited market risk for the 
property. When the transaction closed in the Euromarkets, it was priced 
at 80 basis points over ten-year Treasury bonds, which was about 60 
basis points cheaper than traditional real estate financings at the time. 
The notes were listed on the Luxembourg Exchange, and Salomon 
Brothers became an active market maker in the securities.  
2. Fisher Brothers Financial Realty Company656 
                                            
655 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986); Quek (1996), p. 23. 
656 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 23. 
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The second rated Securitisation of a loan on a multi-tenanted building 
was the Fisher Brothers transaction. It was a $160 million bond that was 
secured by a mortgage over a 43-story, multi-tenanted office building in 
Midtown Manhattan. The building had more than 900,000 square feet of 
rentable space and was more than 99% occupied. Unlike the O&Y 
property, there were 25 tenants in the building – all with different credit 
ratings and holding leases of varying maturities. Some of the largest 
tenants had long-term leases that expired during the term of the 
financing, so that posed a problem, but got solved by credit 
enhancement. The financing was a fifteen-year bullet loan and came at a 
time when conventional lenders would have demanded a participation in 
the property or a convertible loan for maturities longer than ten or twelve 
years. The fixed-rate financing got a rate of 10.75%. Fisher Brothers 
realized a 50 to 60 basis point savings over the traditional financing 
route. Banking on the two previous rated transactions, the deal was 
closed in two months, which was the time required for a conventional 
financing. As investors in the US were not comfortable with the product, it 
was, to a great extent, placed off-shore in a public issuance that was 
listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange. Investors included foreign 
institutional investors like banks and bank trusts. Some bonds came back 
to the US in private placements. 
The O&Y transaction was really a transitional development between the Single 
Tenant owner-occupied American Express transaction and large multi-tenanted 
transactions that followed. Even though all those transactions were Single-
Borrower transactions, they set the standards for future multi-borrower 
transactions (Large Loan, Conduit-CMBS, Conduit-Fusion). Looking at it from 
the CTL perspective, the American Express deal was probably the first Credit 
Tenant Lease Securitisation. 
As of the mid- to late-1980s, Wall Street Investment Banks played a much more 
important role in the intermediation of real estate credit than they did ever 
before. First came better packaging of increasingly larger transactions and then 
the more important integration of the corporate and real estate capital markets 
and the rapid proliferation of new products and structures (including multi-
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borrower structures). By adding new alternative ways of financing, the opening 
of the public markets via Securitisation profoundly affected individual real estate 
businesses.657 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986658 
Another innovation in the Mortgage-Backed Securities market (RMBS and 
CMBS) was introduced with the Tax Reform Act in 1986. One of the most 
important aspects among the many profound changes that were instituted in the 
Tax Reform Act was the creation of the Real Estate Mortgage Investment 
Conduit (REMIC) for issuing multiple-class Mortgage-Backed Securities. The 
REMIC was a tax-neutral vehicle that created structuring flexibility.659 This new 
issuing entity proved to be the dominating factor for the new issuance market in 
the Mortgage-Backed Securities markets (RMBS and CMBS). The reason for 
this was simple:  
• The new law clearly specified that REMICs are non-taxable entities for 
federal income taxes.  
• The law allowed for the more efficient issuance of Mortgage Backed 
Securities.660  
• The REMIC legislation by allowing multiple-class MBS broadened the 
investor base for these securities.661 
“The flexibility in structuring REMICs has made it possible to attract a variety of 
investors. A typical REMIC today contains ten to twenty different classes 
tailored to meet investors' portfolio needs, and past REMICs have had fifty or 
more classes.”662 
Whereas the REMIC structure was a strong boost for the Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities market right from the start, it only proved to be a small help 
                                            
657 Cf. O'Connor Jr. (1986), p. 18. 
658 For a more precise and more in-depth analysis on the REMIC structure confer chapter 
4.3.3.2 – Tax Environment. 
659 Cf. Ranieri (2000), p. 38. 
660 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 27. 
661 Cf. Hu (1987), p. 13. 
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for raising the issuance volume of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. In
the mid-1980’s the CMBS market was still in its infancy and investor
acceptance problems were more of a concern than tax problems. However, as
the CMBS market started to take off in the early 1990’s the efficient tax
structure that was in place became a crucial factor for the exponential evolution
of CMBS. Today, most CMBS vehicles are set up as a REMIC structure.663
The Savings & Loans’ Crisis
The Savings & Loans crisis came about in the early 1980’s, as the removal of
the Regulation Q (1980) de-regulated the Savings & Loan’s (Thrift) industry.664
The removal of Regulation Q gave savers the opportunity to place their funds
outside the Thrift industry. This was the reason why Thrifts were watching their
net worth disappear, some by as much as 10% per month, and it created
pressure for them to develop capital quickly. So, under the deregulation the
Thrifts were also granted commercial real estate lending authority, although
they had no prior experience in the field. This was even expanded by the Garn-
St. Germain Act of 1982. As a consequence Thrifts engaged heavily in
commercial real estate lending because the rates were high. To engage in
speculative loans in the new open markets was the fastest way for Thrifts to
convert depositor funds into increased net worth. It was primarily loans that
generated large fees, but that incorporated a lot of risk. The race for fees
overcame all financial institutions. Competing commercial banks with similar
declining capital reserves and the same need to generate fees participated in
the competition for the same funds to be used in speculative lending. The
checks and balances system of commercial real estate lending crumbled.
Driven by overbuilding and a strong economic recession, the market went into a
physical cycle downturn.665
                                             
663 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554.
664 Savings & Loans and Thrifts are exchangeable terms. They are comparable institutions to
German Sparkassen.
665 Cf. O'Connor Jr. (1986), p. 17.
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Many of the speculative loans made by the Thrift institutions turned out badly. 
By the end of 1984, over 40% of the nation's thrift institutions were either 
insolvent or dangerously close to insolvency.  
“In the 1980’s there was excessive competition in the lending market for real 
estate loans. This led to imprudence in assessing risk and the overall real 
estate environment. In return this fuelled an asset bubble in property prices. 
Through their imprudent loan origination in the 1980’s the Savings & Loans 
(S&L) industry almost went out of business.”666 
A lot of banks failed due to commercial real estate lending. The reason besides 
the aggressive behaviour of the Thrift Institutions was bad underwriting. 
“First of all, it happened because of poor underwriting and you cannot do a lot 
about that. People do not want to take their time and they lose their discipline. 
Poor underwriting is poor underwriting.”667 
So, this crisis could have been fixed, if the underwriting standards had been 
more rigorous and if the Savings & Loans industry had been more disciplined 
and if the government had jumped in earlier. As a result of the crisis in the Thrift 
industry, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which had insured the 
deposits in these institutions through, had to take action.668 
Finally, in 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),669 which, among other things, created the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC).670 The RTC’s sole purpose was to liquidate 
the assets of failed Savings & Loans. In an effort to keep taxpayer exposure to 
a minimum, the RTC immediately began liquidating non-performing commercial 
real estate mortgage loan assets at greatly reduced prices through 
                                            
666 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
667 Stark (2003), Interview 10, p. 554. 
668 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 11. 
669 Cf. Brueggeman (1995), p. 12. 
670 In that time there were few vehicles for Asset-Securitisation. All the non-performing assets 
went into the Resolution Trust. Cf. Stark (2003), Interview 10, p. 554. 
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Securitisation issues. The institution used the proceeds to fund the deposit 
insurance claims.671  
The evolution of the Commercial Mortgage Backed-Security market in the US 
was really spurred by the Savings & Loans Crisis and the institution of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). The RTC showed that it was even possible 
to pool bad and non-performing commercial mortgage loans and sell them into 
the market.672 The logical consequence for investment banks was to originate 
performing loans and sell them into the market: 
“So, then people began to say: ‘Well, if you can sell bad loans, why could not 
you underwrite new (good) loans and sell the new loans?’ ”673 
The insurance industry was a major player in real estate financing in the 1980’s. 
They had been making a lot of the loans for the commercial real estate industry. 
However, they “turned the spigot off” in the early 1990’s, as a result to the 
bubble on the property market. The pressure on the insurance side mainly 
came from regulators and rating agencies urging the large insurance company 
real estate lenders to reduce their real estate exposures. Nearly simultaneously, 
also the bank industry stopped committing funds to commercial real estate, and 
hence, the industry slid into a credit crunch.674 
As a result investment banks started to exploit the market that was opened by 
the RTC. They originated new loans and securitised them in the capital 
markets. Nomura became the early market leader in that field. As in every new 
and inefficient market, in the beginning there was a very large arbitrage in those 
new CMBS deals.675 The arbitrage resulted out of the willingness of the public 
market to pay significantly more for the bond cash flows than for the “crunch-
afflicted private lending market.”676 There was almost a cessation of private 
market lending. The resulting problem for the borrowers was that their 
                                            
671 Cf. Pacelle (1994), p. B1. 
672 Cf. Lancaster (2001), p. 1. 
673 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
674 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
675 It was new because those were large deals with multiple loans that were not non-performing 
as opposed to the non-performing loan transactions issued by the RTC in the early 1990’s. 
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traditional 10-year balloon loans677 were coming to the balloon maturity dates 
and that those loans needed to be refinanced. However, there was no 
refinancing available in the private market. The large life insurance companies 
as well as the bank lenders all had the same policy: 
“Borrowers came to their traditional insurance lender and the lender said: 
‘Sorry, we are not doing those loans this year.’” 678 
So, the investment banks jumped in, underwrote and warehoused new loans 
and then securitised those portfolios in the capital markets. This was the 
inception of a new market segment and really the start of the modern CMBS 
market. 
The Evolution of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
For a CMBS market to be successful it has to sustain liquidity, and it must 
attract a big amount of active buyers and sellers. The success of the 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) market depended on the tax 
structure (REMIC) and the confidence of investment banking firms in the size 
and depth of the demand for securities. As the RTC liquidated $14.4 billion of 
assets between 1991 and 1993 through securitized REMIC low-price offerings, 
it created a large market and high volume of bargain hunting buyers. 
Comparing the development to the evolution in the Residential Mortgage-
Backed Security market, the actions of the RTC paved the way for the issuance 
of securities backed solely by commercial mortgages, just as Ginnie Mae 
introduced residential mortgage securities to Wall Street.679 
As opposed to the pre-RTC era, where most of the CMBS deals were Single 
Property/Single Borrower transactions, the first deals that were done in the 
past-RTC era were Large Loan CMBS transactions. The dominant player during 
                                                                                                                                
676 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
677 The 10-year balloon fixed rate mortgage loan has been the traditional real estate loan in the 
US. However, with financial engineering and Securitisation becoming more predominant, this 
is also changing. Shorter maturity floating-rate financings are starting to become more 
popular, especially with short-term investors, like Opportunity funds. Cf. Choe (2003), 
Interview 13, p. 554. 
678 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
679 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
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that time was Nomura. Large loans were first, because it was easier. The 
rationale for the bankers was the same as in the evolution of other 
Securitisation markets around the world: 
“If you are going to do all the transaction work for a deal, you might as well work 
with a large transaction than a small one – as the fees are larger.”680 
The next step was balance sheet and portfolio Securitisation. Banks and 
Insurance companies started to securitise commercial mortgage loans from 
their balance sheets. The origination of commercial mortgage loans was a long 
time bank and insurance company dominated. The strong involvement of 
insurance companies made sense for two reasons: 
1. Their portfolios needed higher yielding assets. 
2. They best knew the value of the real estate because they were insured it. 
Prior to the Securitisation programs that came on line, those assets typically 
had to be held in the insurance company’s portfolio as pure assets. So, it was 
looked upon as a 100% risk base by the regulators.681 The same counted for 
banks. With Securitisation, however, this all changed. Securitisation was a great 
instrument for insurance companies to get around this constraint. So, those 
companies engaged into the first balance sheet trades to make Securitisation 
take off at the earlier days of the market place. They took the property assets 
(mostly mortgage loans) out of their portfolio and sold them to a securitising 
bank, a mortgage bank or an investment bank. The banks in return packaged 
them up and sold the lower rated tranches – the equity piece – back to the 
insurance company as bonds. Hence, those assets went from being on-balance 
sheet to off-balance sheet, freed up capital and gave them the ability to 
leverage. This was the start of balance-sheet and portfolio Securitisation.682 
The Conduit-CMBS Market 
                                            
680 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
681 100% risk base means that whatever asset the insurance company held, they had to set 
aside equity equal the value of those assets. 
682 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
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As the CMBS market developed in the 1990’s following the wrap up of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, new issuance volume set one record after 
another, year by year. The annual US CMBS volume rose from mere $4.6 
billion in 1991683 to $77.8 billion at year-end 2003 (Figure 18).684 
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Figure 18: Total US CMBS Issuance Volume (2000-11/2004)685 
Driving this real estate financial boom over the years were Conduit deals, or 
multi-borrower securities, as rating agencies called them at that time. As the 
CMBS market developed itself, it became increasingly dominated by CMBS-
Conduits.686 
The share of CMBS-Conduit loans within the universe of CMBS rose from less 
than 5% of CMBS issuance in 1992 and 33% in 1996 to more than 50% in 
1997, and 75% in 1998 (Figure 19).687 Today, the share of Conduit transactions 
within CMBS is estimated at close to 80%. Large loans, single assets/single 
borrower, CTL and other loans account for the rest (Figure 20). 
                                            
683 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 20. 
684 Cf. Anonymous (2001a), p. 12; Sheridan, et al. (2003), p. 43.  
685 Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004b), p. 6. 
686 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 20. 
687 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 23. 
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Figure 19: US Conduit-CMBS and Conduit-Fusion Issuance Volume (2000-11/2004)688 
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Figure 20: Relative Strength of Conduit-CMBS compared to all others689 
                                            
688 Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004b), p. 6. 
689 Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004b), p. 6. 
240 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
The success of the CMBS-Conduits came about because they filled a void for 
longer term, fixed-rate, and non-recourse mortgage loans for smaller borrowers. 
The lack of liquidity created by the Savings & Loans crisis created new 
opportunities for those new non-traditional Conduit lenders. Thus, the highly 
competitive conduits became the driving force in small commercial loan 
financing.690 
The growth of the CMBS market and the success of the Conduit segment can 
mainly be attributed to the fact that originators are increasingly getting into a 
variety of new financial products that had previously been covered by traditional 
lenders such as commercial and savings banks and life insurance companies. 
"Life companies have lost market share…. They once dominated the permanent 
loan market (5- to 25-year loans). Banks also had big share of it, but banks also 
tended to be short-term lenders – three- to seven-year loans. While insurance 
companies competed in terms of spreads and price, banks relied on their 
relationships." 691 
In the period from 1992 to 1998, the CMBS market grew and diversified 
dramatically. In addition to achieving tremendous efficiency, the sizes of 
mortgage pools also became bigger. As a consequent result, this also created a 
lot of liquidity in the marketplace, which attracted more investors that again 
made the market grow.692 
At the end of the 1990’s margins were narrowing, and a battle between Conduit 
loans and the whole loan market began. In the end, the competition among 
Conduit originators became so fierce that consolidation within the industry was 
inevitable. Given the large and always-growing list of CMBS originators in the 
1990’s, the wave of consolidations in the CMBS industry came in 1998 and 
1999. This resulted in a smaller number of big players, especially on the 
Conduit side.693 
                                            
690 Cf. Peterson (1999), p. 56. 
691 George Fantini, chairman of Fantini & Gorga Inc. Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 22. 
692 Cf. Pacelle (1994), p. B1. 
693 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 20. 
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The big players that survived include: Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Lehman 
Brothers, Credit Suisse First Boston, Bank of America, Wachovia, JP Morgan 
Chase, Bear Stearns, Greenwich, and Nomura.694 
The extreme competitiveness in the market place has led to an abundance of 
capital in the marketplace that can be compared to that in the 1980’s. However, 
despite this abundance of capital, underwriting standards have always 
remained high. Underwriters today remain concerned about cash flow of the 
properties they are underwriting. So, Wall Street has done a better job 
disciplining the real estate lending market than the banks had done in the 
1980’s.695 
"I cannot say we will have a big bust because of the increased cash flow and 
low interest rates and the reserves lenders are requiring today. Borrowers are 
getting loans on the basis of their properties…This is what we did not have in 
the '80s." 696 
The Conduit-Fusion Market  
As part of the ongoing structural development in the CMBS industry, a new 
trend evolved in the late 1990’s. Another sub-asset class close to Conduit-
CMBS came into being as more and more financial institutions started to 
combine Conduit-CMBS loans with larger loans. Therefore, the new class that 
became a mixture of large loan and Conduit-CMBS was called “Fusion” deals. 
In fusion deals, large mortgage loans of more than $50 million on institutional 
quality real estate are put into Conduit deals where the average loan size 
remains at about $4 million. The main driver for this development was that the 
industry wanted to have bigger deals in order to be more efficient and cost-
effective, and "fusions" were the way to do it.697 
Even though Fusion deals went out of favour for a period following the 1998 
Russian debt crisis, they have returned. Today however, issuers are careful and 
                                            
694 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
695 Cf. Mishra (1998a), p. 24. 
696 Hal Rose, Executive Vice President of ARCS Commercial Mortgage Co. Cf. Mishra (1998b), 
p. 23. 
697 Cf. Hayre (2001), p. 62. 
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limit the number of large loans so that a transaction does not get too 
concentrated as in 1998.698  
“Fusion deals have become the dominant form of U.S. fixed-rate CMBS 
issuance, and are expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.”699 
The Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation Market 
Another asset-class within Real Estate Securitisation that has evolved following 
the wrap-up of the RTC in the early to mid 1990’s was Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation (CTL).700 Being a lot smaller than Conduit-CMBS, this segment 
was built on a functioning Sale-Leaseback industry; CTL Securitisation became 
a Sale-Leaseback transaction with a Securitisation twist. Since capital market 
investors valued good credit cash flows very highly, compared to commercial 
banks that purely looked at the real estate, investment banks and advisory firms 
started to securitise cash flows from credit tenant leases701 in the private 
market.702 
“The distinction between a traditional CMBS real estate loan and credit lease 
financing is clear: In a Conduit loan the lender's emphasis in on the real estate, 
whereas in a credit lease transaction the lender's emphasis is on the quality of 
the lease.”703 
Before 1995-96 the only credit tenant lease loans financed on Wall Street were 
bondable leases in which the tenant had no lease termination or rent abatement 
rights whatsoever. However, as time went on new programs and structures got 
introduced by lenders to allow the securitised financing of properties with triple-
net and double-net tenant leases. Financing non-bond leases, i.e., double and 
triple net leases as credit rather than real estate through the capital markets, 
                                            
698 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554; Philipp (2004), p. 1. 
699 Philipp, et al. (2004), p. 1. 
700 Cf. Homer (2002b), p. 14. 
701 Credit Tenant Leases are sometimes also called net leases or bondable leases. 
702 Issuances in the private market incorporate securities issued under the Rule 144-A. Only so 
called qualified institutional buyers (QUIBs), that have $100 million of discretionary income for 
investment in private securities – excluding treasuries and government obligations – are 
allowed to buy into these securities. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
703 Richards (1999), p. 10. 
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was made possible when Capital Lease Funding LP (CLF), in 1995, developed 
the first comprehensive lease enhancement structure which effectively plugs 
the real estate "holes" in a lease and meets rating agency requirements for a 
CTL loan.704 
In the 1990’s the industry reached its high point in 1999 during the economic 
boom, when more than $4 billion in business was reported in the Credit Tenant 
Lease industry.705 
Through the economic downturn in 2000/2001, activities slowed down in this 
niche market. By 2002, however Credit Tenant Lease Securities came back into 
favour, fuelled by corporate property supply and strong investors demand. 
Following the hype in 1999/2000, where a lot of banks got burned, Corporates 
in the aftermath of that craze had a hard time to satisfy their financing needs. 
They slid into a banking credit crunch and were pressured to look for new 
methods of monetizing their “bricks-and-mortar assets” in order to fulfil their 
capital needs.706 
Investors on the other side were seeking good and stable securities that were 
backed by real estate. As some investors in the post-Enron environment grew 
reluctant to purchase securities that were solely linked to the fiscal health of a 
bond issuer, the result was a strong increase of interest in securities tied 
directly to a stable, tangible asset like property.707 
“Investors roiled by wild credit markets hope credit-tenant leases are a 
haven.”708 
The fact that those deals were secured by leases on actual properties that still 
had intrinsic value even if the company occupying the property collapsed, led to 
the niche market suddenly appearing lucrative to so many buyers that some 
were even clamouring for leases owned by battered issuers, like K-Mart.709 As 
                                            
704 Cf. Pollert (1998), p. 96. 
705 Cf. Sheridan (2000), p. 90. 
706 Cf. Anonymous (2003q), p. 16. 
707 Cf. O'Leary (2002), p. 11. 
708 O'Leary (2002), p. 11. 
709 Cf. Homer (2002b), p. 14. 
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an effect the small and mostly local players in the market started to broaden the 
transaction base. This resulted in different types of credit-tenant lease 
securities-deals either backed 
• by single leases on commercial properties, 
• or by more high-volume deals into which a variety of CTL leases on 
single properties were pooled. 
Another effect that could be observed was that the secondary trading of those 
instruments heated up substantially.710 
“We're seeing companies that never bought a lease before, and who always 
favoured senior debt, that are now interested in these securities.”711 
Most recently the experience with the performance of some Credit Tenant deals 
has not been very good. The reason is that a lot of loans in 1997/1998, 
underwritten as credit tenant loans with secured by underlying mortgages only 
focused on the credit-worthy tenants. Thus, the loans were done with a debt 
service coverage of 1 instead of 1.3 or 1.5.712 
“So from a real estate standpoint they were weakly underwritten. Then it turned 
out that the environment in which they were done was headed to the worst 
experience for corporate credit and general entity risk since the end of World 
War II. So a lot of those transactions, where people were leaning on the credit 
of the tenant, they were leaning on a weak argument. And then the problem 
was that the real estate underwriting was not very strong and so the deals 
performed poorly as you would have expected if you had had a non-credit 
tenant – a lot of those were retail deals.”713 
State of Secondary Real Estate market in the US today 
CMBS in general has become an integral part of the market, in the modern real 
estate financing setting. The effect on the property markets is that they have 
                                            
710 Cf. O'Leary (2002), p. 11. 
711 James McKinney, head of debt capital markets for William Blair. Cf. O'Leary (2002), p. 12. 
712 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
713 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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become more disciplined.714 Since 1994, the influence of CMBS on the real 
estate market has been enormous as can be observed when looking at US cap 
rates. Not only has the CMBS market arranged for financing for a huge amount 
of real estate borrowers, but it has also had an effect on market behaviour and 
professionalism. There has not been any phase of over-building compared to 
that seen in the boom phase of the 1980s.715 
“Our recent success (since 1994) is not a law of nature, but a matter of market 
vigilance. And this kind of vigilance is not an automatic outcome of public 
markets (as opposed to private markets), because we had an asset bubble in 
real estate in the US in the 1980’s with a private market and we had a bubble in 
stocks in the late 1990’s in a public market. It is not just an issue of public vs. 
private – it is an issue of markets doing their homework and it is an issue of 
smart vs. stupid.”716 
All in all, the state of the overall secondary real estate market in the US today 
has been influenced by tax and accounting issues as well as by the motivations 
of the different parties buying, holding and selling real estate. Out of the given 
circumstances and environments three structures for holding and financing real 
estate over the public markets have evolved:717 
1. The Real Estate Investment Trust structure (REIT) – equity structure 
2. The Mortgage-Backed Security structure (including all CMBS schemes 
except for CTL) – debt structure 
3. The Lease Securitisation structure (CTL) – debt structure 
Apart from that not much else has evolved, except for exotic private placements 
of Securities that have different rights and interests in real estate. But this group 
is so small that it can be neglected.718 
                                            
714 Cf. Gordon (2000), p. 1. 
715 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
716 Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
717 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
718 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
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Looking at the evolution of the overall Mortgage-Backed Security market 
(RMBS and CMBS) it becomes evident that the market went through all four 
stages of the evolution model introduced in chapter 4.2.5. The market went 
from an experimental stage (1966-1984) – first issuances of Residential 
Mortgage Pass-Through Securities (1966), first GNMA-guaranteed MBS (1970), 
first CMO (1983), first CMBS (1984) – to a ripening stage (1984-1989) – the 
RMBS market was maturing fast, but the CMBS market was still in its infancy.719 
The FIRREA Act marked the start of the third stage – the growth stage (1989-
1996) fuelled by the standardisation in the RMBS world and the institution of the 
RTC that started issuing large CMBS. After the wrap up of the RTC, the growth 
went towards the non-government sponsored sector, with a strong growth in 
CMBS vehicles. 
The CMBS market today is in a standardisation stage (1996-present) – the 
product has become a commodity in the market place. This has implications for 
the market’s future. The outlook for the US CMBS market is not clear. It will 
definitely continue to be a very competitive market place on the lending side. 
On the issuing side, the volume has been increasing recently and it is expected 
to keep on rising to higher levels. During the last 10 years, this method of 
financing has become very attractive for many real estate owners and 
borrowers, albeit the strong covenants governing those transactions. All in all, 
the competition in the market place puts a lot pressure on pricing and ultimately 
on the investment bank’s margins. Wall Street firms are always looking for new 
opportunities: the next structure, product or transaction, which will provide a 
competitive edge or produce greater profits. This will lead to even more 
financial engineering and probably more arbitrage business.720 
“So the ‘question of the day’ is really: Now that the market is so commoditized 
and efficient, where will it go next?”721 
                                            
719 Cf. Appendix: Milestones the US Secondary Mortgage Market, p. 552. 
720 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
721 Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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4.3.2.3 Identified Transaction 
As opposed to the Singapore analysis, the US analysis will not go into detail on 
each transaction that was ever done in the US, as there are thousands of 
different CMBS transactions since the inception of the market. The following 
part will only go into the different transaction schemes, real estate financing 
environment, business models and alternatives that have been identified in the 
US. Under each scheme, a mass of transactions can be identified. Identifying 
those would, however, go beyond the limits of this dissertation. Hence, the goal 
for this chapter is solely to identify and introduce the different transaction 
schemes and set the scene for chapter 4.3.4, which will go into more detail on 
the borrowers, assets, motives and structures of the different schemes. 
All of the different transactions schemes in the US are mortgage loan related, 
i.e. even if real estate cash flows are sold (as proposed for Real Estate 
Securitisation), they are structured into interest and principal of a mortgage 
loan.722 Due to that fact the term Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(CMBS) constitutes the generic term for all commercial real estate related 
Securitisation transactions in America. Under CMBS the following 
transaction/deal schemes/types can be identified:723 
1. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower CMBS 
This transaction scheme incorporates one property or one borrower. 
Thus, those transactions are dependent on the quality of the underlying 
property and the sponsor’s credit. 
2. Large Loan CMBS 
Those transactions incorporate a small number of large mortgage loans 
on commercial real estate. The deal is dependent on the sponsor’s credit 
and on the quality of the underlying properties. 
3. CMBS – Conduit724 
                                            
722 This has bankruptcy reasons, and it makes the structuring easier and more tax efficient, as it 
then qualifies for a REMIC vehicle. 
723 Cf. Wheeler (2001b), p. 410. 
724 Those transactions are sometimes also called stand-alone transactions as they stand alone 
without the borrower’s credit. 
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Those transactions are independent from the sponsor’s credit, the 
underlying granular portfolio of small mortgage loans on commercial 
property serves as credit enhancement for the investors. There are two 
types of Conduit transactions: 
a. Conduit-CMBS (the portfolio only consists of small mortgage 
loans) 
b. Conduit-Fusion (the portfolio primarily consists of small mortgage 
loans and a small number of large loans) 
4. Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
Those transactions are totally independent of the sponsor’s credit. They 
are dependent on the property’s tenant credit and partly on the quality of 
the property. There are three types: 
a. Sale-Leaseback – Borrower is a Corporation: it represents the 
funding for a classical credit-rated Corporate Sale-Leaseback 
deal. 
b. Built-to-Suite – Borrower is a Developer: it represents the 
construction funding for the built-to-suite construction of a credit 
tenant. 
c. Outright Acquisition – Borrower is a third-party investor: it 
represents acquisition funding for an investor that buys a building 
with a credit tenant lease on it. 
Single Borrower/Single Asset Transactions 
There are ‘Single Borrower’ and ‘Single Asset’ deals, but most of the time the 
single borrower deals are not single asset. Usually there is a diverse portfolio of 
properties owned by one borrower underlying single borrower deals. 725 
In the past especially large real estate corporations have issued CMBS directly 
at the capital markets, which are called direct issuance transactions. In such a 
deal, a company hires an underwriter726 to help structure the deal and to sell the 
                                            
725 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
726 In Europe and Asia this would be the arranger. 
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bonds. However, the underwriter (which is usually an investment bank) simply 
acts as an agent and does not have any capital at risk for the sale of the bonds. 
The real estate corporation takes the market risk of the bonds being sold and at 
what price. The transaction is structured in the way that there is a large loan 
being securitised as a CMBS that is secured by mortgages over the properties 
underlying the transaction. Since the volume of such transactions has to be 
very high, it has to be a very large corporation issuing the CMBS. Generally 
these companies do not want to sell their assets but CMBS provides an efficient 
source of financing for them. So, the main motive for the company to engage in 
such transactions is to lower its cost of capital.727 
Large Loan Transactions 
Large Loan transactions incorporate mortgage loans made to developers, 
commercial real estate operators and investors on institutional quality real 
estate. The minimum size of a loan in a Large Loan transaction is $20 million, 
but the gross of the loans that are made is usually not below $60 million.728 
Conduit-CMBS Transactions 
Conduit-CMBS deals securitise mortgage loans that have been originated for 
the sole purpose of Securitisation and that have a certain size. Those loans are 
small mortgage loans on commercial properties and have an average size of $6 
million.729 
Conduit-Fusion Transactions 
‘Fusion’ deals are mixture of traditional Conduit-CMBS transactions and large 
loan deals. In essence, the transactions consist of a typical Conduit loan 
component – small commercial mortgage loans that are originated for the sole 
purposes of Securitisation – as well as a large loan component – large 
commercial mortgage loans on institutional quality real estate that could also be 
placed in the banking market. Hence, fusion deals incorporate large loans of 
                                            
727 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
728 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
729 For more detail confer chapter 4.3.2.1. 
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more than $50 million that are put into Conduit deals where the average loan 
size remains at about $4 million.730 
Real Estate Financing in the US – CMBS Business Model731 
Real Estate Financing in the US has become a very standardised and efficient 
process. The real estate financing value chain has been split up and the real 
estate financing industry has segmented itself. 
Mortgage banks, Thrifts and Commercial Banks for example only deal with 
underwriting and originating loans. The banks do not keep the loans in their 
portfolio anymore. They originate the loans, sell them and then do the servicing 
of the loans. After they have sold the loans they can underwrite and originate 
new loans. So, they have focussed themselves on their core competencies of 
underwriting and servicing loans. Investment banks on the other hand most of 
the time do not underwrite loans themselves, but they buy mortgage loans, 
warehouse and securitise those.732 
If a bank is the originator of a loan, depending on what the asset warrants, it 
can either provide floating rate/short term or fixed rate/long term financing. Then 
the bank can put it into different types of executions (depending on the size and 
quality of the mortgage collateral):733 
1. The bank keeps the loan on their balance sheet. 
2. The bank syndicates the loan to other banks. 
3. The bank puts it into a Securitisation. 
For a real estate underwriter and lender that wants to go down the 
Securitisation execution path, there are three alternatives:734 
A. He can set-up his own Conduit, originated the loans, warehouse them 
and place all the bonds himself. 
                                            
730 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 20. 
731 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
732 Cf. Yang (2003), Interview 16, p. 554. 
733 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
734 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
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B. He can venture with fixed income placement players (mostly investment 
banks) that will take over the placement and issue the bonds. 
C. He can underwrite the loan and then sell it to the Conduit with the best 
possible fit for his mortgage loan. 
The reason why most lenders do not choose Alternative A and structure their 
own Conduit is that it does not make sense for them to have it. This decision 
results out of the negative answer from the following two questions:735 
• How frequently does the bank want to come to the market with a 
transaction? 
• How frequently does the bank want to turn its cash flow? 
If a lender has its own placement program, he will have to invest a lot of money, 
in order to make sure that he originates enough mortgage loans, he has the 
financial capabilities to warehouse the loans for a certain timeframe and he has 
the placement capability that he needs to place the bonds. It is a very 
expensive endeavour: 
“…a lot of the banks have lost a lot of money on that. There will ultimately be 
only a few global players that have that volume.”736 
The second choice – Alternative B – is to work with fixed income placement 
players that have the placing capabilities. This still leaves the real estate lender 
with his own franchise. Hence, this takes a lot of flexibility away from the lender 
since he is captive to his own program. The bank will spend a lot of time 
accumulating mortgage loans in a warehouse and will have to hold the 
warehouse line for more time than he would need, if he sold the underwritten 
mortgage loan right away.737 
With Alternative C, the lender can work with different investment banks and 
Conduit programs, and can turn his capital more quickly. He hence does not 
have to build up a billion dollar portfolio to then securitise it under his own 
                                            
735 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
736 Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
737 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
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name. He can build up a lot smaller amounts (e.g. $250 million) and then go to 
another Investment Bank that places the CMBS.738 Usually with every loan that 
this lender originates he can have different target CMBS portfolios.739 
In this respect, the lender will go to different investment banks and will try to 
pool the lender’s mortgage loan together with the mortgage loans that the 
investment banks already have in their portfolios. Depending on who has a 
certain set of other mortgage collateral that best fit to the bank’s mortgage loan 
will become the buyer of the loan. The main question in that regard is: ‘Which 
collateral makes the most sense in what Portfolio?’ 
”It is all about combining cash flows in the way that they get the best 
subordination levels for the most efficient capital structure for the bond.”740 
Funding Alternatives for Real Estate Investments741 
During the last 20 years, the funding alternatives for real estate investors in the 
US have come out to three alternatives (depending on the loan term, the 
borrower’s inclination to recourse and covenants, and the real estate’s debt 
capacity): 
1. The borrower can go to a bank and get a traditional mortgage loan from 
a bank or an insurance company.742 
a. Bank loans can be 5 years or shorter  
b. The borrower has to sign the loan personally to some degree (full-
recourse or limited recourse). 
c. The borrower is subject to Loan-to-Value and Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio constraints (75% LTV and 1.3 – 1.35 DSCR). 
d. The terms of the loan are flexible and subject to negotiations. 
                                            
738 The Securitisation of the mortgage loans can come in different forms of transaction schemes 
depending on the size of the asset (i.e. the mortgage loan): either Large Loan, Conduit or 
Conduit Fusion CMBS. 
739 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
740 Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
741 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
742 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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2. The borrower can choose to get a loan through a CMBS transaction 
(Single Property/Single Borrower, Large Loan, Conduit-CMBS, Conduit-
Fusion):743 
a. A CMBS loan typically is 20 to 25 years in amortization with a 10-
year balloon payment. 
b. It is a non-recourse loan. 
c. The borrower is subject to Loan-to-Value and Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio constraints (75% LTV and 1.3 – 1.35 DSCR). 
d. There will be tough covenants on the CMBS loan (concerning 
second mortgage loans, prepayment, sale of asset etc.). 
3. If the tenant has a good credit standing (i.e. investment grade credit), the 
borrower can go to an investment bank and get a credit tenant loan 
(CTL).744 
a. A credit tenant loan can be as long as the lease is. Usually at 
least 15 years. 
b. It is a non-recourse loan to the borrower. The borrower is banking 
on the credit of the tenant. 
c. There exist no Loan-to-Value and Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
constraints, because in a credit tenant loan the Loan-to-Value is 
calculated on the basis of the present value of the credit tenant’s 
lease cash flows. So, regardless of the real estate value, the real 
estate owner (i.e. the borrower) can achieve a LTV-ratio of up to 
100% and more. 
d. The covenants on credit tenant loan contracts are also tough, but 
the transfer of property is generally not prohibited. 
The main difference for the borrower choosing between a CTL and a Conduit-
CMBS transactions is the attainable Loan-to-Value ratio. If there is just one 
tenant in the real estate, the tenant has an investment-grade credit rating and 
                                            
743 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
744 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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the lease is a bondable lease, then most certainly the LTV on the credit tenant 
loan is higher than on the Conduit loan. 
Looking at the difference from an efficiency perspective, CMBS is a very 
standardized and efficient market, whereas CTL Securitisation is an inefficient 
market. This inefficiency creates opportunity for small players that have an 
insight-track. So, the margins are higher. So, CTL Securitisation “really is a win-
win-win situation”, i.e. the arrangers make high margins, the borrower gets high 
LTVs and the investor can buy investment grade corporate bonds with an 
underlying real estate.745 
For example, there is a building with a 20-year lease on it. The Conduit-CMBS 
and the Bank underwriter’s value is $100 million and so is the credit tenant loan 
underwriter’s value. The difference lies in the LTV – the CTL lender can give 
$110 million on a $100 million value, whereas the other lender will only lend 
$75-85 million on a $100 million. The CTL lender is taking a lien on the 
property, but his lending is not constrained by the value of the property, 
because he is lending against a credit tenant lease; i.e. against a long stream of 
cash flows and the credit rating of the tenant. Above that the CTL financing is 
non-recourse financing and 20 year fully amortizing. Also the financing leaves 
the borrower with a great amount of flexibility: the structure is set up such that 
the borrowing entity can freely transfer its ownership interest in the property, 
without lenders consent generally. And it is tax efficient.746 
In the case of a CMBS loan on the same property not only LTV- and DSCR-
restrictions would apply, but also the borrower would not be able to sell their 
properties. Especially in the Hotel industry this fact led to a great turmoil and an 
up-rise against CMBS loans: 
“But just when the industry needs to reshuffle assets and spruce up properties, 
borrowers are painfully discovering that the bonds are a ball and chain.”747 
                                            
745 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
746 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
747 Cf. Biddle (2002), p. 38. 
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For conduit sponsors, loans that are supposed to go into a Conduit pose 
another problem – it has to make sure that this one loan asset is homogenous 
with the entire pool, whereas in a CTL it does not matter if the loan is 
homogeneous or not. In fact, the arranger in a CTL could put the one mortgage 
loan into a private security and sell it out in a one-loan-transaction the next day. 
Most of the CTL deals are one loan Securitisations.748 
Conduit originators on the other hand have to be very picky with their loans. 
The loan must not be an outlier with respect to the Loan-to-Value for two 
reasons:749 
• Rating agencies do not like that 
• If the bank is going to sell the subordinate tranches, it has got to get the 
B-piece buyer to agree.  
So, the loans have to be very consistent and this takes away a lot of flexibility 
from the lender and the borrower. 
Comparable Product to Real Estate Securitisation in the US 
As Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities only party overlaps with Real 
Estate Securitisation as defined in chapter 3, there is another product that also 
partly overlaps (from a conceptual standpoint). The instrument does not fall 
under Securitisation in the traditional sense, but that implicitly securitises real 
estate cash flows in the capital markets; it is unsecured debt to Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) 
Unsecured corporate debt to REIT’s is structured in such a way that the 
investors in the transactions are looking to the unencumbered assets, i.e. the 
values to pay off their bonds. In the worst case they can go and take those 
assets and have them sold to regain their capital. Hence, what the unsecured 
lender will look at is the values of the properties that are unencumbered with 
mortgages. The investors will subtract all the secured debt (the encumbered 
properties) from the value of the company, so they can estimate what is left 
                                            
748 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
749 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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over in case of bankruptcy after all secured lenders have been paid off. To the 
investor who wants to own the cash flows.750 
“For instance if all that you are going to secure is 10 years worth of lease 
payments, then this is absolutely just like corporate debt. If you are going to put 
up the property as a collateral, then it is absolutely the same as a CMBS. And, if 
I put up the tenants’ credit rating, then it is just like a credit tenant lease 
Securitisation.”751 
So, the instrument is not backed by a mortgage or anything else, and the cash 
flows to pay off the debt are derived out of the companies real estate. Drawing 
the analogy to Real Estate Securitisation, REITs that engage in unsecured debt 
are essentially selling their future rental cash flows from unencumbered 
properties, which are structured into a bond. 
4.3.3 Environments 
The following part will go into the different environments governing the 
Securitisation market in the US. (incl. CMBS) 
4.3.3.1 Regulatory/Legal Environment 
The regulatory environment can be seen as the environment regulating the 
banking system or the environment regulating the market as a whole (i.e. the 
whole Securitisation market). In the case of the US, which is different from the 
case of Singapore, the regulatory authorities really only regulate the banking 
system but they thereby influence the Securitisation market (i.e. also other 
asset classes apart from bank and loan Securitisations). The regulation of the 
banking system was also a driver in the evolution of the market, as Thrifts were 
deregulated in such a way that the ‘loan-underwriting craze’ in the 1980’s nearly 
led to the failure of the whole banking system. This in return – through the 
involvement of the RTC – led to the evolution and broad acceptance of 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities in the US debt market. So, this 
chapter will look at both: Bank Regulation and Market Regulation, as both have 
influenced and will keep on influencing the CMBS market. 
                                            
750 Cf. Mitsoff (2003), Interview 11, p. 554. 
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Regulatory System in the US 
Regulation in the US can be two different things. On the one hand there is bank 
regulation, which is done by the banking supervision agencies, and on the other 
hand there is the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) that regulates the 
financial and capital markets (i.e. brokers, security dealers and the investment 
banks). So, if an originator securitises assets, he has to meet the SEC 
requirements (i.e. registration requirements and so on). But if the originator is a 
bank, then it also has to follow the bank supervision criteria on Asset-
Securitisation. This is also the case if the bank is an investor in Asset-
Securitisations, then it has to follow the bank supervision criteria as well.752 
Effectively, there are three banking agencies: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), Office of the Controller (OCC), and the Federal Reserve 
(Fed). Banks are chartered either as state banks or national banks. The OCC 
supervises all national banks – that is the big banks: Citibank, Bank One. The 
FDIC supervises the state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System. Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System – such as 
Chase or Bank of New York are supervised by the Federal Reserve. The FDIC 
supervises the vast majority of smaller banks, the community banks. These 
rules require a lot of coordination, as for example there is a Bank of America 
Holding Company and a Bank of America Bank. Both are regulated by two 
different parties.753 
In addition to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) being the 
supervisor for state-non-member banks, the FDIC is also the insurer for all the 
savers’ deposits in all banks. In the case of bank failure the FDIC is set in to 
payoff a large portion of the deposits of the savers, generally up to $100,000 
                                                                                                                                
751 Cf. Mitsoff (2003), Interview 11, p. 554. 
752 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
753 This is somewhat comparable to the situation in Germany and the UK. There also has to be 
done a lot of coordination between the Bundesbank and the BAFin, and between the Bank of 
England and the FSA, respectively. So, in all cases they get together to make sure that they 
have a uniform view. However, the US system is still the most complex. Cf. Boemio (2003), 
Interview 17, p. 554. 
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per depositor. In that respect, the FDIC has a role in ensuring that banks do not 
take excessive risks. 754 
So, the supervision agencies are looking at Securitisation from two different 
angles:755 
I. From the angle of the supervised banks doing Securitisation. 
II. From the angle of the supervised banks buying the notes from 
Securitisation. 
Most of the supervision rules that are done in the US are done on an inter-
agency basis. So, the FDIC works together closely with the Fed and the OCC. 
All the agencies supervise the banks from both Securitisation angles. 
In the US the regulatory environment is primarily made off of the bank 
supervision agencies. The SEC plays rather a minor role.756 
Bank Regulation in the US does not favour synthetic Securitisations – that is 
why there are not many synthetics in the US and the True Sale transactions are 
prevailing. Synthetics Securitisations are not as big in the US as they are in 
Europe. There are only some banks that do that kind of Securitisation in the US. 
Compared to Germany the prevailing reasons are that in the US banks do not 
have tax problems doing true sale Securitisations. For German banks apart 
from the tax problems, the other reason is that if a bank had the choice between 
doing a true sale or a synthetic transactions, synthetics would be easier and 
faster to do, because the biggest part of a synthetic transaction is the Senior 
Credit Default Swap with only one counterparty.757 
Moreover, in the US Synthetics are not feasible because the leverage ratio 
requires banks to hold capital on balance sheet assets, which would include 
synthetics, making it less attractive for banking institutions to enter into these 
transactions. There are effectively two capital ratios – a risk based capital ratio 
(tier 1 and tier 2 capital) and a leverage ratio. This is the difference of the US 
                                            
754 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
755 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
756 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
757 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
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supervision and European supervision. Leverage ratios have existed in the US 
for 20-30 years and after Basel I the regulatory agencies retained those. The 
leverage ratio requires banks to hold enough capital. So, in the case of 
synthetics, the assets are never moved off the books; in essence this might give 
the banks some risk based capital relief (as in the case of Germany), but 
because of the leverage ratio it is not as attractive as in Europe, where it is 
totally based on risk-based ratios. There are only few banks that do synthetic 
Securitisations in the US, but not nearly to the extent as to which it is done in 
Europe.758 
Generally banks in the US that do Securitisations have to sell the junior notes 
first, in order to get investor interest in the senior notes. For the junior notes – 
particularly the very low quality or unrated tranches – there are very few 
investors. So, the banks usually have to retain those tranches. The regulatory 
agencies’ focus is to ensure that those banks holding those tranches have 
sufficient capital to withstand losses. The capital required on lower rated or 
unrated subordinated tranche is generally very high, reflecting the fact that if 
they are retaining those tranches, they really have not transferred much of the 
risk on the underlying assets to the market.759 
Under the current rules, if a bank is buying the unrated tranche in a 
Securitisation, it has to put up one dollar of capital against every one dollar of 
face value in the unrated tranche. In that case for the regulators, it does not 
matter if the bank is buying the bonds as an investor or as the originator of the 
transaction. Under the old rules: if a bank were an investor in the unrated piece, 
it would only have had to put up 8% on the face value of the unrated bonds.760 
“This is not a lot of money, if you talk about the higher risk tranches. We have 
gotten rid of that by implementing our rules. So we have taken that potential of 
cross-shareholdings out of the game. This business is treated as if there was no 
risk transfer.” 761 
                                            
758 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
759 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
760 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
761 Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
260 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
Hence, the conclusion is that going forward under the Basel II regime, banks 
will need to find junior investors, or they will not be able to do those 
transactions, as they become expensive and unfavourable. 
Regulatory Changes 
Over time, there have been several iterations of regulatory changes in the US 
regulatory environment that gave some spur to the bank Securitisation market. 
In 1995, the risk exposure rules were changed to favour Securitisation. This 
was a spur for the market. Then in November 2001 rules were issued, which 
basically introduced the Basel II - standardized approach. From then on, a bank 
could essentially increase and decrease the use of capital762 by using external 
ratings. So, the range goes from total capital deduction in the case of unrated 
pieces, to a 200% risk weighting for ‘BB’ pieces, down to a 20% risk weighting 
for ‘AAA’, which basically equals 1.6% in bank capital.763 
The basic rules of Basel II with respect to Asset-Securitisation are already in 
place – particularly the standardized approach. The US Securitisation rules that 
have been in place since 2002 have effectively been the basis for the Basel II 
Securitisation proposals in the standardized approach. Additionally to the 
standardized approach, the US banks that have been involved in Asset-
Securitisation of any kind also had to be compliant with the leverage ratio rules. 
Those rules are actually the big constraint for the banking system, as it sets the 
ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets on the balance sheet.764 
Non-Bank Regulation 
In Asset-Securitisation, the US banking industry is standing in a strong 
competition with the non-banking industry. This results out of the fact that 
besides banks, there are non-banks – like GE Capital – strongly involved in the 
                                            
762 The required capital is always calculated by the nominal amount multiplied with 8% and the 
applicable risk weighting. 
763 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
764 The leverage ratio is also the reason why the Pfandbrief/European Covered Bond concept 
does not work in the US. The Pfandbrief is different from a Securitisation; it is a Mortgage-
Backed Bond, which is essentially a general obligation of the issuing bank to pay back the 
securities. The transaction is collateralized by the mortgage loans that are still on the banks’ 
balance sheets, so that there is no capital break per se: not only for risk base, but also for 
leverage. Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
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US Asset-Securitisation market. Depending on the firm, some companies are 
regulated by the states, others by securities regulators and if it is an insurance 
company getting involved in a Securitisation then the insurance regulators will 
oversee them. However, most of those companies are not regulated at all. 
Supervisory agencies do not get involved with the non-banks because they do 
not insure their deposits. Overall that is a different market because they are 
subject to market discipline. If companies like GE Capital get involved in 
something wrong or very risky, then investors will recognize that and the firm 
will have a tough time to raise capital. That is a very strong influence and a 
severe disciplining mechanism.765 
The SEC is the regulatory instance for placements in the US – 144 A private 
placement. Issuers of private placements under the 144A rule have to comply 
with the SEC. In order to facilitate such placements with institutional buyers, the 
SEC has set up certain rules to streamline the registration requirements for 
Securitisations:766 
1. 144A needs to be a private placement. 
2. Only very large investors are allowed to participate. 
3. There are not more than a total a 100 investors allowed. 
The 144A rule for private placements has been a spur to the market, since most 
of the deals that fall under the threshold for large public placements do not have 
to do all the other registration requirements that need to be done for public 
placements. Hence, they incur less costs and take less time to place. Especially 
for the Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation transactions, which are traditionally 
smaller than Conduit or Large Loan CMBS, this has been a help. The downside 
is that the trading volume is not very high, but it does not necessarily need to 
be, as most institutional investors hold the bonds until maturity.767 
One of the main principles that Basel II is trying to introduce for banks is to 
become more risk-sensitive. In that sense, banks cannot be more risk sensitive, 
                                            
765 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
766 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
767 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
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when they are allowed to buy high risk assets at a 100% risk weighting, and 
take on low risk assets for only a 20% risk weighting. There has to be an equal 
distribution of risk and reward. Going forward, this will lead to a lower 
participation of banks in high-risk asset. For Asset-Securitisation this will result 
in market segmentation. It is most probable that banks will invest into higher 
rated investment grade tranches – preferably ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’, and non-banks 
that do not underlie such a strong supervisory scrutiny will be investors in the 
lower rated tranches. For the case of real estate finance this means that 
investors and developers that used to be strongly dependent on bank loans will 
have to shift towards non-bank funding, i.e. CMBS Conduits or non-bank 
originators like GE Capital or GMAC (General Motors Acceptance Corporation). 
“Again, our concern is that the risk is transferred outside the banking 
system.”768 
Even though most of the regulatory changes over time came from the banking 
regulatory side and even though those changes only influenced the banking 
Securitisation market, it also had implications for the Securitisation market as a 
whole. The reason is that as asset classes diversified and the market grew the 
investor appetite for Asset-Securitisations of any kind grew. This implicitly had 
an effect on the CMBS market that got more attention from the investors. 
Moreover, if it had not been for the Savings & Loans’ Crisis in the 1980’s, the 
involvement of the regulatory bank supervision and the move to institute the 
Resolution Trust Corporation to sell off all the bad real estate loans, then the 
CMBS market would probably not have been such a great evolution as it has 
had. So, whereas the regulatory environment only has an implicit on-going 
effect on CMBS, it was the outright involvement of the regulatory authorities in 
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s that made the market develop in the way that it 
did. 
Legal Environment 
The legal system in the US, which is based on case law, is very sound. It was 
always legally possible to set up bankruptcy remote structures. Over time, SPVs 
                                            
768 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
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and bankruptcy remote structures have only been subject to minor changes in 
case law.769 
Most of the SPVs in US Securitisation are structured on-shore (depending on 
the underlying asset). The state of Delaware has the most favourable trust laws 
and therefore most Securitisation-SPVs in the US are resident in Delaware.770 
4.3.3.2 Tax Environment 
The tax environment was very important for the evolution of the Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities market in the United States. 
“Also, the tax and accounting issues are very important and hazardous. In our 
market they have pushed us into the choices that we have today. The 
Mortgage-Backed Security market did not take off in the US until it was clarified 
that the Mortgage-Backed Security pool was ordered not to be taxed on the 
entity level.”771 
The REMIC Structure 
The “Tax Reform Act of 1986”772 had far-reaching and beneficial effects for the 
Mortgage-Backed Securities market in general. Especially the Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities market was lifted off the ground by this new tax 
treatment. The law facilitated the business by promising investors a single-tier 
tax and thereby laid the basis for a new issuance explosion. The investors only 
had to pay normal income tax on the interest part of the bonds.773 
Before 1986 and the Tax Reform Act, most mortgage securities were pass-
through securities. They were issued as ‘grantor trust certificates’ or as 
corporate debt. In the mortgage securities context, a grantor trust is a trust that 
holds mortgages or mortgage securities in which the grantor or investors own 
undivided interests. Properly structured, a grantor trust was not taxed; only its 
beneficiaries were. However, this started to pose a problem when CMOs came 
                                            
769 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
770 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
771 Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
772 The REMIC rules introduced under the act became effective for securities issued after 31 
December 1986. Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 27. 
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along and issuers intended to issue multiple-class securities, with each class 
having different maturities and yields. Under the so-called Sears regulations,774 
a trust risked being treated as an association taxable as a corporation if it 
issued numerous classes of interests that disproportionately divided ownership 
of investment assets (such as mortgages) or the cash flow from a pool of 
assets. Hence, those trusts were treated as an association that was taxable as 
a corporation and consequently the investors were subject to double taxation. 
Income from the mortgage pools was taxed at the trust level and taxed again 
when it was distributed to holders of interests in the trust. Consequently, the 
results were that mortgage pass-through securities structured as trusts only had 
a single class of interest as opposed to multiple classes in a CMO issuance. 
Therefore, buyers were stuck with undesirable attributes of their securities, such 
as thirty-year maturities.775  
The Tax Reform Act included rules that authorized the creation of a new tax 
entity for Mortgage-Backed Securitisations, the Real Estate Mortgage 
Investment Conduit (REMIC). The REMIC was defined as a new pass-through 
tax entity that both holds real estate mortgages and issues securities that 
represent interests in those mortgages. The bill clarified the federal income tax 
treatment of Mortgage-Backed Security transactions, allowed for tranched CMO 
structures (with different maturities and priorities), and thereby spurred the 
development in the new Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market.776 
A REMIC can be any legal entity: a corporation, trust, partnership, or 
association, but it does not have to be a separate legal entity. To be treated as 
a REMIC for tax purposes, an entity must make an election on its tax return and 
this election stays valid as long as the REMIC qualification conditions are met. 
In the case of an SPV not fulfilling the REMIC criteria, it was not considered a 
REMIC. Hence, it wouldn’t be tax-efficient and the structure was considered a 
                                                                                                                                
773 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
774 The regulation got its name from a precedent transaction done by Sears Mortgage Company 
in 1984. The CMO was intended to combine the tax advantages of the trust with the benefits 
for investors of multiple class securities. Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 28. 
775 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 28. 
776 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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taxable mortgage pool and the SPV was taxed as a corporation. So, by 
qualifying as a REMIC, the SPV effectively avoids the corporate double tax.777 
The principal effect of the REMIC rules instituted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
was to remove federal tax obstacles to the efficient origination and trading of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities. Being exempt from federal income tax, a REMIC 
functions as an investment Conduit without any other business or operation. 
However, the entity must report all its earnings and payments on a calendar-
year basis, so that the tax authority can compare the earnings of the REMIC 
entity to the taxable income that holders of REMIC securities are obliged to 
report in their income tax filings. This then avoids double taxation.778 
The REMIC criteria opened the way for new structures:779 
1. It allowed issuers to create multiple-class mortgage pass-through 
securities that were not taxed as entities separate from the issuer. 
2. It approved the creation of senior/subordinated mortgage securities for 
which there were no restrictions on trading subordinate interests. 
3. It permitted the creation of CMOs that do not have any issuer's equity 
interest. 
4. It allowed pass-through pools to maintain cash reserve funds for added 
credit enhancement. 
5. It made cash flow efficiency possible. 
The REMIC rules gave issuers more flexibility in structuring Mortgage-Backed 
Security Offerings. However, in order to qualify for this favourable tax treatment, 
the entity has to comply with a set of stringent requirements. The most 
important ones include:780 
1. Assets must consist of qualified mortgages, foreclosure property, cash 
flow investments, and a qualified reserve fund. Any obligation that is 
                                            
777 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
778 Cf. Hu (1987), p. 13. 
779 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 10. 
780 Cf. Zacamy and Zwaryczuk (1987), p. 18. 
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principally secured, either directly or indirectly, by an interest in real 
property can be a qualified mortgage. This includes commercial and 
residential mortgages, 100% and partial participation certificates, pass-
throughs and interests in pass-throughs, stripped coupons and 
mortgages such as a stream of only mortgage interest or principal, and 
senior and subordinated participations in mortgage pools.Investors may 
purchase two types of REMIC interests; regular interests and residual 
interests. 
2. Investors may acquire an interest in a REMIC in exchange for cash, 
property, or both. 
3. Even though a REMIC is generally not subject to taxation, regardless of 
its legal forms, a REMIC, like a partnership or an S corporation, must 
calculate its taxable income or net loss at the entity level. A REMIC's 
income, gain, loss, and deductions are passed through to its investors. 
4. If a REMIC enters into a prohibited transaction it incurs a penalty tax. 
Prohibited transactions are those that produce the following types of 
income or gain plus certain unallowable dispositions: 
a. Income from an asset that does not qualify as a qualified 
mortgage or permitted investment;  
b. Income that represents a fee or other compensation for services, 
c. Gain from the disposition of any cash flow investment, except in 
connection with a qualified liquidation;  
d. Disposition of a qualified mortgage, except pursuant to the 
substitution of a qualified replacement mortgage for a qualified 
mortgage; foreclosure, default, or imminent default of the 
mortgagee; the bankruptcy or insolvency of the real estate 
mortgage pool; or complete liquidation of the REMIC pursuant to a 
qualified liquidation plan. 
5. REMICs are obligated to engage in extensive reporting in order to 
provide each investor with the information necessary to determine tax 
liability. 
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At first this tax alleviation was targeted towards the residential properties 
Securitisation market. This made sense as two thirds of the $ 442 billion of 
single-family mortgages originated in 1986 were packaged in pools that were 
securitised as Mortgage-Backed Securities.781 At the time, the Commercial Real 
Estate Securitisation782 market was still in its infancy. However, the institution of 
the REMIC tax structure spawned a new generation of CMBS that had a 
broader appeal to investors and issuers.783 
Looking back it becomes evident that the REMIC tax structure led to an 
increase in volume, a reduction in costs and the production of greater 
efficiencies in the fast growing market for securities backed by real estate. It 
provided issuers with significant new opportunities to raise capital more 
efficiently and at lower costs.784 
“The thing is, here in the States Securitisation has been going gangbusters for a 
while. When we got the REMIC, we had a lot of government sponsored (public) 
Securitisation with Fannie, Freddy and Ginnie Mae, already. The REMIC 
structure came in and we had a very significant growth in the private sector.”785 
The FASIT Structure 
Following the example of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the institution of the 
REMIC structure, the tax authority in 1996 tried to make the market even more 
appealing to originators and institutional investors. The Small Business Job 
Protection Act of 1996 included, among other things, the establishment of the 
Financial Asset Securitisation Investment Trust (FASIT),786 a new means of 
securitising assets that was similar in intent but went beyond the Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) structure. The new regulation allowed 
qualifying institutional investors to invest into FASITs. This vehicle was to 
                                            
781 Cf. Levitin (1987), p. 27. 
782 Even though the CMBS and the RMBS (in the US often only called MBS) transactions both 
rely on the REMIC structure, the markets are perceived as totally different and are even 
analysed as separate asset classes. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
783 Cf. Fink (2000), p. 121. 
784 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
785 Cf. Boemio (2003), Interview 17, p. 554. 
786 The FASIT structure became effective as of 01 September 1997. Mishra (1998b), p. 22. 
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spread the REMIC tax advantage to vehicles for further asset classes other 
than mortgages.787 
The FASIT was another evolutionary step in making the Securitisation market 
more flexible and tax-efficient for investors. It was targeted to become a vehicle 
that was a lot more flexible than the REMIC vehicle, as the REMIC model was 
not optimal in the whole of its structure: 
“There is no one "right" model, as is attested to by the continuing evolution of 
the market in the US; most recently, for example, the introduction of Financial 
Asset Securitisation Investment Trusts (FASITs).”788 
It provided a mechanism of securitizing both mortgage and non-mortgage 
assets, and allowed issuers to substitute collateral, withdraw collateral 
representing over-collateralization and add assets over its life.789 
The industry expectation was that FASITs would add fuel to the Securitisation 
industry on two fronts:790  
1. It would attract a new class of investors such as money managers and 
hedge funds. 
2. It would be able to provide a variety of loans that was not provided for by 
the REMIC – including construction loans, bridge loans, takeout loans 
and other short-term loans. 
Being a so called “living and breathing vehicle”, the FASIT was anticipated to 
create an ‘added value’ for the CMBS industry, but it was also open to all other 
sub-asset classes within Asset-Securitisation. It would give Conduit originators 
the chance to break into an area where traditional lenders (especially 
commercial banks) had maintained a competitive edge – the construction loan 
business. Conduit lenders would be able to originate and securitise construction 
loans, something that was very hazardous under the REMIC structure.791 
                                            
787 Cf. Moreo (1997), p. 80. 
788 Bank of America (1997), p. 6. 
789 Cf. Gichon (1999), p. 9. 
790 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 22. 
791 Cf. Oldfield (2000), p. 449. 
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The authorities anticipated that the FASIT structure was likely to boost the 
market because of its flexible nature – especially in the CMBS and Conduit 
market. Despite a lot of initial enthusiasm when the new financing vehicle was 
introduced in late 1997, the FASIT had a much slower start than initially 
expected. After some regulatory and tax issues were clarified, the FASIT still 
had the potential to provide a dynamic alternative to the REMIC that only 
allowed issuers to pool and securitize commercial real estate mortgage assets. 
And so the market started off very promising in 1998, with a first deal of $2.2 
billion. However, the market never really got off the ground, primarily due to tax 
reasons792 and the limitation of only being able to sell FASIT securities to C-
Corporation investors.793 
Even though it was also possible to structure stringent non-taxable Mortgage 
Securitisation transactions before the Tax Reform Act or 1986, it was a lot more 
challenging and hazardous. The constitution of the REMIC structure facilitated 
the issuance of bonds with multiple tranches; thereby taking away tax hazards 
that constrained the evolution of the Real Estate Securitisation market. On the 
other hand, the FASIT structure never really got off the ground, because it was 
not structured tax-efficiently enough. 
All in all, the REMIC structure allowed the Real Estate Securitisation market to 
develop itself into new sub-asset classes and it opened up room for new 
structural innovations. 
4.3.3.3 Accounting Environment 
“Whilst the accounting treatment is very rarely, if ever, the key driver behind 
Securitisation transactions it is in the current environment an important 
consideration.”794 
The Accounting Environment in the US is influenced by the local accounting 
criteria: the US Generally Agreed Accounting Principles (US GAAP). Everything 
                                            
792 In a FASIT transaction, the party that transfers assets into the FASIT issuing entity may has 
to pay taxes based on the value of the cash flow, as established by the IRS, rather than on 
the actual income from the transaction. Cf. Schneider (2003), p. 99. 
793 Cf. Nirenberg and Burke (1996), p. 85. 
794 Cf. Barnes (2003), p. 19. 
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in the US that in any way relates to accounting of companies is regulated by 
those guidelines. Securitisation transactions and the vehicles utilised also 
underlie US GAAP. As Securitisations are structured to separate the legal 
ownership of the assets from the originator/issuer to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) there is a general concern that if the originator/issuer does not perfectly 
segregate the assets then there may not only tax or bankruptcy issues arise, 
but also accounting issues.795 
The key discussion point in this context is always the off-balance sheet 
treatment of assets that have been securitised in an Asset-Securitisation 
transaction and if the originator has to re-consolidate the SPV (or SPE as it is 
called under in US GAAP) that holds the assets or not.796 
The events around the Enron failure in 2001 has pushed accounting into the 
spotlight of media and accountants. Securitisation with its use of special 
purpose entities (SPEs) and potential for off balance sheet financing has been 
directly influenced by that. The result has been a number of new guidelines, 
interpretations, and modifications to existing accounting standards that have 
sought to clarify or amend the current accounting treatment for Securitisation 
transactions.  
The accounting treatment of Securitisations is centred around two key 
questions:797 
1. Should the originator of the securitised assets derecognise the assets 
from its balance sheet?  
2. Where a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) is involved, should the originator 
consolidate that SPE or does the Entity qualify as a QSPE? 
These two questions are based on two separate accounting principles. 
Consequently it may be the case that an originator may achieve de-recognition 
of the securitised assets at a company level, but on the other hand the assets 
are on the balance sheet at the consolidated level. 
                                            
795 Cf. Gangwani (1998), p. 8. 
796 Cf. Mountain (2003), p. 2. 
797 Cf. Deloitte & Touche (2003), p. 1. 
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Under US GAAP there are a number of standards relevant to Securitisation 
transactions. The key ones are:798 
1. FAS 140, which sets out the rules on de-recognition of financial assets. 
Under FAS 140 de-recognition is based on surrender of control over 
financial assets. A number of conditions need to be met. 
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor. 
b. Each transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets it 
received and no condition both constrains the transferee from 
taking advantage of its right to pledge or exchange and provides 
more than trivial benefit to the transferor. 
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the 
transferred assets through either  
i. an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor 
to repurchase or redeem them before their maturity; or 
ii. the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific 
assets, other than through a cleanup call. 
2. FIN 46 which addresses consolidation of Variable Interest Entities ( a 
newly-coined term which is also called a Qualifying SPEs). 
The decision of whether or not to consolidate an entity in the US, laid 
down in ARB 51 is based on the principle of control. This has been 
supplemented by FIN 46 issued on the 17 January 2003. FIN 46 is an 
interpretation of ARB 51 and addresses the consolidation of variable 
interest entities (VIE). A VIE is an entity that either does not have equity 
investors with voting rights or has equity investors that do not provide 
sufficient financial resources for the entity to support its activities. 
An enterprise shall consolidate a VIE, and be deemed primary 
beneficiary, if that enterprise has a variable interest that will absorb a 
majority of the entity’s expected losses and/or receive a majority of the 
                                            
798 Cf. Barnes (2003), p. 19. 
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entity’s expected residual returns, including fees to the decision maker 
and fees to providers of guarantees. 
FIN 46 does provide an exemption to the normal consolidation rules, 
providing for entities that meet the SFAS 140 definition of a Qualified 
Special Purpose Entity (Q-SPE) to avoid consolidation by any enterprise. 
The standards are very much in a state of flux and have been subject to 
constant change during the last 3 years. 
The accounting treatment of a structure in a Securitisation is very important to 
most originators, but the rules are given and there is not much the originator 
can do to change the rules. In general one has to take the accounting 
environment as a given. 
“It [the Accounting Environment] is what it is and you try to work around it.”799 
Comparing the accounting to the regulatory (supervision) rules of capital 
treatment and the distribution of risk and reward, the regulators’ views differ 
from the accountants’ views. Whereas the regulators believe that a bank can in 
fact have a limited risk transfer for limited capital relief, accountants believe that 
it has to be “all or nothing”, in order to get off-balance sheet.800 
“And this is tough to have.”801 
This is especially tough, if a bank only for example retains $1 of the unrated 
tranche in a $100 issuance. This represents only 1%. From the regulatory 
perspective, the bank will only need to put up $1 in capital for that. Therefore, 
this Securitisation would be in a grey zone, as are most transactions – it is 
never all or nothing. This is why regulators try to match the capital according to 
the risk exposure. Eventually this will lead to a risk transfer out of the banking 
system, as banks try to place the lower rated tranches with other investors.802 
                                            
799 Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
800 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
801 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
802 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
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However, as analysed above, the accountants have a different view: if the
company retains risk, gives guarantees or does not give up future rewards, the
transaction is fully consolidated.
Especially, for Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation and off-balance sheet leases
this FIN 46 has posed great problems.803 There have always been huge
accounting and tax issues in the US. This is especially true in sale-leaseback
transactions. From the accounting perspective, the problem is that the
transaction undergoes an enormous scrutiny in order to get the asset of the
seller’s books.804
The general US GAAP rules on Securitisation have also influenced CMBS
structures and the structural setup and credit enhancement measures in those
transactions. Nonetheless, the accounting rules are what they are and all the
players in the corporate market have to live with those. From that perspective
accounting has neither been an upholding obstacle, nor a spur to the CMBS
market.
4.3.3.4 Rating Environment
The rating environment has been the key to the success of the overall Asset-
Securitisation market. In the early stage of the evolution, the Rating Agencies
have banked on their reputation in providing corporate and bond credit ratings
and have extended this standing to the Securitisation industry by providing
opinions on the credit of Securitisation issuances. First, they rated Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities and then they stretched their expertise to the
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security market.
In the beginning of the CMBS market rating posed a problem. Even though
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities805 had been rated for years, to develop
                                             
803 Cf. Berman (2003); Homer (2003a); Homer (2003b); Homer (2003c).
804 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554.
805 Cf. Chen, et al. (1998), p. 1.
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a rating model for CMBS was a lot more difficult and challenging.806 There were 
many issues that had to be solved:807 
• Commercial property was income producing real estate and hence 
different from single family-homes. 
• There was a greater diversity of properties underlying commercial 
mortgage loans. 
• Commercial real estate mortgage loans were complex and all but 
homogenous.  
• Commercial property leasing incorporating a mass of tenants, which was 
dissimilar to RMBS. 
• There were different financing and underwriting issues involved in 
commercial mortgage loan underwriting. 
• The recorded history of commercial property foreclosures and 
delinquencies was not as comprehensive as that for single-family 
mortgages, for which comparatively detailed foreclosure data could be 
obtained dating back to the 1930’s. 
Standard and Poor's was the first rating agency to introduce a credit-rating 
system for the evaluation of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities in 
November 1984.808 It was the first rating criteria for CMBS. The rating system 
that they developed in cooperation with Salomon Brothers better enabled 
investors to compare CBMS with other rated investments. It was an 
evolutionary step for the Securitisation of commercial mortgage loans. It set a 
credit rating standard for bonds backed by mortgage loans on commercial 
properties. Also, more uniform commercial mortgage loan origination, 
underwriting and property-appraisal standards resulted from the development of 
S&P's rating system. 809 
                                            
806 The difference in rating criteria between RMBS and CMBS made both become separate 
asset classes, from the start of the market. 
807 Cf. Ross and Kane (1985), p. 8. 
808 Moody’s Investor Service and Duff & Phelps (today Fitch IBCA) introduced their credit rating 
system for debt securities collateralized by commercial real estate in 1986. Cf. Adler (1987), 
p. 23. 
809 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 19. 
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Under the rating system, S&P developed two rating models for the evaluation of 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities offerings that are still used today and 
that other rating agencies have adapted in one way or another:810 
• The Actuarial Model811 
The actuarial model is tailored generally for a large number of properties 
(Conduit-CMBS) and for offerings by major institutional issuers (Portfolio 
Transactions), such as life insurance companies and commercial banks. 
It sets underwriter rating standards for the bond issuer and performance 
standards for the issuer's mortgage pool that collateralizes a bond 
offering. The actuarial model takes a statistical approach to rating CMBS. 
The first criteria report stated that mortgage portfolios collateralizing an 
offering rated under the actuarial model should consist of at least 300 
mortgages and no single mortgage or single mortgagor’s ownership 
should exceed 5 % of the bond issue.812 
• The Property- Specific model813 
The property-specific model can be applied to a single property and to 
smaller mortgage pools. The key requirements of this model are that the 
underlying properties must be of high quality and be able to withstand 
adverse economic conditions. The property-specific model, as opposed 
to the actuarial model, sets standards based primarily on the projected 
cash flow of properties underlying the mortgage collateral. The model 
analyses the lease term, tenant mix and quality, property management, 
energy efficiency, construction quality, functional obsolescence, and site 
location of properties in Securitisation transactions. 
Today, the rating industry is characterised by a rating agency oligopoly; there 
are three rating agencies left that rate structured finance transactions: Standard 
                                            
810 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2004), p. 11. 
811 Cf. Manolis and Meistrich (1986), p. 19; Ross and Kane (1985), p. 9. 
812 This model was also the basis for the granular portfolio approach in Securitisation 
transactions taken by bank supervisors and the Basel II committee on bank supervision. 
813 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2004), p. 11. 
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& Poor’s, Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch Ratings.814 All agencies have
developed their own rating criteria and have their own rating scales.815 For
CMBS, the agencies have created general CMBS criteria as well as specialized
CMBS criteria (by property type and by transaction scheme).
General US CMBS criteria:
• CMBS Property Evaluation Criteria (Standard & Poor’s)816
• Structural Innovations in CMBS (Fitch Ratings)817
US CMBS Criteria for all different commercial property types:
• Office Property818
• Manufactured Home Communities819
• Parking Facilities820
• Self-Storage Facilities821
• Assisted Living Facilities822
• Ground Leasehold Interests823
• Hotel Properties824
• Industrial Properties825
• Movie Theatres826
                                             
814 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2004), p. 1.
815 Cf. Bär (1997), p. 203; Bär (1998), p. 32.
816 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2004), p. 1.
817 Cf. Fitch Research (1996), p. 1.
818 Cf. Chen and Church (1999), p. 1.
819 Cf. Rubin (2003a), p. 1.
820 Cf. Rubin (2003b), p. 1.
821 Cf. Rubin (2003c), p. 1.
822 Cf. Rubin (1998), p. 1; Rubin (1999), p. 1.
823 Cf. Citro (2001), p. 1.
824 Cf. Park and Purij (2001), p. 1.
825 Cf. Rubin (2001), p. 1.
826 Cf. Rubin, et al. (2001), p. 1.
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• Multi-Family Properties827 
US CMBS Criteria for all different transaction schemes: 
• Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS828 
• Large Loan CMBS829 
• Conduit-CMBS830 
o Small Commercial Mortgage Loans831 
o Floating Rate Transactions832 
• Credit Tenant Lease Securitisations833 
Special Reports on Framework issues: 
• Legal Criteria for Structured Finance Transactions834 
• US CMBS Legal Criteria835 
• Legal Issues for German Asset-Backed Securitisation836 
• Approach to Terrorism Insurance for US Commercial Real Estate837 
• CMBS Surveillance Criteria838 
• CMBS Evolution and the influence of property cycles839 
• Investors Benefit from the Legal/Structural Review of U.S. CMBS 
Transactions840 
                                            
827 Cf. Rubin and Rosen (2003), p. 1. 
828 Cf. Nayar (2000), p. 1. 
829 Cf. Chen, et al. (2001), p. 1. 
830 Cf. Rubin and Levidy (2000), p. 1. 
831 Cf. Jacobo (1999), p. 1. 
832 Cf. Chen and Chacon (2000), p. 1. 
833 Cf. Nayar (1998), p. 1. 
834 Cf. Dawson (2002), p. 1. 
835 Cf. Scott (2003), p. 1. 
836 Cf. Bell and Staudohar (2003), p. 1. 
837 Cf. Rubock and Philipp (2002), p. 1. 
838 Cf. Stafford and MacNeill (2002), p. 1. 
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Fuelled by the success in the Mortgage-Backed Securities markets (RMBS and 
CMBS), the rating agencies also played a very important role in developing 
other asset classes in Securitisation. Today, rating agencies have created 
rating criteria on nearly every asset and sub-asset class in Asset-
Securitisations. 
• Asset-Backed Securities (ABS):841 
Receivables Backed Securitisations,842 Pooled Aircraft Securitisations,843 
Tobacco Settlement Revenues,844 Mutual Fund Fees,845 Franchise Loan 
ABS,846 Music Royalty and Intellectual Property ABS,847 Airline Ticket 
Receivables,848 Telephone Settlement Payments,849 Future Film 
Securitisations850 and Agricultural & Equipment ABS851 (inter alia). 
• Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)852 
• Whole Business Securitisation (WBS)853 
• Synthetic Securitisation854 
• Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)855 
                                                                                                                                
839 Cf. Gordon (2000), p. 1. 
840 Cf. Biro (2004), p. 1. 
841 Cf. Mazataud and Yomtov (2000), p. 1; Xie (2003), p. 1. 
842 Cf. Dornhofer and Pilcer (2002), p. 1. 
843 Cf. Tuminello and Chen (1999), p. 1. 
844 Cf. Weill and Ekmekji (2001), p. 1; Weill (2002), p. 1. 
845 Cf. Dil (1998), p. 1. 
846 Cf. Chisholm and O’Connor (2000), p. 1. 
847 Cf. Eisbruck (1999), p. 1. 
848 Cf. Knapp (1999), p. 1. 
849 Cf. Weaver (1999), p. 1. 
850 Cf. Eisbruck (2000), p. 1. 
851 Cf. Fabrikant (1998), p. 1. 
852 Cf. Bate, et al. (2003), p. 1; Maurice and Sodhi (2001), p. 1; Seife (2001), p. 1; Standard & 
Poor's (2000a), p. 1. 
853 Cf. Keane, et al. (2004), p. 1; Pfister (2000), p. 1. 
854 Cf. Standard & Poor's (2000b), p. 1; Yoshizawa and Witt (2003), p. 1. 
855 Cf. Falcone and Gluck (1998), p. 1; Gluck and Remeza (2000), p. 1; Levidy and Chacon 
(2004), p. 1. 
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Over the course of the Asset-Securitisation market’s evolution, rating agencies 
have gained an enormous power over issuers and asset originators. It is 
primarily the rating agencies and the investors that arrangers and sponsors 
have to report to – “they are the masters of the transactions”.856  
“All those other items are generally fixed: regulatory, tax, accounting and legal – 
the things that change from deal to deal are the things that investors think and 
that rating agencies think.”857 
The rating agencies determine the tranching for transactions, however loan 
underwriters can generally estimate how a loan will be tranched as it gets 
originated. So, Rating Firms have the power to make transactions work or not – 
they determine the tranching and have an influence on the composition of the 
asset-pool.858 
“We are always there and getting in the way of an awful lot of transactions. I 
submit we play a constructive role. Others think that although we are 
constructive, we are too intrusive.”859 
In Structured Finance, the major role of rating agencies is to estimate and rate 
credit risk in transactions and to assist investors in making investment 
decisions. Through research, analysis, and information the (credit) rating 
agencies protect investors against unknowingly taking credit risk. Hence, 
investment grade rating states that a particular instrument will pay interest and 
principal according to the terms of the indenture.860 
Without ratings, the complex universe of Asset-Securitisation securities would 
not be able to be sold. Rating sets a defined credit standard that investors 
understand and accept; it states that credit enhancement structures used in 
transactions is appropriate to the assigned rating. For issuers to seek ratings is 
favourable, as it makes their securities more marketable to investors at lower 
                                            
856 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
857 Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
858 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
859 Baron (2000), p. 81. 
860 Cf. Baron (2000), p. 81. 
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interest costs. On the other hand, as investors gain confidence in the edit 
analyses of rating agencies, they require a lower yield on an investment.861 
From a principal-agent standpoint, rating agencies have taken over the role of a 
signalling mechanisms for solving hidden characteristics problems in Asset-
Securitisation transactions. For issuers this has led to substantial savings in 
interest expenses and for investors this has led to a greater confidence in the 
quality of the complex securities that they purchase. 
Overall, the evolution of rating criteria was the catalyst that stimulated the 
growth and development of an institutionalised, national market in CMBS.862 It 
led to more uniform mortgage-loan origination, underwriting and property-
appraisal standards and thus made the real estate lending and the CMBS 
market more standardised and resistant against loan underwriting crises as 
observed in the 1980’s. 
The existence of rating agencies, which built up expertise in analysing 
Securitisation transactions, fuelled the growth and development of the CMBS 
market. The CMBS market became not only a very important innovation for real 
estate financing in the US, but also the role model for all other Asset-
Securitisation markets that followed it. 
4.3.3.5 Investor Environment 
As mentioned above, over time the Investor and Rating Environment have 
turned out to be the most important environments in the evolution of the CMBS 
market. They have been crucial for the ongoing success of CMBS. In that 
context investor involvement in the market is one of the most important 
drivers.863 
It does take a certain environment in the capital markets to accept Asset-
Securitisation. The investor environment has been part of the reason, why the 
CMBS market in the US has taken so long to truly get off the ground. After the 
                                            
861 Cf. Baron (2000), p. 83. 
862 The rating environment was not a driver for the evolution of CTL because in a CTL 
transaction the credit tenant is already rated. Hence, there is no other separate rating needed. 
Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
863 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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real estate crisis in the United States in the 1980’s investors became so risk 
averse towards real estate, that Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities took 
a while to become popular among investors. One key problem was to figure out 
the right way to minimize credit risk. Eventually the pooling effect of CMBS 
helped to minimize credit risk and the more issuances were done (especially in 
the early 1990’s by the RTC), the more investors understood the portfolio 
benefits of CMBS.864 
Investor Involvement in Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities did not start 
until the Resolution Trust Corporation. 1993/1994 were the watershed years for 
the CMBS market in the US. It was then, after the wrap-up of the RTC that 
institutional investors, banks and mutual funds started to accept CMBS as a 
legitimate fixed-income investment. Looking at the evolution cycle of CMBS, it 
becomes evident that the start of the investor acceptance fell together with the 
upswing in issuance volumes.865 
Throughout the market development cycle, Investors have influenced the 
outcome of the structures. Over time, there have been a few structures that did 
not hit “investor appetite” or that went out of favour with investors. So, the 
transaction types and the structures that the CMBS market in the US is left with 
today have proven to be the most investor-suitable structures, even though they 
might not be the most sponsor or originator friendly structures.866 
For most investors in the US, the CMBS structure works very well. Hence, this 
does not leave much room for other innovative structures such as pure 
Securitisations of buildings or future real estate cash flows. Above that, CMBS 
works so well for investors because of the diversification effects in large 
underlying mortgage loan portfolios.867 
Investors in CMBS – Bank vs. Non-Bank Investors 
It is possible to segment Investors by fixed vs. floating an by high rated vs. low 
rated tranche preference. Segmenting the investors in CMBS by floating vs. 
                                            
864 Cf. Stark (2003), Interview 10, p. 554. 
865 Cf. Cocheo (1995), p. 48. 
866 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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fixed rate notes, the fixed rate bonds are usually placed within the US, whereas 
on the floating rate side European investors have invested in certain classes of 
CMBS transactions.868 
Banks are one of the primary investors in the highly rated tranches of Asset-
Securitisation; so are insurance companies and other institutional investors in 
traditional debt products. What Basel II implies for the investor environment is 
that the investor universe in Asset-Securitisations will be segmented. The 
market in the future will develop into the direction that the higher rated tranches 
will be taken up by banks because they have to underlie the highly rated 
tranches only with little capital. And the lower rated tranches are placed outside 
the banking system with investors that are not subject to such strong capital 
requirements and that maybe perceive the risk differently. Hence, the investors 
in the higher rated tranches will hence come out of the banking system or the 
insurance system and the investors in the lower rated tranches will come our of 
the Corporate Sector.869 
Due to Basel II and the implementation of a more risk sensitive capital 
framework for Securitisation, most of the US banks are pressured to purchase 
the high quality senior ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’ rated tranches. The reason besides risk-
based capital is that the credit risk and the duration are generally manageable – 
more duration is more stable. Under the current bank regulatory rules, for every 
$100 exposure banks would have to hold $1.60 of risk-based capital for ‘AAA’ 
and ‘AA’ Securitisation tranches.870  
Looking at the credit curve, it is observable how investors in CMBS are 
becoming segmented. The ‘AAA’ and high investment grade classes are 
allocated to regulated investors like insurance companies, banks, thrifts, Fannie 
Mae, Freddy Mac, and high quality accounts. Then going down the credit curve 
and out the maturity curve, it becomes the non-regulated investors that buy into 
                                                                                                                                
867 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
868 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
869 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
870 Under the previous rules for every $100 in ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’ tranches, the banks needed to 
hold $8. The same amount also counted for a single B tranche as well. Therefore the previous 
rules were not very risk sensitive. Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
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the transactions. Those companies incorporate: GMAC, GE Capital, B-piece 
funds, specialty risk funds and special servicers – who are buying and are 
getting the required 27% return.871 
“But that is good, because that means that my tax dollars do not go to support 
that CMBS, if it blows up. It is that GE Capital or GMAC that will lose. If it comes 
down to that thrift across the street that bought the ‘AAA’ piece, they are 
probably fine.”872 
In the future the question will be: Who is buying the lower rated tranches? 
Insurance companies and all of the above mentioned will buy down to the ‘BBB’ 
level. CDO buyers that repackage the bonds into an Arbitrage-CMBS will look 
at ‘BBB’ and ‘BB’ bonds (depending on market dynamics). Below investment 
grade bonds are often bought by certain opportunity investors who have the 
capacity to accurately assess and underwrite the underlying portfolios in great 
detail. Also, they typically have significant real estate work out experience, 
which results out of their position, being in the higher risk and first loss 
position.873 
If banks compete with non-regulated institutions on the same bonds, then the 
Non-regulated institutions – like GE Capital and so on – might be able to price 
the tranches differently, depending on their subjective perception of risk. This 
might even enlarge/magnify the segmentation effect in the industry. Above that, 
the banking industry is also competing with the insurance company industry, 
which is also heavily regulated. So there is also competition between those two 
sets off regulatory capital requirements.874 
Looking at the conclusion of this, it becomes evident that the evolution of Basel 
II and the new risk-sensitivity of banks segment the market. In essence under 
Basel II going forward, as banks do not invest into junior tranches anymore, the 
challenge will be to find junior investors. This will be the key to the success of a 
Securitisation transaction in the future. 
                                            
871 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
872 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
873 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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Investors in CTL 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation from an investor’s standpoint is a different 
asset class than CMBS. It is targeted at a specific investor group. The 
obligation of the borrower to pay the debt service comes from the rent with a 
credit tenant that has signed a triple-net, bondable lease. This is very attractive 
to investors. As long as the tenant is viable, the rent gets paid and the investor 
does not have to care about the building because that is the responsibility of the 
tenant. The only risk that the investor is taking is the credit risk of the tenant. 
And since the tenant has a credit rating the investor can estimate the credit risk 
that he is taking. Additionally, for the event of bankruptcy the investor is hedged 
against a total loss, because he has a first lien on the properties underlying the 
transaction. In a corporate sale-leaseback CTL Securitisation, the key in the 
initial underwriting is to pick those assets as collateral for the transaction that 
are vital to the corporation. This way the investor can be sure that he can sell 
the property if he has to foreclose on it. 875 
“It's almost like owning a corporate bond since the tenant would be 100% 
responsible for the building.” 876 
Even in troubled transactions the downside risk of Credit Tenant Lease Bonds 
is hedged. This is a benefit of CTL compared to Corporate Bonds. When K-Mart 
went into bankruptcy the corporate bonds traded at “20 cents on the dollar”, 
whereas the CTL bonds never went below the ‘go dark value’877 of the real 
estate, which lies between 40% - 60% of the market value. So, the CTL bonds 
traded at “45 cents on the dollar” and thereby provided a downside risk hedge 
against total loss.878 
                                                                                                                                
874 Cf. Cave (2003), Interview 18, p. 554. 
875 Cf. Sheridan (2000), p. 90. 
876 Sheridan (2000), p. 90. 
877 The go dark value stands for the value that the property has, when the tenant moves out 
tomorrow and all the lights go dark in the building. In essence it stands for the price that this 
real estate will always be sold at, even if one has to put it on the market today and sell it 
tomorrow. 
878 Cf. Homer (2002a). 
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As opposed to Conduit, Large Loan or Single Property CMBS, Credit Tenant 
Lease Securitisation primarily attracts insurance companies as investors. This 
goes back to the insurance companies’ regulation guidelines, which all 
insurance companies have to live and invest by. The regulatory body is the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which it is not a 
public body but rather an industry rule. However, any insurance company that is 
domiciled in the US must follow its rules.879 
Under the NAIC guidelines, investors in CTL bonds can make a regulatory 
arbitrage compared to investing into real estate loans. Insurance companies do 
not rate the asset classes as ‘AAA’ to ‘BBB’ – they rate them NAIC-1 to NAIC-5. 
So, from a risk-weighting standpoint, there are only 5 risk weightings. In this 
respect, a credit tenant lease is an investment grade credit and therefore 
qualifies for a lower risk weighting. And because the risk weightings get 
exponentially greater, the lower the investment quality is, most insurance 
companies do not engage in any credit tenant lending under NAIC-2, which is a 
‘BBB’ or better (i.e. investment grade rating).880 
In an asset class context, what the NAIC also does is it puts all asset classes 
on a Schedule – ranging from A to D. A is equity investments (common stocks, 
etc.), B is Real Estate Loans, C is Other Investments and D is Corporate 
Bonds. So, depending upon where the insurance invests its assets, it has a 
particular risk-based capital requirement: with equities it is very high, with 
mortgage loans it is a little bit less, and with bonds it is relatively low – 
especially if they are investment grade bonds. So, in the case of a Credit 
Tenant Lease Securitisation, the CTL securities would be backed by cash flows 
from a credit tenant lease collateralised by a mortgage on the building.881 
Therefore, the security implicitly has a corporate bond rating and will, hence, 
                                            
879 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
880 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
881 The largest section in the NAIC handbook is on Credit Tenant Lending. CTL Securitisation 
falls under this category. There are more information and guidelines in the NAIC book on 
Credit Tenant Lending than for any other asset class. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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qualify for a schedule D investment (corporate bond) with a lower risk reserve 
than for a real estate loan.882 
For insurance companies, Credit Tenant Lease securities represent a special 
case in which a risk-reserve arbitrage can be made between Schedule A (which 
incorporates real estate loans) and Schedule D (which incorporates corporate 
bonds and CTL securities).883 This arbitrage goes in sync with an additional 
yield pick-up between a plain corporate bond and a CTL security of the same 
company and the same credit rating.884 Additionally the security represents a 
downside risk hedge to the investor. Whereas the investor – in the case of the 
corporate bankruptcy – would not be paid back on the corporate bond, the CTL 
paper will always be as much worth as the ‘go dark value’885 of the real estate, 
because it is collateralized by a mortgage on the building. This makes Credit 
Tenant Lease Securitisation a very viable niche-market. 
Example Case886 
Rite-Aid is an American pharmacy chain. The company used to have an 
investment grade credit rating.887 In 2000, Rite Aid888 – as many other retail 
chains – slid into credit problems and was close to bankruptcy.889  
Before the credit problems occurred, Legg Mason Wood Walker over the years 
executed $850 million worth of CTL Securitisation for Rite-Aid stores. Besides 
                                            
882 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
883 In 1995, the NAIC concluded that a CMBS, a CTL or unrated REIT debt rated by a National 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization will be treated as a security on Schedule D of an 
annual statement than Schedule B, which identifies mortgage loans. Cf. Connolly (1995), p. 1. 
884 For measuring the interest rate on the CTL paper, the issuer takes the corporate bond yield 
at and adds a premium between 25 bp and 100 bp, for illiquidity and missing covenants on 
the credit tenant’s corporate debt. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
885 In calculating the ‘go dark value’ of the real estate, one subtracts downtime, leasing 
commission, tenant improvements and everything that needs to get done to get the property 
leased again from the market value. This results in very low values that come out at 40-60 
cents on the dollar (i.e. 40%-60% of the original investment). Effectively this value then 
represents the stop-loss for the investors’ investments in the CTL bonds. Cf. Jacobs (2003), 
Interview 19, p. 554. 
886 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
887 Cf. Anonymous (1999m), p. 1. 
888 Rite-Aid was not the only deal that got into trouble. For further information on non-performing 
CTL deals confer Anonymous (1999a), p. 1. 
889 Cf. Frantz (2000), p. 76. 
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that the company also traded in Rite-Aid corporate bonds. So, effectively there 
were two pools of investors – investors who bought Rite-Aid corporate bonds 
and investors that bought Legg Mason’s Credit Tenant Lease securities. 
“When Rite-Aid committed financial fraud, everything went down – the 
corporate bonds traded at 20 cents on the dollar, if you could find a buyer. And 
when there is crisis, there is no liquidity. Our paper never went less than 45 
cents on the dollar.”890 
The reason why the CTL securities never went below 45% of the bonds face 
value was because this is what the real estate was worth on the market. So 
there the investors were hedged against total loss. Additionally, for the time that 
the transaction performed, the CTL buyers got a premium on top of the 
corporate bond yield that the corporate bond buyers got. The CTL investors got 
6%, whereas the corporate bond buyer only got 5%. 
Insurance company are specifically interested in buying those bonds, because 
this helps their Asset-Liability management.891 For matching their assets to their 
liabilities these bonds are a good instrument, because they are writing a 20-
year annuity. And in that case the insurance has to sell the bond before 
maturity, the bond underwriters can make quotes and create a secondary 
market. In contrast to all other kinds of CMBS, CTL is a very small niche 
business where deals can sometimes be as small as $20 million. Therefore it is 
only attractive to a certain kind of investor group.892 
All in all, whatever structure is being utilized depends on investors. Investors 
have to understand the structures and have to be comfortable with them. 
Different transaction schemes make sense for different kinds of investors. And 
this is the reason why the industry – influenced by rating agencies and investor 
preferences – has come out to four different Real Estate Securitisation 
                                            
890 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
891 Due to Asset-Liability Management issues, Insurance companies usually want 15-year fixed-
rate paper, they have very small appetite for floating rate paper. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 
19, p. 554. 
892 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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structures (Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS, Large Loan CMBS, 
Conduit-CMBS and CTL). 
4.3.3.6 Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment 
When all the financial institution in the US went deep into real estate, took a lot 
of risky loans on and made a lot of bad decisions in the 1980’s, the real estate 
cycle went into a downturn – fuelled by heavy overbuilding. This had a spurring 
effect on the occurrence of CMBS. It was a spark for the evolution of the 
market.893 
The real estate market changes over time – there are physical and financial 
upturns and downturns. The movements really depend on what people think 
and what their expectations are as well as the state of the macro-economic 
situation. When the real estate market changes this can fuel or restrict the 
development of the Real Estate Securitisation market.894 
Above that the current real estate market as well as individual market conditions 
across the country have an impact on the ongoing development of the market: 
structures, proceeds and pricing.895 Not only the cycle can have an effect on the 
inception of CMBS, but also the influence on the value of CMBS can be 
substantial. The timing and the length of the cycle makes difference especially 
for default sensitive classes such as IOs and B-rated classes.896 
The credit crunch of 1989-1992 was the basis for the development of CMBS 
structures in the early 1990’s.897 The economic situation, banking crisis and 
fund available in the private real estate financing market, coincided with the 
main evolution steps in the Securitisation market as can be observed by the 
following compilation.  
1980: Savings & Loans deregulation resulting in uncontrolled real estate lending 
activity. – The MBS market is growing the CMBS market does not exist. 
                                            
893 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
894 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
895 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
896 Cf. Jacob and Hong (2001), p. 217. 
897 Cf. Fergus and Goodman Jr. (1994), p. 5. 
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1984: Savings & Loan’s Crisis resulting out of the deregulation and leading to a 
huge Thrift failure and a tough real estate lending environment. – The first 
CMBS transaction gets structured. 
Mid-1980’s: Big credit crunch leading to a huge demand in real estate financing 
and rising interest rates. – There is increased activity in the CMBS market and 
new structures evolve. 
1986: Tax Reform Act and creation of REMIC vehicle. – Strong growth in the 
overall MBS market. 
1989: FIRREA Act and Institution of the RTC. – increasing growth in CMBS 
issuance volume. 
1989-1994: RTC sells off all non-performing assets out of the banking crisis and 
satisfies saver’s claims. – Strong growth in the CMBS market and broad 
investor acceptance. 
Early 1990’s: Economic recession, downturn in the real estate market and 
credit crunch. – Evolution of Large Loan and Conduit-CMBS replacing much of 
the traditional private lending market. 
The local and cultural environment did not play a huge role after all. 
4.3.4 Core Determinants 
4.3.4.1 Borrowers 
The issuers, originators and sponsors of commercial mortgage-backed 
securities are diverse. Although in the beginning of the market (early 1980’s), 
the leading sponsors were large owners/developers and later the RTC (early 
1990’s), as the market became more diverse, the main sponsors shifted 
towards insurance companies, REITs, commercial banks, investment banks, 
and loan aggregation groups (Conduits).898 
The characteristics of securitized transactions vary enormously by underlying 
loan size, by property type, by the number of properties per transaction, and by 
                                            
898 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
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the degree of tranching. Focusing only on the borrowers and the assets, it is 
possible to distinguish three general categories:899 
1. The single asset, single borrower transaction. 
2. The multiple asset, single borrower transaction. 
3. The multiple asset, multiple borrower transaction (Large Loans and 
Conduit-CMBS). 
In 1993, the market was dominated by 27 single-asset transactions in which 
underlying loan size ranged between $100 and $200 million.900 In 2003, the 
market was dominated by multi-borrower/multi-asset Conduit and 
Conduit/Fusion transactions that made up $54.3 billion, i.e 70% of the whole 
CMBS market.901 
In single asset/single borrower transactions, as in deals with multiple assets 
and a single borrower, the creditworthiness (or reputation) of the borrower is the 
primary underwriting criterion – and not necessarily the characteristics of the 
underlying mortgages. 
With multiple asset/multiple borrower (or "stand alone") deals the marketability 
depends primarily on the quality of the underlying pool of mortgage collateral. 
Those are “true securitized transactions” because, like the original residential 
mortgage pools. A Securitisation transaction gets its benefit out of the pooling 
effect. So, the only way that a transaction can stand-alone and be independent 
from the sponsor’s/originator’s credit, is if it has enough borrowers to diversify 
the credit risk. In those transactions the characteristics of the underlying 
mortgages and the property analysis is what counts.902 
The evaluation of the credit risk for "stand alone" transactions relies on 
statistical calculations of the default rate for commercial mortgage loans. Rating 
analysts make the assumption that in large pools of mortgage loans with 
adequate diversity of borrowers, property types, and geographic regions, it is 
                                            
899 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
900 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
901 Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004b), p. 6. 
902 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 12. 
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possible to calculate the likelihood of default. This is the underlying assumption
of the Modern Portfolio Theory.903
Looking at the different types of borrowers, they can be segmented by type of
the borrower and size of the asset.
Small vs. Big Borrowers
There are big corporations that are selling off their real estate portfolios. They
want to lay off the ownership of the real estate portfolio and they are using a
debt security to do that. The typical case in the US, however, is the small
developer that wants to have a long-term mortgage that is most efficiently
priced in the Securitisation market.904
Fixed or Floating Rate Borrowers
One can distinguish borrowers also by their maturity priority for their loans.
Long-term borrowers are rather large real estate corporations, whereas short
tem borrowers are often times opportunity funds that are seeking their exit after
5-7 years.905
In the United States there is a big amount of credit-worthy real estate business
people who are wealthy and have a net worth of $20-30 million dollars or more.
Their businesses, however, do not have corporate bond ratings. So, the use of
their commercial property and the existence of the CMBS market open up a
way in which those people can upgrade the creditworthiness of their borrowing
instruments. They can use real estate as a collateral in a CMBS transaction,
which allows those borrowers to tap the capital markets and to attain a lower
cost of funding. By contrast, if those borrowers issued bonds in the corporate
bond market, they would be considered junk bond borrowers. The other
challenge that this intermediate class of borrowers, without established credit
ratings, is facing is that there is not a lot of financing alternatives around for
them. By contrast, the group of borrowers in the large loan/ property markets in
                                             
903 Markowitz – Portfolio Theory.
904 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554.
905 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554.
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the US has a wider choice of financing techniques that they can use. They are 
not solely restricted to real estate finance.906 
There are many borrowers, in the US, that fall into that small and middle 
borrower category. Those are wealthy people with good quality real estate. So, 
for this group, real estate borrowing (with the implied credit upgrade) is a very 
efficient vehicle. And, it is primarily commercial real estate developers or 
operators/investors who are looking for a securitized product, because it is 
simply the most price-efficient product around.907 
In the following typical borrowers under the different CMBS schemes will be 
described. 
Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS 
In the past there have been a few companies – especially in the beginning of 
the market – that have done direct issuance transactions. Those were primarily 
large real estate companies and large real estate developer, like the innovator 
Olympia & York in the 1980’s.908 
Large Loan CMBS 
The borrowers in typical large loan deals are developers, commercial real 
estate operators and investors that aren’t developers. They typically are 
focused on large loan transactions, which are at least $20 million – most 
players do not do anything below $60 million.909 
Conduit-CMBS 
For typical Conduit borrowers real estate is the core business, i.e. smaller real 
estate owners/investors and developers. The real estate industry in the US is a 
very diverse and very competitive industry. There are a lot of different kinds of 
developers, real estate owners and operators. The economy and the market are 
so big that there are thousands of real estate industry participants. This results 
                                            
906 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
907 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
908 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
909 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
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in many small to intermediate players, which are the primary beneficiaries of 
Conduit type deals.910 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
There are 4 types of borrowers involved in CTL Securitisation as mentioned 
above:  
• Retail Corporations 
• Developers 
• Other Corporates 
• Third-Party Investors 
Unlike typical CMBS transactions, the owner of the property, who is the 
borrower under a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation, is also the originator of 
the asset that gets securitised. Essentially, the asset is the credit tenant lease 
that the borrower sells to the capital market. 
The main property type for typical sale-leaseback transaction in the 1990’s has 
been retail: 
"Retail has long used net-lease financing which, generally, has tended to be 
more of a credit-based underwriting.” 911 
Many retail companies have traditionally used Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation to finance their businesses. This included pharmacies like Rite-
Aid, CVS or Walgreen’s, or other retailers like The Home Depot or K-Mart.912 
The main reason for the success of CTL Securitisation in the late 1990’s was 
that major retailers continued to expand, and that the owners of those leased 
properties – if not the retail companies themselves – required financing.913 
                                            
910 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
911 Johnson (2000), p. 36. 
912 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
913 Cf. Johnson (2000), p. 36. 
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The proposition for investors on the other hand was that retailers like 
Walgreen’s and CVS as well as Supermarkets were in a recession-resistant 
industry, with demographics moving in their favour.914 
Also, developers increasingly are also becoming borrowers under CTL 
transactions. This is due to the fact that credit-tenant leases have fixed rents 
and long terms, unlike multi-tenant real estate properties where rolling leases 
can be renegotiated to keep up with market conditions. And since a lot of 
developers nowadays sign fixed-rate leases with credit tenants 9 to 15 months 
before a project is complete, their ultimate profit is dependent on interest rates 
and the cost of financing. Hence, when rates or spreads rise during the 
construction period and the developer has not arranged a fixed-rate exit 
strategy, the developer faces a loss in equity value. This is why they have 
started to look at CTL to get a take-out loan set up before the property is even 
built.915 
Since a few Retail-CTL transactions collapsed due to Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
(following financial fraud), the CTL industry has shifted towards corporate sector 
Securitisations. This is also where most business potential lies for CTL. Sale-
Leaseback transactions are the basis for Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisations.916  
Office as an underlying property type came into fashion. As the slowdown 
occurred and companies’ credit deteriorated, it became much more difficult to 
access capital. So, corporations started to take advantage of sale-leasebacks, 
which free up cash. 
"Precisely because we appear to be in an economic slowdown in certain 
sectors of the market and in certain industries, the corporations within those 
industries need to find alternative methods for raising capital…Sale-leasebacks, 
                                            
914 Cf. Sheridan (2001), p. 117. 
915 Cf. Pollert (2000), p. 96. 
916 Johnson (2000), p. 36. 
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financed with credit tenant loans, represent an effective off-balance-sheet 
strategy for raising capital away from the traditional debt and equity markets."917 
Following are some CTL Borrower examples: 
• Within the industrial sector, TYCO International through its subsidiary 
ADT. It was a $51 million deal for a new ADT monitoring facility that 
holds a TYCO lease guarantee. 918 
• Nortel, a telecom company, has done sales lease-backed transactions, 
which were funded by CTL securities. 919 
• Qwest Corporation, another telecom company has financed itself with 
sale-leaseback transactions funded by Securitisation.920 
• Retailers like Walgreen’s have issued sale lease-backed notes.921 
• Railway lines have securitised income from yet-to-be built railway tracks: 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company.922 
• Supermarket Chains like Shaw’s Supermarkets – a subsidiary of J. 
Sainsbury – have finance their expansion by selling their leases and 
banking on their credit rating.923 
• There have also been government agencies like the U.S. General 
Services Administration that have used the implicit government rating to 
finance their real estate.924 
• Even international retailers like Royal Ahold (a supermarket chain 
holding company) have issued CTL securities under the 144 A rule. At 
the time, the issue set precedent for the market.925 
                                            
917 Kyle Gore, Managing Director, Real Estate Capital Markets, Legg Mason Wood Walker, 
Inc.'s. Cf. Anonymous (2001b), p. 11. 
918 Cf. Anonymous (2001b), p. 13. 
919 Cf. Anonymous (2001b), p. 13. 
920 Cf. Homer (2002c), p. 15. 
921 Cf. Anonymous (2001b), p. 13. 
922 Cf. Homer (2002f), p. 17. 
923 Cf. Homer (2002f), p. 17. 
924 Cf. Homer (2002f), p. 17. 
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• Kmart was one of the original CTL credits with numerous transactions of 
early 1990s vintage. At high times it was estimated that an estimated $2 
billion of Kmart CTL paper was in the market. Those transactions that 
were mainly not rated by any of the nationally recognized statistical 
rating organizations originate all from the period of 1993-1995. Payment 
on the securities backed by those leases is dependent on either the flow 
of lease payments by a Kmart-related entity or a Kmart guarantee.926 
• There were even transactions in which specialty real estate owners like 
the amusement park owner Cedar Fair, placed private securities that 
were based on rental cash flows from multiple amusement parks. 927 
4.3.4.2 Assets 
As in the previous Singapore Analysis, in this chapter the securitised assets are 
described by Type of Asset, Cash Flows supporting the bond, 
Collateral/Security, Type of Real Estate and Property Category. Those will be 
delineated in the following. 
Type of Asset 
Resulting out of the US tax structure (REMIC) and out of the specific 
bankruptcy rules (which creates the need for a first lien on the property in 
CMBS), the assets that are securitised in the US are primarily interest and 
principal from mortgage loans; except for the case of CTL Securitisation, where 
the asset that is securitised, is the cash flow from a credit tenant lease. The 
type of assets that gets securitised is primarily interest and principal on 
mortgage loans, but the mortgage loans that are underlying the transaction are 
structured in different ways. They can be segmented by the different transaction 
schemes: 
• Structured loans – based on long-term rental income – from very large 
trophy property assets (Single Property/Single Borrower “direct issue” 
CMBS) 
                                                                                                                                
925 Cf. Colomer (2001), p. 24. 
926 Cf. Homer (2002b), p. 14. 
927 Cf. Homer (2002d), p. 1. 
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• Large real estate loans on large properties (Large Loan CMBS) 
• Small real estate loans on small properties (Conduit) 
• Cash Flows from credit tenant leases (CTL Securitisation) 
Cash Flows supporting the bonds 
The cash flows that support the bonds are derived out of the real estate that is 
backing the securitised mortgage loans. Those cash flows incorporate rental 
cash flows that result out of current leases and other current income from the 
property as well as (more uncertain) rental cash flows from future leases that 
are dependent on the, location, quality and future potential of the property, i.e 
the property value. This is also the reason, why not the projected cash flows 
from the property are backing the bond, but the value of the real estate (except 
for the case of CTL Securitisations). 
Collateral/Security 
As opposed to Singapore, the collateral in all transactions (including CTL 
Securitisation) is a first lien on the property, i.e. a mortgage on the real estate 
underlying the loan. The reason why this is needed is attributed to bankruptcy 
laws. If, for example, only the lease payments from a credit tenant lease were 
underlying the transaction, then in the case of the bankruptcy of the tenant or 
the borrower, the investors would not get to their money. So, in any case there 
has to be a mortgage on the property securing the transaction, so that investors 
are hedged against hold-ups in payments due to bankruptcy. 
Type of Real Estate (Property Types) 
First of all, one has to distinguish between residential and commercial property. 
The Residential Mortgage-Backed Security market is a totally different fixed 
income market than the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security market. Within 
CMBS there is not one property type that dominates. There are 5 different 
property types that can be identified in US CMBS transactions. 
• Office  
• Retail 
• Multi-Family 
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• Hotel 
• Specialty Real Estate (Parking Facilities, Amusement Parks, Sport 
Arenas, Health Care Centres, Hospitals, etc.) 
Property Category 
From a property category standpoint, the majority of real estate that gets 
securitised in CMBS is investment property. There are a few occasions, where it 
is feasible and doable to securitise real development property, but those 
occasions are limited to Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation, where the 
contracted tenant takes over the construction and timing risk. In CMBS no 
investor would want to take that risk. The third property category is corporate 
real estate. This is property that has previously been held by the corporation but 
that has not been used for funding the ongoing operations of the company. This 
is why Corporate Property is increasingly divested in sale-leaseback activities 
and the proceeds are invested in the core business. The sale-leasebacks are 
funded through Securitisations. 
Following are a few selected examples of underlying assets identified in 
Chapter 3.4.4 that can be found as collateral for CMBS in the US. 
Football Stadiums  
Football Stadiums get securitised by the use of CMBS structures. Most of the 
times sport club owners cannot afford to build their own stadiums. So, they sell 
bonds to the public and finance it that way. The underlying asset in that 
transaction would be the mortgage loan on the stadium, but it would be backed 
by revenues and ticket sales derived from the stadium. So, the collateral is real 
estate (i.e. the building), structured into a mortgage loan.928 
Real Estate Backed Whole Company Securitisations929 
A very specific type of Real Estate Securitisation that has been developed in 
Europe has also been introduced into the US: Real Estate Backed Whole 
                                            
928 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
929 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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Company Securitisations. There the asset that gets sold in such a transaction is 
the going concern of the company, but it is backed by the real estate.  
Real Estate Infrastructure Projects930 
Even though the underlying asset in Real Estate Infrastructure Project 
Securitisations, like toll roads, power plants, water and sewer systems or 
airports, is real estate, in the US those transactions do not fall under the 
category of traditional CMBS. It falls under the category of project finance and 
this is the category under which those projects are securitised and placed. 
Project finance is frequently securitised. As in a normal CMBS, in those deals 
the issuer also takes a mortgage on the real estate (e.g. power plant) as 
collateral for the deal. However, the motivation of the deal is differently. The 
investors are really betting on the power plant’s ability to generate power, sell 
power and make money. This is a bet on the future.  
Additionally to the investors being the party to hold the first lien on the property, 
infrastructure projects have another unique attribute to them that normal 
commercial properties in CMBS do not have. The projects/properties/real estate 
are usually essential to the functioning of the community. So, there has always 
got to be someone that runs the power plant or the toll road or the airport. At the 
end of the day, even if everything goes wrong, the investors have different 
options: they can relieve the owner, take over the plant, operate it themselves, 
release it or sell it. 
There is no real difference between project finance and development finance, 
except for the fact that project financing is typically big development finance (i.e. 
big infrastructure projects), there are not really tenants involved and it falls 
under another category.  
Development Assets 
Real Estate Development Securitisation is another asset class that has been 
observed in the American Real Estate Securitisation market. In the mid 1990’s 
Nomura tried to securitise real estate development projects financings into 
                                            
930 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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CMBS, but it did not work. The reason lay in the investors’ acceptance. 
Investors did not want to take new construction and development risk, because 
they did not understand it as well as credit risk. Investors in the CMBS market 
got used to real estate, but real estate development was not feasible for them. 
Besides that the average term in a development financing lies way below 5 
years as opposed to the typical 10-year CMBS-Conduit loans.931 
Development financing is very time consuming and labour intensive. This is the 
underlying reason why investors do not want to buy it. The reasons why banks 
do it – as opposed to CMBS underwriters – is because they have whole 
departments set up to monitor the construction and to approve and fund 
construction draws. 
“You have to have somebody to check the invoices and make sure that the 
contractors are not filing a lien against the property. It is very time consuming 
and investors do not want to deal with it, they want to finance properties that are 
already operating and leased.”932 
This has led to CTL Securitisation being the only way to fund real estate 
developments. But also here the risks – as mentioned – above would have to 
be shifted to the contracted tenant.  
This is what distinguishes the US from Singapore, where Development Real 
Estate Securitisations were possible, because local investors were prepared 
and willing to take development and construction risk. This is a cultural and 
local difference between the US and Singapore. 
Future Cash Flows 
Generally, even in the mature US Securitisation market it is difficult to place the 
riskier future cash flows Asset-Backed Security transactions. 
                                            
931 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
932 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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“In the US with all the Securitisation we have done, everything that incorporates 
future risk, or future income makes it harder to place and therefore to 
securitize.” 933 
This is the main reason why future sales proceeds from property divestments or 
future lease receivables have not been securitised in ABS transactions. 
Basically, the whole spectrum of property types and property categories have 
been financed via CMBS. The asset in those transactions is always the 
principal and interest that have been engineered into a mortgage loan to be 
serviced by the cash flows derived from the underlying properties. The collateral 
securing the transaction always has to be a first lien (a mortgage) on the 
property. 
4.3.4.3 Motives 
Funding 
The prime motive in the US for CMBS is cheaper funding.934 Over time, the 
CMBS market has become so efficient, that commercial real estate developers 
or operators/investors, who are looking for some sort of financing end up with 
CMBS (as opposed to financing in the private market), because it has turned 
out to be the most price-efficient product.935 
“[In CMBS] there was definitely lower financing costs.”936 
A study that was done in 1995 came to the same conclusion that with CMBS 
execution cheaper funding is attainable. The study compared public and private 
real estate lending markets and it indicated that whole loans (private lending – 
banks/insurances) provide wider spreads than CMBS of comparable credit 
quality, i.e. CMBS provide cheaper funding than loans from private lenders.937 
                                            
933 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
934 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
935 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
936 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
937 Cf. Rubin, et al. (1996), p. 39. 
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Conduit-CMBS have proven to be the most efficient and dominant execution in 
CMBS:938 
• Conduits-CMBS offer cheaper financing on smaller loans. As a result 
CMBS have become the cheapest and most efficient funding source for 
the commercial real estate industry. 
• Conduit-CMBS are not asking for personal guarantees on loans. It is 
non-recourse financing, as compared to traditional bank financing. 
• Conduit-CMBS are offering very competitive packages that include a cap 
on legal fees, environmental reports and other third-party reports. Above 
that, while banks are charging 0.5–1.0% fees on loan originations, 
Conduits are not taking such fees. 
In general, Securitisation has turned out to be the most efficient form of 
financing in the US. So, overall CMBS has become the cheapest funding tool. 
Even though traditional lenders like banks and insurance companies still 
compete for loans, in a lot of cases Securitisation gets chosen as it offers very 
efficient execution.939 
Flexibility 
However even though efficient execution and cheap funding are the primary 
motives, over time borrowers have become aware that CMBS financing 
incorporates tough covenants and less flexibility. 
In recent times it has become more popular for borrowers to maximize 
flexibility instead of tying up an asset with long-term debt, which is locked out. 
Hence, the borrower motives for choosing Real Estate Securitisation heavily 
depend on the strategy that the borrower has for the property. The key question 
in that case is: 
                                            
938 Cf. Mishra (1998b), p. 20. 
939 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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“What type of property it is – is it a stable property with little cash flow upside in 
the near term or is it more of a transitional property with a lot of cash flow 
upside?” 940 
So, if it is a long-term owner then the thrive for flexibility is lower as if the 
borrower is short-term opportunistic investor. This will also influence the 
decision for or against CMBS financing – the more concerned a borrower is with 
flexibility, the lower probability that he is going to choose Securitisation as a 
financing alternative. Eventually, the investor will have to outweigh his funding 
gain with the loss in flexibility. Historically, in low interest rate periods, borrowers 
find long-term fixed rate debt attractive in order to lock in a low interest rate for 
a longer period of time. So, in that case the interest rate environment also 
influences the decision and long-term funding becomes also a motive.941 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratios 
To get a higher Loan-to-Value ratio than with a traditional bank financing would 
be a motive for borrowers in CMBS, but it is generally not available in traditional 
CMBS, because somebody needs to take that high LTV-risk and it is typically 
not the capital market.942 Credit tenant Lease Securitisation is the only 
transaction type that under certain circumstances allows for higher LTV 
ratios.943 
Since, the amount of debt in a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation is dependent 
on the rating of the tenant, there can be different amounts of debt on the same 
building with different tenants. In essence with the same 20-year triple-net 
lease, different levels of debt are attainable depending on the credit of the 
tenant. This leads to the following rule 
The higher the rating of the tenant, the lower the interest rate on the bond 
(i.e. the lower the discount rate for the lease cash flows), and hence, the 
higher the present value of the lease cash flows (i.e. the debt). 
                                            
940 Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
941 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
942 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
943 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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Asset-Divestment 
In the case of a corporation owning the real estate that it occupies, in most 
cases it makes sense to divest it in a Sale-Leaseback, funded through a 
Securitisation. If the company has an investment grade credit, the motive would 
be to realise the value of the real estate with the highest price possible and 
invest the money into the business or higher yielding assets. 
“Let us say that this building on the real estate value generates a cap rate of 7-
8% and let us say that Legg Mason is able to get a better return on equity than 
7-8%, because if you can, then you should extract the $90 million of excess 
value and put it into your core business – where you are probably getting 15-
20% on equity. Why own the real estate?… as long as you control it for a long 
period of time – 20-year lease with 5 ten-year options – why care?”944 
In a CTL transaction, the real estate through a sale-and-leaseback arrangement 
would be sold to a third party investor (long-term investor, who is essentially 
buying the upside of the building in 20 years). The acquisition would be funded 
through the Securitisation of the credit tenant lease in the capital markets and 
the financing proceeds would go to the corporation. Then the corporation can 
invest those funds into their core business or distribute the cash flows to the 
shareholders. 
Off-Balance Sheet Financing 
Off-Balance Sheet Financing is a strong motive only for companies engaging in 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisations, for all other transaction schemes the 
financing is on-balance sheet for the borrower under the mortgage loan. For a 
corporate tenant a well-structured lease qualifies as an operating lease and 
therefore as an off-balance sheet leases. The corporation can, hence, sell its 
real estate, get the money for it and lease it back on an operate lease, so it 
does not show up on the balance sheet. This way the company has monetized 
its asset – even though it is a structured financing.945 
Diversification of funding base 
                                            
944 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
945 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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For many retailers the motives for doing Sale-Leasebacks funded by CTL 
Securitisations, is that they can fund their ongoing expansion. So, the 
diversification of the funding base is an important motive in CTL.946 
In general, CTL transactions offer the highest use package for the borrower:947 
• Cheap Funding on the basis of a credit tenant lease. 
• Higher LTV than with traditional or CMBS Conduit financing. 
• Economic advantage in monetizing assets. Especially for retailers this 
helped fund the continued and aggressive expansion of stores. 
• Better allocation of funds.948  
• Off Balance Sheet Financing 
However, there are also Disadvantages, if the borrower is a corporation:949 
• Loss of Flexibility for the Corporation 
It's difficult for businesses to predict occupancy requirements over a 
lengthy lease term, which CTL requires. Likewise, they may not have 
contemplated extended terms into the original lease, making renewals 
potentially expensive. So, the financing takes away flexibility from the 
corporation. 
• Sacrifice of Upside Potential 
For example, a corporation that sells their real estate assets in a sale-
leaseback, which gets securitised as a CTL, gives up the future potential 
of the real estate (assuming an operating lease). Even though a bond-
lease structure provides pricing that is near the corporate cost of funds, it 
requires that most, if not all, of the debt amortizes over the term. This 
means that the new investor’s/developer's building is essentially paid for 
during the life of the lease with the lessee having little ability to take 
                                            
946 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
947 Cf. Sheridan (2000), p. 90. 
948 Instead of a 10% to 13% rate of return on their real estate, corporations can invest the 
money into their core business and try to get a 20% or greater return on their capital. 
949 Cf. Johnson (2000), p. 36. 
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advantage of the low basis because of accounting rules (assuming an
operating lease).
4.3.4.4 Transaction Schemes
Chapter 4.3.2.3 has identified 4 different transaction schemes that broadly fall
under the category of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. Those are:
1. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower CMBS
2. Large Loan CMBS
3. Conduit-CMBS
a. Conduit-CMBS
b. Conduit-Fusion
4. Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation
The reason why those different transaction schemes have evolved is that
sponsors have essentially created the right combination of mortgage loans with
the right quality of diversified cash flows for the different types of investors.950
So, investor preferences, underlying properties and mortgage loans
respectively as well as different structural variations have influenced the
evolution of those four schemes. The different schemes will be delineated and
analyzed in the following part. As Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation comes the
closest to the concept of Real Estate Securitisation introduced in chapter 3, the
most thorough analysis lies on that scheme. All other CMBS schemes are
analyzed and described in the following chapter.
4.3.4.4.1 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
This sub-chapter goes into detail on the structural features of Single Property /
Single Borrower CMBS, Large Loan CMBS, Conduit-CMBS and Conduit-Fusion
CMBS. It is therefore a gathering of all structures that are subject to the
classical CMBS setup and rating criteria. The real estate underlying the
mortgage loan and its ability to generate cash flows is the core of the CMBS
                                             
950 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554.
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concept. This is different in Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation transactions. 
The real estate plays a minor role whereas the cash flow from the lease with a 
credit tenant is the central Proposition of a CTL Securitisation. Even though 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation is usually also summarized under CMBS, 
the concept, the structuring process, the structural features, the placement and 
the trading differ from classical CMBS deals.951 
The following analysis will go into the key structural aspects of CMBS 
transactions. 
Transaction Setup 
A CMBS Securitisation transaction has three principal and two minor 
participants. The leading players are the mortgagor (borrower), the issuer 
(lender), and the securities holder (investor); the minor and operational 
participants are the collateral participants: the servicer and the trustee. The 
trustee holds the mortgage collateral ‘in trust’ and oversees the flow of funds. 
The servicer, on the other hand, receives the principal and interest payments 
from the mortgagors and passes the proceeds to a distribution account held by 
the trustee.952 
It is not unusual in these transactions for the trustee to control the distribution of 
the property's income, which is called ‘lockbox’ rent provision. This enhances 
the credit for the transaction and is favoured by rating agencies. Under such 
provisions the rental income is swept twice each month and placed under the 
control of the trustee. Then, the trustee follows a prescribed release agreement 
that includes debt service, real estate taxes, insurance reserves, replacement 
reserves, and, finally, operating expenses. Lockbox provisions can easily 
interfere with the management and maintenance of each asset in the pool.953 
Origination: 
                                            
951 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
952 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 15. 
953 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 16. 
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Banks that sponsor CMBS transactions are set up differently. There are some 
firms do the underwriting internally and some that do it externally. If a bank 
does it in-house then it needs to have experienced underwriters on-staff.954 
When a commercial bank, without a conduit vehicle engages into a ‘Large Loan’ 
transaction, the loan is usually structured and tranched into different pieces that 
are sold off separately. Hence, the lender does two things:955 
1. The lender originates the mortgage loan in a very standardised way so 
that he can sell it into the highly standardised CMBS market. 
2. The lender structures and tranches the mortgage loan, so that it can be 
placed in the market. 
Once the loan is underwritten, it gets structured and sold. In that process the 
lender sells the higher rated tranches ‘AAA’ and ‘AA’ to brokers and dealers 
“into the street”. Those people who are fixed income salesmen and only know 
little about real estate. However, they only place highest rated tranches, where 
it does not matter to the investor what the underlying asset is. After that, with 
the lower rated tranches it becomes a bit more specific, so the real estate 
lender needs to sell and support those tranches himself. This is where the 
lender’s real estate expertise comes in. He supports the sales process towards 
investors, because those security classes are more real estate driven and need 
more expertise that only the lender has.956 
In essence, there exists only one loan. The ‘AAA’ investment grade portion of 
that loan is placed out – no real estate expertise, only bond market experience 
needed. The “subordinate” portion is done by special real estate lending 
institutions (like Eurohypo957) because there real estate expertise is needed. 
So, on the lower rated side the lender works together with other investment 
banks and mixes his mortgage loan into an asset pool, where it is most efficient 
                                            
954 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
955 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
956 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
957 Eurohypo in the US, for example, is contributing mortgage collateral to other investment 
banks’ transactions. The company does not have a separate Securitisation platform in the US, 
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for the arbitrage. The arbitrage is greatest, when the most efficient sub-
ordination levels958 are achieved. Once the investment bank has bought the 
loan, it gets warehoused until the portfolio makes up a good collateral pool for a 
CMBS issuance.959 
In Conduit transactions the originators of mortgage loans are usually 
subsidiaries or contract operators for investment banks that sponsor CMBS 
Conduit transactions. There are concrete guidelines that tell the originators 
exactly what the loan should look like: Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Loan-to-
Value, Loan Size, Net Operating Income and geographical distribution. So, as 
long as the loan fits into that scenario the loan gets underwritten and it gets 
warehoused. Once there have been enough loans aggregated the sponsor sets 
up a deal. So, as compared to Europe or Asia, the loans do not get originated 
through a bank per se. The Wall Street firms and their affiliates effectively act 
as a bank, but they are effectively taking the commercial banks out of the 
loop.960 
Transaction Execution 
Generally, there are two different execution methods involved in Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation:961 
1. The issuer uses funds from a warehouse line of credit to close mortgage 
loans. Once the warehouse line is filled, he issues securities based on 
the collateral of these mortgages. Subsequently he repays his 
warehouse lines of credit from the proceeds of the issuance. This vehicle 
would then be called a Conduit962 – it is a Conduit into the capital 
markets. 
                                                                                                                                
but it co-arranges deals and originates mortgage loans of a certain size. Cf. Boeckmann 
(2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
958 This happens the higher the investment-grade portion of a transaction is, because this leads 
to a lower overall funding cost. 
959 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
960 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, p. 554. 
961 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 6. 
962 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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2. The issuer sells securities before he can actually close each commercial 
mortgage loan. Hence, this second approach involves simultaneous 
mortgage closing and securities issuance. It works best for Single 
Asset/Single Borrower transactions. However, once the security is 
collateralized by a pool of different assets made up of multiple borrowers, 
this execution method becomes a lot more difficult and effectively too 
complex to execute. 
The feasibility of the first execution method and the demand for smaller 
mortgage loans led to the rise of the Conduit-CMBS market.963 Conduit 
companies, which are usually affiliated with investment banking firms, became 
strong bidders for mortgage loans. The lending intensity rose to levels that had 
not been experienced since the mid-1980s. The development was fuelled by all 
the conduit lenders being willing to offer warehouse lines of credit that made it 
unnecessary for real estate borrowers to share the risk of securitising their 
mortgage loans.964 
As the borrowers were not sharing the Securitisation risks with the lender any 
more, this in return led to an increased risk exposure of Conduit-CMBS 
sponsors. The two main risks in CMBS transactions for Conduit firms that 
principal a loan for Securitisation are: 965 
1. Rating Agency Risk – This is the risk that the rating agencies will not give 
the firm the capital structure that it has anticipated for the portfolio, and 
hence, the potential arbitrage decreases. 
2. Interest Rate / Market Risk – This is the risk that market spreads during 
the warehouse period are widening. Hence, the sponsor is not able to 
place the loan at the conditions that he planned and that he underwrote 
the loan at. This might not only decrease the potential arbitrage to be 
made, but if interest rates really shift dramatically in a short term, it might 
incur losses for the firm. 
                                            
963 Most of the time a CMBS Conduit is not a separate entity but a department within the 
investment banking firm. 
964 Cf. Fiedler and Devoe (1995), p. 5. 
965 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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Size of Loans in Conduit-CMBS
Loans that get originated for Conduit-CMBS transactions can vary in loan size.
The classical Conduit deal by US standards incorporates 100 loans at $6 million
a piece.966 However, mortgage loans in Conduit transactions can be as small as
$1 million and as big as to $50 or 60 million, depending on the type of the deal.
Once the bank starts to mix in larger loans (up to $50 or 60 million a piece) with
typical small Conduit loans ($6 million a piece), the deal becomes a Conduit-
Fusion transaction.967 In those transactions, the number of big loans that get
mixed in is limited to five to ten large loans.968
So for illustration, a classical Conduit deal would be $600 million, i.e. 100 loans
at $6 million a piece. Then if this deal is toped up with another $300-400 million
in large loans, it becomes a Conduit-Fusion deal. The reason for the rise in
large loan components added to Conduit transactions is due to the issues of
stand-alone risk and terrorism insurance of large properties in pure large loan
transactions. Since, the Conduit market has proven to be the most stable
CMBS segment, it makes sense to add large loans to it because this then
makes large loans more marketable to investors.969
Total Deal Size
Total size can range from $600 million (typical conduit deal) to $1.5 billion with
the majority of deals being around $1billion. Transactions below $600 million
are possible, but a portfolio has to be big enough to absorb the costs of the
transaction and to provide a certain level of diversity. So, the minimum size that
a transaction must have is at least $400 million.970
                                             
966 Conduit loans are not all exactly $6 million – the size usually ranges from $4 million to $8
million, but it is smaller loans. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554.
967 Everything that is above $20 to $25 million a piece would be considered a large loan in a
Conduit-Fusion deal. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554.
968 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554.
969 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554.
970Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554.
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“It would be inefficient to place anything on the capital markets that is below 
$300-400 million.”971 
Fixed vs. Floating Debt 
In addition to the different transaction schemes within CMBS there is also the 
choice between a fixed or floating interest rate structure with the corresponding 
maturities. 
Fixed rate debt is less flexible than floating rate debt and typically has longer 
lockout periods. The advantage for the borrower, however, is that CMBS can 
provide a certain interest rate for the entire loan term for him. For fixed rate 
loans the term is usually ten years and the loans are typically locked out for 
most of the term. Borrowers, which are long-term owners, usually opt for fixed 
rate debt. Especially in low interest rate periods, borrowers find fixed rate debt 
attractive. So, in low interest rate periods the demand for fixed rate debt with 
long maturities is high.972 
The fixed rate market as it is today, is made up of Conduit and Conduit-Fusion 
transactions, where the gross of the transactions has become Conduit-Fusion 
type deals. Conduit Loans have traditionally been fixed rate 10-year balloon 
payment mortgage loans and the covenants lock up the borrowers against 
prepayment.973 However, the maturity preferences are changing, as recently the 
demand for 5-year loans has risen. Over time this will lead to a multitude of 
different maturities offered in Conduit-CMBS.974 
Floating rate debt, on the other hand, typically has shorter maturities and much 
shorter lockout periods but the interest rate can fluctuate. Floating rate loans 
typically range from 2 to 5 years with a lockout period that ranges from 1 year to 
2 years. Additionally there can be some sort of prepayment protection. So the 
                                            
971 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
972 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
973 Unlike the Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) market that is primarily concerned with 
prepayment in residential mortgage loans, due to tough covenants, prepayment is not an 
issue in CMBS. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
974 Cf. Corcoran and Phillips (2001), p. 43. 
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borrower might be locked for a year and then has a penalty that may be starting 
at 2% or 3% and is declining from there on.975 
The market for floating rate debt is much smaller than the market for fixed-rate 
debt. However, it is especially more appealing to people who want to sell their 
property in the near future or who are transitioning the property to another use 
or concept. Those borrowers want flexibility. They do not want to be locked into 
a fixed rate mortgage.976 
“This product has been very popular for borrowers who want to have maximum 
prepayment flexibility.”977 
The floating rate CMBS market is made up of floating rate Conduits.978 Floating 
rate transactions usually incorporate between 10 and 40 loans. The floating rate 
loans tend to be larger than Conduit-type mortgage loans. The properties tend 
to be less stabilized. Sometime new construction is going on and sometimes 
the properties are being renovated. As a result the owner does not have what 
the rating agencies call stabilized financial statements. The borrower is hence 
attempting to get the property through a transition period and to establish better 
financials, so that at the end of the transition period he can lock in a more 
favourable rate in the long term borrowing market.979 
The ultimate choice of the borrower really depends on his real estate strategy: 
• Is he a long or short-term holder? 
• What type of property is it?  
• Is the property going through a transition? 
• Is it a stable property with little cash flow upside in the near term or is it 
more of a transitional property with a lot of cash flow upside? 
                                            
975 Cf. Corcoran and Phillips (2001), p. 43. 
976 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
977 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
978 In this case Conduit does not stand for the classical conduit type loans but for the vehicle 
that is bringing the floating rate loans to the capital market. 
979 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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Sometimes it is even possible to have both fixed and floating rate bonds under 
one transaction.980 
Rating/SPV/Placement 
The SPVs that issue CMBS in the US usually reside on-shore. Generally, the 
entities are US entities incorporated in Delaware, the state with the most 
favourable trust laws. The vehicles all opt for the REMIC tax-exempt structure to 
avoid double taxation. The bonds that they issue are normally all rated – no 
matter if they are privately placed or publicly placed.981 
There are no options embedded in the bonds. Embedded options make 
securities inefficient and harder to place, as investors have a hard time 
predicting and pricing them. 982 
Transactions can be publicly or privately placed or may even have certain 
classes, which are public and certain classes, which are private. The ‘AAA’ 
tranches are usually publicly placed out to investors, i.e. they are listed. The 
more junior tranches (starting at ‘A’) are the ones that are privately placed and 
are more credit spread driven. If the bonds are placed in a private transaction 
then it is not a publicly registered transaction. Most private transactions fall 
under the 144A selection and are transaction that can only be place with certain 
types of investors: Qualified Institutional Buyers. In private transactions, the 
bonds primarily get traded by the banks that have arranged or co-arranged the 
deals. If the transaction had a critical mass and a lot of investors are interested 
in them, also other banks will trade the bonds as well.983 
Generally, most of the fixed rate bonds are placed in the US whereas a good 
amount of the floating rate bonds are placed on the European side, where 
floating rate debt has a different standing.984 
Special Servicers in CMBS 
                                            
980 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
981 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
982 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
983 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
984 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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One structural peculiarity of the US CMBS structures that arose out of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) structure is the special servicer in CMBS 
transactions. 
“…special servicers were born as a phoenix out of the RTC ashes – they were 
created because of the RTC, because they worked out these problem loans 
using tax payer money and buying at substantial discounts. Then they had this 
big infrastructure that they did not know what to do with once the RTC was 
gone. So between them and the rating agencies there was a special servicer 
class created.” 985 
Generally in a CMBS transaction, there is a servicer986 and a special servicer. 
So if the loan goes into default, the loan is transferred from the servicer over to 
the special servicer.987 Special Servicers in CMBS transactions work out non-
performing or sub-performing assets in the best interest of the security holders. 
Being the clean up institution in such a deal, the special servicer usually has to 
buy the first loss/equity piece in the CMBS transactions that they service. This 
way the underwriter can cope with the principal agent problem that is resident in 
such a setup – it guarantees an alignment of interest. The special servicer has 
to buy a piece of the first loss tranche, because the senior investors want to 
make sure that their special servicer has the correct incentive structure. In order 
to cope with this very special situation the special servicer also has to be a very 
specialized investors with an intensive real estate know-how. Apart from that 
the special servicing company has to have the operational capabilities and 
qualities to engage in that and it has to be willing to provide such high risk 
capital. The special servicer advance payments up to the point that is deemed 
recoverable. In practice this means that if the special servicer does not believe 
that he can get the money back anymore, he will stop advancing money and will 
start distributing losses to the lowest rated tranches.988 
                                            
985 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
986 In such transactions the servicer is also called Master Servicer. This is the insitution that 
takes care of the interest and principal payments during the course of the transaction. 
987 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
988 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
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“On a single tenant building – if it were vacant – the advances would be 
horrendous. A building of this magnitude does not stay vacant for 6 month; it 
stays vacant for 18 month until it is released. So you have down time, you have 
got to pay leasing commissions, tenant improvements and you still accrue 
interest on the loan. So if this building went empty, it wouldn’t be long for the 
special servicer to say: “Stop – no more advances” and it will start filtering 
through.”989 
So, for the lowest rated class (i.e. the equity/first loss piece) bondholders to 
make sure that the special servicer acts in their best interest, they appoint an 
operating advisor. The operating advisor can consult with and/or direct the 
special servicer in certain cases. However, basically the special servicer 
recommends a course of action, which can be work out, forbearance or 
foreclosure.990 
Overall, in US CMBS transactions the defaults have been quite low, so that the 
CMBS structure and the real capabilities of special servicers have never been 
tested. A CMBS Conduit has never seen a Securitisation “go belly up” before. 
So the true value and the true work out capacity in times of foreclosure crisis is 
still to be proven.991 
Diversification – Core Concept of CMBS992 
The reason for the pricing efficiency in CMBS results out of diversification. 
Banks do not have that. With CMBS, the underwriter puts one mortgage into a 
pool of mortgages and this gives the transaction diversification benefits that 
create ultimately the arbitrage opportunity for the investment banker, who is 
putting together the right combinations and the right pools of collateral. This is a 
very active process that has to be convex with the rating agencies. The way 
that diversification benefits create pricing efficiency is by turning a ‘BB’+ loan 
into a ‘AAA’ tranche, a ‘AA’ tranche, a ‘BBB’ tranche – with subordination levels 
that are ever decreasing. That is really the arbitrage that has been created. This 
                                            
989 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
990 Cf. Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
991 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
992 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
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is the reason why the market has become very efficient. The more mortgages 
are put into a pool, the higher the ‘AAA’ tranche gets, due to diversification 
effects. 
Concluding this sub-chapter, it becomes evident that the CMBS structures have 
matured and that the market – especially the Conduit-CMBS and Conduit-
Fusion segment – has become a very standardized and pricing efficient market. 
The pricing difference in Large Loan, Conduit-CMBS and Conduit-Fusion 
transactions compared to traditional bank financing primarily results out of the 
diversification effect. All deal components and structural features are pre-
defined and homogenous: underwriting criteria (DSCR and LTV ratios), loan 
sizes, maturities, interest rate (fixed for long-term and floating for short-term), 
balloon payments, lock-up covenants, work out capabilities in case of non-
performing assets (special servicer), property types and geographic 
diversification.993 
4.3.4.4.2 Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
The Securitisation of future lease payments resulting out of a Credit Tenant 
Leases is called Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. This incorporates a single 
investment grade credit tenant lease that gets sold and funded through a 
Securitisation of the pre-defined lease payments over a certain period.994 
As mentioned in chapter 4.3.2.3, there are three types of Credit Tenant 
Securitisation transactions, depending on who the borrower is and what the 
purpose of the transaction is:995 
1. Sale-Leaseback: The Borrower under this CTL type is a Corporation 
that has an investment grade rating, that wants to monetize its real 
estate assets and that seeks funding through a corporate Sale-
Leaseback deal. The company sells all the real estate to a special 
purpose vehicle and then leases it back. The underwriter then will create 
a loans backed by a mortgage against the property and sell it to an 
                                            
993 Cf. Gichon (1999), p. 6. 
994 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
995 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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issuing SPV.996 The vehicle engaging into the transaction is funding the 
acquisition through the issuance of Credit Tenant Lease paper. 
2. Built-to-Suite: The Borrower under this CTL structure is a Developer 
that is constructing a built-to-suite property for an investment grade 
tenant. The Securitisation of future lease payments from the underlying 
credit tenant lease represents the construction funding for the built-to-
suite construction. 
3. Outright Acquisition: The Borrower in this case is a third-party investor 
who is buying another investor’s investment property, which is leased to 
a single investment grade tenant. The third-party investor’s acquisition is 
funded by the issuance of Credit Tenant Lease Securities backed by the 
credit tenant lease on the building. 
As CMBS is becoming very commoditized the quest for greater loan origination 
volume is driving some capital markets oriented lenders to push beyond 
Conduit-CMBS into the very specialized credit tenant lease market. Credit 
tenant loans differ from typical Conduit loans in that CTL loans are complex and 
technically demanding. They are characterized by high Loan-to-Value and low 
Debt Service Coverage Ratios. The underlying mortgage loan is structured in 
such a way that the interest and principal on the loan exactly match the lease 
cash flow of the underlying property over the term of the transaction. Hence, 
this means that over the course of the transaction the debt on the property is 
fully amortized by the credit tenant lease and the owner of the property owns 
the property outright.997 
Due to the high leverage and intensive reliance on the tenant’s ability to pay, 
the underwriting and structuring of such securities require a high expertise that 
is different from making typical CMBS loans: 
“The bottom line is CTL financing is a highly technical specialty business, which 
does not easily lend itself to a commodity financing mentality.”998 
                                            
996 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
997 Cf. Pollert (1998), p. 96. 
998 Pollert (1998), p. 96. 
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This type of high leverage lending depends on the credit tenant's rent stream. It 
is the lease cash flow that repays the underlying mortgage loan. The certainty 
of the credit tenant rent stream is protected by the lender providing lease 
enhancements to mitigate the risk that the tenant will interrupt rent as a result of 
a real estate-driven event, such as a casualty or condemnation of the property, 
or the failure of the landlord to satisfy its obligations under the lease.999 
"These loans have to be very carefully underwritten as they are characterized 
by low-debt service coverage and they are dependent upon the quality of the 
lease from the credit tenant. While there is room in the marketplace for several 
competitors to do well, it is not a place where the big conduits or other people 
who are not devoted to this particular market are going to do well."1000 
As in the previous chapter with CMBS, the following analysis will go into the key 
structural aspects of CTL transactions. 
Structural Peculiarities - Valuation 
The financing situation in a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation is somewhat 
unique for real estate financing. This can be demonstrated by the following 
example:1001 
A property, which has a credit tenant lease on it, is appraised at $ 3 
million. However, the present value of all lease cash flows derived from 
the credit tenant over the next 20 years is worth $ 5 million.1002 If this 
financing was structured as a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation, the 
financing would set the loan at 140% Loan-to-Value. Comparing this to a 
traditional CMBS financing, at the highest possible LTV, which lies at 
80% LTV for Conduit loans, the borrower would only get a loan that is 
equal to $2.4 million.  
                                            
999 Cf. Pollert (1998), p. 96. 
1000  Paul McDowell, Senior Vice President, Capital Lease Funding. Cf. Bergsman (1998), p. 46. 
1001 Cf. Wolberg (2003), Interview 8, pp. 554. 
1002 The total sum equals the present value of all lease cash flows over the next 20 years 
discounted at the investment grade company’s bond yield plus a premium of another 50-100 
basis points for illiquidity and risk. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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Therefore the fundamental difference in those two cases is the approach to 
valuation. The question is are you valuing the property as a real property 
investment or as the value of future lease payments:1003 
• In the CTL case the financier is looking to the credit tenant and his ability 
to pay the future lease payments first and then in the next step he is 
looking at the underlying real estate and the value that this real estate 
would have under a worst-case scenario. 
• In the case of a CMBS financing, the lender would look at the real estate 
first, and then at the tenants renting the real estate. In the first step the 
tenants are not that important, especially if they are on short leases. So, 
what the lender really looks at is the real property value. In a second 
step, the Conduit lender examines the fit of the loan within the portfolio of 
another 100 mortgage loans on multiple properties. 
In essence, in the case of a CTL the credit enhancement of the transaction 
derives out of the investment grade rating of the tenant and his commitment to 
pay, whereas in a typical CMBS transaction the credit enhancement results out 
of the diversification within the pool of mortgage loans. 
Additionally to the lower DSCR and LTV ratios that traditional financings incur, 
there is also a valuation difference between the cash flow valuation of a lease 
and the valuation of the building underlying a standard CMBS loan. If, for 
example, there is a 20-year credit tenant lease on the property, then the value 
of the pre-defined cash flows might differ from the appraised value. The 
reasons are twofold:1004 
1. The value of the property subject to the lease is different from the market 
valuation/appraisal of the property. So, if the credit tenant for example 
signs a lease of $40 a square foot, but the market rate is at $20, the 
appraisal will assume that the building is rented at $20. The lender in a 
CTL financing can assume it is $40. Since, this value differs from the 
                                            
1003 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554. 
1004 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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appraised value and since it is based on the lease, it is called the “lease 
fee value” – the value of the property subject to the lease. 
2. The discount rate used in traditional valuations is different from the 
discount rate used in CTL valuations. Traditional appraisals do not 
account for the quality of the tenant in the building, as does the lease fee 
valuation. 
Underwriting of CTL1005 
When underwriting a CTL security there are two different valuations that are 
done.1006 The first one is a valuation of the lease and the second one is a “go 
dark” – worst case scenario valuation. 
1. What is the value of the building with the credit tenant in it for 20 years?  
The value of the building subject to the lease is determined by the net 
cash flows over the term and the adequate discount rate. Once, the 
lender has come to the adequate discount rate1007, he takes all the net 
cash flows and discounts them to the present value, which then equals 
the value of the building.1008  
2. If the credit tenant goes out of business tomorrow, what is the value of 
the building? 
The “go dark value” of the property is a value that is based on worst-case 
scenario. It assumes the value of the building without a tenant in it. In this 
case the valuation incorporates downtime, leasing commissions, tenant 
improvements and everything else that the investor needs to consider 
when trying to get the property leased again. The “go dark values” are 
usually forced down to be very low and come out at 40-60 cents on the 
dollar, i.e. this represents 40-60% of the value of the total financing – the 
                                            
1005 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1006 The normal appraisals that are made for traditional real estate focused lending are 
worthless in the case of CTL financing. 
1007 The discount rate is derived from the capital markets. If the investment grade tenant has 
public debt in the market place, the lender can take the yields that the corporate bonds trade 
at and add a premium for illiquidity and other risks to them. The premium usually ranges 
anywhere between 25 bp and 100 bp. Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1008 Cf. Boeckmann (2003), Interview 15, p. 554; Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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total value of the issued CTL paper. Hence, this value represents the 
stop-loss/downside risk hedge for the investments.1009 
In a nutshell, the Credit Tenant Security is much like a corporate bond with a 
downside risk hedge. The downside risk is hedged by the value of the property, 
which means that in the worst case, when the credit tenant is not able to pay 
the lease anymore and the owner of the property does not jump in and wraps 
up the transaction, the investors will always have the possibility to foreclose on 
the property. In that case, the investor will receive the value that this property 
has on the market as it “goes dark”.  
“When K-Mart went down 6 years ago the Corporate Bonds traded down to 
nothing, but its Credit Tenant Lease paper traded down to the value of the 
property.”1010 
Additionally to the downside risk hedge, investors get a higher return on those 
securities than they would get on equivalent corporate bonds of the same credit 
tenant. Hence, it can be a much safer investment for investors.1011 
Beyond the benefits of private CTL bonds, there are also some disadvantages 
that public corporate bonds do not have. First CTL bonds only get traded by the 
banks that have underwritten the securities, and the issuances are rather small 
compared to public corporate bonds. Hence, this results in illiquidity. Secondly, 
public bonds can have covenants in the borrowing documents that restrict the 
total amount of debt that the corporate can take on. CTL bonds do not have 
such covenants. Those two caveats are also the reason why CTL bonds trade 
at a higher yield than plain vanilla corporate bonds of the same company. 1012 
There are certain structural features that credit tenant lease Securitisation deals 
have to fulfil in order to be advantageous for the tenant, the borrower and the 
investors.  
Bankruptcy Remoteness 
                                            
1009 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1010 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1011 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1012 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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In the US, in most states a lender has to secure his interest in a property (i.e. 
the credit tenant’s cash flow) by a lien on the property. Therefore, the lender in 
a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation will always require a mortgage on the 
property as well as an absolute assignment of the leases – the rents, in order to 
perfect the claim to the property cash flow.1013 
So, in order for the credit tenant lease to be turned into a security and be placed 
in the capital markets, it has to be structured into a credit tenant loan that is 
collateralized by a first lien on the property – this puts the CTL investors in the 
front of the chain of creditors, in the case of a bankruptcy of the borrower. As 
US bankruptcy laws are so bad this is imparative:1014  
“I mean, here I am – I have given you a $110 million, you have absolutely 
nothing to do with the property. First year of the deal it happens that the tenant 
files bankruptcy – and the owner can delay me for 2 years with the claim 
against equity – not for 20 years, as there is no equity in the deal. But the owner 
can hold me up, that is ridiculous.” 1015 
This is the reason why the structure needs to be set up as bankruptcy remote 
entity and the property needs to be in the bankruptcy remote entity. The entity is 
the borrower in this transaction. It can own no other assets; it can perform no 
other trade, except the ones associated with this building. It can incur no other 
debt. And depending on the size of the financing, it would need to have an 
independent director.1016 
In addition, the issuing SPV there needs to hold a mortgage against the 
underlying property. This SPV is usually a pass-through trust governed by a 
trustee. The trustee in most cases is a bank and banks do not go bankrupt. 
In some cases, when the property is of outstanding quality in a non-duplicable 
location, then it is even possible to get a rating that is above the credit tenants 
                                            
1013 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1014 Cf. Homer (2002b), p. 14. 
1015 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1016 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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rating.1017 So, by combining the credit tenant cash flow with a first lien on a 
high-grade property a higher LTV on the deal would be achievable. 
Deal Size of CTL 
Deal sizes in Credit Tenant Lease Securitisations range from $5 million to $1 
billion, depending on the size of the property or the number of properties that 
are leased out to one tenant. The average deal size, however, is around $25 
million. So, small deals sometimes can be placed with one investor, whereas 
larger deals can be done with a multitude of investors. In order to diversify their 
CTL securities portfolio, a lot of investors always want to participate with small 
amounts ($5 million) in every deal.1018 
Lease Structure 
Leases in CTL Transactions have to be arms-length operating leases in order to 
qualify for off-balance sheet treatment. For this to happen, the following 
conditions have to apply to the CTL transaction:1019 
• No covenants. 
• No debt guarantees. 
• No downgrade triggers. 
• No residual value guarantees. 
• No equity role by the tenant. 
In order for credit tenant leases to be securitisable, they have to be bondable 
leases. If they are not then there are mechanisms that turn triple-net and 
double-net leases into bondable leases by eliminating the tenant's termination 
and rent abatement rights, or at least protecting the investor from such an 
occurrence. The sense for doing this is that investors only want to worry about 
the credit of the investment grade tenant, and not about terms of the lease.1020 
                                            
1017 Cf. Homer (2002b), p. 14. 
1018 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1019 Cf. Homer (2002e), p. 17. 
1020 Cf. Richards (1999), p. 10. 
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The lease structure enhancements included specialized, non-cancellable 
insurance policies to cover the risk of tenant termination or rent abatement, or 
the establishment of adequate reserves to cover landlord responsibilities such 
as structural repair and parking issues – items that could trigger the termination 
or rent-abatement provisions in a lease. All in all, on the lease structure side 
there exists a number of "hot-button" lease provisions that should be avoided in 
order to be able to use the lease in a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. Some 
of these provisions include:1021  
• termination clauses tied to another tenant; 
• environmental clauses;  
• off-site/use exclusivity restrictions;  
• substitution of like property;  
• and highway construction/obstruction access. 
Security Structure 
As in traditional CMBS transactions, in CTL deals there has to be a mortgage 
underlying the transaction for bankruptcy remoteness reasons. The cash flows 
from the credit tenant lease have to be structured into interest and principal of a 
credit tenant loan that is secured by a mortgage over the borrower’s property. 
The reason can be demonstrated by a small example:1022 
Supposing there is a Real Estate Asset-Backed Securitisation backed by 
the rental cash flows of an investment grade corporation. If that 
corporation gets into trouble the status of a rental cash flow by this 
formerly credit worthy large corporation is nothing more than an 
unsecured promise to pay. Unsecured means that the investor would be 
the last person in line in case of bankruptcy.  
                                            
1021 Cf. Richards (1999), p. 10. 
1022 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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“The fact that it has the words real estate sprinkled on it means nothing 
in terms of where you stand if you have to stand in front of a bankruptcy 
judge.” 1023 
So, there needs to be a mortgage that backs this deal, no matter how credit 
worthy the tenant is. There is no way that an underwriter can just securitize a 
credit tenant’s cash flows without having a mortgage over the borrower’s 
property. 
Legal Structuring in CTL 
The single property, standard CTL deals do not involve a lot of legal structuring. 
Once, the documentation has been built up for one deal, it can be replicated for 
other deals. This way the sponsors do not have to consult expensive law firms 
for every deal. Most sponsors prefer inexpensive local law firms to expensive 
international firms, as CTL financing traditionally is a local game.1024 
“Our attorneys – we use only two sets of councils, because there is consistency 
of how we approach it. I do not want a $100,000 legal bill from New York and 
nor do I want 27 law firms calling me every 10 minutes, saying: “What do you 
really want to do here?” In my law firms there may be 8 lawyers who work on 
our account – they know exactly what we will say on any situation. We get 
through it rather quickly.”1025 
When the loans are made, they are put into private pass-through securities, 
which are not rated and placed privately with major insurance companies 
primarily in the US and the UK.1026 
Structuring of CTL – Term Sheet Documents for the Borrower 
As CTL is a small niche, high return business, the whole structuring is done in-
house. The transaction workflow is as follows:1027 
1. The deal request comes in. 
                                            
1023 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
1024 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1025 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1026 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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2. A relative value analysis is done.  
3. The lender concludes if the deal is favourable for both sides. 
4. The borrower needs to send a copy of the lease. 
5. The due diligence, the appraisal, and the environmental review are 
done.1028 
6. The borrower will receive a 27-page term sheet, including everything that 
the borrower needs to know: conditions, timing, costs. The loan 
documents are usually not negotiated. 
7. If the borrower agrees to the loan contract, the lender will lock up the rate 
and schedule the closing. 
The closing times of a deal can range from within one week to 14 months, if it is 
really complex. Because the deal structure is standardized and the rating of the 
CTL bonds is only dependent on the rating of the credit tenant, once the vehicle 
is set up, the firm can ride the synergies and replicate the deals. This leads to a 
very fast execution, which is another advantage of CTL financing over CMBS 
financing.1029 
Deal Documentation – Offering Circular to Investors1030 
The deal documentation includes all the things that the security buyers would 
want to know. So the investor document, which is often called the offering 
circular, typically takes the same form in every deal:  
1. Overview of the transaction 
a. Where it is offered.  
b. The offering amount. 
c. The collateral. 
d.  The average life. 
                                                                                                                                
1027 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1028 Most of the firms have an extensive due diligence handbook. The gross of the analysis is 
done in-house, but sometimes outside consultant are required to review the reports. 
1029 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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2. Ratings Analysis 
3. Structure Analysis 
a. How the transaction is sold. 
b. Who the guarantor is.  
4. Narrative description of the transaction (the defined terms spelled out) 
a. Where the security comes from. 
b. What the rates are. 
c. The reference to the NAIC guidelines (Schedule and Rating). 
d. Borrower information. 
e. How the cash flows go from the tenants directly to cover the debt.  
f. Right that the tenant has.  
5. Exhibits – This is how CTL documentation distinguishes itself from 
CMBS documentation. An investor wouldn’t usually get to this 
information unless he is B-piece buyer. 
a. Information about anybody providing credit support to the 
transactions. 
b.  Rating’s analysis. 
c. Copies of the lease. 
d. Appraisals and Valuation. 
e. The loan documents.  
f. The environmental reports. 
So with this comprehensive information, investors know what the deficiency of 
the deal might be and what the mitigation factors and what the problems are in 
the transaction. 
Placement of CTL 
                                                                                                                                
1030 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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Typically CTL Securitisations are sold privately, i.e. they are not listed 
securities. If they were placed publicly, the underwriter would register them with 
the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) and then sell it as debt in the capital 
markets. However, public placements are very hazardous and are not worth the 
time and effort, as all the CTL bonds are usually held by big institutions and 
there is no real trading market. 1031 
For private placements, there are two broad exemptions to public securities 
registration:1032 
1. The first one is Rate D. Rate D under the securities act is a particular 
group of investors – sophisticated, knowledgeable and even individuals, 
if they have particular net worth. It is for small private placements. 
2. The second one is 144 A. Investors under the Rule 144-A, are called 
Qualified Institutional Buyers (QUIBs). They need to have $100 million of 
discretionary income for investment in private securities – excluding 
treasuries and government obligations. Most of the investment bank 
clients meet that test. So, this rule is for larger private placements. 
Most CTL Securities are placed under the 144-A exemption. The offering 
document underlying the transaction is also called ‘144-A’. There are certain 
registration rights for a particular period of time and after that the issuer can 
register the paper as a public security. In most CTL deals sponsor do not give 
investors those rights, because they want to do the trading in those deals. 
Once, the security is a registered 144-A security, it gets quoted and every other 
firm could trade the bonds. 1033 
The market is a very inefficient and private market, which allows for great fee 
income to be made. Issuers want to keep their offering documents confidential, 
so that no other bank can copy them:  
“…so I keep it close to home. I want to trade – I do not want Lehman or 
Salomon to trade it and see the documents. Now, what we have found out 
                                            
1031 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
1032 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1033 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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though, because investors like our product, Lehman will trade our stuff without 
seeing the document. They bid it and sell it.” 1034 
Above that, the CTL department that has underwritten the deal usually also 
trades the CTL paper because the people know the documents. They will do 
the pricing, sell CTL securities and confirm trades. The securities are not traded 
through wire (there is no electronic clearing) – the securities are actually 
delivered to somebody, which makes the process very cumbersome.1035 
Structural feature for Built-to-Suite CTL 
Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation is a good instrument for financing new real 
estate construction. However, as construction is very risky there has to be a 
credit tenant lease already signed and structured in a certain way, before 
financing is committed.  
But, even if there is a credit tenant lease on it, investors still want to have the 
security that they can fall back to the real estate, in case of the tenants or 
developers bankruptcy. In this case to be sure that construction will be finished 
on-time and that lease cash flows will start to come in on a certain date, the 
lease has to start at a certain date. So, even if the building is not built the tenant 
has to start paying by a certain date. If the investment grade tenant agrees to 
that, the structure implicitly obtains a construction completion guarantee from 
the investment grade tenant. In essence, if the building does not get built on 
time, the tenant has to take over from the developer. And then, if the tenant 
cannot get it done by a certain date, the loan document requires the credit 
tenant to pay the loan back to investors at 105-110% of our original loan 
amount (for the investors’ opportunity costs).1036 
One vs. Multiple Tenants 
In nearly all cases, Credit Tenant Lease Securitisations, solely incorporate one 
lease on one building with one investment grade rated tenant in it. In the case 
                                            
1034 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1035 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1036 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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of one building that has more than one credit tenant lease on it, it gets very 
difficult to finance that building through a CTL structure.1037 
Theoretically, it might be possible to structure multi-tenant CTL Securitisation. 
Assuming that the borrower has ten credit-worthy entities in one building – 
which is very unusual – then on paper the argument could be made that it is 
possible to value each floor space separately by the credit of that tenant. The 
underwriter could ascribe a rate of interest to each credit tenant and take the 
income from the lease each year, discount it and get the present value. Then he 
would sum up all the different present values of each floor and this figure would 
be equal to the value of the building subject to the multiple credit tenant 
leases.1038 
Even though this could theoretically be figured out, it nevertheless is not 
placeable with investors. Especially insurance investors that are the primary 
buyers of CTL bonds – under the NAIC guidelines – are not allowed to buy 
multi-tenant credit tenant loans that are scheduled as a Schedule D. So, if there 
are no investors, it does not matter if it is theoretically doable or not, because 
practically it is not placeable and rating agencies will not consider it as credit 
tenant loan but as a real estate loan.1039 
Another reason apart from the insurance regulation is that investors usually 
want to look to one credit in a CTL transaction not to multiple credits. So, if 
there is a multi-tenant buildings, even if all of the tenants are investment grade 
rated, it is virtually impossible to place it with investors in the US. The reason 
lies in the structure: 
“Because let us say that you had 10 very strong investment credits in this 
building and two of them go bankrupt – can happen – you do not have enough 
cash flow to support the debt, but you cannot foreclose on the property and you 
                                            
1037 There have been cases, where investment banks have arranged this.Cf. Jacobs (2003), 
Interview 19, p. 554. 
1038 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1039 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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cannot tell all the other tenants to leave – to sell the building – because they are 
paying their rent as agreed.” 1040 
Even though the SPV, which is holding the portfolio of credit tenant leases, has 
the right to release the space this potential hazard makes the transaction too 
complex to be feasible. Assuming that the space can be re-rented at the right 
market rents, two other things will happen to the transaction:1041  
1. With the bankruptcy of one tenant, there is a breach in the credit tenant 
loan contract and since there is no longer a credit tenant loan, it is no 
longer a CTL bond. Hence, it becomes a real estate loan. As a result the 
insurance investors’ risk adjusted reserves “go through the roof”.  
2. Investors are not in the real estate business, and the lender that has 
structured the credit tenant loan is in the corporate loan business and not 
in real estate.  
“I do not know anything about real estate. Many of my investors never 
see the real estate – they bought a Legg Mason leaseback deal NAIC-1, 
scheduled D to be a corporate bond. Even if it is real estate underlying it 
– and god forbid if they ever have to foreclose it, they have got to hire 
somebody to come in and tell them what to do. They have no idea what 
to do.” 1042 
So, a multitude of credit tenants in one deal adds another layer of complexity to 
the transaction that is not desired by investors. 
This does not necessarily mean that Multi-Tenant buildings do not get financed 
well, but not as a Credit Tenant Lease Financing with a high Loan-to-Value 
(LTV). Opposed to a 100% LTV in the case of a building with one good credit 
tenant, in a multi-tenant transaction there will only be a maximum of 80% LTV 
achievable. So, even if the borrower has a portfolio of really good credit tenants, 
                                            
1040 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1041 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
1042 Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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the deal does not get financed with more than 80% LTV. Moreover, it is more 
expensive.1043 
Multi-tenant transactions can get structured, but not as a CTL and it is more 
expensive to place those. The reason lies in the structure:1044  
1. If there is a bond-like credit lease on a building, the tenant has to pay or 
he goes bankrupt – there is no other possibility. That is the credit risk 
that investors take and lenders underwrite this credit risk. So, from the 
investor’s standpoint it is looked upon as a secured corporate debt, 
secured by the real estate.  
2. If there is a multitude of good credit tenants, but more than one credit 
lease on the building then there is a fluctuation risk. It might be good 
from a diversification standpoint to have a property leased to numerous 
good credit tenants but the tenants could leave anytime, when the lease 
is up or they can go bankrupt. This, to investors, is a much higher risk 
than the risk of just one credit tenant. 
All in all, underwriters and investors would categorize multi-tenant transactions 
as CMBS deals. Unless there is only a single credit tenant with a good quality 
lease, investors and underwriters cannot look past the real estate to the credit 
of the tenants. As a result the transaction gets more expensive, as CMBS 
prices are always wider than Corporate bonds and CTL securities.1045 
Hypothetical Example Case for a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation:1046 
The building for this example case is located in downtown Baltimore and is 
currently leased out to “EBS” Corporation. The acquisition of the building was 
financed on a credit lease basis. 
The building is leased on a 20-year basis to EBS Corporation and EBS is a ‘A3’ 
credit. So, it is a healthy investment grade company with a positive outlook. The 
real estate is appraised at $10 million. The lease that EBS Corporation agrees 
                                            
1043 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
1044 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
1045 Cf. Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
1046 Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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to pay is either gross or net. If it is a gross lease, where the landlord has to pay 
the expenses, the expenses get deducted and inflated, so that over a 20-year 
timeframe there is a consistent cash flow that can be taken as the basis for the 
transaction cash flow. If it is a net lease – as it is most of the time – the tenant 
will pay all of the operating expenses and the NOI can be taken as the basis for 
the transaction cash flow.  
In the next step these net cash flows are taken and discounted at a ‘A’ 
corporate bond rate plus the spread for risk and the lack of liquidity. The 
present value of those 20-year cash flows at a rate which is representative of 
the credit risk of the tenant – in this case EBS Corporation – is $15 million. This 
is the amount of the credit tenant loan that the lender commits to the acquisition 
of the building. 
The lender funds the credit tenant loan by putting it into a private CTL Security. 
This is done by setting up a special purpose vehicle that acquires the credit 
tenant loan and funds itself by issuing bonds backed by the credit tenant lease 
on the building. The transaction does not need to be rated, as EBS Corporation 
is already rated. The securities get privately placed with insurance companies in 
the US that by the NAIC guidelines are allowed to invest into investment grade 
credit tenant loans and securities thereof. The transaction gets scheduled as 
Schedule D, which is a corporate bond. The risk weighting for the insurance 
company is lower than what it would be for a traditional mortgage loan. So, for 
the insurance company’s purposes, the security is a corporate bond, but for 
EBS Corporation’s purposes, the lease is an operate lease, i.e. an off-balance 
sheet lease – it is not a capital/finance lease. So, EBS Corporation sees it as 
being off-balance sheet, which means that it is not a liability in the company’s 
balance sheet, whereas the insurance company investors classify it as 
investment grade corporate debt. Hence, the corporation views it one way and 
the regulators look at it another way. This is what it makes it attractive for both 
sides. 
So, in conclusion the property owner that acquired the building with a credit 
tenant lease on it will get a credit tenant loan from the lender of $15 million, 
whereas the appraised value of the property is $10 million. The inclination of the 
lender to engage in this financing lies in the fact that he can place it with invest 
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ors that do not care about the appraised value of the property. This results out 
of the insurance investors not betting on the building and its value, but on EBS 
Corporation being solvent and being able to pay the rent each month.  
At closing, the real estate owner will receive $15 million from the lender. For the 
term of the lease the owner, who acquired the building will not receive any 
payment from EBS Corporation for bankruptcy reasons; the payments go 
directly into the Special Purpose Vehicle that has funded the credit tenant loan 
by issuing securities at the capital market. The SPV is then directly pays out 
interest and principal to the investors each month. At the end of the term the 
buyer owns the building outright – all debt has been amortized by the credit 
lease. 
4.3.5 Analysis 
“Securitisation is probably the biggest single change affecting our financial 
landscape during the past sixty years, since the Great Depression. The 
implications for this linking of the creators of debt and the global capital markets 
has monumental implications for banks, thrifts, and insurance companies. It 
broadens greatly the investment options available to institutional investors and 
will change how they buy, monitor and price the assets in portfolios.”1047 
In the following the results of the previous analysis in this chapter will be 
summarized, starting with a short description of the first 5 (landmark) 
transactions and the general evolution of the market. 
Real estate was one of the last major asset classes to go public. The impact of 
the public capital markets on commercial real estate debt (especially in the 
1990s) has transformed both property markets and real estate capital 
markets.1048 The evolution of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities resulted 
out of the functioning Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities market, that 
started in 1966. The RMBS market was heavily supported by the government 
through its government-sponsored entities: Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and 
Freddy Mac. The entities were insuring and guaranteeing interest and principal 
                                            
1047 Fink (2000), p. 126. 
1048 Cf. Katz (1997), p. 18. 
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in RMBS transactions. This led to a development of investor demand that 
favoured the inception of CMBS. The CMBS market got started in 1984 and 
evolved out of 5 landmark transactions: 
1. The Olympia & York transaction in early 1984 arranged by Salomon 
Brothers was the first CMBS transaction. It was a $970 million, 15- year, 
unrated Single Borrower transaction that involved 3 underlying assets 
that were pledged by a blanket mortgage. Since there was no market in 
place, Salomon took the risk to develop a market around this issue. If it 
had not been for that the market would have started as soon as 1984. 
2. The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. transaction in December 1984, 
which was also arranged by Salomon Brothers. The deal was a landmark 
transaction because it involved a CMO structure. It was the first CMO 
structured to be secured by commercial (income producing) properties. 
3. The American Express Securitisation arranged in May 1985 essentially 
became the first Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. As all the 
predecessors deals this deal was also arranged by Salomon Brothers, 
but it was the first deal to get a rating by Standard & Poor’s. American 
Express thereby financed its 2.3 million square-foot new world 
headquarter at the World Financial Center. The $500 million finance of a 
property that was not fully constructed, yet, posed big problems. 
Salomon came up with a new structure that was similar to a CMO 
structure. The structure was linked to the credit of the credit tenant: 
American Express. 
4. The next logical step in CMBS was multi-tenant stand-alone deals. 
Olympia & York Maiden Lane Finance Corporation was the first multi-
tenant CMBS. The $200 million ‘AA’ rated 10-year bond issuance was 
backed by one property (59 Maiden Lane) and had three major tenants 
whose leases expired well after the maturity of the bonds. 
5. The last landmark deal in this development was Fisher Brothers 
Financial Realty Company. The rated $160 million bond issuance was 
the first transaction involving a building with a diversified number of 
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tenants (25 tenants). The leases had varying maturities and expired 
before and after the maturity of the bonds. 
Even though all those transactions were Single-Borrower transactions, they set 
the standards for future multi-borrower transactions (Large Loan, Conduit-
CMBS, Conduit-Fusion). 
The removal of the Regulation Q in 1980 and the following deregulation of the 
Savings & Loans industry led to a strong crisis in real estate lending in the mid-
1980’s and it nearly brought down the whole financial system. The Financial 
Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 instituted 
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that – by selling off all non-performing 
mortgage asset in Securitisation transactions – opened the CMBS market. The 
RTC showed that commercial mortgage Securitisation was even possible with 
non-performing assets, and so investment banks started to create vehicles that 
did the same thing with performing real estate assets. The actions of the RTC 
paved the way for the issuance of securities backed solely by commercial 
mortgages, just as Ginnie Mae introduced residential mortgage securities to the 
capital markets. 
Additionally, the credit crunch in the early 1990’s created a need for long-term 
real estate financing, which created arbitrage potential for Investment banks. 
The arbitrage resulted out of the willingness of the public market to pay 
significantly more for the bond cash flows than the crunch-afflicted private 
lending market. So, this was the inception of a new market segment and the 
start of the modern CMBS market, as it is known today. 
As opposed to the pre-RTC era, where most of the CMBS deals were Single 
Property/Single Borrower transactions, the majority of deals done in the past-
RTC era were Large Loan CMBS and later Conduit- (small loans) and Conduit-
Fusion (mixed small and large loans) CMBS transactions. As opposed to the 
conventional CMBS transactions, Credit Tenant Lease Securitisations have 
been a small niche and are likely to stay that way. The biggest transaction 
scheme today has become Conduit-CMBS. The success of the CMBS-Conduits 
came about because they filled a void for longer term, fixed-rate, and non-
recourse mortgage loans for smaller borrowers that was left over by the failed 
Thrift industry. 
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Despite the abundance of capital that the CMBS market has created, 
underwriting standards have always remained high. With that Wall Street has 
done a better job disciplining the real estate lending market than the banks had 
done in the 1980’s 
Apart from the traditional real estate lending sources (banks, insurance 
companies & pension funds), today, there exist three structures in the capital 
markets that allow real estate owners, developers, operators and investors to 
raise capital (debt and equity): 
1. The Real Estate Investment Trust structure (REIT) – equity structure 
2. The Mortgage-Backed Security structure (including all CMBS schemes 
except for CTL) – debt structure 
3. The Lease Securitisation structure (CTL) – debt structure1049 
The capital market basically has disintermediated the traditional private lenders 
and created new financing alternatives for all kinds of real estate investors, 
operators and developers. As a result, CMBS has become the fastest and 
easiest way of raising capital for real estate. 
The overall Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market has run through all 4 stages 
of the Securitisation market evolution model and is today characterised by a 
high degree of standardisation. CMBS bonds have become a commodity in real 
estate financing and fixed income investing. 
Who was involved? 
• The Government sponsored entities – Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and 
Freddy Mac for starting up the secondary mortgage market and the 
adjacent RMBS market. 
• Rating Agencies were strongly involved in the evolution of the market. 
Standard & Poor’s as the first rating agency to set up a credit rating 
system and issue CMBS criteria was the innovator in that field. 
                                            
1049 As CTL Securitisation, like all other transaction schemes in the US are mortgage related, 
they all fall under the category of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
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• Salomon Brothers and Nomura as the innovators in Single 
Borrower/Single Asset (Salomon) and Large Loan transactions 
(Nomura). Wall Street Investment Banks in general played an important 
role in the intermediation of real estate credit. They have been a 
catalysts for the shift from credit to capital markets 
• The government through its regulatory agencies have instituted the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) through the FIRREA Act. 
• Big Developers, like O&Y, and big corporations, like Amexco that took 
the risks in the first transactions. 
In the beginning it was primarily big developers and big corporations. As the 
market evolved it became smaller real estate players. Today, the vast amount 
of CMBS that get issued are Conduit-CMBS, i.e. issuances backed by a large 
portfolio of small loans. So, now everybody that seeks or commits real estate 
financing is in one way or another involved with Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation: real estate developers, operators, investors and all kinds of 
corporates that hold real estate. 
Which assets? 
Assets are primarily interest and principal payments on commercial mortgage 
loans, backed by income-producing real estate. The cash flows supporting 
the bonds are derived out of the real estate that is backing the securitised 
mortgage loan. A mortgage as underlying collateral in the transaction has 
proven to be the most adequate security. But even, if the real property were 
transferred to the SPV (as suggested in pure form of Real Estate Securitisation) 
that would not make a difference. One way or another the property has to back 
the issue and the investor has to be able to get to that property. The mortgage 
has just proven to be the most advantageous, price-efficient and bankruptcy 
remote instrument. 
The types of real estate that back the securitised mortgage loans vary across 
all property types (office, retail, multi-family, hotel and specialty real estate). 
From a property category standpoint, the majority of real estate that gets 
securitised in CMBS is investment property. There are a few occasions, where it 
is feasible and doable to securitise real development property, but those 
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occasions are limited to Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. Corporate property 
increasingly gets securitised, even though it is primarily backed by sale-
leaseback agreements. 
Why do assets qualify? 
In the beginning the underlying assets were large ‘trophy properties’. Then it 
developed into more diverse asset classes. Today mortgage loans on all kinds 
of assets are securitisable.  
Assets have to be interest and principal payments structured into a mortgage 
loan that can be backed by all kinds of income-producing properties. 
What motives? 
The prime motive for choosing CMBS loans over private market loans in the US 
is cheaper funding, which is resulting out of a most efficient execution.  
“The capital markets have proven that commercial mortgage Securitisation can 
save real estate owners 40-60 basis points per annum. On a $100 million 
mortgage, this difference translates into a $500,000 to $750,000 savings each 
year in financing costs. Owners and developers have found that the capital 
markets can consistently provide financing for larger projects and at lower 
costs, in contrast to insurance companies and pension funds, which are in and 
out of the market depending on their ability to raise capital.” 1050 
Motives include: 
• Cheap Financing – there is an arbitrage to be made between the capital 
markets and the traditional private real estate financing markets. 
• Non-recourse long-term financing (especially in the beginning) 
• Efficient Execution 
• Diversification of funding sources 
• Capital markets financing without being rated 
• High LTV (for well-structured CTL) 
                                            
1050 Adler (1987), p. 26. 
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Although Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities may be a cheaper source of 
financing for owners and developers in the US, the capital markets are not the 
appropriate financing source for all commercial real estate borrowers. The lower 
cost of funds that can be found in the capital markets is accompanied by 
tougher underwriting criteria and covenants. Therefore CMBS financing goes in 
sync with less flexibility. On the other hand, traditional institutional lenders offer 
higher interest rates but have less restrictions on the loans. Hence, it is a trade-
off that borrowers have to make: Flexibility vs. Funding costs/Interest rates. 
What structures/schemes? 
The following transaction schemes are summarised under CMBS: 
1. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower CMBS: 
This transaction scheme incorporates one property or one borrower. 
Thus, those transactions are dependent on the quality of the underlying 
property and the sponsor’s credit. It is mainly large real estate 
corporations that directly issue Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS 
directly at the capital markets. 
2. Large Loan CMBS:  
Those transactions incorporate a small number of large mortgage loans 
on commercial real estate. The deal is dependent on the sponsor’s credit 
and on the quality of the underlying properties. The minimum size of a 
loan in a Large Loan transaction is $20 million, but usually the average is 
$60 million. 
3. CMBS – Conduit1051 
Those transactions are independent from the sponsor’s credit, the 
underlying granular portfolio of small mortgage loans on commercial 
property serves as credit enhancement for the investors. There are two 
types of Conduit transactions (today the share of all Conduit transactions 
lies between 70%-80% of all issued CMBS): 
                                            
1051 Those transactions are sometimes also called stand-alone transactions as they stand alone 
without the borrower’s credit. 
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a. Conduit-CMBS (the portfolio only consists of homogenous small 
mortgage loans – average size: $6 million) 
b. Conduit-Fusion (the portfolio primarily consists of small mortgage 
loans – average size: $6 million – and a small number of large 
loans –size: more than $50 million) 
4. Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
Those transactions are totally independent of the sponsor’s credit. They 
are dependent on the property’s tenant credit and partly on the quality of 
the property. There are three types: 
a. Sale-Leaseback – Borrower is a Corporation: it represents the 
funding for a classical credit-rated Corporate Sale-Leaseback 
deal. 
b. Built-to-Suite – Borrower is a Developer: it represents the 
construction funding for the built-to-suite construction of a credit 
tenant. 
c. Outright Acquisition – Borrower is a third-party investor: it 
represents acquisition funding for an investor that buys a building 
with a credit tenant lease on it. 
Between those four transaction schemes there are really two categories that 
can be distinguished: Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation and all the other 
schemes (Single Property/Single Borrower, Large Loan, Conduit-CMBS, 
Conduit-Fusion). Although all schemes are summarised under CMBS, the main 
difference for the borrower choosing between a CTL and and all the other 
CMBS transactions is the attainable Loan-to-Value ratio. If there is just one 
tenant in the real estate, the tenant has an investment-grade credit rating and 
the lease is a bondable lease, then most certainly the LTV on the credit tenant 
loan is higher than on the CMBS loan. 
Apart from the LTV, the alternatives differ depending on the loan term, the 
borrower’s inclination to recourse and covenants, and the real estate’s debt 
capacity: 
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1. CMBS Loan (Single Property/Single Borrower, Large Loan, Conduit-
CMBS, Conduit-Fusion): 
a. A CMBS loan typically is 20 to 25 years in amortization with a 10-
year balloon payment. 
b. It is a non-recourse loan. 
c. The borrower is subject to Loan-to-Value and Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio constraints (75% LTV and 1.3 – 1.35 DSCR). 
d. There will be tough covenants on the CMBS loan (concerning 
second mortgage loans, prepayment, sale of asset etc.). 
2. Credit Tenant Loan (CTL): 
a. A credit tenant loan can be as long as the lease is. Usually at 
least 15 years. 
b. It is a non-recourse loan to the borrower. The borrower is banking 
on the credit of the tenant. 
c. There exist no Loan-to-Value and Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
constraints, because in a credit tenant loan the Loan-to-Value is 
calculated on the basis of the present value of the credit tenant’s 
lease cash flows. So, regardless of the real estate value, the real 
estate owner (i.e. the borrower) can achieve a LTV-ratio of up to 
100% and more. 
d. The covenants on credit tenant loan contracts are also tough, but 
the transfer of property is generally not prohibited. 
This results in CMBS loans overall being more expensive than CTL transactions 
with very high credit tenants. 
Which role played which environment? 
All environments played an important role in the evolution of the market and the 
overall framework in the US is one of the most favourable in the world. This fact 
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is ultimately supported by America’s position in the Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) 
Global Real Estate Market Transparency Index.1052 
Looking at the different environments in form of a ranking then there are some 
fixed environments and there are some variable environments in the US. Within 
this spectrum the investor and rating agency environment are number 1, 
because both are crucial to getting the transaction put together:  
“To do a deal with one but without the other wouldn’t work. The other things are 
important, but we are smart people – we can usually work within the bounds of 
tax, legal and accounting issues. But I got to get rating agencies and I got to get 
investors on board, otherwise I cannot do a deal.” 1053 
• Regulatory and legal environment was the nucleus of the evolution: 
In the US the regulatory environment is primarily made off of the bank 
supervision agencies. The SEC plays rather a minor role. The regulation of 
the banking system was the nucleus for the evolution of the CMBS market. 
The de-regulation of Thrifts led to a ‘loan-underwriting craze’ in the 1980’s 
nearly led to the failure of the whole banking system. This in return – 
through the FIRREA Act and the involvement of the RTC – led to the 
evolution and broad acceptance of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
in the US debt market. 
Above that, the supervision agencies have an influence on the day-to-day 
business in CMBS, as they are looking at Securitisation from two different 
angles: 
I. From the angle of the supervised banks doing Securitisation. 
II. From the angle of the supervised banks buying the notes from 
Securitisation. 
                                            
1052 The Jones Lang LaSalle index maps different countries and regions with respect to legal 
factors, tax and other regulatory burdens, governance and disclosure of listed investment 
vehicles, quality of market fundamental research, and availability of investment performance 
indices. It relates the resulting transparency scores to each country’s per capita GDP. One 
rule that can be derived is that the more per capital GDP a country has, the better the 
transparency score. The US with the highest per capita GDP has an enormous transparency 
and ranges behind the UK and Australia. Cf. Corcoran and Iwai (2004a), p. 2. 
1053 Ashenmil (2003), Interview 14, p. 554. 
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From a legal standpoint, the key concept for all Securitisations has always 
been the bankruptcy remoteness of the assets in the SPV and the effective 
security interest. This has been supported by the legal environment as the 
legal system in the US, which is based on case law, is very sound. It was 
always legally possible to set up bankruptcy remote structures.  
• Tax environment had a great influence for the inception of CMBS: 
“Much of the growth and evolution of financial markets has been affected by 
regulation and taxation, and the mortgage-backed securities market is no 
exception.”1054 
In the early years there were limits to what multi-class mortgage securities 
could accomplish as issuers were faced with complex tax, accounting, and 
regulatory obstacles. The tax obstacles were addressed in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, which created Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit 
(REMIC), which allowed for multi-class MBS like CMOs, but without the tax 
impediments. Since then, there have been tremendous growth and 
innovation in multi-class MBS (RMBS and CMBS). 
“Tax Reform is one major force” 1055 
The institution of the REMIC tax structure, since then, has spawned a new 
generation of CMBS that had a broader appeal to investors and issuers 
alike. The tax structure led to an increase in volume, a reduction in costs 
and the production of greater efficiencies in the fast growing market for 
securities backed by real estate. It provided issuers with significant new 
opportunities to raise capital more efficiently and at lower costs. 
• Accounting environment did not play a great role in the evolution, but is 
important for day-to-day structuring: 
“Whilst the accounting treatment is very rarely, if ever, the key driver behind 
Securitisation transactions it is in the current environment an important 
consideration.”1056 
                                            
1054 Brendsel (2000), p. 23. 
1055 O'Connor Jr. (1986), p. 21. 
346 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
Going forward the accounting environment, which has become very fierce to 
Securitisation due to the failure of Enron, will become more important in 
structuring and it might also pose problems. 
For Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation the accounting of leases and the 
accounting qualification as operate leases has become the crucial factor. 
• Investor and rating environment have been crucial to the evolution: 
The rating environment has been the key to the success of the overall 
Asset-Securitisation market. If it was not for the rating criteria and rating 
issuances on Securitisation transactions, the investor would not have bought 
it. Over the years rating agencies have put out a lot of rating criteria reports 
for different property types, for each transaction scheme and special reports 
on the overall market situation. The evolution of rating criteria was the 
catalyst that stimulated the growth and development of an institutionalised, 
national market in CMBS.1057 It led to more uniform mortgage-loan 
origination, underwriting and property-appraisal standards and thus made 
the real estate lending and the CMBS market more standardised and 
resistant against loan underwriting crises as observed in the 1980’s. The 
agencies still play a huge role in each transaction and have a great power 
over originators and issuers. 
Besides rating transactions, rating agencies have also educated investors, 
which in return has led to a great investor demand. By this investors have 
become the second crucial environment besides rating. If investors do not 
buy the issue, then it does not get securitised. 
Only with the eventual investor acceptance through the issuances of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) the CMBS market got off the ground. 
Eventually investors were convinced by the benefits that include: 
• Strong yields 
                                                                                                                                
1056 Cf. Barnes (2003), p. 19. 
1057 The rating environment was not a driver for the evolution of CTL because in a CTL 
transaction the credit tenant is already rated. Hence, there is no other separate rating needed. 
Cf. Jacobs (2003), Interview 19, p. 554. 
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• Credit quality, i.e. opportunity to invest into high quality properties and 
diversified portfolios (geographic and property type diversification). 
• Security of Rating 
• Asset-Liability Matching 
• Diversification 
• Liquidity 
• Call protection (as most CMBS are hedged against prepayment) 
• Safety through mortgage collateral 
Throughout the market development cycle, Investors have influenced the 
outcome of the structures. Over time, there have been a few structures that 
did not hit ‘investor appetite’ or that went out of favour with investors. So, the 
transaction types and the structures that the CMBS market in the US is left 
with today have proven to be the most investor-suitable structures, even 
though they might not be the most sponsor or originator friendly structures. 
• The Real Estate Environment was the leading driver behind the inception 
of the market. CMBS evolved and developed under the two credit crunches 
of the mid-1980’s and the early 1990’s. The Cultural and Local 
Environment played a minor role. 
What were the drivers? 
There were a lot of drivers involved in the inception and evolution of the 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities market in the US: 
• The main driver was the Savings & Loans’ Crisis in the 1980’s, the 
FIRREA Act and the foundation of the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC) that led to the first big issuances of CMBS, the broadening of the 
asset base in Securitisation and the inception of the modern Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Security market. 
• The Standard & Poor’s credit rating system for non-recourse MBS made 
it possible to rate issues that could not be credit rated before. Before 
marketing notes privately without ratings was time-consuming and 
required a massive effort to educate potential investors, even though 
there was a big safety through mortgage and yield benefits. 
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• The institution of credit rating systems, the issuance of rating criteria and 
the credit rating of CMBS issuances by rating agencies lead to investor 
confidence. This made a broad spectrum of rated and publicly placed 
offerings possible (from trophy properties in New York City to suburban 
office buildings). 
• The credit crunch resulting out of Savings & Loans/Thrift crisis (mid-
1980’s). As the number of lenders for large projects became limited and 
the general financing environment (with fewer lenders) had a negative 
impact on financing costs, the ability to negotiate favourable terms 
declined. Moreover, real estate financing in the 1980’s was characterised 
by long negotiation processes leading to high financing costs. The 
availability of long-term debt financing was restricted and overall 
financing amounts were low compared to the potential in the capital 
markets. This lead to a disintermediation of traditional lenders and the 
shift from credit to capital markets. 
• The government wanted to push the market and therefore favoured it by 
issuing favourable tax laws. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, introducing the 
Real Estate Mortgage-Conduit for issuing multiple-class Mortgage-
Backed Securities was a strong driver. The existence of this a tax-neutral 
entity became a crucial factor in the development of CMBS in the early 
1990’s. 
• Credit crunch resulting out of the physical real estate down-cycle in the 
early 1990’s restricted private market lending capabilities. 
• The existence of the RMBS market and the lessons learned from it. The 
RMBS market sparked the development of Asset-Securitisation 
structures. This was fuelled by the strong government involvement in 
providing affordable home loan financing. It was accomplished by 
facilitating the secondary real estate market through implicit government 
guarantees taken on by the three government-sponsored entities (GSE): 
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddy Mac.  
• Structural Innovations instituted by the government-sponsored entities 
also played a role – Fannie Mae started the secondary mortgage market 
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and was the first issuer in the Securitisation market and Freddy Mac was 
the first Conduit and the innovator of the first CMO. 
• The innovation of CMOs were a driver for the market, as CMOs allowed 
distribution of cash flow to be prioritized among various bond classes, 
instead of distributing the cash flow of the underlying mortgage pools 
equally among investors (as pass-through securities did). This structure 
was the ancestor of all other CMBS structures ever to be used in the US. 
• Drivers for CTL: the funding problems that corporations were faced with 
in the 1999/2000 was a driver for CTL Securitisation. As companies slid 
into a banking credit crunch, they were pressured to monetize their real 
estate assets. 
• Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation from an insurance investor’s 
standpoint is a different asset class than CMBS. It is targeted at a 
specific investor group. If it was not for the NAIC investment criteria that 
favours credit tenant loans over pure real estate loans then CTL 
Securitisation would not be an asset class. So, this was a driver for CTL 
Securitisation. 
Credit Crunch, Banking Crisis & Government involvement were the three main 
drivers for the US.  
What role plays the timing? 
Timing plays a huge role in Securitisation and the evolution of the market. 
Regulatory influence, and the state of the physical and financial cycle had an 
effect on the timing of the inception of CMBS. The following analysis 
summarises the physical and financial cycle up- and downturns that influenced 
CMBS: 
1. Early-1980’s: strong lending by Thrifts following the de-regulation – 
Strong capital inflows into real estate (financial cycle upturn) 
2. Mid- to late-1980’s: Strong over-building in the physical market (physical 
market downturn) 
3. Mid-1980’s: Credit Crunch following Thrift Crisis and weak capital inflows 
(financial cycle downturn) 
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4. Early-1990’s: Physical real estate recession resulting out of an economic 
recession. (physical cycle downturn) 
5. Early-1990’s: Weak capital inflows into real estate due to economic 
recession (financial cycle downturn) 
How this relates to the general Banking and CMBS market can be seen in the 
following chart: 
Year General Banking & Finance Market Securitisation Market 
1980 Savings & Loans deregulation 
resulting in uncontrolled real estate 
lending activity. 
The MBS market is 
growing the CMBS 
market does not exist. 
1984 Savings & Loan’s Crisis resulting out 
of the deregulation and leading to a 
huge Thrift failure and a tough real 
estate lending environment. 
The first CMBS trans-
action gets structured. 
Mid-1980’s Big credit crunch leading to a huge 
demand in real estate financing and 
rising interest rates. 
CMBS structures evolve 
– increased activity. 
1986 Tax Reform Act and creation of 
REMIC vehicle. 
Strong growth in the 
overall MBS market. 
1989 FIRREA Act and Institution of the 
RTC. 
Growth in CMBS 
issuance volume. 
1989-1994 RTC sells off all non-performing 
assets out of the banking crisis and 
satisfies saver’s claims. 
Strong growth in the 
CMBS market and broad 
investor acceptance. 
Early 1990’s Economic recession, downturn in the 
real estate market and credit crunch. 
Evolution of Large Loan 
and Conduit-CMBS 
replacing much of the 
traditional private lending 
market. 
Chart 17: Relationship between the general banking and real estate financing market, and the 
Securitisation market 
The evolution of transaction schemes came in specific order: 
1. Single-Property/Single Borrower CMBS 
2. Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
3. Large Loan CMBS 
4. Conduit CMBS 
5. Conduit-Fusion CMBS 
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The reason why Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS was first was that 
those were the easiest to do at the time. It needed one willing borrower to take 
on the fees. Those borrower were seeking financing for big commercial assets 
that were too expensively priced in the private market. The deals were not 
standardised, yet. They created the biggest fees for the investment bankers and 
were still cheaper and more advantageous to borrowers. With one credit tenant, 
CTL Securitisations were just easier to do. The rationale for large loan CMBS 
was the same as for Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS. 
All in all, CMBS always got a spur at the bottom of the financial cycle that was 
usually following the trough of physical cycle. 
What else played a role in making the market successful? 
Before CMBS came along, real estate entrepreneurs who developed, invested 
and managed real restate were faced with relatively limited financing 
alternatives. Short-term and intermediate-term financing was provided, for the 
most part, by banks and other financial institutions. In obtaining long-term 
funds, the borrower chose between secured debt, which imposed restrictive 
financial and operating covenants, or relinquishing a portion of equity to a joint 
venture partner. Before 1983 real estate entrepreneurs had virtually no access 
to the public securities market, particularly for long-term debt. For the real 
estate industry as the largest capital user in the economy the evolution of the 
public real estate financing market created great opportunity for growth. They 
benefited from numerous choices of non-recourse financings with different 
structural features, interest rates, payment schedules, maturities and other 
restrictions. 
With CMBS the small and intermediate borrowers benefited from Wall Street 
firms that integrated the secondary public markets into real estate financing and 
started the disintermediation of the traditional real estate lender. They became 
the innovators in the real estate financing markets and were the guarantors for 
on-going innovation in CMBS. 
4-Stage Model for Real Estate Securitisation 
From the preceding breakdown of the Asset-Securitisation framework and the 
analysis of the evolution of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities in the US, 
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the 4-stage model for the Real Estate Securitisation markets introduced in 
Chapter 4.2.5, can be adapted to the US (Figure 21):1058 
Stage 1 (1966-1984): Experimental Stage 
a. New structure development 
i. First Residential Mortgage Pass-Through Securities (1966) 
ii. First Collateralized Mortgage-Obligation (1983) 
iii. First Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security (1984) 
b. Market opening: small market (first CMBS transactions were private, 
RMBS were public transactions) 
c. Small market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. High structural uniqueness – very strong innovative activity 
e. High structural flexibility / unstandardised 
f. High costs / expensive transactions (very high structuring fees) 
g. Very high margins for arrangers 
h. RMBS were rated – CMBS were not yet rated 
Market
Sophistication
High
Margins
1966 Present1984 1989 1996
Low
Experimental Stage
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Ripening Stage
Growth Stage
Standardisation Stag
 
Figure 21: 4-Stage Evolution Model for Real Estate Securitisation Markets – applied to the case 
of the United States 
• Stage 2 (1984-1989): Ripening Stage 
a. Structure ripening/enhancement 
i. Commercial Property CMO 
                                            
1058 Cf. Chapter 4.2.5. 
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ii. Single Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
iii. Multi-Tenant CMBS 
b. Market broadening (increasing number of transactions) 
c. Growing market volume (i.e. new issuance volume is rising) 
d. Still relatively high structural uniqueness, but decreasing – 
innovative activity still strong 
e. Relatively high structural flexibility  
f. Costs are less, but still high  
g. Still high margins for arrangers, but decreasing 
h. Transactions are increasingly getting rated 
• Stage 3 (1989-1996): Growth Stage 
a. Structure evolution  
i. Standard is set by Resolution Trust Corporation 
ii. Large Loan CMBS 
iii. Conduit-CMBS 
b. Strong market growth (through RTC more public transactions) 
c. Relatively large market volume (a lot of new issuance through 
RTC and Conduits) 
d. International recognition (increasing international appetite for 
CMBS) 
e. Strongly decreasing structural uniqueness – standardisation in 
underwriting 
f. Structural flexibility is declining rapidly – increasing 
standardisation 
g. Costs decrease as execution gets more efficient and investor 
base more educated 
h. Lowering Margins for arrangers 
i. Transactions are all rated (except for most CTL – that are 
implicitly rated) 
• Stage 4 (1996-present): Standardisation Stage 
a. Structure standardisation (CMBS-Conduit and CMBS-Fusion reign 
the market – all transactions are the same) 
b. Matured market  
c. Large market volume (Portfolios are big and granular) 
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d. Global product – global investors 
e. No innovative activity – bulk transactions 
f. No structural flexibility – total standardisation / high covenants for 
borrowers/originators 
g. Costs are really low –  
h. Low margins for arrangers 
i. All transactions are rated  
The analysis about the US is also validating the 4-stage model set up in the 
Singapore analysis in Chapter 4.3.5. 
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4.4 Europe 
4.4.1 Literature Review 
Academic literature on Asset-Backed Securitisation exists in Europe. However, 
there is hardly any academic literature on European CMBS – except for some 
chapters in US textbooks. There have been no studies on the evolution of the 
European Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation market. 
Generally, Asset-Securitisation research (incl. CMBS and Real Estate 
Securitisation) in Europe is very much industry dominated: 
1. Rating Agency – Publications include: 
a. Country-specific Rating Criteria 
b. Asset-specific Rating Criteria 
c. Market Reports (Year in Review, Quarter in Review) 
d. Special Reports 
2. Securitisation Research Departments within Investment Banks – 
Publications include: 
a. Weekly Market Updates/Reports 
b. Sub-Asset Class Reports (RMBS, CMBS, CDO, ABS, WBS) 
c. Transaction Performance Updates 
d. Special Reports 
3. Periodical Industry Research (Magazines): 
a. Euroweek 
b. Euromoney 
c. Asset Securitisation Report 
d. International Financing Review 
e. Structured Finance International 
f. International Securitisation Report 
g. International Financial Law Review 
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h. Asset Sales Report International  
i. Asset Finance International 
4. Other Industry Research: 
a. Securitisation and Structured Finance Guide 
b. Global Structured Finance Guide 
Most of those literature sources will be used in this chapter in addition to the 
scarce academic European CMBS literature for analysing the European Real 
Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market. 
4.4.2 Market Overview 
4.4.2.1 Definitions and Terminology 
Real Estate Securitisation vs. CMBS 
As in the US, Real Estate Securitisation in Europe is primarily cateogrized 
under CMBS. The reason why it is called CMBS results out of the history and 
the evolution of Asset-Securitisation transactions backed by commercial 
property. In Europe, however, both categories overlap strongly. So, terms will 
be used interchangeably in this chapter. 
True-Sale vs. Synthetic1059 
In a standard ‘True-sale’ Securitisation transaction, a pool of assets is 
transferred by its owner to a special purpose entity, which in turn issues arising 
from the transferred assets. The transaction may have different purposes 
including: to remove the assets from the transferor's balance sheet, to obtain 
financing at a price otherwise unavailable to the transferor or to obtain capital or 
other regulatory relief. 
A Synthetic Securitisation, on the other hand, provides for at least part of the 
economic substance of a standard Securitisation transaction, but without the 
actual transference of any assets. Generally, the owner of the assets (the 
‘Protection Buyer') transfers the portfolio of assets (a 'Reference Portfolio' of 
‘Reference Obligations') to another entity (the ‘Protection Seller') or directly to 
                                            
1059 Cf. Uwaifo and Greenberg (2001), p. 139. 
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the Capital markets. Although the credit risk of the Reference Portfolio is 
transferred, actual ownership of the Reference Obligations remains with the 
Protection Buyer, so it is not a true Securitisation but a synthetic one. 
Originator vs. Sponsor 
In Europe the Originator is the seller of the asset. The sponsor is only the 
company that holds a conduit into the capital markets (usually investment 
banks) and that puts together a European Conduit CMBS transaction.  
Originators can be banks (for loan assets) or corporates (for corporate assets – 
receivables, real estate) of governments (for government assets – future 
receivables, government employee housing). 
European Conduit vs. US Conduit CMBS1060 
In Europe, the Morgan Stanley European Loan Conduit Deals have led the way 
for the development of European Conduit CMBS. This type of Conduit has 
developed differently than in the US. Even though the term is the same, the 
transactions differ. Although, both types of transaction schemes represent a 
conduit for borrowers into the capital markets, European Conduit CMBS do not 
exactly fit the definition of Conduit-CMBS by US standards (100 loans at $4-6 
million a piece), because they securitise large loans and sometimes even single 
borrower loans. 
True Sale vs. Secured Loan Structures 1061 
An innovation in the European Asset-Securitisation market has been the 
creation of ‘secured loan’ structures. In contrast to the traditional ‘true sale’ 
Securitisation structures, under a secured loan structure, not the asset is sold to 
an SPV but the SPV grants a loan to the asset originator (typically via the 
purchase of a loan note). The repayment of the loan, however, is secured by 
the cash flow from the relevant assets. So in the case of real estate, as 
opposed to traditional true sale CMBS in which the asset is a mortgage loan, 
under a secured loan transaction structure essentially the cash flows from the 
property and its operations are structured into a secured loan and are 
                                            
1060 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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subsequently securitised. From a bankruptcy standpoint, the rating agencies 
will generally assume insolvency of the originator in their stress scenarios. 
Doing that they must gain comfort that such an event will not result in any cash 
flow timing delay and loss to the transaction. In Europe, a secured loan 
structure may even be stronger than a true sale structure.  
4.4.2.2 Evolution and State of the Market 
1. Overall European Asset-Securitisation Market 
Following the United States, Europe is the world's second largest and 
second highly developed Securitisation market. Although a form of 
Securitisation had been in existence in the German and Danish mortgage 
markets for a long time, Asset-Securitisation in the modern sense only 
emerged in Europe in the mid 1980s. The history of Securitisation in Europe 
goes back to 1985 and the creation of a Mortgage-Backed Securities market 
in the UK. At the time, the US investment banking firm Salomon Brothers 
saw several forces come together that indicated that Europe and especially 
the United Kingdom were “ripe for Securitisation”1062. Residential mortgages 
became the first asset class within Asset-Securitisation in Europe and have 
also remained the driving force behind the market ever since. Today 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities – with a market share of over 50% 
– are still the most dominant asset class by far.1063 
The driving forces for the evolution of the European Asset-Securitisation 
market were:1064  
• Borrower/Originator/Issuer Demand – in anticipation of Basel I 
banks were under pressure to better manage their balance sheets 
and their liquidity. Asset-Securitisation in the US had proven to be an 
adequate mechanism for that. 
                                                                                                                                
1061 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 29. 
1062 Myerberg (2000), p. 139. 
1063 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 22. 
1064 Cf. Hayre and Thompson Jr. (2001), p. 735. 
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• Investor Demand – there was an ample supply of funds and 
investors, which was a prerequisite for such a market to start. In the 
US, Mortgage-Backed Securities had proved to be high-quality assets 
offering very attractive returns at a relatively low level of risk. There 
was potential for such investors in Europe. 
• Profit Potential – for Investment Banks to engage as intermediaries 
between borrowers and the capital markets there needed to be an 
adequate premium for introducing and structuring such instruments. 
The profit potential arose out of a potential arbitrage between credit 
and capital markets. 
So, Salomon Brothers, the company that was also the innovator for Asset-
Securitisation and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities in the US, 
recognized this opportunity in European Asset-Securitisation and ventured 
overseas. 
From the whole of Europe, the UK provided Salomon with the biggest 
opportunity to cash in on the development expenses that had gone into the 
creation of the mortgage securities market in the US. For the firm the UK 
market offered the right environment and framework to first introduce 
Securitisation to Europe. And it displayed a chance to ride the synergies 
from the operations in the US:1065 
• The UK mortgage market had a crucial size and was big enough to 
create economies of scale – at the time the size of the mortgage 
market was $400 billion. 
• The legal system in the UK – as in the US – was based on common 
law as opposed to civil law prevalent on the European continent. 
• No enabling legislation was required for Securitisation – many of 
the techniques developed in the US market could be exported. 
• The Thatcher government strongly advocated home ownership, 
privatisation programs and deregulation – thereby increasing 
                                            
1065 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 140. 
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disintermediation of traditional lenders and pushing new capital 
markets instruments. This lead to funds flowing directly from savers to 
capital market investments without passing through intermediaries, 
like Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
• Finally, there were no language barriers for investment bankers – 
the language in the UK as in the US is English. 
From the investor and capital market side there was also a great demand for 
such a product as the following conditions were prevailing:1066 
• There was no adverse government regulation – the government 
was even welcoming a new development. 
• There was a strong investor appetite for capital markets debt 
(Sterling floating-rate notes) – even though all transactions in the 
market at the time were unrated and unsecured. However, the supply 
was limited, which created a supply vacuum to be filled at times of 
rising demand. So, the investor environment for introducing a new 
Asset-Securitisation product to the market was favourable. 
• There were no government-sponsored entities (like Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac) in the UK, so the Mortgage-Backed Securities concept 
was driven by market forces. As a consequence there were no 
common standards developed by one institution. It had to be 
established by the market innovators. 
This all created a very attractive climate for the introduction of Securitisation 
in the United Kingdom. For the investment banks, the basics for the creation 
of the market could be put in place fairly quickly. 
Following the evolution path of the US, the first asset class to be securitised 
became residential mortgage loans. Salomon Brothers set up a company 
called ‘The Mortgage Corporation’, which essentially became a private 
mortgage banking company and Salomon’s conduit into the capital markets. 
The company functioned as a primary mortgage lender for home buyers and 
                                            
1066 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 142. 
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a funding institution for those loans through the issuance of Mortgage-
Backed Securities. As there were no common underwriting standards for 
Securitisation and traditional loans did not qualify for Securitisation, new 
standards had to be set up by the Mortgage Corporation. Setting standards 
and structuring the first transaction was not easy, as the market was not 
100% congruent with the US market.1067 However, the problems were 
solved and the first deal was offered in February 1987, which can be set 
as the inception date of the European Asset-Securitisation market.1068 
By 1990, over €10 billion of floating-rate Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
transactions had been issued, which was a successful and very promising 
launch for the new instrument. However, as financial market history 
indicates, financial innovations do not always grow in a straight upward 
direction – there are failures and learning experiences that make a market 
mature. The same happened in the UK. As a consequence of the 1987 
stock crash in the US small depositors over the period of 3 years brought 
their money back to traditional lending institutions in the UK (building 
societies). Those building societies engaged into strong competition with the 
new capital market lenders and drastically lowered their rates. Then, the UK 
economy turned and rates rose dramatically, so that by 1992 delinquencies 
for certain lenders reached up to 20%. Mortgage insurers suffered large 
losses and stopped enhancing Securitisation transactions. Hence, the 
primary credit enhancement mechanism fell out. As a consequence, the new 
issuance in Mortgage-Backed Securities declined. To overcome this fall out 
and the resulting decline, bankers introduced subordination structures 
(similar to US CMO structures) that tranched issues into different security 
classes with different risk-return profiles. Investor acceptance was good and 
the MBS market started to revive. During the following years Asset-
Securitisation spread over continental Europe and new asset classes apart 
from first and second mortgages were created; new asset classes included 
                                            
1067 First of all, all loans were floating rate loans. Secondly, without Freddy Mac and Fannie 
Mae, there was no agency guaranteeing the interest and principal on the notes. So credit 
enhancement from third-party guarantors with the capital status to validate the desired rating 
had to be found. Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 143. 
1068 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 453. 
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commercial property leases, auto loans, consumer loans, trade receivables
and bank loans. As a result by 1996, total issuances in the UK had reached
€20 billion in 79 issues covering all asset classes. The Mortgage
Corporation stayed the strongest issuer with €4.5 billion (16 issues). In the
following time, the market became even more innovative and developed a
multitude of new asset classes.1069
“One can expect virtually anything that has cash flow to be a candidate for
Securitisation.”1070
Even though the evolution of the European Securitisation market and
especially the Mortgage-Backed Securities market was initiated from the
United States, the development in Europe significantly lagged that of the
US. In the UK, the growth drivers might have been the similar to the US, but
MBS in continental Europe had different drivers. The residential real estate
lending environment in Europe was fundamentally different and diverse:1071
 I. There was a lack of a large powerful body to provide for
homogenization and standards. There were no special government-
sponsored agency programs to promote mortgage financing like
Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac in the US.
 II. There was a lack of active specialized housing finance companies.
 III. A number of European countries (Austria, Finland, Germany, Holland,
Scandinavia, Spain, and Switzerland, France and Ireland) had well-
developed, large domestic Mortgage-Backed/Covered Bond
markets that had existed for decades. Mortgage-Backed Bonds are
secured against a mortgage portfolio and are an obligation of the
issuing bank.1072
                                             
1069 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 144.
1070 Myerberg (2000), p. 146.
1071 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 760; Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 448.
1072 In some countries, the investor may have only a claim against the issuing institution,
whereas in others the investor may enjoy a special conditional claim over a specific portfolio
of underlying mortgages. Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 760.
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IV. The differing legal frameworks in each European government 
provide a very different setting for Mortgage-Backed Securitisation in 
Europe than in the United States. 
V. Prepayment risk, a driving factor in the US, was almost entirely absent 
in European market.  
However, in the early 1990s the continental European MBS market started 
to find some support from Spain and France. France endorsed 
Securitisation in the late 1980s, but laws on Special Purpose Companies 
were not clear, and thus the market was slow until the 1990’s. Spain 
enacted a law in 1991 allowing for the issuance of MBS. The new law 
allowed for the creation of unique Securitisation vehicles that were 
compatible with Spanish domestic legal structures. Despite moderate MBS 
issuances out of these countries and irregular issues from originators in 
certain other European countries (notably Sweden), there was generally not 
a strong consensus for Residential Mortgage-Backed Loan Securitisation in 
continental Europe for much of the early 1990s. This changed toward the 
mid-1990s as new players from Belgium and the Netherlands entered the 
MBS market. In the subsequent years also countries as Italy, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany issued regulatory guidelines, and 
thus enabled the start for Asset-Securitisation.1073 
As Asset-Securitisation became a valid and more mature capital markets 
instrument, it spread over to continental Europe – primarily in the form of 
Mortgage-Backed Securities. The United Kingdom formed the early 
stronghold of European Asset-Securitisation (especially MBS) and is still the 
strongest Securitisation country in Europe.1074 
Even though, Europe was able to make use of the US knowledge base, 
participants had to alter it to fit specific European needs. This resulted in the 
following market characteristics:1075 
                                            
1073 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 761. 
1074 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 758. 
1075 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 448. 
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• The European Market does not have a pass-through type MBS 
structure. 
• MBS from different countries, and even from different issuers within 
one country, can be very dissimilar, which makes it difficult to provide 
benchmarking for investors.  
• There is a huge lack of statistics on underlying assets, making it 
necessary to do significant due diligence on each and every MBS or 
ABS transaction. 
Overall, the development of Asset-Securitisation in Europe was hazardous. 
There were lots of other obstacles besides the existence of Mortgage-
Backed/Covered Bond markets restricting the evolution of European Asset-
Securitisation:1076 
• Different legal systems (Common law, Napoleonic law, Germanic 
law) resided in Europe. There was no standardisation of applicable 
laws. 
• There were no uniform underwriting guidelines. 
• There were no databases with historic performance statistics. 
• There was no uniform currency (which has vanished with the 
introduction of the Euro). 
• In most cases government support was little and government-
sponsored entities like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae that could set 
standards and enhance credit in the market were non-existent. 
• Political risk for capital market innovators was large and legal 
changes had to precede any market action. 
• The markets in Europe were very small and fragmented, as 
compared to the US. Country specific development resulted in 
smaller and less liquid markets. 
                                            
1076 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 23. 
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• Large legal fees at start-up. Without sizeable volume they were 
prohibitive. 
• Other up-front costs (for e.g. computer networks, research) were too 
high for small deals in small markets. 
• The standardised US technology and setup did not work for all 
markets. 
Nevertheless, the growth of Asset-Securitisation in Europe was inevitable, 
as it is a free market concept. In Europe, the concept took longer to develop 
than in the US. A very important, but non-quantifiable hindrance to the 
development of the European Asset-Securitisation market was the historic 
suspicion of new financing techniques. There were two major factors behind 
that:1077  
I. The banking industry had been highly regulated and protected within 
Europe, which resulted in an oligopolistic banking sector within most 
countries and a captive investor community.  
II. For a long time European banks were not under pressure to achieve 
high returns on equity.  
As the market developed, both of these factors changed. The European 
Union regulations allowed banks to provide services in the other EU 
countries, and hence the banking sector became increasingly competitive. 
As the concept of ‘Shareholder Value’ was developed and as the general 
public increasingly participated in the capital markets the pressure for banks 
to manage their bottom line increased. This provided a strong incentive for 
banks to move forward and participate in Asset-Securitisation to manage 
their balance sheets. 
Hence, the forces that eventually favoured the evolution of the overall 
European Asset-Securitisation were similar to the ones in Singapore and the 
United States:1078 
                                            
1077 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 448. 
1078 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 152. 
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I. A common currency (the EURO) and a pan-European capital 
market. 
II. Financial Crisis – a shortage of money to fund investments and 
operations resulting out of a restrictive traditional lending environment 
(i.e. credit crunch). 
III. Government support – resulting out of the need to safeguard the 
banking system.1079 
With these developments and growing investor demand for those products 
the prospects for Asset-Securitisation in Europe rose and have led to what 
the market is today. 
Since 1996 the market has been on a steady growth path. The last eight 
years have witnessed the overall European market’s continued expansion 
into new asset classes and an increased acceptance of Securitisation as an 
established financing technique by financial institutions and corporates 
throughout Europe.1080 
These transactions have pointed to a strong growing market that is likely to 
be marked by a dynamic mix of asset classes and increasingly innovative 
structures for years to come. Steadily increasing numbers of European 
investors and originators are embracing Securitisation. This is evidenced by 
the growth in traditional asset classes and structures, and by the level of 
investor interest seen in more and more innovative transactions.1081 
Investors’ appetite for structured bonds in general has been evidenced by 
their willingness to buy securities backed by an ever-broadening range of 
assets, which shows an increasing comfort with the Securitisation process. 
The investment base is becoming more sophisticated, and investors are 
increasingly looking for performance data on transactions – one sign of 
active investor involvement and interest.1082 
                                            
1079 This has been the experience in the US with the Savings & Loan’s crisis. 
1080 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 449. 
1081 Cf. Herrmann (2001), p. 1; Rajendra, et al. (2003), p. 234. 
1082 Cf. Sampson (2001), p. 15. 
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Globally, as the US Securitisation market continues to mature, it is the 
European market that is increasingly the main focus for growth across a 
number of jurisdictions and asset classes. Due to the number of 
jurisdictions, the pan-European market is one of the most complex as, whilst 
there are proposals to harmonise European legal, accounting and regulatory 
guidance to produce a pan-European framework, at present the implications 
for Securitisation in Europe are many and varied and also subject to 
considerable change and evolution.1083 
The graph below (Figure 22) shows the development of the overall 
European Asset-Securitisation market since its inception. The market has 
risen from €3 billion in 1988 to €209.9 billion at year-end 2003 and is set to 
exceed the ‘2003 Issuance’ in 2004. The enormous growth of the market 
during the last eight years can be attributed to mainly four things:1084  
I. The amendment of the legal and regulatory framework. 
II. The introduction of the Euro. 
III. The growing acceptance in the corporate and the banking market. 
IV. The transparency of the market that has been pushed forward by the 
rating agencies. 
The only year where growth slowed down was 2002. Whilst European 
Securitisation issuance set another record in 2002, the total new issuance 
volume in 2002 was only slightly over 2001’s issuance. The slowdown in the 
rate of growth could be attributed to investors sentiment in the aftermath of 
the World Trade Center bombings, general concerns regarding corporate 
creditworthiness and an increase in the number of Securitisation 
downgrades. Apart from that the rising volume of Synthetic Securitisations 
had an ongoing effect on new issuances in Asset-Securitisations, as the 
biggest part in Synthetic Securitisations is covered by credit default swaps, 
                                            
1083 Cf. Clifford Chance European Securitisation Group (2001), p. 36. 
1084 Cf. Clifford Chance European Securitisation Group (2001), p. 36; Collingridge, et al. (2003), 
p. 243; Herrmann (2001), p. 1; Rajendra, et al. (2003), p. 234; Sampson (2001), p. 15. 
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only a small part is actually funded by ABS notes.1085 Nevertheless, the 
continued resilience of the European Securitisation market demonstrates 
that Asset-Backed Securities have become a financing technique that will 
grow and innovate even during years when there is a downturn in the capital 
markets.1086 
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Figure 22: European ABS Issuance (1988 – 2004) Source: Authors Compilation1087 
After a slower year in 2002, the overall Asset-Securitisation market has 
strongly grown in 2003 and 2004.1088 Unimpressed by this growth market 
participants expect another record year, with slower growth rates, though. A 
lot of expectations lie on Germany, with the True Sale Initiative coming to 
terms.1089 
In Europe, today there exist five major – rating agency recognized – asset 
classes:1090 
1. Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) 
                                            
1085 For more information on structuring synthetic Securitisations confer Uwaifo and Greenberg 
(2001), p. 139. 
1086 Cf. Weiffenbach and Ghali (2003), p. 247. 
1087 Source: Authors Compilation based on the following sources: Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 
449; Hayre and Thompson Jr. (2001), p. 742; Rajendra, et al. (2004a), p. 4; Rajendra, et al. 
(2004c), p. 1; Rajendra, et al. (2002), p. 5. 
1088 Cf. Seymour (2004b), p. 2. 
1089 Cf. Weber (2004), p. 3. 
1090 Cf. Seymour (2004a), p. 1. 
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2. Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) 
3. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) 
4. Asset-Backed Securities i.n.S. (ABS i.n.S.) 
5. Whole Business Securitisations (WBS) 
Whole Business Securitisation is the youngest innovation in asset classes 
and is pretty much unique to the UK and France. Instead of focusing on 
cash flows from a single identifiable asset, the entire set of flows generated 
by a business on a going concern basis is used. The technique used is a 
variation of the secured loan concept. The principle idea is to isolate the 
cash-flow-producing assets from the originator/borrower, so that the control 
of the asset can be given to the trustee/receiver, in case of default. If 
bankruptcy occurs the trustee may manage and operate the business for the 
realization of cash flows over time. This technique has come to be a popular 
source of funding for corporates with strong operations backed by real 
estate. However, it is only suitable for certain types of businesses that 
demonstrate very stable cash flows. The evolution of Whole Business 
Securitisation was driven by favourable legal circumstances in Great Britain. 
So that, the first Real Estate Securitisation deals in the UK were Real 
Estate-Backed Whole Business Securitisations or Operating Company 
deals. Even though those Securitisations will be unique in their way and 
most of them will probably not be repeated, the European Securitisation 
market will keep on growing into different directions.1091 
2. European Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
Market 
Mirroring the inception of the overall Asset-Securitisation market in Europe, 
the Real Estate Securitisation market also got started in the United 
Kingdom, as it provided the most favourable commercial property and the 
least restricted Securitisation framework. 
                                            
1091 Cf. Dorendorf (2004), p. 21. 
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Similar to the 1991-1992 North American recession, the UK recession had a 
severe impact on commercial real estate. After the deep recession in the 
early 1990’s, the United Kingdom, has experienced stable economic 
conditions. Price inflation and economic growth have been relatively stable, 
in the 2 % to 4% range, while the base lending rate has been in the low 5% 
to 7% range. This stable growth and negligible inflation environment 
combined with limited real estate construction has created a very strong 
commercial real estate market that was the basis of a functioning Real 
Estate Securitisation market and thus favoured the evolution of CMBS in 
Europe.1092 
But beyond economic conditions, the primary reasons for this evolution path 
was that the established British legal system, which was very similar to the 
US system and provided for strong mortgage security and bankruptcy 
remote Special Purpose Vehicles. This was underlined by the success of the 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities market. The experience with RMBS 
gave investors faith in bonds backed by secured UK commercial real estate 
assets.1093 
The strength of the UK legal system derives out of the circumstance that in a 
default, the appointment of a receiver cannot be blocked. This standard 
default mechanism helps to not delay the realisation of the secured 
creditors’ collateral in the case of the borrower filing for bankruptcy 
protection, as it is the case in the US.1094 
Moreover, the UK real estate market has been established as one of the 
most landlord-friendly leasing markets in the world. Commercial leases have 
a contractual term of 15 or 25 years and provide the landlord with ‘five-year, 
upward only rent reviews’. This means that the rent is raised to the greater 
of market or the previous rental rate every five years. Additionally, 
commercial leases are usually ‘fully repairing and insuring’ leases. This 
relates to the tenant’s responsibilities of paying the cost of fully maintaining 
                                            
1092 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 757. 
1093 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 757. 
1094 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 757. 
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and insuring the property, in addition to the operating cost and taxes.1095 The 
tenant's requirement to maintain, repair, and insure the property removes 
most of the capital expenditure cost from the landlord. Above that, the tenant 
is also responsible for returning the space to a base building standard at 
lease termination. As a consequence it is more likely that tenants renew 
their lease, when it expires because if they have made substantial 
improvement investments those are ‘sunk build-out costs’ for them.1096 
This leads to very stable, secure and bondable rent cash flows. The 
commercial property sector in the UK was made for Real Estate 
Securitisation. So, the favourable factors led to a rapid expansion of the 
Securitisation of UK commercial real estate as will be delineated in the 
following part. 
Apart from Bank originated Portfolio-CMBS there are three types of ‘true 
sale’ transaction schemes that can be identified.1097 Those types originated 
in the UK in the following sequence: 
1. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business / Operating Company 
transactions 1098 
The first Real Estate Securitisation transaction came about in 1994. 
Operating Company Securitisations1099 were the first form of Asset-
Securitisation to use commercial real estate to support bonds. 
Citibank was the innovator in the early transactions. In those cases 
the Securitisation structure was used to finance two different 
nursing home pools in 1994 (Sonar 1) and 1995 (Sonar 2). The 
                                            
1095 By being fully repairing and insuring the UK leases cover more than typical North American 
triple-net leases. 
1096 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 758. 
1097 Bank originated Portfolio-CMBS only came into being after the inception of the other three 
transaction schemes: Real Estate Backed WBS, Conduit CMBS and Single Asset/Property – 
Single Borrower transactions. It really took until 1999 for the first Bank originated Portfolio-
CMBS to come out. Cf. Chart 18: List of European CMBS Transactions (1996-1999), p. 388. 
1098 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 761. 
1099 In the beginning of the market those transactions were called Operating Company 
transactions. As the market matured the term developed itself into Whole Business/Company 
Securitisations (WBS). Transactions that are backed by the strength of the operating company 
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reason for operating companies being early adopters of the Real 
Estate Securitisation/CMBS concept was that their corporate cost of 
debt was usually higher than traditional mortgage finance rates. So, 
nursing home operators used the CMBS market to access the 
mortgage finance market through sale-leaseback deals that were 
secured by a mortgage and the cash flows from nursing home 
operations. 
Since 1994, there have been different sorts of operating company 
CMBS. Pub companies for example have also utilized the CMBS 
type structure to finance large pub portfolios. The pub operating 
companies receive rental income from owned pubs leased to 
smaller local operators on 10 to 20 year lease terms. In addition, 
those companies also supply the beer. The typical transaction 
structure for Pub transactions is a secured loan structure: the 
operating company gets granted a secured loan from the issuing 
SPV rather than a true sale of the assets to the issuer.1100 Hence, 
the financing is also based on the operating company's revenues, 
as well as the underlying property's rental revenues. Under the 
British legal system, this structure additionally enabled the issuer to 
gain control of the company and the related real estate assets 
relatively quickly in the case of loan default. So, this made this 
segment develop so quickly in the UK. 
From 1996 on, a multitude of deals was done including the Real 
Estate-Backed Whole Business Securitisation of Madam Tussaud's 
Museum, the London City Airport and private hospitals. Above that 
the United Kingdom saw the secured-loan structure spread into a 
segment that did not necessarily incorporate real estate: e.g. 
                                                                                                                                
as well as by real estate are now called Real Estate-Backed Whole Business Securitisations. 
Most of the time WBS transactions are summarized under the ABS asset class. 
1100 The Operating Company/WBS transactions only function under a secured loan structure. 
The true sale of assets would be very hazardous. In this respect only the very favourable legal 
framework in the UK has proven to be feasible for Operating Company/WBS deals in Europe. 
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Nomura’s ‘Angel Train Securitisation’ or ‘Isle of Wight ferries’ – a 
ferry operator.1101 
2. Multi-borrower (European) Conduit transactions 1102 
Following the Operating company transactions came the Multi-
Borrower Conduit transactions. Those tried to replicate the US style 
Conduit-CMBS that were developing in the US at the time.1103 In the 
beginning several issuers attempted multi-borrower CMBS but the 
success was limited. The earliest issues were done in 1995 and 
1996. Until 1999 there were only 8 Conduit CMBS issuances 
totalling €1.9 billion. 
The environment at the time was not favourable for such 
transactions. Many institutions believed that Conduit CMBS pools 
were not economically feasible, given the tight mortgage spreads 
and the wide CMBS issuance spreads. The tight mortgage spreads 
were blamed on European banks that had liberal capital allocation 
rules for commercial mortgages. But, as this factor disappeared with 
the increasing alignment of European Union banking legislation, 
continuing banking consolidation and the Basel Capital Accord, the 
transaction became more favourable at the end of the 1990’s. So 
investment banks started set up continuously issuing European 
Conduits – the biggest ones include programs at Morgan Stanley, 
Lehman Brothers, and Deutsche Bank, but there are are at least 
another seven institutional firms committing resources to building 
their own CMBS platforms for recurring issuance.1104 
                                            
1101 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 459. 
1102 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 763. 
1103 Part of the reason why those transactions are called European Conduit CMBS and not just 
Conduit-CMBS is that this transaction scheme has developed itself differently from the US 
CMBS-Conduit. Instead of originating small commercial mortgage loans those conduits have 
started to accumulate and securitise large commercial mortgage loans. Hence, European 
Conduits have been adapted to the specific needs of the respective region. 
1104 Cf. Hunt (2004), p. 2. 
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Until 2004 there have 31 Multi-Borrower European Conduit CMBS 
transactions (totalling €15.9 billion) been executed in the European 
Market. 1105 
3. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower transactions 
In total, the issuances of Operating Company/RE WBS and Multi-
Borrower CMBS compared to the total amount of Asset-Backed 
Securitisation issuances was very small and the issues were rather 
sporadic. Moreover, since there was a limited number of operating 
companies and Conduit transaction that did not turn out to do well, 
the focus of the UK market for public real estate financing shifted to 
single asset/single borrower transactions with great collateral or 
good credit.1106 
On 06 November 1996, Annington Finance No. 1 became the first 
big Single Borrower CMBS issuance in Europe. Annington Property 
Limited (APL) purchased 57,443 residential properties from the 
Secretary of State for Defence. The units made up the majority of 
the Armed Forces Married Quarters Estate in England and Wales. 
The majority of properties (approx. 55,000) was subsequently 
leased back to the Ministry of Defence. The issued fixed rate notes 
and bonds were backed by this secured rental stream from leases 
entered into between APL and the Secretary of State for Defence of 
the United Kingdom. So, in essence this was a true Real Estate 
Securitisation on the basis of a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
transaction scheme.1107 
The structure of this transaction became the role model for most of 
the subsequent Single Asset/Single Borrower transactions. 
Payment of the issued securities was supported by the repayments 
of principal and interest due under a loan made by the issuer 
(Annington Finance No.1) to Annington Property Limited (APL). The 
                                            
1105 Cf. List of European CMBS transactions (1996-2004), Chart 18 - Chart 21, pp. 388-391. 
1106 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 765. 
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loan proceeds were used by APL to purchase the Married Quarters 
Estate, comprising residential housing for service personnel. The 
Secretary of State leased back a portion of the estate for continued 
use by the Ministry of Defence. Under the arrangements, the 
Secretary of State guaranteed the payments. The high investment 
grade ratings (AAA) were based on the UK government’s credit, the 
likelihood of the obligation being paid back, and the legal structure 
of the transaction.1108 
So, the Single Asset/Single Borrower segment started only in 1996 
with one transaction and in 1997 there were already 8 transactions 
(including big ones Mooncrest Funding, La Defense, Canary Wharf 
and Annington Finance No.4) totalling €6.7 billion.1109 
These first transactions were based almost entirely on the credit 
rating of a single tenant or entity (similar to the US Credit Tenant 
Lease Securitisation concept). The reason, why single asset deals 
became a success was that, in late 1996/early 1997, single-asset 
CMBS issues achieved significant financing cost advantages versus 
traditional mortgage lending rates. Single-asset transactions have 
been favourable in those cases when the underlying assets were 
too large for anyone lender to finance, leaving the CMBS market as 
the most efficient method of financing. The transactions have all 
been backed by strong investment grade credit or trophy assets and 
prime real estate, which real estate lenders view as stable and safe 
                                                                                                                                
1107 Cf. Moody's Investor Service (1996), p. 1; Mortimer and Corpet (2004a), p. 1. 
1108 Further funds were raised by Aninngton Finance No. 4 in December 1997, February 2002, 
and July 2004. The same properties as in Annington Finance No. 1 were used for those 
issuances. The bonds were backed by (i) Ministry of Defence rents in excess of the 
guaranteed payments, (ii) disposal proceeds from the sale of properties released and (iii) the 
property value of the residual estate. Cf. Drevon (1997), p. 1; Lindstrom and Breda (2002), p. 
2; Mortimer (2004), p. 1; Mortimer and Corpet (2004b), p. 1. 
1109 Cf. Chart 18: List of European CMBS Transactions (1996-1999), p. 388. 
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investments (e.g. Canary Wharf I/II in 1997/20001110 and Broadgate 
in 19991111).1112 
With the successful placement of Trafford Centre in 2000, the UK 
CMBS market moved into a new dimension. It had evolved from 
investing in the underlying tenants' credit rating to relying on the 
underlying commercial property value.1113 
Today Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS are the strongest 
transaction scheme among European CMBS. Until November 2004, 
there have been 80 transactions totalling a New Issuance Volume of 
€60.6 billion.1114 
As with the overall evolution of Asset-Securitisation and the initiation of other 
sub-asset classes, the first Real Estate Securitisation transactions were 
executed in the UK. As the transaction schemes proofed to be profitable and 
ripe, they were multiplied all over Europe. 
Therefore, the evolution of the European CMBS market started in the UK 
during the mid-1990’s with a limited number of Operating Company/WBS 
and Multi-Borrower Conduit transactions. However, the true inception of the 
European CMBS market was 1997, when large, one-off Single Asset or 
Single Borrower Securitisation transactions came into being. The engine of 
issuance became transactions such as the Annington Finance No.1/No.4, 
Canary Wharf and Broadgate deals that opened the market.1115 Followed by 
Real Estate Securitisations of large portfolios of former government-owned 
assets in Italy, S.C.I.P. 1 & 2,1116 and large telecom sale-leaseback 
Securitisations in the UK1117, France, Italy1118, and Switzerland1119, the 
                                            
1110 Cf. Toft and Gamm (2000), p. 2; Vrensen (2001), p. 2; Vrensen (2002b), p. 1. 
1111 Cf. Toft (1999), p. 1; Vrensen (2002a), p. 1. 
1112 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 765. 
1113 Cf. Anonymous (1999h), p. 19; Anonymous (2000d), p. 19; Anonymous (2000f), p. 11; Miller 
and Barret (2002), p. 1; Miller and Gidoomal (2000), p. 2. 
1114 Cf. List of European CMBS transactions (1996-2004), Chart 18 - Chart 21, pp. 388-391. 
1115 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 60. 
1116 Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004b), p. 1. 
1117 Cf. Palimeri (2004), p. 2; Pfister (2002b), p. 1. 
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market got lifted off the ground. The development of new issuance volumes
over time can be observed in Figure 23: European CMBS - New Issuance
(1996-2004).1120
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Figure 23: European CMBS - New Issuance (1996-2004) Source: Authors Compilation
As CMBS lenders and arrangers spread across Europe, they often encountered
challenges requiring expanded market-level due diligence, greater legal due
diligence, and new ways of structuring forms of security to address differing tax
regimes and country-specific enforcement procedures. With its great diversity of
jurisdictional issues and submarkets, Europe still stays a challenge for lenders
and issuers in CMBS and Real Estate Securitisations. Nevertheless, as issuers
expand their experience base and deal flows increase, obstacles and timing
delays will decrease. The driving force will become European Conduit taking
away some market share from Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS.1121
“In European CMBS, we expect more in the way of conduit supply from
established as well as new bank issuers. We believe conduit issuance could
be fuelled by funding opportunities in corporate related real estate sales /
leasebacks. Lease Securitisation volumes are likely to depend on whether
                                                                                                                                 
1118 Cf. Pfister (2002a), p. 2.
1119 Cf. Gamm (2003), p. 1.
1120 Cf. Hunt (2004), p. 1.
1121 Cf. Hunt (2004), p. 2.
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Canary Wharf finalises its ownership plans in the foreseeable future, 
allowing the company to return to the CMBS market.“1122 
In the near future, Moody’s expects CMBS issuance to be dominated by the 
UK, Germany and Italy, and synthetic issuance will continue to play a 
reduced role in total issuance. 1123 
3. General Market Overview 
In order to understand the drivers of the market one has to look at different 
segmentations of the total issuance volume. The total issuance at year-end 
2003 was €209.9 billion, and at year-to-date (November) 2004 it was €222.3 
billion. In the following it will be looked at a division of the total issuances by 
Asset class, by Country and by Type of Seller/Borrower/Originator – 
comparing the distributions in 2003 and 2004. From this analysis it will be 
possible to draw different conclusions for the European Asset-Securitisation 
market and for the further development of Real Estate Securitisation. 
Division by Asset Class 
Looking at the two pie charts, it can be derived that the overall distribution of 
asset classes within the Asset-Securitisation framework stays pretty much 
constant over time. Looking at the share of each individual asset class as it 
relates to the whole new issuance the following statements can be drawn 
from Figure 24: European ABS – Division by Asset Type: 
• Residential mortgage loans (RMBS) still make up the biggest part 
of securitised assets, as most Asset-Securitisation transactions in 
Europe are bank-originated. Hence, those transactions are primarily 
balance sheet and regulatory equity driven. Residential mortgage 
loans represent the oldest and most homogeneous asset class in 
Europe, and therefore offer the greatest synergies. Above that 
investors seem to believe that RMBS are the safest haven in the 
arena of ABS. And only products that investors buy get securitised. 
                                            
1122 Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004c), p. 19. 
1123 Cf. Seymour (2004b), p. 3. 
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• The same reason as with RMBS counts for corporate loans and 
corporate bonds (CDO). New Issuance in that segment is also 
primarily bank driven and is initiated by balance sheet management 
and regulatory equity relief. 
• Commercial mortgage loans (including Real Estate Securitisation 
deals) are the third strongest asset class. Being a very 
heterogeneous asset class (as every commercial loan and every 
piece of real estate are different) this market segment is a lot smaller 
than RMBS. Part of the reason lies also in the stronghold of 
commercial real estate financing institutions in Europe. Commercial 
lending is still one of the core competencies of those specialty real 
estate banks. As the market is shifting from credit to capital markets 
this will, however, change and real estate financing institutions will 
become the originators of commercial mortgage collateral for CMBS. 
• Credit Card Receivables and Auto Loans have been a fairly 
constant asset class. Both have been around for a long time and 
have always attributed constant issuances. As the limited number of 
mostly corporate originators are securitising these assets on an on-
going basis, the new issuance volumes are fairly small compared to 
the huge asset base of banks. 
• All kinds of other Receivable Securitisations are summarised under 
Other ABS. 
• Generally, the market is open for new products and asset classes 
as described in the Market Evolution part of this chapter. Those 
include project finance, public sector receivables and all sorts of 
Whole Business Securitisation, inter alia. Investor appetite for those 
newer and sometimes very innovative products for portfolio 
diversification has risen.  
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Figure 24: European ABS – Division by Asset Type Source: Deutsche Bank1124 
Going forward it is evident that residential mortgage loans and corporate 
loans/bonds will stay the most dominant assets. This can be primarily 
explained by the importance of Asset-Securitisation as a funding tool for 
banks. 
Division by Country 
• The UK is not only the oldest market in Europe, but is also the 
biggest Asset-Securitisation market in Europe. Today, the UK is even 
the largest Securitisation market outside of the United States. It has 
firmly established itself as a viable source of funds and as a balance 
sheet management tool for many UK corporates and banks. The UK 
will continue to be the largest market for securitised transactions in 
Europe for the foreseeable future. 
• The UK is followed by Italy that has been a strong issuer for the last 
4 years. Especially the government driven Real Estate Securitisations 
(S.C.I.P. 1 & 2) have raised Italy’s share of the market in 2001 and 
2002.  
                                            
1124 The data used to compile the ABS New Issuance Volumes and the graphs on Division by 
Asset Type, Country and Originator is based on data supplied by Deutsche Bank 
Securitisation Research. Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004a), p. 4. 
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• With new legislation in Spain and a growing acceptance in the 
Spanish market, the new issuance volume in Spain has increased 
and has made Spain Number 3 issuer in Europe for the first time.  
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Figure 25: European ABS – Division by Country Source: Deutsche Bank
• The Netherlands is keeping on going steady. Primarily fuelled by 
RMBS issuances, the Dutch Asset-Securitisation market has stayed a 
strong investor and issuer market during the last few years – 
especially regarding the small size of the Dutch economy. 
• Germany being a big market for bank driven synthetic Securitisations 
is climbing up the ladder. The new issuance volume in Germany 
would be a lot smaller if only the funded portions of synthetic 
issuances were counted, though. The statistics, however, also count 
the big senior credit default swaps that never get securitised in the 
market, but that are part of the transaction. If only the true sale 
transactions were counted Germany wouldn’t even be on the list as 
there are hardly any true sale transactions in Germany. 
Division by Type of Seller/Borrower/Originator 
As already mentioned above, Banks are still the biggest originator of Asset-
Securitisation issues in Europe. This is mainly due to the fact that Asset-
Securitisation transactions relieve regulatory capital that is very valuable to 
banks. Also, the instrument has come into favour for funding loans. Going 
forward, under Basel II, the funding motive will become even more 
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important. This leads to the conclusion that banks will keep on holding the 
first position in Asset-Securitisations. 
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Figure 26: European ABS – Division by Country Source: Deutsche Bank 
Even though the Corporate and the Public Sector issuance volume have 
sunk, these two originator classes have the best potential for the future. The 
Public Sector Securitisations are weaker, since the EUROSTAT (the 
Department of European Statistics) published the new off-balance sheet 
criteria for European Governments.1125 The governments try to raise money 
without elevating their debt new indebtness. 
Investment and Financing Companies are increasing their influence 
through the repackaging of subordinate Asset-Securitisation tranches into 
new issuances. 
Based on the previous analysis the following primary Asset-Securitisation 
markets in Europe can be identified (ranked in the order of importance and 
size – excluding Germany): 
1. United Kingdom (UK) 
2. Italy 
3. Spain 
4. The Netherlands 
                                            
1125 Cf. Anonymous (2002h), p. 18; Arend and Schuff (2002), p. 4. 
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5. France 
6. Luxembourg 
The identified markets provide the basis for the subsequent analysis in 
Chapter 4.4.3, relating to the Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate 
Securitisation environment in Europe  
4. Outlook for the European Asset-Securitisation market 
General ABS Market1126 
The rating agencies expect to once again see many of the same 
achievements made in 2003 and 2004, only in greater volume. The next 
years will mirror 2003 and 2004 in many ways: an expanding number of 
originators, venturing into new markets and jurisdictions, will explore new 
structuring techniques to circumvent the inevitable road blocks they will 
encounter. All of these factors will continue to make Asset-Securitisations 
challenging for originators, lawyers, rating analysts, and investors, and will 
continue to require great effort and time to bring deals to the market. 
Struggling with and overcoming these obstacles over the past years has, in 
fact, paved the way for the industry's future growth.  
Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
market1127 
As a result of the high issuance year-to-date, and the assessment of the 
potential pipeline for the future, the rating agencies anticipate that the 
interest shown by mortgage banks in accessing the public capital markets – 
especially in Germany – will continue. A greater number of banks will use 
true-sale transactions in 2005. It is anticipated by the rating agencies that 
the increase in true sale financings across Continental Europe will be the 
primary engine for new issuance volume in the near future. 
In summary, the European CMBS market volume in 2004 was higher than 
expected. The relatively attractive spreads on CMBS notes compared to 
                                            
1126 Seymour (2004a), p. 1. 
1127 Cf. Vrensen, et al. (2004), p. 4. 
384 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
other structured asset classes has attracted a significant number of new 
investors into the sector. The expectation for issuance volume in 2005 is 
that it will rise above 2004 levels. 
4.4.2.3 Identified Transactions 
As opposed to the US analysis, the part on Europe will display and analyze all 
transactions that can be summarised under Real Estate Securitisation and 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. First a delineation of transaction 
schemes will help to categorize the transactions. Then a comprehensive list of 
CMBS transaction will be displayed. Finally, the transaction summary will give 
an overview of the market and the market’s segmentation. 
1. Transaction Schemes 
As in the US, most of the different transactions schemes in Europe are 
mortgage loan related, i.e. even if real estate cash flows are sold (as 
proposed by the Real Estate Securitisation concept), they are structured into 
interest and principal of a mortgage loan.1128 Due to that fact most Real 
Estate Securitisation transactions are categorised under the term 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS). As in the US this 
constitutes the generic term for all commercial real estate related 
Securitisation transactions in Europe. Even though not all Real Estate 
Securitisation transactions are backed by commercial mortgage loans 
(S.C.I.P. transactions). By industry standards, they are all categorized under 
CMBS.1129 
Due to a European specificity all Asset-Securitisation transactions (incl. 
CMBS) can be segmented into ‘True Sale’ and ‘Synthetic’ Securitisations. 
Following this segmentation the subsequent transaction/deal 
schemes/types1130 can be identified:1131 
                                            
1128 This is done because the structures that were introduced in Europe in the 1980’s were 
based on the structures utilised in the US. 
1129 Cf. Anonymous II (2003), Interview 21, p. 554. 
1130 The grouping and categorization of transaction schemes is based on the study of the market 
and rating agency as well as industry research material. In the market exist different 
definitions, terminologies and categorizations. Therefore this categorization might differ from 
other industry research. 
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I. Synthetic CMBS 
1. Synthetic Portfolio-CMBS 
There is only one kind of synthetic CMBS: Portfolio-CMBS. The 
originator in this kind of CMBS transaction is a commercial bank or 
a mortgage bank. The sole purpose of the transaction is to sell 
(swap) the credit risk of the underlying mortgage loan portfolio to 
capital markets investors. The concept is based on the concept of 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Credit-Linked Notes (CLN). There 
is no sale of assets and there is no liquidity/funding effect for the 
originator. The sole motive is to reduce the regulatory capital 
imposed by the Basel Capital Accord. 
II. True Sale CMBS 
1. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business / Operating Company 
transactions 
Those transactions are based on cash flows from an operating 
company that are backed by underlying real estate and that are 
structured into a secured loan structure. Operating Company CMBS 
are a European innovation and relate to transactions incorporating 
nursing homes, health care facilities, pubs, Telecom switching 
stations, airports and leisure businesses like Madame Tussauds. 
2. European Multi-borrower Conduit CMBS (Large Loan 
CMBS)1132  
Those transactions incorporate multiple properties and multiple 
borrowers, i.e. a number of large mortgage loans on commercial 
real estate that have specifically been originated for the sole 
purpose of Securitisation. The originator in the case of European 
Conduit CMBS is usually an investment bank, a big commercial 
                                                                                                                                
1131 Cf. Rivlin and Philips (2003), Interview 23, p. 565; Philips (2003), p. 3; Vrensen (2003b), p. 
22. 
1132 Conduit-CMBS transactions as identified in the US part (Chapter 4.3.2) do not exist in 
Europe. The European Conduit transactions incorporate large loans and not granular portfolio 
of small mortgage loans. Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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bank or a big real estate financing institution. Those transactions 
are independent from the originator’s credit. 
3. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower  
This transaction scheme incorporates one property or one borrower. 
Usually the deals are executed as direct issuances into the capital 
markets. There are three types: 
a. Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS – The underlying 
asset is a mortgage loan of a single borrower or on a single 
property. Transactions are dependent on the quality of the 
underlying property and the originator’s, corporation’s or 
tenant’s credit rating. 
b. Multiple Property/Single Borrower CMBS – The underlying 
assets are multiple mortgage loans on multiple properties by a 
single borrower. Transactions are dependent on the quality of 
the underlying properties and the originator’s, corporation’s or 
tenant’s credit rating. 
c. Sale-Leaseback/Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation – 
Transactions are primarily dependent on the property’s tenant 
credit rating and are partly dependent on the quality of the 
property. There are three types: Sale-Leaseback, Built-to-Suite 
and Buy-Leaseback. 
4. Portfolio-CMBS 
The originator in Portfolio-CMBS is usually a commercial or a 
mortgage bank. The issued securities are backed by an underlying 
granular portfolio of bank-originated mortgage loans on commercial 
property. The majority of those loans have not been originated for 
Securitisation and are seasoned loans. Those transactions are 
independent from the originator’s credit and are only based on the 
performance of the underlying mortgage loan pool. 
2. Transaction List 
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The list of European CMBS transactions (1996-2004) displayed in 
Chart 18 - Chart 211133 is not exhaustive, as the market for information 
on Asset-Securitisations is very inefficient and mostly private. Above that 
information from the different sources is not consistent with each other. 
The reason for this lies in different categorisations and definitions of the 
respective markets and asset classes. Even though the main sources of 
CMBS data in Europe have been surveyed for this list, there may still be 
transactions that are missing. 
The data source used to compile the list of European CMBS 
transactions (1996-2004) as well as the CMBS New Issuance Volumes 
(1996-2004) is based on raw data supplied by Deutsche Bank 
Securitisation Research, Moody’s CMBS Research and JP Morgan 
Securitisation Research. This is valid for all graphs and tables in the 
following chapters that relate to European CMBS. 
The analysis has identified 213 transactions that fall into the category of 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation and Real Estate 
Securitisation. It does not include private transactions – only public 
transactions are listed. Furthermore, the compilation only includes rated 
issuances. Non-rated issuances are mostly private placements that do 
not spread information into the capital markets. 
The displayed list might vary from other CMBS ‘New Issuance Lists’, as it 
includes the Italian Treasury’s ‘Societa Cartolarizzazione Immobili 
Pubblici S.r.l.’ transactions - S.C.I.P. 1 and S.C.I.P. 2. In many CMBS 
compilations those transactions are not included as they do not fit into 
the concept of Commercial Mortgage Loan Securitisation and they skew 
the new issuance volumes because of their sizes. The reason the deals 
do not fit the traditional CMBS context is that the transactions securitise 
current income from multi-family and office properties as well as future 
privatisation (sales) proceeds. With that the deals rather feature true 
Real Estate Securitisation than Commercial Mortgage Loan 
Securitisation.  
                                            
1133 Cf. pp. 388-391. 
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# Year Date Issuer Property Type Country Total in Ū (in million)
1 1996 04/11/1996 Annington Finance No 1 plc Multi-Family UK 1,355.7
2 1997 12/03/1997 Care Homes No 1 Ltd. Healthcare UK 155.8
3 1997 12/03/1997 Northavon Office UK 125.5
4 1997 07/05/1997 PARCS Ltd. Office UK 217.0
5 1997 17/06/1997 Acres Mixed UK 191.3
6 1997 18/07/1997 Mooncrest Office UK 207.2
7 1997 19/08/1997 Colisee Mixed France 105.2
8 1997 03/09/1997 County Hotels Group plc Hotel UK 118.3
9 1997 25/10/1997 La Defense Office France 341.8
10 1997 18/11/1997 Canary Wharf Office UK 938.0
11 1997 06/12/1997 Chelsea Village plc Multi-Family UK 123.8
12 1997 15/12/1997 Annington Finance No 4 plc Multi-Family UK 4,710.0
13 1998 20/01/1998 Housing Association Funding plc Social Housing UK 95.2
14 1998 22/01/1998 Haven Funding (32) PLC Social Housing UK 85.4
15 1998 03/02/1998 Quadrant Housing Finance Ltd Multi-Family UK 182.8
16 1998 13/02/1998 Fresenius Medical Care Capital Trust III Healthcare US 381.7
17 1998 18/02/1998 Central European Land Ltd Office UK 45.9
18 1998 12/03/1998 Punch Taverns Pub UK 752.4
19 1998 25/03/1998 BL Universal plc Office Multi 421.9
20 1998 01/04/1998 Sasco Europe 1998-C1 plc Office UK 143.2
21 1998 24/04/1998 Haven Funding plc Social Housing UK 334.1
22 1998 14/05/1998 Sanctuary Housing Association Multi-Family UK 70.3
23 1998 15/05/1998 Haven Funding (32) PLC Social Housing UK 30.3
24 1998 27/05/1998 Northern British Housing Association Multi-Family UK 140.6
25 1998 11/06/1998 Northern Counties Housing Association LtdMulti-Family US 42.2
26 1998 18/06/1998 Summit Finance (Law) PLC Healthcare UK 192.0
27 1998 26/06/1998 Colonnade 98-1 Social Housing Netherlands 147.5
28 1998 03/09/1998 Fennica No 3 plc Multi-Family Finland 334.4
29 1998 21/10/1998 Welcome Break Finance plc (Tap) Other UK 484.5
30 1998 01/11/1998 Haven Funding (32) PLC Social Housing UK 25.5
31 1998 10/11/1998 Colonnade 98-1 (Tap Issue) Social Housing Netherlands 79.4
32 1998 16/11/1998 Premier Pub Finance Company PLC Pub UK 218.1
33 1998 26/11/1998 Roadchef Finance Ltd Retail UK 295.3
34 1998 30/11/1998 Fiorentina Finance Ltd Retail Italy 34.9
35 1999 19/01/1999 Great Portland Estates plc Mixed UK 142.5
36 1999 25/01/1999 Enterprise Inns plc Pub UK 85.7
37 1999 05/02/1999 Care Homes No 2 Ltd Healthcare UK 383.3
38 1999 12/02/1999 Chene Financial Ltd Multi-Family France 228.7
39 1999 16/02/1999 Haven Funding plc Social Housing UK 10.1
40 1999 01/03/1999 South Somerset Homes Ltd Other UK 97.8
41 1999 11/03/1999 Hotel Securitisation No 1 plc Hotel UK 77.1
42 1999 16/03/1999 Tiara Securities Issuer BV Healthcare UK 182.1
43 1999 23/03/1999 La Defense II plc Office France 132.0
44 1999 24/03/1999 The Unique Pub Finance Co plc Pub UK 1,207.7
45 1999 24/03/1999 Catalyst Healthcare (Worcester) plc Healthcare UK 144.6
46 1999 23/04/1999 London Exhibition Centre Other UK 276.8
47 1999 28/04/1999 Asda Property Holdings Plc Office UK 75.9
48 1999 30/04/1999 RSL Finance No 1 plc Multi-Family UK 143.2
49 1999 05/05/1999 Broadgate Plc Office UK 2,343.6
50 1999 06/05/1999 Colonnade 1999-1 Social Housing Netherlands 230.0
51 1999 07/05/1999 Tussauds Finance Ltd Other UK 350.0
52 1999 24/05/1999 Criterion Healthcare PLC Healthcare UK 98.1
53 1999 23/06/1999 Pubmaster Finance Ltd Pub UK 467.8
54 1999 29/06/1999 Dutch Housing Association Finance Multi-Family Netherlands 109.0
55 1999 20/08/1999 European Loan Conduit No 1 BV Office Multi 256.5
56 1999 09/09/1999 Fennica No 4 plc Multi-Family Finland 500.0
57 1999 21/09/1999 Alehouse Finance plc Pub UK 285.5
58 1999 27/10/1999 City Aviation Finance Ltd Other UK 155.6
59 1999 01/11/1999 Paternoster Securitisation No 1 plc Mixed UK 169.3
60 1999 08/11/1999 Care Homes No 3 Ltd Healthcare UK 302.6  
Chart 18: List of European CMBS Transactions (1996-1999) Source: Authors Compilation 
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61 1999 30/11/1999 European Loan Conduit No 2 BV Office UK 570.4
62 1999 05/12/1999 DHB-1 Office Germany 262.3
63 1999 16/12/1999 Kings College Hospital Healthcare UK 145.2
64 2000 08/02/2000 UK Care No 1 Ltd Healthcare UK 381.0
65 2000 09/02/2000 Pubmaster Finance Ltd Pub UK 176.7
66 2000 21/02/2000 Avebury Properties Limited Pub UK 232.0
67 2000 22/02/2000 Trafford Centre Finance Ltd Retail UK 989.0
68 2000 23/02/2000 Morfun No. 1 plc Multi-Family Sweden 121.9
69 2000 01/03/2000 Colonnade 2000-1 Social Housing Netherlands 170.0
70 2000 10/03/2000 Europa One Ltd Mixed Germany 1,345.0
71 2000 17/03/2000 Highbury Finance BV Retail UK 549.1
72 2000 23/03/2000 Peverel Funding Ltd Multi-Family UK 167.2
73 2000 25/05/2000 Canary Wharf Finance II plc Office UK 790.1
74 2000 14/06/2000 Punch Funding II Ltd Pub UK 2,347.7
75 2000 14/06/2000 Integrated Accomodation Services plc Office UK 643.6
76 2000 16/06/2000 European Loan Conduit No 3 plc Office Multi 402.8
77 2000 04/08/2000 Haven Funding plc Social Housing UK 107.1
78 2000 15/08/2000 Dragon Finance BV Retail UK 386.3
79 2000 01/09/2000 Westminster Priory Healthcare Finance LtdHealthcare UK 180.0
80 2000 14/09/2000 Monument Securitisation No 1 plc Mixed UK 637.0
81 2000 25/09/2000 European Loan Conduit No 4 plc Office UK 764.3
82 2000 06/10/2000 Fennica No 5 plc Multi-Family Finland 800.0
83 2000 18/10/2000 Punch Taverns Finance plc Pub UK 425.0
84 2000 01/11/2000 Really Useful Theatres Finance Ltd Other UK 144.5
85 2000 15/11/2000 Colonnade 2000-1 Social Housing Netherlands 90.0
86 2001 01/02/2001 Enterprise Inns plc Pub UK 197.6
87 2001 15/02/2001 Canary Wharf Finance plc Office UK 187.9
88 2001 27/02/2001 Unique Pub Finance Co plc Pub UK 534.4
89 2001 28/02/2001 Store Finance plc Retail UK 478.5
90 2001 23/03/2001 Silver No 1 plc Healthcare UK 417.7
91 2001 30/03/2001 Europa Two Ltd Mixed Germany 1,531.0
92 2001 02/03/2001 European Loan Conduit No 5 plc Mixed UK 844.2
93 2001 26/04/2001 Pan-European Industrial Properties Series Industrial UK 213.8
94 2001 30/05/2001 Sunderland (SHG) Finance plc Social Housing UK 397.1
95 2001 31/05/2001 Canary Wharf Finance II plc Office UK 1,451.4
96 2001 07/06/2001 Global Hotel One Ltd Hotel Multi 298.4
97 2001 15/06/2001 Werretown Supermarkets Securitisation plcRetail UK 935.1
98 2001 19/06/2001 Powerhouse Finance Multi-Family France 690.8
99 2001 05/07/2001 European Loan Conduit No 6 plc Office UK 755.4
100 2001 23/07/2001 Alehouse Finance plc (Tap) Pub UK 56.5
101 2001 25/07/2001 Housing Association Funding plc Social Housing UK 46.0
102 2001 06/08/2001 Bromios (European Loan Conduit No 7) plcOffice UK 551.6
103 2001 21/08/2001 EUROHYPO AG Office Germany 351.0
104 2001 10/09/2001 Colonnade Securities BV Social Housing Netherlands 210.0
105 2001 20/09/2001 Framtiden Residential Housing Finance NoMulti-Family Sweden 260.0
106 2001 24/10/2001 Fennica No 6 plc Multi-Family Finland 500.0
107 2001 09/11/2001 Dutch Care 2001 - I BV Healthcare Netherlands 257.0
108 2001 22/11/2001 Coronis (European Loan Conduit No 8) plcOffice UK 883.9
109 2001 28/11/2001 Meadowhall CMR Finance plc Retail UK 1,325.3
110 2001 03/12/2001 Amethyst Finance plc Retail UK 527.2
111 2001 07/12/2001 Telereal Securitisation plc Other UK 2,866.7
112 2001 10/12/2001 Windermere I CMBS plc Office UK 750.4
113 2001 13/12/2001 Westfaelische Hypothekenbank AG-Dutch Office Netherlands 198.9
114 2001 20/12/2001 S.C.I.P. 1 - Societa Cartolarizzazione ImmoMixed Italy 2,300.0
115 2002 31/01/2002 Ellenbook Developments plc Multi-Family UK 97.8
116 2002 06/02/2002 Enterprise Inns plc Pub UK 451.5
117 2002 11/02/2002 Canary Wharf Finance II plc (2nd Tap) Office UK 2,044.3
118 2002 25/02/2002 Annington Finance No 4 plc Multi-Family UK 994.5
119 2002 20/03/2002 Annes Gate Property Plc Office UK 442.2
120 2002 27/03/2002 Spirit Funding Ltd Pub UK 1,065.2  
Chart 19: List of European CMBS Transactions (1999-2002) Source: Authors Compilation
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121 2002 27/03/2002 France Industrial Properties No 1 SA Industrial France 144.0
122 2002 04/04/2002 Unite Finance One plc Multi-Family UK 446.4
123 2002 22/04/2002 Real Value One Office Multi 199.2
124 2002 14/05/2002 Pan-European Industrial Properties Series Industrial Multi 356.0
125 2002 29/05/2002 Dionysus (European Loan Conduit No 9) p Office France 470.0
126 2002 29/05/2002 Monument Securitisation No 2 plc Mixed UK 631.7
127 2002 10/06/2002 Colonnade Securities BV 2002 Social Housing Netherlands 145.0
128 2002 14/06/2002 Dolerite Funding No1 plc Office UK 764.8
129 2002 02/07/2002 HOTELoC plc Hotel UK 820.1
130 2002 05/07/2002 UK Hospitals No 1 Healthcare UK 694.4
131 2002 27/07/2002 Vesteda Residential Funding I BV Multi-Family Netherlands 1,600.0
132 2002 05/08/2002 Eros (European Loan Conduit No 10) FCC Office France 342.0
133 2002 07/08/2002 Nymphenburg 2002-1 Ltd Office Germany 2,170.5
134 2002 13/09/2002 The Unique Pub Finance Co plc Pub UK 1,354.1
135 2002 25/09/2002 RSL Finance No 1 plc Multi-Family UK 86.7
136 2002 30/09/2002 Duke 2002 Office Multi 813.5
137 2002 11/10/2002 Imser Securitisation Srl Other Italy 1,163.4
138 2002 16/10/2002 Canary Wharf Finance II plc (Tap) Office UK 514.5
139 2002 01/11/2002 Feronia (European Loan Conduit No 11) plOffice UK 525.2
140 2002 21/11/2002 Pubmaster Finance Ltd (Tap) Pub UK 839.2
141 2002 28/11/2002 Tornator Finance Other Finland 370.0
142 2002 10/12/2002 S.C.I.P. 2 - Societa Cartolarizzazione ImmoMulti-Family Italy 6,637.0
143 2002 12/12/2002 GECO 2002 Ltd Mixed Germany 590.0
144 2002 12/12/2002 WuerttHyp EU-1 Office Multi 373.7
145 2002 13/12/2002 Bamburgh Finance No 1 plc Multi-Family UK 317.6
146 2002 19/12/2002 Global Commercial One Mixed Multi 282.5
147 2003 07/02/2003 Annington Repackaging No 1 Ltd Multi-Family UK 843.4
148 2003 10/02/2003 Berica 3 MBS Srl Office Italy 409.7
149 2003 11/02/2003 Romulus Finance Srl Other Italy 1,264.2
150 2003 14/02/2003 Pan-European Industrial Properties Series Industrial Multi 190.5
151 2003 28/02/2003 Gorgons (European Loan Conduit No 12) FOffice UK 339.2
152 2003 25/04/2003 Real Estate Capital No. 1 Retail UK 272.2
153 2003 13/05/2003 Eiger Trust Office UK 699.0
154 2003 14/05/2003 Cartesio Srl Series 2003-1 Healthcare Italy 141.0
155 2003 16/04/2003 Hermione (European Loan Conduit No 14) Industrial UK 423.0
156 2003 30/06/2003 DECO 2003-CIT Retail UK 353.8
157 2003 01/07/2003 Northern British Housing Association Social Housing UK 288.9
158 2003 02/07/2003 Consort Healthcare (Blackburn) Funding plHealthcare UK 92.3
159 2003 04/07/2003 Juturna (European Loan Conduit No 16) pl Office UK 1,175.0
160 2003 11/07/2003 First Real Estate SA Office Italy 243.6
161 2003 31/07/2003 Craegmoor Funding No 2 Ltd Healthcare UK 344.0
162 2003 01/08/2003 Harbour Funding plc Social Housing UK 255.9
163 2003 12/08/2003 Spirit Funding Ltd Pub UK 188.1
164 2003 28/08/2003 Priory Finance Co Ltd Healthcare UK 300.6
165 2003 03/09/2003 Derby Healthcare plc Healthcare UK 593.0
166 2003 10/09/2003 Bramante plc Office Italy 214.6
167 2003 19/09/2003 Iolaus (European Loan Conduit No 15) plc Office UK 544.5
168 2003 29/09/2003 Werretown Supermarkets Securitisation plcRetail UK 41.1
169 2003 17/10/2003 Windermere II CMBS plc Office UK 438.6
170 2003 29/10/2003 Punch Taverns Finance plc Pub UK 1,385.5
171 2003 29/10/2003 Polish Retail Properties Finance plc Retail Poland 74.0
172 2003 30/10/2003 Europa Three Ltd Mixed Multi 322.2
173 2003 06/11/2003 Mitchells & Butlers Finance plc Pub UK 2,768.6
174 2003 12/11/2003 PremierTel plc Office UK 416.4
175 2003 13/11/2003 Paris Residential Funding plc Multi-Family France 964.2
176 2003 18/11/2003 DECO Centro Ltd. Retail Germany 549.2
177 2003 19/11/2003 Opera Finance No 1 plc Office UK 519.0
178 2003 21/11/2003 Khronos (European Loan Conduit No 17) pOffice Multi 335.3
179 2003 02/12/2003 Nightingale Funding Plc. Healthcare UK 342.4
180 2003 11/12/2003 Global Commercial Two Mixed Multi 382.3  
Chart 20: List of European CMBS Transactions (2002/2003) Source: Authors Compilation 
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181 2003 12/12/2003 Coeur Dˇfense FCC Office France 820.0
182 2003 12/12/2003 WuerttHyp F-1 Office France 148.9
183 2004 25/02/2004 La Defense Plc Office France 635.0
184 2004 26/02/2004 Telereal Securitisation plc Office UK 1,458.0
185 2004 27/02/2004 European Property Capital 1 Mixed France 355.5
186 2004 04/03/2004 Business Mortgage Finance 1 Plc Mixed UK 199.4
187 2004 08/03/2004 Windermere III CMBS Plc Mixed Scandinavia 460.2
188 2004 17/03/2004 White Tower 2004-1 Plc Office UK 306.4
189 2004 24/03/2004 Harbour Funding (Tap) Social Housing UK 111.0
190 2004 01/04/2004 Delamare Finance Retail UK 939.0
191 2004 02/04/2004 Midgaard Finance Office Scandinavia 775.0
192 2004 20/04/2004 AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias II Multi-Family Spain 475.4
193 2004 23/04/2004 Vesteda Residential Funding I (Tap) Multi-Family Netherlands 400.0
194 2004 26/04/2004 Alehouse Finance Plc Pub UK 360.6
195 2004 10/05/2004 Sandwell Commercial Finance No.1 Multi-Family UK 373.3
196 2004 26/05/2004 Real Estate Capital No. 2 Office UK 366.3
197 2004 22/06/2004 Castanea One Office Multi 314.8
198 2004 30/06/2004 European Loan Conduit 18 (Leto) Office France 419.4
199 2004 07/07/2004 BBC Pacific Quay Finance Office UK 192.2
200 2004 19/07/2004 Marlin (EMC-II) Office Multi 614.0
201 2004 02/08/2004 Gepralazio Healthcare Italy 150.0
202 2004 04/08/2004 European Loan Conduit 19 (Morpheus) Mixed UK 906.9
203 2004 04/08/2004 Annington Finance No 4 plc Multi-Family UK 1,399.4
204 2004 06/08/2004 Opera Finance Plc (Lakeside) Retail UK 832.2
205 2004 13/08/2004 Nereus (European Loan Conduit No. 20) Office Italy 332.0
206 2004 06/09/2004 Framtiden Public Housing Finance No. 5 Multi-Family Sweden 295.0
207 2004 27/09/2004 Epic (Caspar) Office UK 774.8
208 2004 27/09/2004 PICTS Office UK 223.0
209 2004 06/10/2004 Self-Storage Securitisation Industrial Multi 325.0
210 2004 15/10/2004 Epic Opera (Arlington) Office UK 436.8
211 2004 20/10/2004 Windermere IV CMBS Office UK 646.5
212 2004 21/10/2004 Global Commercial Three Mixed Germany 272.3
213 2004 05/11/2004 Business Mortgage Finance 2 Plc Office UK 214.5
Chart 21: List of European CMBS Transactions (2003/2004) Source: Authors Compilation
 
The interest and principal are implicitly guaranteed by the Italian government. 
So it also has aspects of Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. 
Thus, this transaction list summarises and categorizes all transactions that fall 
under the category of Real Estate Securitisation and Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation (including Bank-originated CMBS). 
3. Market Analysis/Segmentation 
The overall CMBS market (including Real Estate Securitisation transactions) 
has strongly risen from its final birth in 1996 to its height in 2002. Especially 
in 2001 and 2002 the Italian government deals S.C.I.P 1 & S.C.I.P 2 have 
significantly bolstered year-end data, amounting to one fourth of total 
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issuance in 2002.1134 Since then the market has calmed down, but is
expected to get a boost in 2004 and 2005 through an increasing number of
True Sale Portfolio CMBS.
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Figure 27: Distribution of Transaction Schemes 1996-2004 Source: Authors Compilation
Traditionally, Single Asset/Single Borrower transactions have been the
strongest transaction scheme. This makes sense as Single Asset/Single
Borrower transactions feature a lower complexity and given the outstanding
quality of property or credit of the tenant, in the past, they were easier to
place with investors. After a period of constant growth, the share of single
asset deals has been declining since 2002.
The second largest group is Real Estate-Backed Whole Business /
Operating Company Securitisations. This has mainly been driven by the
privatisation tendencies in the UK. The market share of this transaction
scheme is declining, though. And as potential assets in the UK are
diminishing and as this Securitisation scheme is not very feasible in the
other European countries, it becomes inevitable that this transaction scheme
will vanish in the future.
                                             
1134 Cf. Collingridge, et al. (2003), p. 246.
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Figure 28: Distribution of Transaction Schemes (in %) Source: Authors Compilation
The share of European Conduit CMBS as a percentage of total CMBS 
issuance has risen significantly over the past 4 years. Conduit transactions 
have risen to become the third biggest transaction scheme in Europe. As the 
market gets more efficient, issuance get more standardised and Conduit 
sponsors built up a good reputation for their programs (like Morgan 
Stanley’s ELOC Conduit), the Conduit market will become the driving force 
in the development of the European CMBS market. 
Until now Portfolio-CMBS have played a minor role as real estate financing 
institutions have kept the most part of their commercial mortgage loan 
engagements on their balance sheets. In this respect, Synthetic Portfolio-
CMBS Securitisations had a strong increase from 2000 until 2002 because 
this was the time when this risk transfer instrument became popular in 
Germany, where True Sale Portfolio CMBS were legally not possible. As a 
lot of risk has been transferred and regulators are starting to embrace true 
sale transactions, Synthetic Portfolio CMBS will decline and True Sale 
Portfolio CMBS will increase. 
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From a Geographic perspective the UK is still the biggest market for CMBS 
in Europe; with an overall market share of 65%. The Italian CMBS market 
has become the second largest in Europe – this can be mainly attributed to 
the Italian Treasury deals. France, Germany, Scandinavia and the 
Netherlands all have nearly the same share of the pie. 
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Figure 29: Geographic Distribution of European CMBS Source: Authors Compilation 
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Even though the UK is the biggest market in Europe, the total new issuance 
in the UK as a percentage of the total European Issuance is declining. New 
markets in Continental Europe are increasingly broadening their issuance 
base. The UK is losing ground as can be observed in Figure 30: Geographic 
Distribution as Percentage of Total. 
4.4.3 Environments 
The following part will go into the different environments governing the Real 
Estate Securitisation market in Europe. For the Regulatory, Legal and Tax 
environments the important markets identified in Chapter 4.4.2.2 will be 
surveyed to come to a conclusion about the importance of those environments 
for the evolution of the overall European Real Estate Securitisation market. 
4.4.3.1 Regulatory/Legal Environment 
In Europe, the regulatory and legal environments in the different countries set 
the scene for the overall Asset-Securitisation environment. They make up the 
framework for all transactions. As a result, the legal and regulatory environment 
has carried a great importance in the evolution of the Asset-Securitisation 
market in Europe. 
Due to the nature of the legal system in Europe (diverse regulatory regimes and 
different types of laws in every European country), the legal and the regulatory 
environment in Europe merge into one. It is the regulatory institutions that bring 
forward laws that regulate, control and develop Asset-Securitisation. In this 
regard, the market in Europe is fundamentally different from the US or 
Singapore, where the legal and regulatory environments were separate.  
In Europe, the legal framework for Securitisation in any given country is a large 
factor for how much activity can be seen in that country. 
Regulatory & Legal Environment 
In the United States, most legal issues with regard to Asset-Securitisation have 
long been settled and the market has reached a very mature stage. So for the 
analysis of such securities it is easy to focus solely on mathematics and 
valuation. However, in Europe, the legal setup of a deal is crucial. The 
arranging of the deals is complicated and legal fees are the main up front cost 
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for originators. Keeping in mind that bonds are contractual agreements and in 
the case of Asset-Securitisation they become complex contractual agreements, 
then this results in a flood of documents that need to be drawn up by lawyers, 
accountants and tax specialists. In this regard, a really excellent model for 
forecasting cash flows does not help investors much in a bankruptcy situation, if 
the assets and cash flows are not properly secured, due to bad contract 
drafting. So, the legal component plays a very crucial part in European Asset-
Securitisation transactions, and there are three general areas to think about in 
regard to legislation:1135 
1. Type of law (Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, or Napoleonic).  
2. Securing the assets and cash flows.  
3. Local framework for Securitisation. 
In the United States, legal discussions regarding Asset-Securitisation only focus 
around how the asset is secured. The type of law (Anglo-Saxon) and the 
framework are taken for granted. However, in Europe, all three aspects must be 
given close scrutiny. Thus, all three areas will be dealt with in the following 
analysis. 
1. Type of Law1136 
The main types of law in Europe can be broadly characterized into Anglo-
Saxon, Germanic, and Napoleonic law. The financial markets, however, 
tend to apply Anglo-Saxon law as the United States and United Kingdom are 
the strongest financial centres in the world. 
Anglo-Saxon Law 
Anglo-Saxon is only applied in Great Britain, where it has originated. 
Historically, this is also the only region in Europe, where it is practiced. 
Anglo-Saxon law is contract law – there is only a small amount of laws that 
establish a broad framework under which individuals can make heir own 
agreements.  
                                            
1135 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 489. 
1136 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 490. 
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Contractual agreements between parties are rarely governed by specific 
laws and are open to many interpretations. Therefore, in case of 
disagreement, the outcome can usually only be predicted based on case law 
or precedent cases. 
On the positive side, this type of law allows for a large degree of flexibility 
since parties can agree to almost anything that they can think up. Very little 
things are specifically illegal. This is extremely beneficial for the financial 
markets. It opens room for new creations and new solutions. On the 
negative side, this type of approach must try to think of all possible aspects 
and consequences of an agreement and ensure that every thing is 
specifically included in the contract. It creates a lot of paper, lengthy 
conversations with lawyers, and large legal bills. 
Germanic Law 
Germanic law is prevalent in Northern Europe. Various local versions exist in 
countries such as Germany, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Denmark, and Norway. This type of law is the extreme opposite of the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system. The legal framework is very detailed regarding 
many areas of the economy and the financial sector. Contracts between 
parties have to be based on the commercial code.  
On the positive side, the Germanic legal framework provides for legal 
documents to be shorter because detailed law governs many aspects. This 
also means less structuring time, legal costs and effort, once a transaction 
structure has been proven to work. In the case of disputed contracts, there 
is less room for interpretation of agreements. The outcomes are pretty 
predictable. On the negative side, the Germanic law is not very flexible. With 
respect to financial markets and Asset-Securitisation transactions this poses 
a problem. New structures often arrive faster than regulators can amend 
laws to keep up, and thus sometimes financial innovations disappear again. 
Napoleonic Law 
Napoleonic law is a mixture between Germanic law and Anglo-Saxon law. In 
many areas the Napoleonic law is detailed. However, in the whole, there 
tends to be more flexibility and room for interpretation than in a Germanic 
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law system, depending on the country. Countries in this category include 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal. 
2. Securing the cash flow and assets1137 
Asset-Securitisation is based on the transfer of assets from the originator to 
the investors. For the investors the key issue is obtaining the legal 
ownership or the right to the revenue-producing asset. It is this right that 
differentiates Asset-Securitisation transactions from other forms of debt. 
With respect to real estate assets, the basic idea of a mortgage loan is the 
same in most countries around the world. The loan that is granted is backed 
by real estate as collateral/security. So, in the case of the borrower not 
paying the contractually agreed interest and principal on the loan, the lender 
has the right to foreclose into the real estate, in order to satisfy the 
outstanding loan. In Europe, the principle idea is the same as in the US, but 
the details differ widely over each country. The main areas of concern under 
such loan agreements are:1138 
I. The loan contract 
II. The security 
III. The legal foreclosure process 
The main questions with respect to Asset-Securitisation and bankruptcy-
remoteness of the transaction are: 
• How is the collateral secured? 
• If the collateral is seized, does the borrower still have to pay the loan? 
• How does the lender know that he or she has sole right to the real 
estate? 
Obtaining the legal right to the asset is often done via a ‘true sale’, i.e. the 
asset is sold by the seller/originator/borrower to an SPV, which is 
specifically set up for the sole purpose of owning the asset. The true sale is 
                                            
1137 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 492. 
1138 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 471. 
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avoids that other creditors of the originator can access the collateral in the 
case of bankruptcy of the originator. Above that, the sale avoids delays in 
obtaining the collateral in case of bankruptcy. The concept of true sale, 
however, can be misleading. Especially in Europe, with the secured loan 
structures and different legal requirements, it is not always possible to 
transact a true sale. From the US perspective, it is often thought that 
without a true sale, there can be no real Asset-Securitisation. This is wrong 
– the key point is not to have a true sale but to have the cleanest possible 
right to the assets in question. 
This again leads to the question about asset, collateral and security of an 
Asset- or Real Estate Securitisation transactions. The collateral can have 
multiple layers of security. For example, in a RMBS deal the asset is a loan 
that is backed by a mortgage on real estate. The ‘true sale’ is on the loan, 
not the underlying real estate, which remains owned by the borrower. In 
many jurisdictions all over Europe, the true sale of the loan is not possible 
(due to data secrecy laws) or feasible from a cost perspective. So, in those 
cases there is an assignment of the loans to an SPV but the perfection of 
the sale is often postponed until various trigger events occur in order to 
avoid complicated borrower notification laws.  
In the case of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), the legal 
structure depends on the transaction scheme. If the asset is comprised of a 
portfolio of bank-originated loans, then this case would be similar to the 
case of RMBS. However, if the transaction scheme is a Single Asset/Single 
Borrower transaction or a Real Estate-Backed WBS that gets structured into 
a secured loan, then the credit structure and exposure of the investors are 
very different. 
Traditionally, from the US perspective a true CMBS was only considered to 
be a transaction securitising a diversified portfolio of commercial mortgage 
loans from different borrowers. The second case (secured loan) was not 
considered as a true Securitisation but rather as a corporate bond backed 
by real estate. This simple notion is missing the point, though. The strong 
popularity of Operating Company, and Single Asset/Single Borrower deals, 
and the evolution history of the European Securitisation market have 
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proven this wrong. The entire point of a Real Estate Securitisation – WBS or 
a Single Asset/Single Borrower CMBS – is that the structure of the deal 
assumes a bankruptcy of the borrower on the first day of the deal. If the 
deal is stress-tested and structured correctly, then the asset (commercial 
real estate or pubs) should pass cleanly through to the SPV in the 
transaction, be managed by a third party, and thus continue to produce 
cash that can pay off the debt to investors.  
3. Local Framework for Securitisation1139 
In the US exist various trust structures whereby the trust owns the assets 
such as the mortgage loans, and the investors have a direct ownership 
interest in the trust. This concept does not exist in Europe. The SPV in 
European transaction is simply a company, subject to normal company law 
in the respective jurisdictions, but restricted in activity and may be 
exempted from certain taxes.  
Even though most countries have different approaches to legislating Asset-
Securitisation, attempts are being made to facilitate the process, while 
simultaneously ensuring that the transactions are transparent and safe for 
investors. Some countries rely on older laws not explicitly addressing 
Securitisation, whereas other countries have been implementing legislation 
specifically aimed at controlling and ensuring sound Securitisation activity. 
In the following part, the legal and regulatory environment for the leading 
Asset-Securitisation1140 and Real Estate Securitisation markets in Europe 
(as identified in Chapter 4.4.2.2) shall be delineated: 
1. United Kingdom (UK) 1141 
a. Regulatory Environment 
In the UK it is not the issuing vehicles that are directly regulated 
but the originators. Thus, the relevant regulators play a key role in 
bringing transactions to the market. There are also listing 
                                            
1139 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 490. 
1140 Excluding Germany. 
1141 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 28. 
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requirements to meet (e.g. prospectus requirements), as most 
issues are listed  in Luxembourg or London. 
The key regulators of Asset-Securitisation transactions are the 
Bank of England (in respect of UK banks), the Building Societies 
Commission (in respect of building societies) and the Accounting 
Standards Board (for all UK companies, including banks and 
building societies). Over time, aIl regulators have produced 
detailed comment and regulations on Securitisation. However, 
traditionally they allow Asset-Securitisation to develop with few 
restrictions, creating a healthy regulatory environment. 
The Bank of England has taken a neutral stance on 
Securitisation, neither encouraging, nor discouraging this form of 
finance. Nevertheless, it has been very effective in letting banks 
know where they stand. There has been a set of guidelines 
(1989, 1992, 1995) on all different asset classes and transaction 
structures. 
b. Legal Environment 
Generally, there are very few legal obstacles to completing 
Securitisation transactions in the UK, as explained in the upper 
part of this chapter. The flexibility of the UK's common law system 
has generally benefited the development of a strong Asset-
Securitisation market. However, little of the legal theory used in 
many structures has been tested. 
2. Italy 
a. Regulatory Environment1142 
Even though proposals for a Securitisation law were made in the 
mid-1990’s, there were no laws that specifically addressed 
Securitisation in Italy until 1999. Existing Securitisation structures 
had been designed to address particular Italian tax and legal 
                                            
1142 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 498. 
402 4  International Comparison - Validation of Research Framework 
 
issues, and had provided a good set of guidelines for following 
transactions, but without the definite commitment of the Italian 
government nothing came together. 
In 1999, Italy implemented a Securitisation legislation that was 
solely targeted at different forms of lease payment Securitisation. 
Even though this was a step in the right direction, there were still 
several concerns regarding certain points not addressed or 
specified in the law. However, this has not stopped Italy from 
being the second most active market in Europe. With the strong 
involvement of the Italian Treasury in Securitisation deals, it is 
anticipated that future legislation will address the shortfall of the 
current framework 
The Bank of Italy takes a supervisory role with respect to the 
activities of the SPV. As in other countries, the SPV in Italy is not 
allowed to engage in any other activities other than those 
performed to ensure sufficient cash flows to payoff the issued 
notes. In other words, the SPV can only purchase money credits, 
including future receivables resulting from normal course of 
business, issue notes, and ensure the payments on these notes. 
b. Legal Environment1143 
The main legislation governing Securitisation activity in Italy is 
Law No. 130 of April 30, 1999. The main purpose of the law was 
to set out the provisions for the creation of an SPV for 
Securitisation, guidelines for the transaction, and the SPV's 
relationship to other parties such as creditors and debtors. A Key 
issue in Italian transactions is the fact that the SPV is not by law 
constituted as a bankruptcy-remote entity, which constitutes an 
area that needs consideration in future legislation or 
amendments. 
3. Spain 
                                            
1143 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 498. 
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a. Regulatory Environment 1144 
The regulators have generally encouraged the market's 
development, although without being regarded as being too 
positive. The main supervisory bodies are the Bank of Spain, the 
securities market regulator, and the Ministry of Finance – financial 
policy unit. The Bank of Spain produced ‘Circular 4’ on June 14, 
1991 which allowed for the mortgage certificates (Participacion 
Hipotecarias – PH) to be classified as asset transfers and thus 
qualified for off-balance sheet treatment. Further clarification to 
off-balance sheets treatment for Securitisation transactions was 
issued by the Bank of Spain in ‘Circular 7’ of November 13, 1992.  
b. Legal Environment 1145 
The law 19/1992 of July 7, 1992 (regime for property investment 
funds and mortgage securities), allowed for the creation of 
“fondas de titulizacion hipotecaria” or mortgage Securitisation 
funds. The main purpose was limited – to assist in providing 
cheaper loans for the acquisition of homes. This first step was 
insufficient to extend or apply the concept of Securitisation to 
loans other than mortgages. The royal decree-law 3/1993 
enabled the government to extend the scope of the Securitisation 
system to other cover loans and credit rights. In 1994, provisions 
were introduced to allow for the adaptation of regulations and the 
legal system so that both Mortgage Securitisation Funds and 
Asset Securitisation Funds could be administered and managed. 
The latest royal decree 926/1998 provides for the regulation of 
non-mortgage assets through Asset Securitisation Funds and 
Securitisation fund management companies. 
Although Securitisation laws go back a long time, only the Spanish 
regulation changes in May 1998 have achieved the goal to encourage 
                                            
1144 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 761; Taylor (1996), p. 44. 
1145 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 496; Jeffrey (2001), p. 34. 
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both the Securitisation of a wide range of assets and the participation 
of new banks in the Asset-Securitisation market. 
4. The Netherlands 
a. Regulatory Environment1146 
The Netherlands Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 
from 1992, made all credit institutions subject to banking 
supervision and require a license. In 1993, a regulation was 
implemented allowing for exemptions to this law for SPVs that 
met certain criteria. Thereby, the regulators facilitated the 
Securitisation process. In September 1997, the Dutch Central 
Bank, which is the main Dutch banking regulator published a 
memorandum on the treatment of Asset-Securitisation and their 
supervision. This memorandum established conditions regarding 
the ‘true sale principle’, servicing issues, transparency of the 
transaction, credit enhancement, underwriting, and the 
administrative organization. 
b. Legal Environment1147 
Currently, there is no legislation in the Netherlands specifically 
aimed at Asset-Securitisation. This, in combination with the fact 
that assets such as consumer and mortgage loans or credits are 
considered receivables under Dutch law, results in the required 
application of the Netherlands Civic Code to Securitisation 
transactions. There are a number of aspects of the Dutch 
legislation that can create hurdles to a Securitisation transaction, 
although these can be surpassed with certain provisions. But it 
makes the process more complicated. 
5. France 
France, together with the United Kingdom, has one of the most 
advanced legislative frameworks when it comes to Securitisation. 
                                            
1146 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 784. 
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a. Regulatory Environment 1148 
Even though France was the second market in Europe to start 
Asset-Securitisation, it was a slow and hesitant start due to the 
regulatory framework. The French regulatory authorities, 
however, are now demonstrating a much more positive attitude 
towards the concept of Securitisation. Management companies in 
such transactions (Societes de Gestion) are regulated by the 
Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB). With respect to 
those, a decree was published on 01 July 1994, increasing the 
requirements for these companies – in terms of human 
resources, systems capacity, and capital. As a consequence, 
each transaction must receive COB approval before a public 
offering. The system is found frustrating by many market 
participants since it often interferes with transaction timing. 
b. Legal Environment1149 
The specific legal framework for Securitisation in France (Law 
No.88-1201) was introduced in December 1988. The initial law, 
completed by the decree of March 1989, has been further 
supplemented by numerous additional amendments that have 
continuously improved the framework and have clarified new 
concerns not previously addressed. 
Under the law, the previous absence of the concept of trust under 
French law resulted in the creation of a special purpose vehicle to 
facilitate Securitisation, called “Fonds Commun de Creances” 
(FCC). The FCC is not a legal entity, but rather a co-ownership 
that owns a pool of receivables and issues certificates to 
investors. The vehicle is tax-efficient and is dedicated exclusively 
to Securitisation. The allowed assets for FCCs consist only of 
receivables and the cash flows derived from them. 
                                                                                                                                
1147 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 494. 
1148 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 40. 
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The initial government-driven framework has been amended over 
time because shortcomings in the original framework became 
apparent. However, despite the detailed Securitisation provisions, 
including the various amendments, some grey areas have kept 
on existing that have needed clarification over the years.  
Today, the legal and regulatory framework has been clarified so far that 
it is generally favouring the overall market’s development. After a 
number of amendments, the framework has been adapted to fit the 
requirements of the international Asset-Securitisation market. 
6. Luxembourg1150 
Being a common jurisdiction for stock exchange listing purposes in 
Securitisation transactions, Luxembourg has always been a financial 
innovation-friendly country. However, it took until March 2004 for a 
comprehensive law – defining and regulating Luxembourg SPVs – to be 
put in place. The new Luxembourg legislation to facilitate Securitisation 
is a similar framework to the one in Belgium and France – although 
updated and simplified. It is simple, cost-efficient and effective, and 
thereby creates the opportunity for Luxembourg to become a popular 
jurisdiction for Securitisation SPVs. 
a. Regulatory Environment1151 
Generally, there is no regulatory burden associated with the new 
Securitisation law. The Law draws a very clear line between 
those vehicles that engage in the continuous issuance of 
securities to the public and the others (incl. a one-off issuance of 
securities to the public, or the continuous issuance of securities 
not available to the public). 
Only those vehicles, which continuously issue securities to the 
public are subject to prior authorisation and supervision by the 
                                                                                                                                
1149 Cf. Batchvarov, et al. (2001), p. 761; Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 495. 
1150 Cf. Schmitt and Lazard (2004), p. 1; Trichet (2004), p. 1. 
1151 Cf. Schmitt and Lazard (2003), p. 298; Schmitt and Lazard (2004), p. 3. 
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financial sector regulator – Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Financier (CSSF). Regulation of Securitisation in 
Luxembourg is therefore kept to the minimum.  
Prior authorisation by the CSSF is subject to the approval of: 
• the articles of incorporation (company) or 
management regulations (fund) of the vehicle, and the 
articles of incorporation of the management company 
(fund); 
• directors and reference shareholders of the special 
purpose company or management company ('fit and 
proper test'). 
The special purpose company and the management company 
must demonstrate that they have sufficient organisation and that 
they are financially sound. 
b. Legal Environment1152 
The Law of 22 March 2004 on Securitisation amended the law of 
5 April 1993 on the financial sector, the law of 23 December1998 
creating a commission for the supervision of the financial sector, 
the law of 27 July 2003 on the trust and on fiduciary contracts, the 
law of 4 December1967 on income tax, the law of 16 
October1934 on wealth tax, and the law of 12 February 1979 on 
value added tax. 
Therefore the Luxembourg law on Securitisation has been 
designed to meet the expectations of the market by creating a 
dedicated, yet flexible legal, tax and regulatory environment in 
which participants are able to pick and choose the features they 
want to apply to each individual structure. The Law provides for 
added structural flexibility and for legal and regulatory soundness, 
by insulating Luxembourg Securitisation SPVs from bankruptcy 
                                            
1152 Cf. Ministry of Finance (2004), p. 1. 
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and regulatory risks. In this respect the law validates the "true 
sale" character of a transfer of receivables where such 
receivables, subsequent to their assignment to the Securitisation 
vehicle, are transferred to a third party or even the initial assignor. 
The Law excludes the re-characterisation of such transactions, 
for example as secured indebtedness of the initial assignor. 
The Law classifies two forms of Securitisation vehicles: one is a 
special purpose company, the other a Securitisation fund 
managed by a management company. Both have different tax 
implications. 
Key Legal & Regulatory Developments in 20031153 
The year 2003 has marked a key development in the legal and regulatory 
framework. It provided evidence that regulators and legislatures are paying 
greater attention to the growing acceptance of Asset-Securitisation in the 
market. In Italy, for example, legal flaws in the lease Securitisation market 
were expediently addressed by a change in the law. 
But more fundamentally, legislators and policy makers started to accept the 
benefits of Asset-Securitisation to the credit economies in Europe. This has 
been underlined by the talk of a pan-European mortgage agency 
resembling that of the US (the European Mortgage Finance Agency or 
EMFA) and the True Sale Initiative in Germany.  
Most legal developments entailed refinements in existing Asset-
Securitisation frameworks to accommodate changes in structures, collateral 
or issuer types. The only exception was Greece that implemented a totally 
new Asset-Securitisation legislation. 
4.4.3.2 Tax Environment 
As the regulatory and legal environment, the tax environment has also been a 
withholding factor for the evolution of a standardized Pan-European Asset-
Securitisation market.1154 
                                            
1153 Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004c), p. 16. 
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In general, Securitisation structures should aim to be tax-neutral and the special 
purpose vehicles should be tax transparent. However, due to the number of 
jurisdictions, the pan-European market is one of the most complex as there 
exist local regulatory, legal, tax and accounting regimes. Even though there 
exist proposals to harmonise European tax, regulatory and accounting guidance 
to produce a pan-European framework, at present the implications for 
Securitisation in Europe are many and varied and also subject to considerable 
change and evolution. 
There are a number of fairly generic tax issues such as withholding tax on 
interest payments, as well as specific tax issues like stamp duty on assignment 
of receivables, and sales tax on the sale of receivables. However, in most 
cases withholding tax will not be charged where there are double taxation 
treaties. Above that a key issue for the originator is whether the transaction will 
be seen as a sale or financing. This is usually dependent on the accounting 
treatment and will lead to different sets of tax implications. 1155 
In achieving a tax-neutral structure there are two key factors that should be 
considered under any tax jurisdiction: 
• The existence of the issuer and the intended contracts to be entered 
into should not in themselves lead to additional tax costs.  
• Sufficient research and tax planning should be undertaken into the 
tax structures to be implemented, as it is likely that these will be 
challenged by the tax authorities. 
As there are different tax regimes in different countries, the crucial 
characteristics of the tax environment for the leading Asset-Securitisation1156 
and Real Estate Securitisation markets in Europe (as identified in Chapter 
4.4.2.2) shall be delineated in the following: 
1. United Kingdom (UK) 1157 
                                                                                                                                
1154 Cf. Van Drunen and Bull (2003), Interview 20, p. 554. 
1155 Cf. Jeffrey (2001), p. 26. 
1156 Excluding Germany. 
1157 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 29. 
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As a general rule, agencies look for transactions to be tax neutral for an 
originator. Issues in tax law have raised a number of difficulties and 
concerns for UK Asset-Securitisation transactions. Examples are:  
• extracting profit without being assessed to Corporation Tax twice 
• preserving MIRAS entitlements 
• predetermining the tax status of an issuer (investment or trading 
company status) 
• value added tax 
• avoidance of stamp duty  
• the statutory indemnity issuers might have to the Inland Revenue 
for the tax liabilities of other companies.  
2. Italy1158 
In Italy, tax laws generally provide for a range of withholding taxes on 
interest and other payments. To get around this problem, transactions have 
used off-shore withholding tax-exempt conduits. Registration tax (stamp 
duty) is payable on asset transfer. However, execution of the transfer 
outside of Italy can avoid this cost. An exchange of letters (offer letter and 
acceptance letter) can also be used. 
3. Spain 1159 
European resident investors in bonds issued by a Spanish special purpose 
company are exempt from withholding tax on payments of interest on the 
bonds. Only if they cannot certify that they are resident in a European Union 
country they have to pay withholding tax. 
4. The Netherlands1160 
The Netherlands has traditionally been considered a favourable jurisdiction 
for setting up SPVs and Securitisation transactions. The country has 
                                            
1158 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 52. 
1159 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 44. 
1160 Cf. Crans, et al. (2003), p. 301; Kellermann (2001), p. 95. 
4.4  Europe 411 
 
favourable withholding tax treaties on different kinds of payments and there 
is no withholding tax on interest. Transaction participants are also able to 
obtain advance rulings from the relevant tax authorities. 
5. France1161 
Generally the French tax environment is favourable, as the French FCC 
Vehicle is tax-transparent and does not allow for double-taxation. Apart from 
only withholding tax on interest payments may pose a problem to overseas 
investors in the French market. 
6. Luxembourg1162 
The general tax environment has traditionally been very attractive to foreign 
Securitisation issuers, as there is a moderate tax pressure, absence of 
withholding tax on interest payments, no thin capitalisation or debt/equity 
ratio for the Luxembourg SPV and an extended network of treaties to avoid 
double taxation available. 
By the new Securitisation law issued in March 2004, these features have 
been enhanced with further tax advantages for Luxembourg Securitisation 
SPVs, including: 
• An absence of withholding tax on dividend payments; 
• VAT exemption of management fees; 
• wealth tax exemption; 
• fixed capital contribution duty (maximum 1.250 €); 
• investment fund-type income tax exemption available if the fund 
structure is chosen. 
This leads to very favourable tax environment that results in Securitisation 
companies only being subject to regular corporate income tax, which does 
not result in a significant tax liability, and to a fixed capital contribution duty 
(maximum € 1.250). Securitisation funds, on the other hand, bear absolutely 
                                            
1161 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 495. 
1162 Cf. Schmitt and Lazard (2003), p. 297; Schmitt and Lazard (2004), p. 3. 
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no Luxembourg tax other than the fixed capital contribution duty (maximum 
1.250 €). 
4.4.3.3 Accounting Environment 
As with the case of the tax environment the accounting environment has also 
be a hindrance for the free evolution of pan-European Asset-Securitisation. 
Although there are common international accounting guidelines in the making 
that will also apply to Asset-Securitisation in Europe, until now there have been 
multiple jurisdictions with multiple implications for accounting treatments. In 
some countries there have been favourable laws and in some countries there 
have been unfavourable laws. 
As the global market for Asset-Securitisation continues to push out its 
boundaries into new jurisdictions, and volumes and complexity increase, 
accounting and tax treatments become an increasingly important feature to 
consider when determining the appropriate structure. It is obviously important to 
achieve the correct accounting treatment. However, but to determine whether 
the accounting treatment is critical to a particular transaction or not, will proof if 
it is a deal killer or not. In order to understand this it is important to recognise 
the originator’s reasons for the entering into a Securitisation transaction. These 
reasons are usually many and varied, and may not just be simply about 
removing assets from the statutory balance sheet. For regulated entities, often 
the main driver is to free regulatory capital by obtaining off-balance sheet 
treatment from the regulators. Other originators may simply be seeking a 
cheaper or more efficient source of finance, rather than necessarily looking to 
move assets off-balance sheet. Alternatively, the key driver may simply be the 
release of economic capital or to create a presence in the marketplace.1163 
So, the accounting treatment may be important for some originators and less 
important for others. However, during the course of the development of the 
market over the different jurisdictions, accounting has played a major role. 
Following the harmonization pressure in the European Union, the new 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)1164 will become the leading 
accounting framework for Asset-Securitisation transactions in Europe. Those 
shall be delineated in the following. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Accounting standards set the rules by which an institution can account for its 
assets, and determine whether those assets are either on- or off-balance sheet 
and the profits that those assets generate. Even though until now every country 
has had its own individual accounting standards, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) – formerly known as International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) – will become the European Union standards in 2005.1165 Most 
large corporations in Europe have already prepared themselves for the new 
regulations and are now looking at any direct implications with regard to 
Securitisation, specifically the accounting treatment of SPVs of the originating 
company. 
The relevant IFRS standards concerned with Asset-Securitisation, SPVs, True 
Sale and Consolidation are:1166 
• IAS 27:1167 Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for 
Investments in Subsidiaries. 
• SIC: 12: Standing Interpretation Committee on Consolidation of Special 
Purpose Entities. 
• IAS 39:1168 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. 
The main issue for concern is IAS 27, and its interpretation SIC 12, which relate 
to the implicit requirements on consolidation of SPVs by the originating 
                                            
1164 For a more thorough analysis of the international accounting standards, confer Achleitner 
and Behr (2003). 
1165 Cf. Parolai and Paper (2003), p. 14. 
1166 Cf. Barnes (2003), p. 21. 
1167 For comparison purposes, the relevant standards in the United States are FIN 46, and in the 
United Kingdom FRS 5 and FRS 2. 
1168 For comparison purposes, the relevant standards in the United States are FAS 140, and in 
the United Kingdom FRS 5. 
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company. There are two tests determining if an entity needs to be consolidated 
or not: 
1. Ownership test 
2. Control test 
In accordance with most regulations of consolidation, IAS 27 determines that 
ownership of more than 50 percent of the voting rights of the entity 
automatically implies that it should be consolidated with its parent company 
(Ownership test). 
However, according to IAS 27 and SIC 12, ownership alone is neither sufficient 
nor necessary to determine whether to consolidate an SPV or not. Instead, the 
second test focuses around the concept of "control" of the entity. IAS 27 defines 
control of a company as "the power to govern the financial and operating 
policies of an enterprise so as to obtain benefits from its activities." IAS 39, 
control is defined as "contributing to or benefiting from the risks and the rewards 
of the SPV," implying that control s not necessarily determined by ownership or 
voting rights. In general, derecognition or partial derecognition can be achieved 
under IFRS standards, but SIC 12 generally requires the SPE to be 
consolidated. Therefore, these rules challenge the off-balance-sheet objective 
of a typical Securitisation.1169 
An exception to the above rules are multi-seller conduits – SPVs created and 
sponsored by one entity, and used by several originators. They appear to 
provide for an off-balance-sheet solution under the IAS regulation, which mainly 
reflects the fact that the conduit is under "control" of the sponsor, and not the 
originators.1170 
There is no doubt about the fact that going forward the somewhat stricter 
accounting rules must be taken into account during the structuring of a 
Securitisation. The new IAS rules clearly indicate a need to revise the setup of 
each transaction individually. In this respect the arranger plays a crucial role in 
discussing the structure in detail with the originating company’s audit firm in 
                                            
1169 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 501. 
1170 Cf. Barnes (2003), p. 21. 
4.4  Europe 415 
 
order to make sure that they understand and agree to any given structure, and 
propose mitigation for satisfying the auditor, if necessary. Future Asset-
Securitisation transactions will demand careful arranging and structuring in 
order to achieve off-balance-sheet treatment of assets sold to an SPV, if that is 
the motive. The IAS regulations clearly indicate that there is not one definite 
answer on when to consolidate an SPV and when not. 
4.4.3.4 Rating Environment 
“The rating process is of vital importance. Without the oversight of the public 
rating agencies like Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, I do not think the deals 
would have held up during the period of stress. Without agency insistence, the 
deals would not have been structured with adequate coverage to make it 
through the catastrophic-risk period.”1171 
As has been demonstrated above, the rating Environment has also played a 
crucial role in the evolution of the European Asset-Securitisation market. But it 
was not only the oversight of the rating agencies and their rigorousness that 
was important for the development of the market. It was also the agencies’ role 
as a standard setting body for transaction structures that made them so 
valuable. This has been especially true for the commercial real estate segment. 
From the start, all of major rating agencies have been involved in rating UK 
commercial real estate transactions. Due to the heterogeneity of the European 
countries, the agencies had found that they had to adjust their models in each 
European real estate market to reflect the term of the lease, the sharing of 
property obligations between tenant and landlord, the mortgage security, and 
the strength or volatility of the real estate market. In the case of the UK, the long 
lease terms have caused most CMBS issues to be structured to fully amortize 
during the tenant's lease. Hence, the agencies had to focus on the tenant 
default probability, rather than on the balloon refinancing risk.1172 
Due to not widely available default and loss data in most European countries it 
became difficult for the agencies to predict future portfolio defaults and losses. 
                                            
1171 Myerberg (2000), p. 146. 
1172 Cf. Wheeler (2001a), p. 759. 
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Thus without historical data, they used the tenant rent roll to project a 
transaction's cash flow under a set of conditions such as a triple-A economic-
stress scenario, a double- A stress scenario, a single- A stress scenario, and so 
on down the rating scale. The triple-A stress scenario had the toughest set of 
cash flow projection assumptions for tenant retention, rental rate decline, 
releasing costs, property vacancy, and property underlying value. Similar to 
North American guidelines, the rating agencies used a benchmark such as the 
1990-1992 recession in the UK, which may be considered to be a single-A 
stress scenario. The agencies then geared their stress assumptions up from 
1990-1992 distressed property parameters using a commercial property 
valuation data source such as the Investment Property Databank. The resulting 
stressed cash flows were compared to each loan's required mortgage debt 
service to determine if a property has sufficient cash flow to service the 
mortgage. Using this methodology, the rating agencies determined the absolute 
amount of triple-A proceeds that they considered to be triple-A recession-proof 
using their triple-A recession assumptions; the same analysis was performed 
for each additional class.1173 
North American CMBS rating agency methodology, such as stressed debt 
service at an expected refinance constant and stabilized loan-to-value 
calculations, are not commonly used in the European CMBS market. This is 
mainly because the bonds are usually structured to match amortization with the 
longer-term real estate leases. In the case of a Credit Tenant scenario, the 
rating agency simply adjusts the property's default probability to reflected 
corporate default rate of the underlying tenant rating.1174 
4.4.3.5 Investor Environment 
Influence of Investor Environment on early UK developments 
The primary goal of Asset-Securitisation from an investor’s perspective is to 
broaden the investment asset base available to investors. If institutional 
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investors are willing to buy those assets in a specific market sector, then this 
investment instrument will be successful.1175 
This is what happened in the UK in the mid-1980’s, when Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities first came to the market. Those securitised assets 
(residential mortgages) offered good yields on high-quality assets, liquidity, 
diversification, and potential trading profits. In return, such appealing values 
attract new sources of capital to this new market sector, and hence, lowering 
borrower costs and expanding the base market. As this has occurred in the 
United States, it also happened in the United Kingdom and later in the rest of 
Europe, as well. Even investors that had previously not invested into real estate 
related assets were attracted to the UK RMBS and later CMBS market. 
Investors came from outside the UK, as well as from within. It proved itself to be 
an international market with high potential for diversification. Without investor 
acceptance it wouldn’t have come that far.1176 
As the new product spread from the UK over to Europe, Europe the different 
local environments be came a challenge for arrangers as well as investors. As 
they embarked across continental Europe, they often encountered challenges 
requiring expanded market-level due diligence, greater legal due diligence, and 
new ways of structuring forms of security to address differing tax regimes and 
country-specific enforcement procedures. With its great diversity of jurisdictional 
issues and submarkets, Europe has stayed a challenge for CMBS lenders, 
issuers and investors. It took a great amount of investor education to open new 
segments in European sub-markets. However, the advantages of Asset-
Securitisation persuaded investors to invest. As they expanded their experience 
base, deal flows increased and obstacles and timing delays decreased.1177 
Current Investor Environment 
Asset-Securitisation transactions more and more profit from investor 
acceptance as the current investor environment is increasingly driven by the 
                                            
1175 For further information on how investors choose their investment markets confer Schiereck 
(1995). 
1176 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 147. 
1177 Cf. Hunt (2004), p. 2. 
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quest for yield-pickups compared to traditional corporate bonds. Asset-
Securitisation transactions, for example, on the ‘BBB’ level offer a yield-pickup 
of 120 to 140 basis points to swaps, whereas the yield-pickup of corporate 
bonds of the same investment grade only amount to 70 to 80 basis points. The 
overall Asset-Securitisation market has enormously profited by this during the 
last few years and it will keep on doing so in the future. Especially, the RMBS 
and CMBS market that both offer superior collateral for Asset-Securitisation 
transactions have profited from this. 
However, every transaction is unique and has a unique risk-profile. Apart from 
that, the liquidity in those instruments is only acceptably high in the ‘AAA’ 
segment, as three quarters of the overall Asset-Securitisation market is made 
up of ‘AAA’ tranches. Below ‘AAA’ there is only a small, but very illiquid market 
that incorporates large transaction costs. 1178 
So, investor motivation is mainly driven by four objectives:1179 
• The search for relative yield advantage to alternative investments. 
• Investment opportunities for high quality assets and structural benefits. 
• The allocation to property debt without need for origination & servicing 
(with respect to real estate). 
• Risk diversification from other investment products. 
Generally, investor’s can be segmented relative to their different risk/return 
profiles – rating preference:1180 
• Aaa/AAA – Risk averse investors only permitted to buy Aaa/AAA (e.g. 
Structured Investment Vehicles). 
• Aa/AA and A/A – Investors looking for security first with some yield pick-
up. This category is mostly made up of insurance companies, banks, 
pension funds. 
                                            
1178 Cf. Weber (2004), p. 3. 
1179 Cf. Vrensen (2003b), p. 40. 
1180 Cf. Vrensen (2003b), p. 38. 
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• Baa/BBB – Investors are looking for yield pick-up (investment 
managers). 
• Ba/BB – These tranches are less suitable for investors with risk based 
capital reserve requirements. In CMBS, investors include property 
investment companies and property specialists. 
• Unrated or B-Piece Buyers – Investor need to have significant ability to 
analyse and manage risk. This category is dominated by Private 
Equity/Hedge Funds that have adequate resources and know how. 
European ABS - Overall Investor Segmentation
Banks/SIV
55%
Insurance 
Companies
14%
Investment 
Managers
11%
CDO Buyers
9%
Private 
Equity/Hendge 
Funds
5%
Pension Funds & 
Others
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Figure 31: Asset-Backed Securities – Investor Segmentation Source: Moody’s 1181
Figure 31 shows the overall segmentation of investors in European Asset-
Securitisations. Banks and Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV) make up the 
biggest investor group. As banks are also the biggest originator of asset 
collateral, they best know the quality of the transactions and usually buy back a 
certain part of their own issuances. Banks are followed by insurance 
companies, which follow the same goals as pension funds: long term 
investments to match their asset-liability base. Structured Bonds under Asset-
Securitisation transactions satisfy that need. The third main category 
(investment managers, CDO buyers and Private Equity/Hedge Funds) are 
usually investors into the middle and lower quality tranches. They are looking 
                                            
1181 Cf. Vrensen (2004), p. 42. 
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for investment arbitrage and relative value investments. Especially CDO buyers 
are buying up lower rated tranches in order to repackage those into new CDO 
bonds and thereby creating an arbitrage through structuring. 
4.4.3.6 Real Estate/Local/Cultural Environment 
Local/Cultural Environment 
As in the case of Singapore and the USA, the Real Estate Environment had an 
important impact on the timing of the inception of the market. In Europe, the 
situation in the UK residential mortgage lending market in the mid to late 1980’s 
led to start of the Mortgage-Backed Securities market. It was also the real 
estate lending environment in the beginning of the 1990’s that led to the 
evolution of the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities market. The 
Underwriting craze in the late 1980’s and the economic and real estate down-
cycle in the UK in 1989-1992 led to higher lending conditions and to the need 
for certain borrowers to seek other sources of financing. The move towards 
capital-market oriented financing was inevitable, as enormous financing 
benefits (arbitrage) could be achieved.1182 
Local/Cultural Environment 
As opposed to the case of the US, the local and cultural environment played an 
important role in the evolution of the European Asset-Securitisation market. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 4.4.3.1, there are as many legal, regulatory and tax 
environments, as there are countries in Europe. All the environments are 
subject to local peculiarities in each European country. Also the evolution of 
Asset-Securitisation in each country was influenced by the local and cultural 
environment. Whereas the evolution in the UK was driven by the US and 
investors in the issuance were global institutional investors, the evolution in 
France was coined by local issuances targeted at French investors.1183 The 
evolution in Italy on the other hand was initiated by the government seeking to 
reduce its national deficit.1184 
                                            
1182 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 148. 
1183 Cf. Myerberg (2000), p. 142. 
1184 Cf. Anonymous (1998a); Anonymous (1999c). 
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4.4.4 Core Determinants 
The graphs and segmentations  displayed in this chapter (Figure 32 - Figure 44) 
are based on the European Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
transaction list introduced in Chapter 4.4.2.3. As explained above, the data 
source used is based on raw data supplied by Deutsche Bank Securitisation 
Research, Moody’s CMBS Research and JP Morgan Securitisation Research. 
4.4.4.1 Borrowers 
The biggest borrowers or sellers/originators of assets in the European market 
are Corporates and Governments. These deals are usually Single Asset/Single 
Borrower deals in which governments or corporations try to monetize on their 
real estate. Conduits (usually set up by investment banks) and Banks make up 
the third and fourth biggest category. As those deals are mainly commercial 
mortgage loan deals, they function as funding instruments for the originators 
new loan origination. The next biggest category is Real Estate Investors and 
Real Estate Developers that use CMBS as a means of funding their respective 
investments or developments of real estate. The smallest category overall is 
Housing Associations. 
CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Division by
'Seller/Borrower/Originator Category'
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Figure 32: Distribution of Originators in European CMBS Source: Authors Compilation1185
The following statements explain Figure 32: 
                                            
1185 The data used to compile the CMBS New Issuance Volumes (1997-2004) is based on raw 
data supplied by Deutsche Bank Securitisation Research, Moody’s CMBS Research and JP 
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• The corporate category primarily stands for originators in operating 
company deals as well for corporate Sale-Leaseback. 
• Governments in Europe play a different role in the Asset Securitisation 
market than does the US government. The US government is a large 
player in the U.S. market given its indirect support of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac through their unique status as government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs). European government, on the other hand, involve 
themselves in a more direct way because there are certain governments 
that securitise their own assets from residential to commercial real 
estate, to lottery revenues, and even future tax revenues. Government 
Securitisation besides RMBS have often been the catalyst for making 
Asset-Securitisation popular as a funding method within their respective 
countries. From a real estate perspective the best example is Italy. The 
government has securitised rental income and future revenues from 
privatisation of residential units leased to government employees 
(S.C.I.P. 1 & S.C.I.P. 2). On the same page, the British government has 
spun off its military housing by selling it to Annington Property Finance 
that has funded the deal through the capital market (Annington Finance 
No.1 & No.4). So governments play a huge role as direct originators of 
transactions. This trend will keep on going strong as governments 
(including states, counties and municipalities) all over Europe are subject 
to decreasing tax revenues, higher deficits and increased spending. This 
will only be fundable if their real estate gets sold or the revenues 
securitised. 
• Conduit and Bank originated transactions are multi-borrower 
transactions. Traditionally, this segment has been small as discussed 
above, but in the future especially the Conduit business is expected to 
rise. 
• The difference between Real Estate Investor and Real Estate Developer 
is the underlying real estate. In the case of the underlying real estate 
                                                                                                                                
Morgan Securitisation Research. This is valid for all graphs and tables in the following 
sections. 
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being a development that has not yet been finished the company is 
categorized as a developer. If the development has been finished and 
has become investment property the originator is considered an investor. 
Therefore, in some cases companies like ‘British Land’ are considered 
developers and in other cases the same company is considered an 
investor. This makes a difference as the risk inherent in development 
transactions is extremely higher than in investment property transactions. 
Thus, the most development transactions have been big single 
properties that have been leased to one tenant that is taking the risk. So, 
this category primarily relates to deals like ‘BBC Pacific Quay Finance’ – 
a property built for BBC, who also guaranteed the transaction. Those 
deals are primarily based on credit tenant lease agreements and are 
usually built-to-suit deals. 
• Housing Associations have been a strong issuer of CMBS backed by 
housing association loans and social housing. Especially, during the first 
phase of the market they have been strong issuers. The small overall 
share is due to a decreasing number of transactions in recent years. 
Interestingly the CMBS market has not been dominated by banks as compared 
to the overall Asset-Securitisation market. This leads to the conclusion that the 
drivers for the market are different than for the overall Asset-Securitisation 
market. The drivers in the CMBS market are, thus, not the relief of regulatory 
capital for banks but the diversification of funding sources and the need for 
price efficient capital markets funding for corporations, governments and real 
estate players. This leads to the conclusion that for this market to develop 
further the environment for those players has to be made more attractive as 
opposed to supporting bank-originated mortgage loan Securitisation as has 
been done in the case of Germany (True Sale Initiative). 
4.4.4.2 Assets 
The Asset analysis for the European Real Estate Securitisation market will be 
comparable to the analysis in the Singapore part. Four different attributes of the 
transactions with respect to the asset in the transaction will be analysed: 
1. The Type of Asset. 
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2. The Cash Flows Supporting the Bonds.  
3. The Type of Collateral/Security in the transaction. 
4. The underlying Property Type.  
CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Division by 
'Asset Type'
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Figure 33: Distribution of Asset Types in European CMBS Source: Authors Compilation 
The biggest category of assets underlying Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation transactions is ‘Mortgage Loans’ (36%). This asset type 
primarily relates to the Portfolio-CMBS (synthetic and true sale) and European 
Conduit CMBS transaction schemes. Those multi-borrower deals are based on 
portfolios of mortgage loans that have either been originated for the sole 
purpose of Securitisation (Conduit) or that have been accumulated over time 
and that have by chance qualified for Securitisation (Portfolio-CMBS). The 
focus in those transactions is rather the performance of the loans and the 
composition of the portfolio of loans than the quality and the tenants of the 
respective properties. 
The ‘Credit Tenant Lease’ (24%) asset category relates to deals, where there 
is a single tenant in the building that gets financed through a Real Estate 
Securitisation. The lease payments of this credit tenant (i.e. the credit tenant 
lease) constitute the asset that gets rated and securitised. This type of financing 
is often used by supermarket chains or big corporations with investment grade 
credit that use Securitisation to either finance their expansion or to spin-off their 
real estate. 
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‘Current and Future Real Estate Receivables’ (23%) represent the asset 
category for transactions on single properties or multiple properties by a single 
borrowers. The buildings usually represent trophy properties with a mix of 
different, well situated tenants that all have different lease contracts and thus 
different lease maturities. So the focus does not lie on the credit of the tenants 
but rather on the quality of the property and its current and future cash flow 
generation potential. 
‘Operating Companies’ (17%) or the ongoing business operations of a real 
estate-backed business represent the asset category for Real Estate-Backed 
Whole Business Securitisations. The real estate in those cases is not the asset, 
but rather the collateral of the transaction because the business would not exist 
without the real estate (airports, health care facilities or theatres). However, 
what gets securitised are the cash flows from operations resulting out of the real 
estate. 
The example of operating companies or WBS best explains the difference 
between the ‘Type of Asset’ and ‘Cash Flows Supporting the Bonds’. In the 
Securitisation industry this would not be distinguished, but in order to argue the 
case for Real Estate Securitisation it is important to make and to explain that 
distinction. The type of asset relates to the asset that gets sold or transferred (in 
one way or another) to the special purpose vehicle, whereas the cash flows 
from those assets are needed to support the bonds. Essentially, in every Asset-
Securitisation it is the cash flows from assets that get securitised, but it is the 
assets that get sold to the capital market investors (through the SPV in the form 
of bonds). So, it is important to understand and distinguish where the cash 
flows originate from. 
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Figure 34: Cash Flows Supporting European CMBS Issuances Source: Authors Compilation 
The shares of the different cash flow types are the same as in the ‘Asset Type’ 
analysis as the cash flows are linked to the respective assets. Therefore bonds 
that are backed by mortgage loans get serviced through interest and principal 
cash flows resulting out of those loans. Analogous to that cash flows resulting 
out of lease cash flows and future property sales proceeds service bonds 
that are backed by Credit Tenant Lease or other Real Estate Receivable 
assets. Cash flows from operations are the basis for Whole Business 
Securitisations. 
CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Division by
'Collateral/Security'
Strenght of 
Operating 
Company/ Property
17%
Property
23%
Mortgage
60%
 
Figure 35: Distribution of Collateral/Security in European CMBS Source: Authors Compilation 
As described in one of the earlier chapters there exists a difference between 
asset and collateral in Asset-Securitisation transactions. For the case of Real 
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Estate Securitisation transactions the question is: What is the investor’s 
collateral in the transaction?  
This usually results out of the assets that get securitised and it links to the 
problem complex of originator or borrower bankruptcy. In most cases relating to 
real estate the additional security of the investor is a ‘Mortgage’ over the 
property. A mortgage lien is a traditional securing mechanism in real estate 
lending that does not exist in other asset classes. What this means is that it 
represents the most cost efficient way to secure a lenders loan. For Real Estate 
Securitisation, where the asset is a credit tenant lease of future real estate 
receivables, the capital market investor wants to have a security in the case of 
bankruptcy. Depending on the deal structure, this can be the property itself or it 
can simply be a mortgage over the property. If the assets are residential units 
that get privatised over a certain amount of time (e.g. S.C.I.P. 1 & S.C.I.P. 2), 
then the ‘Property’ gets transferred to the SPV. However, if the assets are one 
commercial property complex (Broadgate) that is leased out to a multitude of 
tenants for a long period of time and that stays in the estate of the borrower 
thereafter, it does not make any sense to transfer the property, due to transfer 
tax. So, in this case a mortgage over the property serves as additional collateral 
to the investors. In those cases the cash flows from the property are often 
structured into a real estate loan or a credit tenant loan for multiple tenant or 
one single tenant, respectively. 
As described above, the asset of Real Estate-Backed WBS is the operating 
company, and hence, the security to the investors are two things. ‘The 
Strength of the Operating Company and the Property’ that is used for 
generating cash flows from operations. So, in this case it is a combination 
between the value of the property and the value of future cash flows. 
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CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Division by 'Property Types'
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Figure 36: Property Type Distribution in European CMBS (in %) Source: Authors Compilation 
From a property perspective, the three strongest property types in European 
Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisations is ‘Office’, 
‘Multi-Family’ and ‘Pubs’. The explanation for this is simple. Most Single 
Asset/Single Borrower transactions in Europe are office-related, all of the 
Housing Society transactions were ‘Multi-Family’ and ‘Social Housing’ 
related, the big S.C.I.P. transactions were primarily Multi-Family and the Real 
Estate-Backed Whole Business Securitisations were primarily backed by pub 
operations. The next biggest category is ‘Mixed’ properties, which relates to 
most Portfolio-CMBS transactions that securitised mortgage loans from different 
jurisdictions and different property types. ‘Retail’ was stronger than ‘Hotel’ and 
‘Industrial’ for the reason of the big shopping centre Securitisations (Trafford 
Centre, Meadowhall and Centro) and the supermarket Credit Tenant Loan 
Securitisations (Sainsbury’s, Tesco and Marks & Spencers). For ‘Healthcare’ 
the same counts as for pubs, healthcare facilities were the second biggest 
property type in operating company deals. 
A selection of different Real Estate Securitisations with different assets 
displaying the broad variety of assets will be delineated in the following: 
Annington – Military Housing 
Annington Property Limited (APL) was formed in 1996 to purchase from the 
Secretary of State for Defense of the United Kingdom certain interests in part of 
the Married Quarters Estate. APL purchased the units with a combination of 
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equity, bank debt and a secured loan provided by Annington Finance No.1. 
Annington Finance No.4 is being established to refinance the existing bank debt 
and to provide APL with working capital. APL repays the secured loans to 
Annington finance No. 1 & No.4 with the following sources of funds: (1) a 
portion of rental payments made by the Secretary of State for Defense of the 
United Kingdom, (2) proceeds from disposals of properties over 25 years, and 
(3) refinancing in 25 years, of the remaining properties. 
Unite Finance One – Student Housing 
There was a student accommodation Securitisation in 2002 (Unite Finance One 
plc). The Unite Group raised £273 million primarily through rental income from 
the Group’s properties, for the purposes of debt refinancing, working capital and 
future property development. The deal was secured by the properties in the 
portfolio.1186 
Canary Wharf – Office Development 
In late May 2000, the second Canary Wharf transaction introduced another 
innovative structure that has become a benchmark for Real Estate 
Securitisations. Canary Wharf II followed the initial £555 million transaction by 
the Canary Wharf group in 1997 which, at the time, was the world’s largest 
Securitisation of a single property. The £ 475 million multi-currency four-tranche 
structure in the Canary Wharf II transaction incorporates variable funding notes 
that effectively operate as a revolving loan facility. The underlying asset of the 
deal was the development property and its future rent receivables. 
Italian Treasury (S.C.I.P. 1 & S.C.I.P. 2) – Government Real Estate 
(Housing and Commercial Real Estate) 
In 1999, the Italian Treasury initiated a € 3.5 bn Real Estate Securitisation that 
was the first under a government programme to dispose of real estate with an 
estimated book value of between €15bn and €30bn. This Securitisation, which 
was launched late 1999, involved the sale of a portfolio comprising 27,000 
government-housing properties to a special purpose vehicle owned by the 
Italian treasury. The sale was financed with a bond offering, through which the 
                                            
1186 Cf. Weiffenbach and Ghali (2003), p. 248. 
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government raised 75% of the assets’ gross book value with ‘AAA’ debt. 
Bondholders are entitled to rents on the properties, but will be repaid primarily 
from the proceeds of selling the flats. The deal was followed by a similar deal in 
2002, S.C.I.P. 2. The transactions were just the latest in a series of 
Securitisations designed to reduce Italy’s debt burden to meet the Maastricht 
criteria for European Monetary Union. 
Trafford Center – One Shopping Centre 
In 1999, the Trafford Centre Real Estate Securitisation provided investors with 
the attractive opportunity to buy securitised papers from one of the UK’s 
premier shopping centres. Trafford Centre is a developed site located in an 
excellent catchment area, and before the transaction commenced 98% of its 
space was already let out through long-term lease contracts to a broad mix of 
well-known retailers. The structure was a two tier financing structure that was 
secured by the rental cash flows of the property. Proceeds from the bond were 
used to refinance bank debt, to pay the associated costs and to provide liquidity 
for the ultimate owner of Trafford Centre, the Peel Group. 
Vesteda Residential Funding I B.V. – Multi-Family Portfolio 
This Real Estate Securitisation securitised a portfolio of Dutch residential 
properties owned and managed by Vesteda, a real estate mutual fund. Vesteda 
was created in 1998 following the divestiture of the residential portfolio of ABP, 
the largest pension fund in the Netherlands. The initial portfolio, valued at €3.98 
billion consisted of more than 38,000 apartment units and single family houses 
located in 372 properties throughout the Netherlands. The issued notes 
benefited from a pledge of shares in the investment funds that legally owned 
Vesteda’s properties. The interest on the notes is paid through the rental cash 
flows of the properties. The company’s direct motivation in originating the 
transaction was to refinance an existing bridge loan, as part of its broader 
strategy to refocus its residential property business. 
Schalke 04 – Future Ticket Proceeds from a Soccer Stadium 
The soccer club FC Schalke 04 in Germany has recently raised about €85 
million by securitising their ticket proceeds of the next 10 years in a private 
placement with UK and US institutional investors. The new built stadium 
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functions as an additional collateral for the transaction. The money will be 
invested in the development of a new rehabilitation compound on the football 
clubs property. 
Tornator Finance – Proceeds from a piece of land used for Forestry 
A forestry company called Stora Enso from Finland spun off 600,000 hectares 
of forest to a company called Tornator Timberland Oy, which has refinanced 
itself by issuing notes in a Real Estate-Backed Whole Business Securitisation. 
The revenues that will pay off the bond will come from a 10-year contract with 
Stora Enso guaranteeing the harvest sales for the length of the deal. In essence 
this is a sale of future cash flows from real estate (forest/land).  
4.4.4.3 Motives 
The motives of doing Real Estate Securitisation are basically the same as with 
other asset classes. Real Estate Securitisation constitutes an innovative form of 
financing and the most fundamental question to be asked is: Why securitise?  
Here, the key motivations for real estate companies and corporates to use 
Asset-Securitisation basically remain the same in Europe as in the United 
States: 
1. Cheaper funding 
2. Diversification of funding sources 
3. Balance sheet optimisation – off-balance sheet financing 
For banks that are securitising their commercial mortgage loan portfolios, also 
the selling of risks and relief of regulatory capital are a motive. Here the 
hierarchy of motives also differs from the other originators: 
1. Regulatory and/or tax arbitrage 
2. Selling risks 
3. Cheaper funding 
4. Diversification of funding sources 
5. Balance sheet optimisation – off-balance sheet financing 
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There continues to be a heavy debate in Europe regarding the validity of 
Securitisation as an innovative financing tool. Identifying and understanding the 
originator’s motives is half the battle to completing a transaction. Once the 
motives are identified, the question comes up if all the motives can be 
structured into the transaction. If, for example, the originator's main motive is 
balance-sheet optimisation, special care must be taken to ensure that the sale 
of the assets to the SPV will be characterized as a true sale. However, if the 
originator views the transaction as simply a financing, then the true sale 
character may not be an issue at all, and the focus will be on minimizing credit 
enhancement in order to obtain the best funding achievable. Whatever the 
motivations, structuring in Europe is an open field for innovation. 1187 
4.4.4.4 Transaction Schemes 
The strongest overall transaction scheme over the last 8 years has been Single 
Asset/Single Borrower transactions (51%), by far. This has been followed by 
Operating Company transactions (16%) and European Conduit CMBS 
transactions (14%). The smallest category has been the Portfolio-CMBS 
transactions (synthetic and true sale) both with 9% market share. (Figure 37: 
Structure Analysis – Transaction Schemes). 
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Figure 37: Structure Analysis – Transaction Schemes Source: Authors Compilation 
                                            
1187 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 504. 
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Looking at Figure 38: CMBS New Issuance by Transaction Scheme, it becomes
evident that Single Asset/Single Borrower transactions are losing ground
compared to other transaction schemes. For the purpose of this analysis
synthetic and true sale Portfolio-CMBS have been added into one category, as
in the future the synthetic part of transactions in Europe will decline. This can be
mainly attributed to the developments in Germany and the ‘True-Sale Initiative’.
True Sale Portfolio-CMBS as well as European Conduit CMBS transactions will
lead the way in the future. Historically, the Operating Company deals have been
strong because of the funding benefit, but going forward the number of potential
operating companies that fit this category will decline, as it is only popular and
feasible in the UK. Single Asset/Single Borrower transactions are still going to
take up a big part in European CMBS, but their relative share will decline as the
other (except operating companies) will become stronger. It is already
observable that European Conduit programs are making up ground and the
number of new conduits in the market is also leading to this conclusion.
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Figure 38: CMBS New Issuance by Transaction Scheme Source: Authors Compilation
As in many financial fields, structuring Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisations is both an art and a science. On the one hand,
arrangers have to have a mathematical understanding of the underlying cash
flows from the asset, be able to model the flows, and transform those flows into
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bonds with characteristics pleasing originators and investors alike. However, on 
the other it is not enough to only take a mathematical approach to structuring. A 
Real Estate Securitisation is bound by legislation relating to the collateral that 
can impact both the structure of the bonds as well as the credit of the collateral. 
Regulations pertaining to the originators, particularly financial institutions, can 
create incentives for various types of structures. Finally, the needs and motives 
of the originator as well as the requirements of investors (with respect to asset-
liability matching) can have a large impact on the characteristics of the issued 
bonds. Especially in Europe, structuring takes particular creativity because of 
the differences between legal jurisdictions and simply because the market is still 
relatively new and the assets are mostly heterogeneous.1188 
In order to understand the different structures, it is important to look at the 
different peculiarities in the European market. For this the following part will 
analyse true sale vs. synthetic distributions, distribution of rating agencies, 
distribution of interest rates models chosen, denomination of issued notes and 
the number of tranches in transactions. 
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Figure 39: Structure Analysis – Synthetic vs. True Sale Source: Authors Compilation 
Figure 39 shows the distribution of true sale vs. synthetic transactions. As 
mentioned in the previous parts the amount of synthetic bank-originated 
Portfolio-CMBS is very limited as they are predominantly used in Germany as a 
                                            
1188 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 503. 
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risk-transfer instrument. In all other countries in Europe, true sale transactions 
are feasible and doable – only in Germany there is a tax problem that burdens 
true sale transactions with such high credit enhancements that those 
transactions do not make economic sense. Going forward this obstacle is on 
the best way to be solved as a new law in Germany has made true sale 
transactions possible for bank-sponsored SPVs. 
From a Rating perspective, all transactions in Europe are rated. Looking at 
Figure 40, it becomes obvious that the structured finance rating market is an 
oligopoly. All rating agencies hold about 1/3 of the market, with Standard & 
Poor’s (39%) being the leader followed by Moody’s (34%) and Fitch (27%). 
CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Rating Agencies Distribution
Moody's
34%
S & P
39%
Fitch
27%
Figure 40: Structure Analysis – Rating Source: Authors Compilation
Being the opposite to the US, the biggest part of transactions in Europe are 
floating-rate transactions. This has historic reasons, as the market in the UK 
has always been a floating rate market. Even residential mortgage loans have a 
floating rate charge. Being the strongest market in Europe, the UK is therefore 
also skewing the distribution of interest rates concepts shown in Figure 41. 
Especially in the beginning, transaction were either fixed or floating interest 
transactions. As the market has developed and deals increasingly had multiple 
tranches, for better placement with investors all over Europe, issuances were 
mixed between fixed and floating-rate interest rates. 
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CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - Fixed vs. Floating Issuance
fixed
13%
floating
48%
mixed
39%
 
Figure 41: Structure Analysis – Fixed vs. Floating Source: Authors Compilation 
 
CMBS Issuance (1996-2004) - 
Denomination of Issued Notes
STG
64%
Other
1%
EUR
35%
 
Figure 42: Structure Analysis – Denomination of Issue Source: Authors Compilation 
Looking at the denomination of issued notes it also becomes evident that the 
UK has dominated the European Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation market. The majority of tranches in CMBS transactions 
were issued in British Pound Sterling (STG), only one third was issued in Euros 
or before the Euro in the respective currency of the issuing country. Only a 
small amount of European Issuances was issued in other currencies. 
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Figure 43: Structure Analysis - # of Tranches (in %) Source: Authors Compilation
The CMBS Issuance divided by number of tranches per transaction (Figure 
43), also offers an interesting picture. Generally, at the inception of the market it 
was usual to only issue transactions with one tranche or at most two/three 
tranches. However, as the market got more diverse and sophisticated 
transactions were structured into more and more different tranches. Those 
issuances obviously also had a higher issuance volume as can be observed by 
the comparison of Figure 43 and Figure 44. The gross of transactions only had 
one tranche (62), however, comparing the issuance volume of transactions with 
the respective number of tranches as percent of total issuance volume, then it 
becomes clear that transactions with 5 tranches had the overall highest share of 
all transactions (21.16%). This leads to the conclusion that the complexity of 
structuring in European CMBS transactions is increasing and that smaller 
transactions with just one, two or three tranches are declining. 
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Figure 44: Structure Analysis - # of Tranches (in €) Source: Authors Compilation 
4.4.5 Analysis 
The first Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities transaction in February 1987, 
in the UK, can be set as the inception of the European Asset-Securitisation 
market. Even though it was an early start, the overall evolution of the concept in 
Europe took a lot longer than in the US. As it is the banks that traditionally are 
the first adapters and users of Asset Securitisation, in Europe there were not 
the right implications for this kind of start for two reasons: 
1. The banking industry was highly regulated and protected. 
2. Banks were not under much pressures to achieve high returns on equity. 
Even though, the UK became similar to the US, the overall European market 
was very different from the US: 
• There were no pass-through structures in Europe. 
• Securitisations in different countries and even from different issuers in 
one country could be very dissimilar. 
• There was a huge lack of statistics about default rates. 
After moving starting years in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s the overall Asset-
Securitisation market in Europe has been on a steady growth path. However, 
due to the number of jurisdictions, the pan-European market is one of the most 
complex as, whilst there are proposals to harmonise European legal, 
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accounting and regulatory guidance to produce a pan-European framework, at 
present the implications for Securitisation in Europe are many and varied and 
also subject to considerable change and evolution. 
Who was involved? 
Asset-Securitisation (overall market) 
The beginnings of the market go back to 1985, when Salomon Brothers decided 
to venture into the European market and introduce Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities. Salomon became the innovator in European Asset-
Securitisation as they became the innovator in US CMBS.  
Rating Agencies were strongly involved in the evolution of the market. Standard 
& Poor’s and Moody’s set the standards and adapted the criteria from the US to 
fit European peculiarities. Thereby they facilitated the Securitisation issuances. 
Investment banks and rating agencies have played a crucial role in the Asset-
Securitisation market in Europe throughout the development cycle. They have 
been innovators and drivers for constant change in the political, legal, 
regulatory and investor/rating environment. 
The UK was the first market to develop Asset-Securitisation (1987). France 
(1989) and Spain (1991) were early adopters followed by Belgium and France 
in the mid-1990’s. The Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg only followed in 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation  
In Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation, the UK was not 
only the first market to introduce this product in 1994, but it is also the strongest 
market in Europe with an overall share of 65% of all CMBS since the inception 
of the market. The second largest market is Italy, fuelled by government 
Securitisations with a share of 11%. This is followed by Germany (6%), France 
(5%), Scandinavia (4%) and Netherlands (3%). 
Sellers/Originators/Borrower: 
? The primary originator category is the corporate category (23%). 
Corporations (especially in the UK) have strongly been involved in Sale-
Leaseback transactions.  
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? The second largest class was Governments (22%). Governments in 
Europe played a crucial role not in facilitating the market (as in the US), 
but by being a strong originator of assets in Real Estate Securitisations 
(especially Italy). This trend is likely to rise as governments, states, 
counties and municipalities all over Europe are subject to decreasing tax 
revenues, higher deficits and increase spending. Securitisation is a 
legitimate funding tool in that respect.  
? The third category are Conduit Vehicles (16%) and Banks (13%) that 
both originated multi-borrower transactions. Especially the Conduit 
category is expected to grow in the future. 
? Real Estate Investors (12%) and Developers (8%) also represent a 
growing originator group. Especially investors and developers of large, 
trophy projects will generate funding advantages by using Securitisation. 
? The smallest category is Housing Associations (6%) and that is 
negligible. 
Which assets? 
From an asset class perspective, Europe took the same evolution path as the 
US. First it was residential mortgages and then new asset classes evolved out 
of RMBS. As residential mortgage loans are very small and homogeneous; and 
hence, big granular highly diversified portfolios can be constructed, it is this 
asset class that offers the greatest opportunity. 
For Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisations in Europe it 
would be misleading to just look at the asset. There are four different attributes 
of a transactions with respect to the asset in the transaction: 
1. The Type of Asset 
Biggest category of assets securitised in Europe is ‘Mortgage Loans’ 
(36%), followed by ‘Credit Tenant Lease’ (24%) and ‘Current and 
Future Real Estate Receivables’ (23%).The smallest category is 
‘Operating Companies’ (17%), which is a European invention. 
2. The Cash Flows Supporting the Bonds 
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The cash flows that support the bonds are different in transactions that 
securitise different assets. Hence 36% of all transactions were supported 
by ‘Interest and Principal Payments from a loan’, 24% by ‘Credit 
Tenant Lease Cash Flows’, 23% by ‘Lease Cash Flows and Future 
Sale Proceeds’ and 17% by ‘Cash Flows from Operations’ (including 
lease cash flows). 
3. The Type of Collateral/Security in the transaction 
The difference between asset and collateral has been described in an 
earlier part of this chapter. The primary security in European Real 
Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisations is ‘Mortgage’ 
collateral (60%). This makes sense as many Real Estate Securitisations 
are structured into mortgage loans in order to bypass the transfer tax on 
property transfers. A first lien (mortgage lien) on a property is a legitimate 
and cost effective way to secure claims in Europe. However, in 23% of 
the overall transaction volume, ‘Property’ was transferred. Operating 
company deals that make up 17% of the total volume offer the ‘Strength 
of the Operating Company and the Property’ as additional security to 
the investors. 
4. The underlying Property Type 
The underlying property types were primarily ‘Office’ (31%), ‘Multi-
Family’ (22%) and ‘Pubs’ – a UK specificity (13%). ‘Retail’ (7%), 
‘Industrial’ (2%) and ‘Hotel’ (1%) were relatively small. The strong UK 
market also had an influence on the underlying property types, as special 
property types like ‘Healthcare’ (5%) and ‘Social Housing’ (2%) played 
a strong role. 
Why do assets qualify? 
Underlying real estate generally qualifies for Real Estate Securitisation if it 
satisfies the following criteria: 
• High grade assets/properties 
• Long lease terms 
• Predictable cash flows 
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• High credit tenants 
As a result, the following evolution of underlying property assets in Single 
Asset/Single Borrower CMBS can be identified: 
1. Trophy Assets (Canary Wharf, Broadgate) 
2. Government Assets (Annington, S.C.I.P.) 
3. Corporate Assets (Imser, Telereal) 
What motives? 
Looking at the motives it is important to distinguish between bank-originated 
transactions and others. For banks the primary motives are relief of regulatory 
capital and the sale of risks, whereas for non-banks (including governments 
and corporates) the primary motives were cheaper funding, diversification of 
funding sources and balance sheet management. 
What structures/schemes? 
The study identified 213 transactions including deals that fall into the category 
of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation, 
like the Italian Treasury deals (S.C.I.P. 1 & 2). 
Due to a European specificity all Asset-Securitisation transactions (incl. CMBS) 
can be segmented into ‘True Sale’ and ‘Synthetic’ Securitisations. Following this 
segmentation the subsequent transaction/deal schemes/types can be identified: 
1. Synthetic Portfolio-CMBS  
Only the risk of the underlying loan portfolio is transferred to the 
investors. The assets stay on the bank’s balance sheet. 
2. True Sale Portfolio-CMBS  
The issued securities are backed by an underlying granular portfolio of 
mortgage loans originated by commercial or mortgage banks. 
3. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business / Operating Company 
transactions  
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Transactions are based on cash flows from an operating company that 
are backed by underlying real estate and that are structured into a 
secured loan structure. 
4. European Multi-borrower Conduit CMBS (Large Loan CMBS) 
Those transactions incorporate multiple properties and multiple 
borrowers, i.e. a number of large mortgage loans on commercial real 
estate that have specifically been originated for the sole purpose of 
Securitisation. 
5. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower  
This transaction scheme incorporates one property or one borrower. 
There are three types: 
i. Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS  
ii. Multiple Property/Single Borrower CMBS  
iii. Sale-Leaseback/Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation 
Single Asset/Single Borrower transactions (51%) have been the strongest 
transaction scheme since the inception of the market in Europe. Out of their 
historic position Real Estate-Backed Whole Business/Operating Company 
Securitisations have come up to the second strongest transaction scheme 
(16%). European Conduit CMBS have had a hesitant start, but have been 
catching up during the last couple of years (14%). Portfolio-CMBS have been 
the second largest category if synthetic and true sale transactions are combined 
(synthetic – 9%, true sale – 9%). However, looking at the attributes of synthetic 
transactions this result is misleading. Those transactions have been bank 
driven and especially the true sale deals are expected to rise in the future. 
Overall, 91% of all transaction structures have been true sale transactions, 
compared to only 9% that have overall been synthetic transactions. The most 
part of the synthetic transactions originates out of Germany. Keeping in mind 
that synthetic Securitisations are not Securitisations in the traditional sense (as 
the asset stays on the originator’s balance sheet), this leads to the conclusion 
that the German market is still strongly underdeveloped. 
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All transactions are rated. Standard & Poor’s (39%) leads the market, followed 
by Moody’s (34%) and Fitch (27%). The biggest part of all transactions is 
floating rate interest or mixed – only 13% is pure fixed rate issuances. The 
majority of tranches is issued in Pound Sterling (as most issuances have 
occurred in the UK). Only 35% are denominated in Euro. Transaction structures 
are usually complex and targeted at specific investor groups. As the issuance 
volumes are rising, the number of tranches is also increasing. 
Which role played which environment? 
Generally, all environments had an influence on the market – some stronger 
and some weaker. The overall framework for Asset-Securitisation in Europe, 
however, was not favourable, but quite hazardous. 
• Regulatory and legal environment has carried the greatest importance in 
the evolution of Asset-Securitisation in Europe: 
A favourable environment is a driver for the evolution, a bad environment is 
a total hindrance for the evolution. The legal and regulatory environment, in 
many countries was the most critical evolution obstacle in Europe. 
In the US, most legal and regulatory issues with regard to Asset-
Securitisation have long been settled. In Europe, however, due to a number 
of different jurisdictions, those issues have remained mainly unsettled for a 
long time. The pan-European market is one of the most complex as there 
exist different local regulatory and legal regimes. 
The main considerations that make the market so complex from this 
perspective are: 
1. Type of law (Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, or Napoleonic): 
Anglo-Saxon law (UK) is very capital market friendly. Germanic law 
(Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Scandinavia) is very inflexible 
and therefore represents an obstacle for the evolution of the market. 
Napoleonic law (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal) 
is a mixture between the two previous. 
2. Securing the assets and cash flows: 
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The main concern for investors is how to secure the asset and the 
cash flow in case of originator or borrower bankruptcy. With respect 
to real estate the following issues are important – they vary 
tremendously over different jurisdictions (also depending on the type 
of law): 
? The loan contract 
? The security 
? The legal foreclosure process 
3. Local legal and regulatory framework for Securitisation: 
Even though most countries have different approaches to legislating 
Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation, attempts are 
being made to facilitate the process and to harmonize European 
legislation. Currently, there is no common pan-European framework 
that. Hence, regulation and legislation is different in different 
countries. Some countries rely on older laws not explicitly addressing 
Securitisation, whereas other countries have been implementing 
legislation specifically aimed at Asset-Securitisation. 
The analysed countries offer a diverse picture of the legal and 
regulatory environment in Europe: 
? The overall environment in the United Kingdom was 
favourable. Even though UK regulators were neither 
encouraging, nor discouraging this form of finance, the legal 
environment was very advantageous. There were very few 
legal obstacles to completing Securitisation transactions- The 
flexibility of the common law system has generally benefited 
the development of a strong market. 
? Italy featured a strong government involvement that has 
shaped the legal and regulatory framework to facilitate Asset-
Securitisation for certain groups of assets and borrowers. 
? Spain was an early adopter of Asset-Securitisation. However, 
changes in the regulatory and legal environment were not far-
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reaching enough. Instead of implementing a comprehensive 
legislation, changes came piece by piece. This has been an 
obstacle for the free evolvement of Asset-Securitisation. 
? The Netherlands was one of the countries that has not yet 
introduced a specific Securitisation law. There exist regulatory 
guidelines, but from the legal side only the Dutch Civic Code 
applies. Hence, there are a number of hurdles that can create 
problems in Dutch Securitisation. This has held up the market. 
? Together with the UK, France has one of the most advanced 
legislative frameworks with respect to Asset-Securitisation. 
France was also an early adopter in the late 1980’s, however, 
the start was hesitant and it took long before the framework is 
what it is today. After multiple amendments the framework has 
been adapted to fit the modern international Asset-
Securitisation requirements. 
? The Luxembourg legislation on Securitisation is the newest of 
all European countries, resulting out of March 2004. It is a very 
Securitisation friendly framework that will create another 
promising market segment for the strong financial market in 
Luxembourg. 
Overall, policy makers in Europe are making the right decisions and are 
generally going into the right direction. Especially in 2003, key developments 
in the legal and regulatory framework have happened, which provides 
evidence that regulators and legislatures are paying greater attention to the 
Asset-Securitisation market and what it can do for the overall economy. One 
key development is the talk about a pan-European mortgage agency 
(European Mortgage Finance Agency) that will set standards and promote 
mortgage lending in a similar way as government-sponsored entities in the 
US. 
• Tax environment also had a strong influence on the CMBS: 
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The tax environment has been a withholding factor for the evolution. So, it 
has had a strong influence on the development of the market. However, 
rather on the negative side than on the positive side. 
In general Securitisation structures should aim at being tax-neutral and 
special purpose vehicles should be tax transparent. If this is not the case, 
then Securitisation becomes very difficult and the market development is 
held up. Hence, if the legal and regulatory policy makers decide on 
favouring the legal and regulatory environment, they should also create 
solutions for the tax environment. Only Luxembourg, with the new 
Securitisation law, has created a stringent and integrated Asset-
Securitisation solution over all different environments. 
• As in the US, the Accounting environment did not play such a critical role 
in the evolution as the previous environments, but it has been an overall 
hindrance for the free evolution of the market: 
Although there are common international guidelines in the making, until now 
there have been multiple accounting guidelines and multiple implications for 
Securitisation in the different countries. This has led to a divergence of 
motives in different countries and transaction structures have mirrored this. 
• Investor and rating environment are of vital importance the evolution of 
Asset-Securitisation: 
The Rating environment has played a crucial role in the European Asset-
Securitisation market. They set standards, rigorously checked transactions 
and rated and oversaw them. 
It was the rating agencies’ ratings that gave comfort to investors; however, 
the market go off the ground at times, when new bond issuances were not 
rated at all. So the most important success driver of a new investment 
instrument is investor acceptance. From an investor’s perspective the 
question is if the investment broadens the investment asset base available 
to investors, if it incorporates attractive risk/return ratios and if investors 
understand it. Hence, if investors are willing to buy those assets in a specific 
market segment, then this investment instrument will be successful. As the 
investment base is becoming increasingly sophisticated and investors are 
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more and more getting comfortable with investments in Asset-
Securitisations, investor acceptance of new innovative transaction structures 
and new asset classes has grown. 
Investors in Europe got interest in Asset-Securitisation because it offered: 
? Good yields on high quality assets (attractive spreads) 
? There was a yield-pickup compared to corporate bonds. 
? Diversification benefits  
? Liquidity in the market (only UK) 
? Potential trading profits 
All in all, it is the security of the assets, the spreads and yield-pickups that 
drive investors in Asset-Securitisations. The investor environment is crucial 
to the evolution of the product, but without a good product there is no 
evolution. 
• The Real Estate/Local Environment had different influences: 
The Real Estate Environment had an influence on the timing of the 
development, but it was not such a strong driver as the other environments. 
The different local environments in Europe have led to a multitude of local 
peculiarities. Overall, this has been an obstacle for the standardisation of 
asset classes and transaction structures. Also, this has led to differences in 
structuring between the US and Europe as is displayed by the secured loan 
technique used in many European Asset-Securitisations. 
What were the drivers? 
Europe is diverse – it is more than just the UK. The European market is coined 
by different legislations, regulations, tax and accounting environments, 
economies and localised capital markets. Those peculiarities lead to different 
drivers and obstacles in different countries. In order to show the peculiarities of 
Europe, one has to look at the obstacles first, before looking at the drivers. 
Obstacles 
As CMBS lenders and arrangers spread across Europe, they often encountered 
challenges requiring expanded market-level due diligence, greater legal due 
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diligence, and new ways of structuring forms of security to address differing tax 
regimes and country-specific enforcement procedures. The development of 
Asset-Securitisation was hazardous, due to the following obstacles: 
• Differing legal frameworks. 
• No uniform underwriting standards. 
• No databases with historic performance statistics. 
• In the beginning there was no uniform currency. 
• In most cases government support was very little. 
• Political risk for innovators was large. 
• Markets throughout Europe were small and fragmented. 
• New deals incorporated large legal and structuring fees. 
• Other up-front costs (e.g. for computer networks, research) were too high 
for such small markets. 
The market in continental Europe was also different from the US and the UK – 
for example, multiplying the successful development of RMBS in the UK into the 
other continental European countries was difficult because of the following 
reasons: 
• No special government-sponsored entities to promote mortgage 
financing in Europe. 
• A lack of active specialised housing finance companies. 
• Large domestic covered bond markets. 
• Prepayment Risk was non-existent. 
Drivers 
As with the US and Singapore, when Asset-Securitisation finally got adapted in 
the different countries, the main drivers in most of those countries became: 
1. Government Support – in order to safeguard the banking system 
2. Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch – a shortage of funds available for 
originators through traditional financing. 
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Additionally the introduction of a pan-European currency (EURO) opened up 
local markets and created a pan-European capital market. 
Overall, there were a lot of drivers involved in the inception and evolution of the 
Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities market in Europe: 
• The British regulation on Securitisation has been a driver for the 
regulation in other markets. Many European regulators have looked at 
the views and guidelines of the Bank of England's as the basis for their 
approach to Securitisation in their domestic market. 
• Residential Mortgages became the first asset class within Asset-
Securitisation in Europe – it still makes up more than 50% of the overall 
market. 
The same evolution drivers as for RMBS also count for CMBS. The 
drivers for RMBS in the UK were: 
o Borrower/Originator/Issuer Demand – as banks were pressured 
by Basel I to better manage their balance sheets 
o Investor Demand – there was a big supply of funds that needed 
to be invested and there was not enough supply of capital markets 
debt. 
o Profit Potential – investment banks identified potential profits in 
the market. 
• Innovation is always there, where there are favourable legal 
circumstances – a solid and established legal system as was prevalent in 
the UK in the 1980’s was the seed for the evolution. 
• Enormous growth in the overall European market over the last 8 years 
can be attributed to the following drivers: 
I. The amendment of the legal and regulatory framework. 
II. The introduction of the Euro. 
III. The growing acceptance in the corporate and the banking market. 
IV. The transparency of the market that has been pushed forward by 
the rating agencies. 
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• The drivers for the evolution of CMBS was that the UK real estate market 
offered the best opportunity. It has been established as one of the most 
landlord-friendly leasing markets in the world – commercial leases have 
a contractual term of 15 to 25 years and provide landlords with ‘five-year 
upwards only rent reviews’. This has lead to very stable, secure and 
bondable lease cash flows, which are the basis for a functioning Real 
Estate Securitisation. 
Eventually, the solution of obstacles became the driver for the inception and on-
going evolution of the market. Securitisation has continued to develop steadily 
as a viable funding alternative for European companies. There are good 
grounds to assume that this steady progress will continue. Since 1997, the 
number of originators has grown (including many substantial highly rated 
institutions), along with their underlying motives, asset types supporting 
transactions have diversified, the investor base has expanded to easily absorb 
the increased issuance, costs have fallen, and positive legislative and 
regulatory changes have been seen in different countries. 
What role plays the timing? 
The evolution of transaction schemes came in specific order: 
1. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business/Operating Company Securitisations 
(1994/1995) 
? Assets: First health care facilities and then pubs. 
? Motives: First lower borrowing costs (health care facilities), later 
also acquisition financing (pubs). 
? Timing: Corporate cost of debt at the time was usually higher than 
mortgage finance. 
2. Multi-Borrower Conduit CMBS (1995) 
? Assets: Mortgage loans specifically originated for Securitisation. 
? Motives: Conduit into the capital market – fee generation for 
investment banks. 
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? Timing: Slow start – Market was too immature – European Conduit 
CMBS did not directly get off-the-ground. 
3. Single-Property/Single Borrower CMBS (1996) 
? Assets: First the deals were based on Single ‘Trophy Assets’ or 
Single ‘Investment-Credit Borrowers’ – transactions were based 
almost entirely on the credit rating of a single tenant or entity. In a 
second stage the focus shifted towards the underlying commercial 
property value. 
? Motives: Incurred less costs and had a competitive edge – 
transactions achieved significant financing cost advantages over 
traditional mortgage lending rates. 
? Timing: Transactions were easier to structure and place than 
Conduit CMBS. 
4. Portfolio-CMBS (1997) 
? Assets: Mainly bank-originated mortgage loans. 
? Motives: Relief of economic and regulatory capital. 
? Timing: In times of increasing pressure on return on equity targets 
banks needed to find ways to relief their capital base and generate 
new and higher-yielding business. 
Conclusion: 
Whenever there is a funding arbitrage public real estate debt markets will 
disintermediate private lending markets. 
What else played a role in making the market successful? 
Markets driven by investment banks always develop in the place with the 
greatest potential and the least structuring obstacles – the UK offered the right 
environment at the time: 
o The UK mortgage market had a critical size. 
o No enabling legislation was required. 
o There was no adverse government regulation. 
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o No language barriers existed for investment bankers. 
o Strong investor appetite for capital markets debt. 
However, there were no government-sponsored entities involved as in the US 
(Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac). Thus, the development and the government 
involvement had a different character than the US. 
4-Stage Model for Real Estate Securitisation 
From the preceding breakdown of the Asset-Securitisation framework and the 
analysis of the evolution of Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation in Europe, the 4-stage model for the Real Estate Securitisation 
markets introduced in Chapter 4.2.5, can be adapted to Europe (Figure 45):1189 
Stage 1 (1987-1992): Experimental Stage 
a. New structure development  
i. First Asset-Securitisation in the UK – RMBS (1987) 
ii. First transactions in France and Spain (early 1990’s) 
iii. First Sub-ordination structure in the UK (1992) 
b. Market opening: small market (primarily UK) 
c. Small market volume (total new issuance until 1990 – €10 billion) 
d. Local development (first UK, then France & Spain, later the rest of 
Europe) 
e. High structural uniqueness – Structures were adapted to fit the 
respective market’s legal, regulatory, tax and accounting 
frameworks 
f. High structural flexibility / unstandardised 
g. High costs / expensive transactions (very high structuring & legal 
fees due to different jurisdictions) 
                                            
1189 Cf. Chapter 4.2.5. 
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Figure 45: 4-Stage Evolution Model for Real Estate Securitisation Markets – applied to the case 
of Europe 
• Stage 2 (1992-1997): Ripening Stage 
a. Structure ripening  
i. RMBS market becomes mature 
ii. New asset classes develop 
iii. First CMBS issuances(1994) 
b. Market broadening for Real Estate Securitisation Schemes 
i. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business/Operating Company 
Securitisations (1994/1995) 
ii. Multi-Borrower Conduit CMBS (1995) 
iii. Single-Property/Single Borrower CMBS (1996) 
iv. Portfolio-CMBS (1997) 
c. Growing market volume (yearly new issuance by 1997 – €35 
billion) 
d. Starting internationalisation 
i. Issuances in multiple jurisdictions 
ii. Pan-European Investors 
iii. Rating criteria for each jurisdiction 
e. Still relatively high structural uniqueness, but decreasing 
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f. Relatively high structural flexibility / partly standardised 
g. Transaction Costs are less, but still higher compared to traditional 
bank financing 
• Stage 3 (1997-2004): Growth Stage 
a. Structure evolution/assimilation (pan-European standards) 
i. Standards are set by mature UK market 
ii. Structures get adapted in continental Europe 
b. Strong market growth 
i. Asset base increases 
ii. Issuance activity increases 
iii. Broader originator base (Governments, Corporates, Banks) 
c. Relatively large market volume (yearly new issuance by 11/2004 – 
€222.3 billion) 
d. International recognition 
e. Strongly decreasing structural uniqueness – assimilation of pan-
European best practice structures 
f. Structural flexibility is declining rapidly – increasing 
standardisation 
g. Costs decrease 
• Stage 4 (2004-Future): Standardisation Stage 
a. Structure standardisation (dominant transaction schemes will 
dominate) 
b. Matured market 
c. Large market volume (New issuance will increase further) 
d. Pan-European product 
e. No innovative activity – bulk transactions 
f. No structural flexibility – total standardisation  
g. Costs are competitive to traditional bank financing 
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4.5 Results 
The primary purpose of the international comparison was to find patterns in the 
evolution of Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
markets, and to find out what the typical core determinants are. This was 
achieved by using Singapore, the United States of America and Europe as case 
studies. The results will be presented in the following structure. 
• Market Evolution Patterns 
o Drivers 
o Timing 
o Generalized Market Evolution Model 
• Influence of Environments on the Market 
• Core Determinants 
o Involvement (Sellers/Originators/Borrowers, Others) 
o Real Estate Asset Classes and Asset Requirements 
o General Motives/Motivations 
o Generalized Transaction Schemes 
• Minimum Evolution Requirements for Real Estate Securitisation 
In all three cases the Real Estate Securitisation market and the Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market have been analyzed as one. The 
reason is that by industry definition Real Estate Securitisation is categorized 
under CMBS and in most cases it is hard to draw the line as both asset classes 
overlap. For this reason the analysis incorporates both. 
4.5.1 Market Evolution Patterns 
The whole international comparison shows that markets do not necessarily 
have to evolve and develop in the same act and manner. And above that not 
every market has to be constructed in the same fashion, has to have the same 
transaction schemes, and has to follow the same path as the market in the 
USA. Nevertheless, there are patterns that can be identified in the evolution of 
Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation markets. 
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Singapore is a unique case within the observed Securitisation markets. Here, 
Asset-Securitisation evolved out of Real Estate Securitisation (Securitisation of 
commercial real estate assets) and not out of Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation, as in the cases of Europe and the US. One reason is definitely 
the small size of the city state’s market. Nonetheless, the more obvious reason 
for this is that US institutions (banks/arrangers, rating agencies and investors) 
did not have any influence on the inception and the first two development 
stages of the market. It was a pure local development that only related to the 
general concept of Asset-Securitisation and not to any predefined international 
structures. The European market, on the other side, was initiated by Salomon 
Brothers, a US investment banking firm that had already brought forward the 
US RMBS and CMBS market. Nevertheless, all three markets offer the same 
kind of patterns. 
Europe followed the US path, but the market was different than the US and 
Singapore in another respect. It was highly fragmented and coined by a 
multitude of different jurisdictions, local frameworks and local peculiarities. From 
this case the importance of the right set of environments can be derived. When 
comparing the obstacles for the evolution in Europe with the evolution in 
Singapore and the US, the Singapore market definitely had the most attractive 
and consistent environment that was set in place by a fully integrated 
Securitisation framework initiated by the Ministry of Finance. 
Drivers 
There are common drivers for the inception and evolution that can be derived 
from the previous international comparison 
1. Strong Involvement from the Government1190 
It is important to know the catalyst for a new market in order to 
understand its development. For example, in the United States, the 
catalyst for Securitisation was the US government's goal to encourage 
home ownership, and thus to create a secondary market for mortgages. 
In order to facilitate the evolution of a secondary market the government 
                                            
1190 Cf. Davidson, et al. (2003), p. 447. 
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set up various government and government-sponsored agencies. One 
extremely important result of this government intervention was the 
creation of standards for the secondary mortgage market, and thus for 
the Asset-Securitisation market. This is also the reason why the 
development of Asset-Securitisation has taken longer in Europe than in 
the US. In Europe, there has been no government body to act as a 
catalyst for Securitisation. 
In a few countries in Europe, however, governments have provided an 
important boost to the Securitisation market, but in a totally different way 
than in the US. Governments in Europe have traditionally had a large 
role in their respective economies, from state-owned utilities to banks, 
and even a large ownership in commercial and property. The institution 
of the common European market in the 1990s, the advent of the euro, 
and the resulting stabilisation pacts, have meant that many European 
governments have been faced with a funding dilemma for their state-
owned companies. Their need to reduce balance-sheet debt has meant a 
large amount of privatisation and Securitisation. 
A lack of government support can be a problem for the evolution of 
Securitisation markets as has been demonstrated in the beginning of the 
market in Europe. The result of less government support and the lack of 
government-sponsored entities to promote the secondary mortgage 
market has created obstacles for the setting of standards and the 
evolution of overall Asset-Securitisation.  
• Government Involvement in Singapore: 
Promotion of the debt market – consistent with Singapore’s effort to 
make the city-state a leading financial centre. From the regulatory 
and tax side through the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the 
Internal Revenue Service, respectively. From the originator side 
through its Government-Linked Corporations. From the arranger side 
through the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS Bank) – a 
government-linked bank. 
• Government Involvement in the USA: 
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Creation of a secondary mortgage market through the involvement of 
government and government-sponsored entities (Fannie Mae, Ginnie 
Mae and Freddy Mac) 
2. Financial Crisis 
In financial crisis (e.g. Asian Financial Crisis), governments are always 
concerned about a banking system collapse. In order to safeguard the 
financial system in their respective countries, in those cases most 
governments initiate a wide range of reforms and economic restructuring. 
They open new markets (i.e. Asset-Securitisation) and thus try to take 
away pressure from the banking system. – Example Singapore: 
Following the Asian Financial Crisis the government has actively 
encouraged banks to reduce their exposures to the property sector. 
3. Credit Crunch 
High interest rate environments coupled with a strong demand of real 
estate funding or refinancing, and low loan commitment from the banking 
sector lead to the evolution of Real Estate Securitisation, a public market 
for real estate debt. 
4. Real Estate Cycles 
The state of the real estate cycle has a strong influence on the inception 
and timing of the Real Estate Securitisation market. The downturn in the 
physical cycle followed by a (lagging) trough in the financial cycle are 
drivers for the start of a public real estate financing market. 
When the physical real estate market is in a decline and capital flows into 
real estate are scarce, but real estate companies need to sell their 
assets, or refinance in a high interest rate environment, then this spurs 
the development of Real Estate Securitisation. So, in times where yields 
are low, asset values are high, banks do not want to commit financings 
(lagging down turn in the financial cycle), no investor can afford to buy 
and no asset holder wants to sell, then there is potential for new vehicles. 
5. Competitive Advantage of capital markets funding over traditional 
private market funding 
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The choice of capital markets funding over private funding is typically 
interest rate driven. If a company is using capital markets financing, this 
should be at least as cost effective as borrowing from a bank – in fact the 
average interest rate should be lower, as the transaction costs with 
capital market financings are higher. Hence, if Real Estate Securitisation 
compared to a bank loan is more competitive, then Real Estate 
Securitisation will evolve.  
6. Trend to Disintermediation 
The overall disintermediation trend of traditional financing institutions, the 
thrive for more efficient funding, and thus the shift from credit to capital 
markets drives the evolution of public markets for real estate (debt and 
equity). The general rule: ‘Whenever there is a funding arbitrage between 
private and public markets, public real estate debt markets will 
disintermediate private lending markets.’ 
7. Previous Experience and Investor Involvement 
A history of bond market instruments or other related capital markets 
products are favourable for the evolution of Asset-Securitisation, as prior 
experience can be adapted, investor experience can be assumed and 
best practice transfer can happen. 
8. Policy Maker inclination to creating an Asset-Securitisation market 
A conviction of legislators and regulators that Securitisation is a desirable 
development for the local financial market is a strong driver. If the policy 
makers’ approach is to be oriented at the economy’s higher good, to be 
flexible, and thus to be open to new capital market innovations, then this 
will help the market develop at a very fast pace. The overall benefit for 
policy makers is that public debt markets generally exercise a greater 
discipline than private lending markets. Hence, this reduces pro-cyclical 
loan commitment and the overall risk for the financial system. 
9. Country’s overall Standing  
If a country/region is recognized for its clear goal definitions with respect 
to the government’s influence on the economy, the banking system, the 
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currency and the country’s/region’s reformation ability, as well as its 
continuity with respect to the regulatory system and approach, and the 
legal, tax and accounting framework, then this country is viewed 
favourable by international investors to invest into it. 
Timing 
As most things in the world, the evolution of Asset- and Real Estate 
Securitisation comes in cycles. The inception is dependent on a specific timing 
that relates to the state of other cycles. For the case of commercial real estate, 
the timing is dependent on the state of the financial industry’s cycle (i.e. the 
state that banks are in and their competitive situation) and the real estate cycles 
(i.e. physical and financial cycles). 
The usual sequence in the evolution of an Asset-Securitisation market is: 
1. Financial Crisis 
2. Credit Crunch 
3. Strong Government Involvement 
4. Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation market 
Also, the length of the evolution cycle can vary over different countries as it is 
dependent on the favourability of the different environments in each country and 
on government support. The evolution cycle in the US was a lot longer than in 
Singapore or Europe. The reason was that global Asset-Securitisation started in 
the US with the inception of the Mortgage-Backed Security market. The US 
development could not relate to any other development, whereas the markets in 
Singapore and Europe could look back to the US experience. In addition to that, 
markets with a good, sound and favourable framework evolve faster than 
others, as can be observed with the case of Singapore. 
Apart from that, there is a right timing for the right products. Generally timing, 
transaction structures and transaction schemes evolve in a certain order 
determined by the following questions: 
1. What is most desperately needed to be financed? 
2. What assets are readily available? 
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3. What Structure/Scheme is widely accepted? 
Also, looking at the evolution pattern of transaction schemes it can be derived 
that: 
1. The first transactions that mark the true start a market are always 
property-related, i.e. it is usually a single property or its cash flows that 
get securitised. The properties are usually great properties with 
government or other highly rated credit tenants. Typically, the financing 
volumes are very high and the overall financing offers an advantage, as 
compared to the traditional bank market. – This is considered Real 
Estate Securitisation. 
2. Multi-Borrower and Multi-Asset transactions evolve out of the Single 
Asset/Single Borrower deals. The transactions might still be property-
related, but are increasingly structured into mortgage loans (Large 
Loan/European Conduit-CMBS). – This is still considered Real Estate 
Securitisation. 
3. Bank- and Insurance-originated mortgage loan Securitisations follow the 
second phase. Assets are exclusively mortgage loans that have been 
originated for the companies’ balance sheet. Those loans are sold to 
relief the balance sheet from regulatory equity requirements. – This is 
considered Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. 
4. In a standardized market, Securitisation vehicles for small real estate 
financings are created. Assets are exclusively small mortgage loans that 
have specifically been originated for Securitisation. This requires, 
standardized and stringent underwriting criteria, strong covenants, and a 
functioning mortgage origination and trading market. – This is considered 
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. 
The preceding analysis shows how Asset-Securitisation markets and their 
transaction schemes with respect to real estate develop. The development of 
new schemes does not necessarily mean that other schemes vanish. So, in 
most cases Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation 
markets exist side by side. 
Generalized Market Evolution Model 
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From the preceding breakdown of the Asset-Securitisation frameworks and the 
analysis of Real Estate Securitisation in the respective countries, a ‘4-stage 
Evolution Model for Real Estate Securitisation Markets can be derived’: 
Stage 1: Experimental Stage 
a. New structure development  
b. Market opening: small market  
c. Small market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Local development 
e. High structural uniqueness – very strong innovative activity 
f. High structural flexibility / unstandardised 
g. High costs / expensive transactions (high interest expenses & very high 
structuring fees) 
Experimental Stage
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
Ripening Stage
Growth Stage
Standardisation Stage
Market
Sophistication
High
Structural Uniqueness
Begin
Stage1
TimeBegin 
Stage 2
Begin
Stage 3
Begin
Stage 4
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Figure 46: 4-Stage Evolution Model for Real Estate Securitisation Markets 
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Stage 2: Ripening Stage 
a. Structure ripening/enhancement (still unique, but rethought and adapted) 
b. Market broadening 
c. Growing market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Starting internationalisation 
e. Still relatively high structural uniqueness, but decreasing – innovative 
activity still strong 
f. Relatively high structural flexibility / partly standardised 
g. Costs are less, but still higher compared to traditional bank financing 
Stage 3: Growth Stage 
a. Structure evolution/assimilation (international standards) 
b. Strong market growth 
c. Relatively large market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. International recognition 
e. Strongly decreasing structural uniqueness – slow innovative activity, 
assimilation to internationally recognised structures 
f. Structural flexibility is declining rapidly – increasing standardisation 
g. Costs decrease and can compete with traditional bank financing 
Stage 4: Standardisation Stage 
a. Structure standardisation (all transactions are the same) 
b. Matured market 
c. Large market volume (i.e. new issuance) 
d. Global product 
e. No innovative activity – bulk transactions 
f. No structural flexibility – total standardisation / high covenants for 
borrowers/originators 
g. Costs are lower than with traditional bank financing 
Generally, markets with strong government involvement and a favourable 
framework that is embracing Asset-Securitisation grow and evolve faster and 
stronger. As a result, it must be in policy makers’ best interest to guarantee an 
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effective framework for Asset-Securitisation if they want to strengthen the local 
financial system and the most efficient allocation of capital. 
4.5.2 Influence of Environments on the Market 
Each of the environments identified in the theoretical framework for Asset- and 
Real Estate Securitisation markets had a different influence on the respective 
markets – sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker. Generally, however, it is 
valid to state that there are some environments that are more crucial to the 
inception, evolution and further development of a market than others. Looking 
at the three case studies one can derive the following statements: 
• The overall framework in Singapore was favourable. This lead to a fast 
evolution of Real Estate and Asset-Securitisation in the city-state. 
• The overall framework in the US is one of the most favourable in the world. 
• The overall environment in Europe was characterized by a lot of obstacles 
and a multitude of jurisdictions – the framework was not favourable. 
1. Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Depending on the country and the general legal and regulatory 
framework with respect to capital markets, the legal and regulatory 
environment can be most important or medium important (but still 
crucial). In the US, most legal and regulatory issues with regard to Asset-
Securitisation have long been settled, before the start of Real Estate 
Securitisation. So, if prior to the introduction of Asset-Securitisation, the 
legal framework has been favourable as in the case of the US and the 
UK, then the environment is not the most important. However, if there is 
no adequate legal and regulatory system in place as in the case of 
Singapore, then the regulatory and legal environment become the most 
important part in the framework for an Asset-Securitisation market. In 
Singapore the goal of the government was to reform the fiscal and 
regulatory system in order to give a freer rein to the market dynamics. 
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2. Tax Environment 
The tax environment is crucial for the success of the market. Even if the 
regulatory and legal environment might be good, if the tax environment is 
unfavourable, it will hold the market up or even choke the market.  
In general Securitisation structures should aim at being tax-neutral and 
special purpose vehicles should be tax transparent. If this is not the case, 
then Securitisation becomes very difficult and the market development is 
held up. Hence, if the legal and regulatory policy makers decide on 
favouring the legal and regulatory environment, they should also create 
solutions for the tax environment.  
In Singapore, the tax structure and especially tax incentives for bond 
investments have given a strong push to the internationalisation of the 
Singapore bond and Asset-Securitisation market. 
In Europe, the tax environment has been a withholding factor for the 
evolution. So, it has had a strong negative influence on the development 
of the market. Only Luxembourg, with the new Securitisation law, has 
created a stringent and integrated Asset-Securitisation solution over all 
different environments. 
In the US, the Real Estate Investment Conduit (REMIC) structure has 
setup a framework that has spawned a new generation of CMBS that 
had a broader appeal to investors and issuers alike. 
The tax environment has to be favourable for Real Estate Securitisation 
to evolve. A strong tax environment is an accelerating driver in getting 
the market of the ground. 
3. Accounting Environment 
The accounting environment may have played a decisive role in some 
markets (e.g. Singapore), due to local rules, but in short or long all 
‘Generally Accepted Accounting Principles’ (GAAP) standards will 
converge – either into US GAAP or IFRS. And then the influence of 
accounting on the evolution of Real Estate Securitisation markets will be 
small. So therefore originators and arrangers have to take the accounting 
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environment as a given and have to work around it. For the structuring 
part of a transaction the accounting environment will play an important 
role with respect to the originator’s motives, but with the convergence of 
accounting standards the overall development of the market will not be 
influenced by this. Apart from that, off-balance sheet treatment is and 
should not be the primary objective in Real Estate Securitisations. 
4. Investor and Rating Environments 
The investor and rating environment are the most important 
environments from the market (demand) side. 
• Investor Environment 
Transactions have to be adapted to originators needs on the one 
side, but on the other side they have to be tailored to fit investors’ 
needs. Also, an adequate investor demand and the thrive for new 
investment alternatives is an important prerequisite of an Asset-
Securitisation market (e.g. Singapore, UK and US). 
Investors can have a strong influence on the evolution of the market, 
but also on the structural development of the market. On the one 
hand, if investors do not accept the market, the market will not 
evolve. On the other hand, if investors do not like the structure or are 
not comfortable with the complexity of instruments, then those 
transaction structures or schemes will vanish. All in all, investor 
demand is driven by the security of the assets, by spreads and yield-
pickups. 
• Rating Environment 
The rating environment has been the key to the success of Asset-
Securitisation as a global product. If it hadn’t been for the rating 
criteria and rated issuances, investors would probably never have 
bought Asset-Securitisation bonds. In addition, rating agencies have 
led the market to more uniform mortgage-loan origination and 
underwriting standards. Due to their position and the oligopoly in the 
market rating agencies, today, have a strong influence on transaction 
structures, schemes, originators and investors. 
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5. Real Estate, Local and Cultural Environment 
The Real Estate, Local and Cultural Environment is the residual in the 
overall Real Estate and Asset-Securitisation framework. However, the 
Real Estate Environment should be viewed and portrayed as a separate 
Environment, as it has different implications for the evolution than the 
Local and Cultural Environment, even though all three overlap. 
• Real Estate 
It is important to look and consider this environment, because it is 
important for the timing of the market. The real estate environment 
can be a driver for the inception of the market. Especially in physical 
market down cycles and lagging financial market down cycles, the 
implications for the successful establishment of a Real Estate 
Securitisation market is great. 
• Local and Cultural Environment 
The Local and Cultural Environment need to be considered when 
setting up the market, when creating transaction schemes and 
developing investor bases. Local environments can be an obstacle to 
the evolution and can have an influence on the structures, as has 
been demonstrated in the case of Europe. 
In some countries (e.g. Singapore, Countries in Continental Europe) 
the culture and the local market play an important role in the setup of 
the market. So, for market innovators the culture and the local 
peculiarities are set in each local environment and Asset-
Securitisation has to evolve around it. 
Transactions in Singapore, for example, incorporated unique local 
structures tailored at local investors and the local market. Local 
developments and the local framework were one drivers for the 
inception of the market. 
One could argue that the investor and rating agency environments are even 
more important than the regulatory and legal environment, because if rating 
agencies do not rate it and investors won’t buy it, then it does not get sold. This 
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is true, however, on the other side without a functioning legal and regulatory 
environment, it would never come to a ABS/CMBS issuance (supply side). So, 
in essence both are the two sides of one medal. The regulatory and legal 
environment create the framework from the supply side and the investor and 
rating environments create the framework from the demand side. 
The other environments have an influence on the timing of the inception and the 
success of the development but overall they are workable. However, if the 
regulatory and legal, investor, or rating agency environment is not working the 
market will not evolve. 
Assorting the environment relative to their importance for the overall market 
evolution, the following list can be displayed: 
1. Most important and crucial to the evolution – prerequisites for market 
evolultion 
• Legal and Regulatory Environment 
• Investor Environment 
• Rating Agency Environment 
2. Important for the timing of the market inception 
• Real Estate Environment 
3. Important for a fast development, but not crucial for overall evolution 
• Tax Environment 
4. Need consideration 
• Local and Cultural Environment 
4.5.3 Core Determinants 
Involvement (Sellers/Originators/Borrowers, Others) 
The involvement of different parties in Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation transactions can be divided into 
Borrowers/Originators/Sellers and Others. 
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1. Borrowers/Originators/Sellers 
As explained above, the market develops in different stages of a 
development cycles. Hence, there is also a specific order of 
borrowers/originators/sellers. In the first stage the following group can be 
observed: 
a. Government-Linked Corporations (Singapore) or Governments 
directly through their Treasury department (Europe – Italy) 
b. Large Real Estate Developers1191 – Olympia & York, the biggest 
developer at the time opened the Real Estate Securitisation 
market in the US. British Land opened the market in the UK and 
Europe. CapitaLand became one of the first and the biggest 
originator of Real Estate Securitisations in Singapore. 
c. Big Corporations – American Express was the first corporate to 
engage into a Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation in the US. 
Borrowers/Originators/Sellers that become the innovators of Real Estate 
Securitisation markets have to be big companies with big projects and a 
large balance sheet because the up-front costs are very high and the 
funding benefit for small projects as compared to large projects are very 
low. At a later stage once the market has developed and has become 
more efficient, it gets opened to other borrowers/originators/sellers. 
d. Corporates 
e. Real Estate Developers (small and medium size) 
f. Real Estate Investors 
g. Conduit Vehicles 
h. Banks 
                                            
1191 In most countries large real estate developers are also investors, hence, investor 
developers. Thus, the real estate that gets securitised is not development real estate, but 
investment real estate. 
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2. Others 
a. Government-Sponsored Entities (US – Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac) 
– facilitating and guaranteeing the issuances. 
b. Government Regulatory Agencies – the RTC in the US. 
c. Rating Agencies – setting standards and rating transactions. 
d. Investment Banks – Arrangers like Salomon Brothers or Nomura 
that brought forward the markets in Europe and the US. 
Investment banks are generally an important catalyst for the shift 
from credit to capital markets. Where there is profit potential 
investment banks will engage and become innovators in that filed. 
As a rule of thumb, an increased investment banking activity in a 
specific geographic or sub-asset class market hints to a strong 
development of that market in the near future. 
Asset Requirements 
Asset requirements relates to the question of what the attributes of a real estate 
asset or a property have to be in order to qualify for Real Estate Securitisation. 
Overall, the Assets have to be acceptable to bond investors. 
1. High grade properties ? ‘Flagship’/’Trophy’ properties (primarily retail 
and office). Only high yielding properties qualify. 
2. Long term leases and predictable cash flows. Only properties with good 
quality and stable income qualify. 
3. There have to be sufficient property cash flows to service the bonds and 
to account for credit enhancement. 
4. Good credit tenants. 
5. In the case of assets that are receivables from yet to be built residential 
development projects the following criteria has to be fulfilled: 
a. The project has to be substantially sold.  
b. Its construction costs have to be fixed. 
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Real Estate Asset Classes 
“But certainly if real estate owner do not have a lot of choices for financing or 
are looking to liquefy their position, then by all means you can securitize cash 
flows from real estate – just as you can with cash flows from anything else.”1192 
For Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisations, there are five 
different attributes of a transactions with respect to the asset in the transaction: 
1. The Type of Asset 
a. Mortgage Loans 
b. Credit Tenant Lease  
c. Physical Real Estate Assets (i.e. buildings and land) 
d. Current and Future Real Estate Receivables  
e. Receivables from future residential development sales proceeds 
f. Operating Companies (a European specificity). 
2. The Cash Flows Supporting the Bonds 
The cash flows that support the bonds are different in transactions that 
securitise different assets: 
a. Interest and Principal Payments from a loan 
b. Credit Tenant Lease Cash Flows 
c. Cash Flows resulting out the Property 
d. Lease Cash Flows and Future Sale Proceeds 
e. Progress payments on residential developments (condominiums) 
f. Cash Flows from Operations (including lease cash flows). 
                                            
1192 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
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3. The Type of Collateral/Security in the transaction1193 
a. Mortgage – the SPV holds a first lien (mortgage lien) on the 
underlying property. This is the most legitimate and cost efficient 
way to secure claims on real estate. Investors do not wan to own 
the property, they want to own the first right to the cash flow. 
b. The Property – the SPV holds the title to the property (fee simple) 
c. Strength of the Operating Company and the Property as additional 
security – the SPV is the owner of the Operating Company 
4. The underlying Property Type 
The underlying property types differ from country to country. However, 
the most dominant property types are: 
a. Office  
b. Multi-Family (including Residential Developments) 
c. Retail 
Additional property types include: 
d. Industrial  
e. Hotel  
f. Healthcare (only Europe) 
g. Social Housing (only Europe) 
h. Pubs and other operating real estate (only Europe) 
5. Property Category (in sequence of securitisability) 
a. Investment Real Estate 
b. Corporate Real Estate 
c. Development Real Estate (very little) 
                                            
1193 The difference between asset and collateral has been described in an earlier part of this 
chapter. 
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Even though Development properties played a role in Singapore, it is however 
unlikely to see Real Estate Securitisation in combination with development 
funding anywhere else. For one this is because it was residential condominium 
property, for two it was Singapore and for three there are only few commercial 
development projects that are sold in advance piece-by-piece.1194 
Real Estate Financing is about choices and Real Estate Securitisation might be 
one choice in that spectrum. It is definitely not suitable for everybody and every 
piece of real estate, but it is an alternative for properties that qualify and 
borrowers that might face an situation with not many financing choices. 
General Motives/Motivations 
Generally Real Estate Securitisation can be used as a divestment vehicle (a 
way to monetize on the physical real estate asset) or as an innovative financing 
instrument. Depending on the ultimate motivation, the motives for doing a 
transaction change. 
1. Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment vehicle 
o Creation of liquidity through an asset divestment 
o Property Monetization 
o Balance-Sheet Management (Off-Balance Sheet Financing) 
2. Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative financing instrument 
o Diversification of funding sources 
o Cheaper funding 
o Non-recourse, long-term funding 
o Efficient execution (in mature markets) 
o Opportunity to bring forward cash flows from future receivables 
o Higher Loan-to-Value (in specific cases of Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation) 
                                            
1194 Cf. Ho (2003), Interview 6, p. 554. 
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Also in case of a bank participating in a Portfolio-CMBS, or in case of a 
developer securitising receivables from future sales proceeds the motives can 
be different. 
3. Portfolio-CMBS as a bank instrument: 
o Relief of regulatory capital 
o Funding for high Loan-to-Value loans 
4. Real Estate Securitisation to fund development projects: 
o Reduction of construction funding costs.  
o Unlocking value tied up in development projects.  
o Creation of liquidity to buy new land. 
o Monetization of projects to fund new ones. 
But even if Real Estate Securitisation is chosen to divest the asset, then off-
balance sheet treatment is not guaranteed. So, it comes down to two scenarios: 
• If divesting the asset, but sharing the upside and being able to control the 
asset at a later stage are important to the originator, then the originator has 
to accept that the transaction will be on-balance sheet.1195 
• If the originator wants to divest the asset, without keeping any interest in the 
property, then the property will go off-balance sheet.  
Hence, it is a conflict of objectives; everything at the same time is not 
achievable. All in all off-balance sheet treatment must not be the primary driver 
for choosing Real Estate Securitisation. The tougher the accounting rules are, 
the harder it will get to achieve off-balance sheet financing. 
Generalized Transaction Schemes 
One has to distinguish between the Singapore structure and all the other 
schemes in the US and Europe. Singaporean Real Estate Securitisation 
securitised physical real estate assets from developers’ and investors’ balance 
sheets. In that respect the Singapore structure is unique. International 
                                            
1195 Control by the use of options and upside participation by investing into the junior tranche 
and the use of preference shares. 
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investment bankers tend to deny that the Singapore transactions are 'true' 
Securitisations.1196 
In addition to that a distinction can be made between physical real 
estate/property related, credit tenant related or mortgage loan related Asset 
Securitisations. Whereas the first two categories rather related to Real Estate 
Securitisation, the last category nearly exclusively relates to Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securitisation. 
1. Physical-Asset Real Estate Securitisation/Singapore Structure 
(Physical Real Estate/Property related): 
The Singapore structure is primarily based on Sale-Leasebacks. Therefore it 
is comparable with Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation. However, in some 
cases the Sale-Leaseback is backed by a tenant portfolio (e.g. Retail 
Property Securitisation). Features of Physical-Asset Real Estate 
Securitisation 
o Two tranche structure – 2/3 senior bonds, and 1/3 junior bonds with 
preference shares stapled to them. 
o Embedded options – call options for originators and put options for 
bond investors. 
o Originator participation in junior bonds – sellers of assets took the 
equity piece position to keep a hold of the property. 
2. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower (Physical Real 
Estate/Property related) 
This transaction scheme incorporates one property or one borrower. Thus, 
the transaction is dependent on the quality of the underlying property and 
the originator’s credit. Large real estate companies directly issue Single 
Property/Single Borrower CMBS directly at the capital markets. 
There are two types: 
a. Single Property/Single Borrower CMBS  
                                            
1196 Cf. Anonymous (2000e), p. 62. 
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b. Multiple Property/Single Borrower CMBS  
3. Real Estate-Backed Whole Business / Operating Company transactions 
(Physical Real Estate/Property related) 
Transactions are based on cash flows from an operating company that are 
backed by underlying real estate and that are structured into a secured loan 
structure. 
4. Sale-Leaseback/Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation (Credit Tenant 
related) 
Those transactions are totally independent of the borrower. They are 
dependent on the property’s tenant credit and partly on the quality of the 
property. There are three types: 
d. Sale-Leaseback – Borrower is a Corporation: it represents the 
funding for a classical credit-rated Corporate Sale-Leaseback deal. 
e. Built-to-Suite – Borrower is a Developer: it represents the 
construction funding for the built-to-suite construction of a credit 
tenant. 
f. Outright Acquisition – Borrower is a third-party investor: it 
represents acquisition funding for an investor that buys a building with 
a credit tenant lease on it. 
5. Large Loan CMBS/European Multi-borrower Conduit CMBS (Property 
and Mortgage related) 
Those transactions incorporate multiple properties and multiple borrowers, 
i.e. a number of large mortgage loans on commercial real estate that have 
specifically been originated for the sole purpose of Securitisation. 
6. CMBS – Conduit (Mortgage related) 
The transaction is backed by a granular portfolio of small mortgage loans on 
underlying commercial property. There are two types of Conduit 
transactions: 
a. Conduit-CMBS – the portfolio only consists of homogenous small 
mortgage loans. 
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b. Conduit-Fusion – the portfolio primarily consists of small mortgage 
loans and a small number of large loans. 
7. Portfolio-CMBS (Mortgage related) 
a. Synthetic Portfolio-CMBS – Only the risk of the underlying loan 
portfolio is transferred to the investors. The assets stay on the bank’s 
balance sheet. 
b. True Sale Portfolio-CMBS – The issued securities are backed by an 
underlying granular portfolio of mortgage loans originated by 
commercial or mortgage banks. 
4.5.4 Minimum Evolution Requirements for Real Estate Securitisation 
This chapter outlines the minimum prerequisites that a market needs to offer in 
order to have a successful inception. As defined above, the most critical 
precondition for the inception of a Real Estate Securitisation market is the 
existence or the creation/drafting of: 
1. A stringent and reliable Legal and Regulatory Framework. 
2. A sound and well structured Tax and Accounting Environment is an 
important but not necessarily crucial condition for the development of a 
successful market. 
3. A functioning Investor Environment and the demand for new 
investment alternatives. 
4. A competitive Real Estate Market framework. 
5. Other Crucial Drivers that lead to a market inception and to a further 
development. 
All five issues will be dealt with in depth in the following analysis. 
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1. Stringent and reliable Legal and Regulatory Framework 
A well-developed legal and regulatory framework is the premise of a successful 
evolution of a Real Estate Securitisation market.1197 
• Legal Environment 
The primary concern for investors is the security interest. A good and 
reliable legal environment as it relates to bankruptcy and the institution of 
SPVs is the biggest prerequisite. For investors it is most important to 
perfect their security interest in the case of bankruptcy of the originator or 
borrower. In essence, the question is:  
‘How enforceable is the claim that the investor has on the collateral 
in the event of default?’ 
The answer depends on the bankruptcy code, the clarity of property title 
and the ability to establish priority of liens on the collateral (i.e. an 
effective title and lien registration system). The ability to enforce 
foreclosure and repossession over a reasonable time period is key in that 
respect. 
Enforceable security interest is an important but not sufficient condition 
for a successful market. Security interests must be transferable and 
investors must have the ability to perfect their security interest after 
transfer, for transactions involving asset sale or pledging (i.e. collateral). 
Above that, the transfer of interest must be at a relatively low cost. 
Additional legal concern are: 
o The possibility of a ‘true sale’ or perfection of a security interest. 
o The legal framework to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle that is 
bankruptcy remote. 
o The legal right to transferred assets upheld even in the even of 
bankruptcies. 
                                            
1197 Cf. Ledesma and Jirasetpatana (2001), p. 247. 
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Changes in the legal framework have to account for existing laws, but 
also need to be modified with respect to the need to perfect security 
interests, achieve a true legal sale and limit additional costs. 
• Regulatory Environment (i.e. government support) 
It must be in the policy makers’ best interest to foster the capital markets 
and thus to create a favourable regulatory environment in their country. 
In this respect, regulation is relating to regulated originators (banks, 
insurance companies) as well as to SPVs (buyers of assets and issuers 
of securities) and the overall financial market. 
Regulatory authorities must balance their concerns for financial 
soundness with the need for fair, prudent and transparent rules. 
2. Sound and well structured Tax and Accounting Environment 
Tax and accounting issues do not influence the inception of the market, 
however, they have a strong impact on the feasibility and attractiveness of 
Securitisation transaction – i.e. the daily structuring business. If there is not a 
favourable framework, transactions are more hazardous and they are of a more 
complex nature. Hence, structuring takes longer and increases the transaction 
costs. For example, this happens if the issuing SPV has to be off-shore, due to 
tax reasons. So, there is a need for a clear framework. It does not only increase 
the likelihood of high credit ratings for Real Estate Securitisations, but it also 
decreases the economic costs to the issuer. 
A sound tax environment, where the tax code allows for a Securitisation SPV 
not to be subject to double taxation, is the key to growth in Asset-Securitisation. 
If governments and policy makers want to get a Real Estate Securitisation 
market lifted of the ground in their country, they have to do two things: 
1. The legislator has to create a sound and favourable tax environment.  
2. They must set out reasonable rules on off-balance sheet treatment for 
GAAP purposes to fairly reflect the company's operations as analysts 
may use financial reports to compare and rate the company, thereby 
affecting its access to capital markets. 
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Without tax and accounting neutrality to minimize additional costs, the 
economics of Securitisation can be unattractive. So, those are the two things 
that are important for the ongoing development and the pace of the 
development in the future. If one of the two is not in place, the market will 
develop very slowly or under certain circumstances not develop at all. 
3. Functioning Investor Environment 
Investors are crucial to the success of a market. They have to be comfortable 
with buying the securities. This is dependent on the underlying assets and the 
cash flows that they purchase a claim to. For this it is important that the 
underlying properties have a track record. So, in a first step only trophy 
properties qualify. 
However, the underlying collateral is not everything. Price and Yield are 
anything to the investors. They compare the product in question to their 
investment universe, and thus the decision about a successful evolution is all 
market driven. It is the question of the competitiveness of Real Estate 
Securitisation investments as compared to traditional real estate investments 
(public and private) and traditional bond investments (corporate and 
government bonds). 
4. Competitive Real Estate Market Framework 
The precondition from the real estate market side is that property investments 
must generally be attractive investments and that the real estate market must 
offer an adequate leasing framework. A landlord friendly environment helps to 
safeguard and predict cash flows. A prerequisite for a successful Securitisation 
transaction. Best are long leases with predictable rental cash flows and 
acceptable contractual terms that allow to predict cash flows for Securitisation 
(at least 5-10 years). The yields on the properties must be market driven and 
need to provide investors with an adequate risk-adjusted rate of returns.  
5. Other crucial drivers 
a. Government involvement – government must have an interest in 
the market 
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b. Financial Crisis – there must be a strain on the overall financial 
system and especially the banking system 
c. Credit Crunch – loan commitments must be down, funding and 
refinancing of existing loans must be burdensome 
d. Real Estate Market Cycle – downturn in the financial cycle 
e. Competitive Advantage of Capital Markets Funding – Funding 
arbitrage for originators & profit arbitrage for investment banks 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated two things: 
1. It has validated the research framework, by showing the evolution of the 
market, and by analyzing which environment influenced the market, 
which core determinants existed and what the patterns/drivers were. 
2. It has lead to a summary of minimum requirements that offers a 
framework for the analysis of the German market. Hence, this offers 
potential conclusions on how to get the evolution of a Real Estate 
Securitisation market in Germany started. 
Even though developments do not follow the same path in different countries, 
the underlying patterns give hints about similarities and show what are the 
preconditions for an evolution and where the evolution could start from. The 
analysis of the research framework has shown that it is valid for every Asset-
Securitisation/Real Estate Securitisation market. It has also shown that there 
are local and regional differences due to unique environments. Hence, the 
research framework is valid, but the environments and core determinants have 
to be adapted to local peculiarities and local needs. There is an optimal timing 
and there are certain crucial drivers that offer universal validity. 
Capital markets are not the appropriate source of financing for all real estate 
owners, but Real Estate Securitisation may be an adequate alternative for 
specific borrowers/originators/sellers, with certain types of assets and collateral, 
that follow certain set of motives. 
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5 Implications for the case of Germany 
The following chapter will discuss the implications of the results of the 
international comparison analysis derived out of Chapter 4 for the case of Real 
Estate Securitisation in Germany. 
For this Chapter 5.1 will first tackle the German environment for real estate 
financing (backed by an empirical lender survey), in order to show the 
constraints of the current environment and to proof the need for new innovative 
real estate financing instruments. Then, in a second step an analysis of Asset-
Securitisation in Germany will lead to the answer of the question regarding the 
feasibility and the potential of Real Estate Securitisation as a form of financing 
for property companies in Germany. The summary will conclude this chapter 
and will offer recommendations for German policy makers. 
5.1 Lender Survey – Real Estate Financing Environment 
“Overall the lending environment in Germany will change dramatically.”1198 
The current real estate environment is coined by constant change, 
consolidation and a big set of problems: 
• Increasing international pressure with respect to return-on-equity (ROE) 
targets. 
• Increased non-performing loan exposures. 
• Declining bank credit ratings – hence, increased funding costs. 
• Requirements of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) – technical and 
loan exposure requirements. 
Those problems and their results will be analysed and discussed in the 
following chapter. The assertions are supported by an empirical study (i.e. 
lender survey) and by analysing the recent developments in the German 
banking market. 
                                            
1198 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
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The lender survey will proof some of the hypothesis formulated in the 
Introduction to this thesis. It will show that: 
• Credit conditions will rise, 
• Securitisation is becoming more important, and 
• Real Estate Securitisation is not very well known, yet. 
5.1.1 Study Setup 
The data that the empirical study is based on was derived from a postal survey 
with a standardized questionnaire. The questionnaire was divided in five parts 
consisting of the following topics: 
• Data about the responding institute 
• Questions concerning the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
• Credit-Risk Management 
• Innovative Real Estate Financing 
• Securitisation 
In order to generate a higher response rate and also to get competent 
respondents, the surveys were sent to the bank management of the biggest 205 
German lending institutes. The sample represents banks that had a balance 
sheet total of at least €3 bn.  
The questionnaires were posted on 29 May 2003 and were requested for reply 
on 1 July 2003. In the second half of July 2003, a written and telephonic follow-
up was conducted.  
Overall 78 banking institutes responded of which 3 stated that they were not 
involved in commercial real estate lending at all and 22 rejected the response 
due to time or company policy reasons. Altogether 53 questionnaires were 
valid, which leads to a response rate of 25.85%.  
All institutes (n=53) answered the first part (Questions 0.1 to 0.10) of the 
questionnaire. The responding banks can be segmented into the following 
categories: 15 Thrift Institutions, 11 Mortgage Banks, 7 Landesbanks, 5 
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Commercial Banks, 4 Mutual Savings Banks, 3 Private Banks, 2 Special
Lending Institutes and 6 Others.
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Question 0.1: Type of participating institute (n=53)
Figure 47: Participating Institutes Source: Authors Compilation
The following analysis will relate to the key propositions of this study with
respect to the overall lending environment in Germany, the influence of Basel II
on real estate financing, Real Estate Securitisation and the True Sale Initiative.
5.1.2 Analysis
5.1.2.1 Current Real Estate Financing Environment
There are four main trends that can be observed in Germany that are likely to
result in decreased loan commitments and higher lending spreads for real
estate financing in Germany. Those are the problems of non-performing loans,
the pressure of capital markets on banks to increase their returns-on-equity
(ROE Problem), the cancellation of state guarantees for German Landesbanks
(Landesbank problem) and the influence of Basel II on real estate financing.
The first three shall be delineated in the following part and shall be put into
relation to the result of the lender survey with respect to real estate loan
commitments and lending spreads. Basel II will be dealt with in Chapter 5.1.2.2.
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1. Non-Performing Loans / Bad Loan Problem 
Traditionally German Banks have been very strong in loan underwriting, so 
that no alternative financing sources for debt finance could evolve. 
Especially during the 1990’s after the German Reunification the German 
banks have engaged into a great lending competition that has originated a 
vast amount of loans at very competitive rates and sometimes even with 
negative spreads. Hence, the German banks (including mortgage banks) 
have not only underwritten a lot of loans, but they have also priced those 
loans so competitively that no other instrument could compete.1199  
This, however, was only possible because of the Pfandbrief as the primary 
funding tool. This funding tool was a peculiarity of the German mortgage 
funding market only existed in Germany.1200  Thus German banks could 
always fund their loan commitments at very low rates and this explains, why 
the German real estate borrowing rates were always lower than in the 
neighbouring European countries.1201 
So, in the aftermath of the extensive loan-underwriting phase of the 1990’s 
the German banks have lost a lot of money and are today sitting on a huge 
non-performing loan exposure that is weighing heavy on their balance 
sheets.1202 Even though the German banking industry does not admit this, 
there exist indications that there are more non-performing loans in the 
German banking market than have previously been expected. Even until 
April 2003, Banks did not admit that they had large non-performing loan 
portfolios.1203 
In recent month several portfolios of non-performing loans have been sold 
by German banks. This will have two effects: it will potentially strengthen the 
Securitisation market, as those portfolios could be securitised in the capital 
                                            
1199 Cf. Day and Moore (2003). 
1200 The European covered bond market evolved in the UK and really only exists since 2000. 
Until recently there was not even a legal framework in the UK. Cf. Day (2003), p. 74; 
Dreesbach (2003), p. B6. 
1201 Cf. Weber (2003), p. 3. 
1202 Cf. Morris (2002), p. 52. 
1203 Cf. Anonymous (2003i), p. 1. 
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markets (comparable to the case of the US) and it will offer new lending 
flexibility to banks that will most likely result in adequate lending activities 
with adequate spreads comparable to other European markets. 
2. ROE Problem 
In recent times, banks have increasingly become a play ball of capital 
market investors. Their return requirements on invested stock is driving the 
banking market. Banks with low ROEs will become take-over targets. 
Hence, they will have to shift from lending activities to fee-producing 
activities that offer higher margins. Additionally, they will have to re-evaluate 
their risk-positions and together with the other trends explained in this part, it 
will be inevitable that lending margins will rise. 
The situation is best described by the following quote: “They [the German 
banks] are looking wounded and their competitive slim margins are 
expected to widen as they look to improve their cost of return on equity. 
Their performance will be further affected by problems of non-performing 
loans at home and regulatory changes, such as the Basel II Accord, which is 
forcing banks to adjust the levels of reserves they are obliged to hold.”1204 
3. Landesbank Problem 
Another problem for the German real estate financing market is that a group 
of providers of inexpensive long-term funding for real estate will have to 
raise their margins, due to decreased credit rating and thus increased 
funding spreads. Those are the German Landesbanks. The Landesbanks 
have come under strong scrutiny of the competition authorities of the 
European Commission (EC). The EC judged that government involvement 
and guarantees for the Landesbanks constitutes an anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
As a consequence, in March 2002, an agreement was reached between the 
German government and the EC under which federal guarantee and 
maintenance obligations shall be taken away from the Landesbanks in mid-
                                            
1204 Cf. Anonymous (2003a), p. 35. 
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2005. The government support would continue to be enjoyed by Germany's 
development banks (e.g. the KfW).1205 
The influence of the cancellation of government guarantees will result in 
Landesbanks being treated as all other private credit institutions in 
Germany. Hence, their rating will become dependent on their credibility to 
satisfy their liabilities.1206 Under federal guarantees the Landesbank were 
treated as ‘AAA’ lending institutions and thus could fund themselves on a 
‘AAA’ level with unsecured debt. However, as the current discussion about 
Landesbank rating implies, the future ratings will be well below this level and 
this is a critical issue.1207 
A lower rating for credit institutions usually results in higher funding costs. 
As a consequence, costs for real estate financing will increase. In addition to 
that, it will become more likely that Landesbanks will become active in 
Asset-Securitisation to bridge the funding gap. 
Summarizing this part, it seems inevitable that the business model of real estate 
lending institutions will change in the future. The trend described in the upper 
part combined with the increase requirements levied on the institutions by Basel 
II will most likely result in less loan commitments and higher lending spreads. 
This is also supported by the lender study. The two most compelling results of 
the lender survey are that the  
• loan commitments have changed dramatically from 2002 to 2003 (Figure 
48) 
• more than half of the respondents (56%) believe that they can implement 
higher lending spreads in the future. 20% stated that they partly assume 
to be able to implement higher lending spreads. The results are shown in 
Figure 49. 
 
                                            
1205 Cf. Anonymous (2003j), p. 1. 
1206 Cf. Jenkins, et al. (2003), p. 22. 
1207 Cf. Anonymous (2003h); Schmid and Krosta (2003), p. 1. 
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Figure 48: Commercial real estate loan commitment in 2003 Source: Authors Compilation
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Figure 49: Development of lending spreads in the future Source: Authors Compilation
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5.1.2.2 Influence of Basel II on Real Estate Financing
Hardly any other banking subject has had such a great influence on such a
broad section of Germany’s political and business community as have the new
rules emerging from the new Basel Capital Accord. This sensitivity is closely
tied to the vast significance that borrowed capital, i.e. bank debt, has for the
German economy. The fear that the funds required for investments will either
rise sharply in cost or may even become completely unattainable scares the
German industry. Especially the commercial real estate sector is greatly
influenced by this, since it has traditionally relied heavily on bank debt and as it
is traditionally long-term funding. But also the rest of the economy relies heavily
on loans secured by mortgages (almost every other bank loan in Germany is
collateralized by mortgages). In comparison to the US and the UK, German
companies rely a lot more on bank lending than on other lending sources.1208
Under the Basel II criteria, real estate lending – applying the IRB approach –
falls under specialized lending, and as a result has different risk weightings
relative to the different real estate category (from ‘strong’ to ‘default’). In
addition, the criteria distinguishes between income producing real estate (IPRE)
and high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE). The risk weightings for
IPRE range from 75% to 625% and for HVCRE form 100% to 625%. Under the
Basel Capital Accord, the risk weightings are the driver for the amount of
regulatory equity applicable to a certain asset and hence the required lending
spread on the asset: the higher the risk-weighting, the higher the required
regulatory equity, the higher the costs to the lending institution, and thus the
higher the interest costs to the borrower.1209
As a result, future interest terms for high risk projects/low rated real estate will
incur increasing financing costs, as lending institutions will have to account for
increased regulatory equity. On the other side for low risk investment
property/high high rated real estate there will be decreasing interest expenses,
as lending institutions have to underlie less equity as now.1210
                                             
1208 Cf. Dosswald (2002), p. 63; Hagen and Holter (2002), p. 52.
1209 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003a), p. 50.
1210 Cf. Pitschke (2004), p. 273.
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Figure 50: Cyclicality of loan commitment under Basel II Source: Authors Compilation
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Figure 51: Scope of loan commitment under Basel II Source: Authors Compilation
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The indications are that the influence of Basel II might lead to a credit crunch in
Germany1211 but its influence on real estate lending is not yet assessable for the
German property industry. However, there is a great uncertainty going around
in the industry. Especially for real estate developers the new Basel II criteria
might have a detrimental effect – on lending commitments, lending spreads and
cycality of loan commitments.1212 As a consequence, developers and other real
estate companies are thriving to substitute bank funding by non-bank
funding.1213
Therefore Basel II has implications for real estate financing, but also for the use
of Asset-Securitisation following the introduction of the standard in 2006. The
lender survey has addressed both questions.
Influence of Basel II on Real Estate Financing (Figure 50 and Figure 51)
With respect to real estate financing and the effect of the Basel Capital Accord,
two results are of great importance: 82% of the lenders surveyed in the study
assume that in the future pro-cyclical loan commitment will be fuelled by Basel
II. 52% of the respondents have expressed Basel II has already lead them to a
more restrictive loan commitment. These two facts document that the property
industry’s fear of not getting funding for their real estate is valid.
Influence of Basel II on Asset Securitisation (Figure 52 and Figure 53)
The questions concerning the influence of Basel II on Securitisation can be in
the following figures. The first figure shows that nearly all responding market
participants believe that Basel II will have an effect on Asset-Securitisation –
only one respondent did not think so. The influence that Basel II might have on
the use of Asset-Securitisation is documented in Figure 53. The majority (42 out
of 45) believes that the number of transactions, and hence the transaction
volume will rise. This leads to the conclusion that Basel II will favour the
evolution of Asset-Securitisation as a funding instrument.
                                             
1211 Even though the Basel Capital Accord does not come into effect until the end of 2006, the
banks are urged to start following the Basel II Guidelines, if they want to choose the Internal
ratings-based (IRB) approaches. Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003b), p. 1.
1212 For a greater insight into Rating and Basel II confer Achleitner and Everling (2004).
1213 Cf. Wolf (2004).
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Question 4.16: Will Basel II have an effect on Securitisation? (n=47)
Figure 52: Effects of Basel II on Asset-Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
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Figure 53: Scope of the effects of Basel II Source: Authors Compilation
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5.1.2.3 Real Estate Securitisation
One key objective for the lender survey was to find out what the banking
industry’s knowledge base is with respect to Asset-Securitisation in general and
Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative real estate financing instrument in
specific. The results offer an insight into the question of what the state of the
overall Asset-Securitisation market is and what the potential for the evolution of
the Real Estate Securitisation market is in Germany. The key points
documenting the trend towards Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate
Securitisation will be delineated in the following part.
Asset Securitisation (Figure 54 - Figure 58)
The figures below demonstrate that the recognition for the term ‘Asset-
Securitisation’ is very high – 94.1% stating that they know Securitisation. The
market penetration, however, is quite low – only 37% of all responding institutes
utilize Securitisation. This is an indication for a new and still underdeveloped
Securitisation market in Germany. This analysis is totally neglecting the
problem complex of Synthetic vs. True Sale Securitisations. If this was included
in this breakdown, then the study would come to the conclusion that True Sale
Securitisation in Germany is virtually non-existent. However, the awareness of
the existence of this concept is high. During the last two years a public
discussion was fuelled by the fact that there is no adequate Securitisation
framework in Germany. This raised the awareness for the concept and the
problems.
Figure 56 underlines this fact – 25.5% of all respondent were planning
Securitisation transactions and 40.4% were considering such transaction, but
were at the time of the study still undecided. For those institutes that were
executing Securitisation transactions, the primary asset class constituted
Mortgage-Backed Securities, followed by credit card receivables and CDOs.
One reason for the stronghold of synthetic Securitisations in Germany is the
fact that true sale transactions are not feasible, due to a trade tax problem. This
has also held back a lot of banks. However, the expectation is that with the
trade tax problem being solved for credit institutions, the demand for
Securitisation will rise. (Figure 58)
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Question 4.1: Is the term Securitisation known? (n=51)
94.1%
5.9%
Yes No
Figure 54: Recognition of the term Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
Question 4.2: Does your Institution use the Securitisation Concept? (n=46)
37.0%
63.0%
Yes No
Figure 55: Market penetration of Asset-Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
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Question 4.10: Is your institution planning Securitisation transactions? 
(n=47)
25.5%
34.0%
40.4%
Yes No Still undecided
Figure 56: Planned Securitisation Transactions Source: Authors Compilation
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Question 4.3: In what form does your Bank use the Securitisation Concept? 
(n=28)
Figure 57: Utilised Asset Classes Source: Authors Compilation
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Figure 58: Future development of Asset-Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
Real Estate Securitisation
The awareness of Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative financing tool for
the property industry and as a fee-income producing product for real estate
lending institutions is still very low.
Figure 59 demonstrates that Asset-Securitisation is not yet widely considered
as an innovative financing instrument. Only 23.4% stated that they have thought
about offering Asset- Securitisation to their clients for financing real estate. 66%
have stated that they have not yet though about doing that.
Even though it is the real estate companies that are the potential originators of
Real Estate Securitisation assets, it is the real estate lending institutions that
have to offer this service as an innovative financing instrument to the property
industry. For real estate lenders this has a double benefit:
1. They do not need underlie regulatory capital for those transactions.
2. They generate fee-income that offers high returns-on-equity.
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Question 4.14: Are you considering to offer the Securitisation Concept as an 
innovative real estate financing instrument to your clients? (n=47)
23.4% 66.0%
10.6%
Yes No Still undecided
Figure 59: Market penetration of Real Estate Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
With respect to the recognition of the term ‘Real Estate Securitisation’, the
result is similar to the case of Asset-Securitisation – a high percentage of
respondents (78%) stated that they know the term Real Estate Securitisation.
However, the understanding of the term is ambiguous, as respondents offered
various explanation of what should be understood under Real Estate
Securitisation. The understanding of the concept is mostly related to mortgage
loan related capital market transactions. Most respondents named Mortgage-
Backed Securities and Pfandbriefe as instruments for Real Estate
Securitisation. Only one fourth of all respondents recognized the concept as the
Securitisation of real estate cash flows. The result is comprehensible, as it is
the business of real estate lending institutions to originate mortgage loans. So,
their focus lies more on relief of regulatory capital and bank funding instruments
than on innovative financing concepts for the property industry. Therefore, the
result of this analysis leads to the conclusion that the term is not well defined
and the concept not well explained in industry.
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Question 4.4: Is the term Real Estate Securitisation known? (n=47)
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Figure 60: Name recognition of Real Estate Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
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Figure 61: Comprehension of Real Estate Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
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Question 4.6: Does your bank do „Real Estate Securitisation“? (n=41)
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Figure 62: Use of Real Estate Securitisation in the industry Source: Authors Compilation
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Question 4.15: If you have considered this, in what way are you offering this 
innovative real estate financing to your clients? (n=15)
Figure 63: Bank Involvement in Real Estate Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
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The same conclusion is valid when analysing Figure 62 and Figure 63. The
uncertainty of respondents with respect to Real Estate Securitisation is proven
by only a small group of respondents (29.3 %) that do Real Estate
Securitisation.
Figure 63 demonstrates the banks see their involvement in Real Estate
Securitisation as being the arranger of transactions. This indicates that banks
are moving away from the credit business into capital markets fee-income
business. Only a small number of respondents has answered that they are
interested in a Conduit. This leads to the conclusion that the German market is
in its very first stage.
5.1.2.4 True Sale Initiative (TSI)
“In my view, the True Sale Initiative is one of the most innovative and
groundbreaking novelties that the German financial centre has produced for a
long time.”1214
The German ‘True Sale Initiative’ (TSI) was created in April 2003 by the four big
German banks: Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and
HypoVereinsbank in co-operation with the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
– a state sponsored bank – and DZ Bank.1215 This was a tentative combined
start to fulfil their mission of strengthening their balance sheets. The True Sale
Initiative had two goals:
• To alleviate the trade tax obstacles that had restricted the development
of True Sale Securitisation transactions in Germany.
• To create a joint platform to securitise corporate loans.
The first objective was achieved in mid-2003, when the German government
passed a new law to exempt SPVs in German bank Securitisations from trade
tax obligations (Gewerbesteuer). Apart from bank-sponsored entities, the law
also applies to non-bank entities set up to purchase assets from banks' balance
sheets.
                                             
1214 Hans Reich, chairman of KfW’s board of managing directors. Cf. Day and Moore (2003).
1215 Cf. Anonymous (2003i).
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The law was a crucial prerequisite for the institution of the TSI-platform. When
the final TSI contracts were signed on 30 April 2004,1216 this German banking
initiative was supported by 13 major commercial and mortgage banks as well as
the Ministry of Finance and the KfW.1217 Under the programme, KfW is
expected to coordinate the formation of Securitisation vehicles to finance small
and medium company corporate loans and with residential mortgages in the
first instance, followed by other assets.1218
Event though the True Sale Initiative (which is now called True Sale
International) was originally founded as an organisation to foster cash
Securitisation as an additional funding tool for German banks, and to provide
liquidity to the German small and medium enterprise financing market,1219 the
TSI has become a catalyst for an encouraging development in the German
market, not least because it was the first time where all constituents of the
capital markets – banks, KfW, the ministry of finance – agreed to bring forward
the evolution of True Sale Securitisation in Germany. However, as time went
on, problems arose. Until November 2004, there has just been one True Sale
Securitisation via the TSI platform and it was auto loans by Volkswagen Bank.
This deal was only the second German Securitisation to-date using a German
GmbH as on-shore SPV.1220
Being a vehicle for Bank Receivable Securitisations, the True Sale Initiative
does not help much for Real Estate Securitisation transactions. However, it can
be seen as a catalyst for the evolution of a true sale market that might also
create a favourable framework for Real Estate Securitisation transactions. It is a
sign for increasing government involvement, as the main partner – KfW – is a
government-sponsored bank, and it is a sign for a stronger acceptance and
involvement of real estate financing institutions in this field as the following
figures indicate. The assessment of the TSI is positive and the majority of banks
would use the TSI platform.
                                             
1216 Cf. Schmid (2004b), p. 19.
1217 Cf. List (2004), p. 8; Schmid (2004a); Schmid (2004c), p. 17.
1218 Cf. Rajendra, et al. (2004c), p. 16.
1219 The financing of the Mittelstand is a problem in Germany. Cf. Hommel and Dufey (1999).
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Question 4.18: How do you assess the „True Sale Initiative“? (n=46)
Figure 64: Assessment of the ‘True Sale Initiative’ Source: Authors Compilation
Question 4.19: Would you use the „True Sale Plattform“, if you possible? 
(n=46)
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Figure 65: Acceptance of the ‘True Sale Platform’ Source: Authors Compilation
                                                                                                                                 
1220 Cf. Rajendra and Nicolaus (2004), p. 1.
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5.1.3 Summary
All in all, as described above, the real estate industry is faced with decreasing
loan commitments, rising lending rates and an overall unfavourable
environment for borrowers, especially for long-term borrowers as in the case of
real estate. This is supported by the following trends:
1. Large non-performing loan exposures in the banking industry
2. The pressure of capital markets on banks to increase their returns-on-
equity (ROE Problem)
3. The Cancellation of state guarantees for German Landesbanks
(Landesbank problem)
4. The influence of Basel II on real estate financing.
As has been proven by the above analysis this is expected to result in an
increased shift from credit to capital markets and the trend to Asset-
Securitisation.
The knowledge base of real estate financing institutions with respect to Asset-
Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation is, however, quite low. Especially
the concept of Real Estate Securitisation is not sufficiently known.
Nevertheless, the True Sale Initiative that has come up during the last two
years will do its part to make the concept of Asset-Securitisation more well
known; it will also widen its applicability.
The ultimate result of this analysis is the fact that there is an increasing need of
alternative sources of financing. Even though the TSI is only for bank originated
Securitisations, signs are positive that this will also help the corporate market.
Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative financing tool might be one choice
within that spectrum of alternative ways of financing for the property industry. In
that context, the following chapter will analyze the potential of Real Estate
Securitisation as a catalyst for the shift from credit to capital markets.
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5.2 Real Estate Securitisation for Germany
5.2.1 Market Overview
History of Securitisation in Germany
From the start, the evolution of the Asset-Securitisation market in Germany has
been slow. Early indications were that it will take a long time for the market to
succeed. This was due to a variety of factors including:1221
1. Already long-established financing and funding instruments (Pfandbrief).
2. Adverse sentiments from regulators.
3. Most banks were very reluctant to rock the regulatory boat in order to
access a source of funding they did not require at the time.
4. No pressing capital or cost needs.
5. Traditionally, the long-standing and very close banking relationships in
Germany have a long time presented another considerable barrier.
The weak German framework for Asset-Securitisation, as compared to other
countries in Europe, can be attributed to multiple factors:1222
• No need for Securitisation as a bank funding market, as there was a
strong covered bond/Pfandbrief market in Germany.
• No need to use Securitisation as a means for government funding or the
divestment of non-core assets.
• No special Securitisation legislation.
• No overall government support.
There has certainly been no shortage of assets in Germany that could be
included in Securitisation structures. The potential asset base is huge, given the
                                             
1221 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 54.
1222 Cf. The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 25.
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size of the German economy and the importance of the corporate sector
including: 1223
• Trade receivables
• Credit-card receivables
• Lease financings
• Auto leases
• Corporate loans
However, the incentive to securitise has traditionally been low and obstacles
have been high for most potential participants. Especially,  the lack of incentive
for Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities has been an obstacle, as there has
been a substantial and active domestic covered bond market (Pfandbriefe) and
other funding instruments were not needed. Any progress has been slow. The
close banking relationships enjoyed by most German companies has acted as a
strong counterforce to any need to change the current system. However, this
has gradually changed in recent times.
Even though Germany is one of the world's largest, most robust, and diversified
economies, and even though Asset-Securitisation is favourable for the
development of an economy with respect to financial markets, Germany was
one of the latest followers of the Asset-Securitisation trend in Europe. It was not
until 1997 for a first guideline to be published in Germany.
After a couple of true sale transactions in 1998 and 1999, the market has
shifted to synthetic Securitisation. The synthetic Securitisation market in
Germany experienced a significant push in 2000 and was boosted by the
existence of two major transaction platforms that enabled even smaller
portfolios to be securitised in a cost-efficient manner. The synthetic market is
favoured because of discussions initiated by the German tax authorities about
the potential tax liability of special purpose vehicles in Germany. True sale
transactions involving German assets were no longer attractive to German
                                             
1223 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 56.
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originators and sponsors, despite the originators' increasing need for
liquidity.1224
Current State of the Securitisation Market
Today, most German banks are still utilizing synthetic structures to offload credit
risk from their property loans. The use of synthetic structures is one of the
characteristics of the German market, due to a combination of economic and
tax reasons. The enormous growth of unfunded synthetic issuances has
resulted from the increasing ease with which German banks use synthetic
Securitisations.1225
In 2003, there were only 2 out of 17 public Asset-Securitisation transactions
were based on a true sale structure (auto or leasing ABS). 15 transactions were
of a synthetic nature (pure bank Securitisations). True Sale transactions of
German banks were primarily executed through their subsidiaries abroad with
non-German assets. The reason lies primarily in a tax and legal obstacle (trade
tax) and the main motivation behind synthetic Securitisations:1226
1. There are tax and legal obstacles in German Asset-Securitisation
transactions (i.e. trade tax issue) that have two main effects that
make true sale transactions more costly, and thus unfeasible, as
compared to synthetic Securitisation:
a. High rating agency discounts on the rating of German
issuances. This is due to the fact that there is a risk in
unsolved questions about legal (insolvency issue) and tax
(trade tax issue).
b. High documentation requirements as a result of the constraint
for the transfer of receivables under the German civil code.
The average transaction costs for a synthetic Securitisation lie around
26.5 bp, whereas true sale Securitisations additionally incur 8bp up-
front costs and 17.5 additional credit enhancement costs, in order to
                                             
1224 Cf. Kreppel (2003), p. 273.
1225 Cf. Hunt (2004), p. 2.
1226 Cf. The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 12.
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account for the discussed risks. This leads to a funding disadvantage
of 25.5 bp – double as much as the synthetic transaction costs.
2. The main motivation of synthetic Securitisations is the relief of
regulatory capital. As this only applies to regulated banking
institutions, the main Securitisation focus in Germany has been on
banking institutions. Because relief of regulatory capital was the most
pressing concern for banks in Germany and the level of alternative
funding was still acceptable, it did not matter to banks if the
transactions were of a true sale or of a synthetic nature.
Nearly all transactions in Germany are originated by banks. While Asset-
Securitisation transactions, in the past, have been primarily been motivated by
balance-sheet restructuring, risk transfer and relief of regulatory capital, in the
future funding will become a key factor in the Securitisation market. Funding
spreads have narrowed in such a way that Asset-Securitisation might become a
competitive funding tool.1227
Even though the relief of regulatory capital is still the biggest driver, funding as
a motive has gained importance. This has also been demonstrated by the
lender survey done for this thesis. (Figure 66 and Figure 67)
While volumes of funded synthetic and true sale issuance are low relative to
unfunded synthetic issuances, German originators are now increasingly looking
to the true sale market. The German ministry of finance is increasingly
interested in Asset-Securitisation and market participants are waiting for the
introduction of reforms designed to match structured finance solutions to the
banking, corporate and public sector' s funding needs. The True Sale Initiative
reflects a strong drive in Germany towards these types of transactions. If
attempts to improve the legal environment for true-sale transaction are
successful, this could well mean that the size of the German structured finance
market will start, in the near future, to reflect the size of the German economy
within Europe. 1228
                                             
1227 Cf. Weber (2004), p. 3.
1228 Cf. Collingridge, et al. (2003), p. 245.
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Figure 66: Lending institutions' motives for Securitisation Source: Authors Compilation
Question 4.8: Do you think that Funding will become a dominant goal in the 
future? (n=47)
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Figure 67: The role of the funding as a motive for banks Source: Authors Compilation
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The tax disadvantage (trade tax issue) has been solved for credit institutions by 
the German Small Business Support Act (Kleinunternehmerförderungsgesetz), 
which was passed in July 2003, and funding, besides the relief of regulatory 
capital, will become a very important goal for banks. Hence, this leads to 
conclusion that Asset-Securitisation will increase. However, this only counts for 
credit institutions. Corporates and especially real estate companies do not fall 
under the exception of the new law, and thus their transactions would still incur 
increased transaction costs. Apart from that the insolvency issues are still 
unsolved, which is a strong obstacle and risk. As a result, right now, the Real 
Estate Securitisation market is virtually non-existent. Only transactions with very 
large volumes would be feasible, if even.  One case in that respect has been the 
Securitisation of a loan over the Centro Oberhausen shopping centre.1229 
5.2.2 Test of Minimum Evolution Requirements for Germany 
“Whether you can securitize the future real estate cash flows or not is just a 
question of, if the regulatory, tax, accounting and structural issues can all be 
reconciled…But again, if the tax structure, the accounting and the regulatory 
framework are such that in Germany you need a solution, then yes, that is a 
perfectly legitimate solution.”1230 
Only during the last two year, the support and strengthening of the German 
financial market has become one of the primary goals of the German 
government (represented by the Ministry of Finance). One key element in that 
respect is the fostering of the Asset-Securitisation market in Germany. In part, 
this has led to the German Small Business Support Act. The law was a first 
measure in reducing obstacles for Asset Securitisation in Germany, however, it 
was only a very small step as compared to list of problems and obstacles in the 
legal, regulatory, tax and accounting environments. For policy makers, it took a 
long time to identify the strengthening of the overall financial market in Germany 
as one of the major goals and if it takes as long to implement a favourable 
                                            
1229 Cf. The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 12. 
1230 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
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framework, then Germany will not be a major force in Asset-Securitisation for 
years to come. 
This part of the analysis will go into depth on the current problems and 
obstacles with Asset-Securitisation in Germany. It will also delineate potential 
solutions. 
5.2.2.1 Stringent and Reliable Legal and Regulatory Framework 
This sub-chapter deals with the legal and regulatory framework as it relates to 
the following question:  
• What is the prerequisite of functioning environment? 
• What is the current legal and regulatory framework made up of – how did 
it evolve? 
• What are the obstacles to the development of the market? 
• What are potential solutions? 
First it will be looked at the legal environment and then the regulatory 
environment will be analyzed. 
1. Legal Environment 
The legal environment is far away from being favourable for the evolution of 
Real Estate Securitisation. 
a. Prerequisite for a functioning Legal Environment 
The most crucial prerequisite for a functioning Real Estate Securitisation 
market is a good and reliable legal environment as it relates to the 
bankruptcy code, to the legal transfer of assets and the institution of 
SPVs:  
• The possibility of a ‘true sale’ or perfection of a security interest. 
For investors the primary concern is to perfect their security 
interest in the case of bankruptcy of the originator or borrower. 
• The legal framework to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle that is 
bankruptcy remote. 
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• The legal right to transferred assets upheld even in the even of 
bankruptcies. 
• Security interests must be transferable and investors must have 
the ability to perfect their security interest after transfer, for 
transactions involving asset sale or pledging. This all has to be 
executed at a relatively low cost 
Hence, in order for Real Estate Securitisation to be feasible there has to 
be  
1. a reliable bankruptcy/insolvency code, 
2. clarity of property title, 
3. ability to establish priority of liens on the collateral, and  
4. the ability to enforce foreclosure and repossession over a 
reasonable time period.  
The last point in the list is the key to Real Estate Securitisation in that 
respect. If it is not possible to get to the assets that are underlying the 
transaction and to foreclose on those in a short period of time, then 
investors will not buy into the transaction. Thus, the market will not come 
into existence. 
b. Evolution/State of Legal Environment1231 
Legally, Securitisation of receivables has always been possible within the 
German legal system – which is comparable to the case of factoring. 
However, the system has not necessarily encouraged the development 
of Asset-Securitisation, as is. The sale of receivables (assets) is solely 
based on the German civil code. There is no specific law governing 
Asset-Securitisation. 
In Germany, the transfer of a receivable works through the assignment of 
legal and beneficial ownership interest in a receivable. The receivable 
may be assigned without notice to the debtor and the assignment can be 
evidenced by computer records. However, notice is required to be given 
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to debtors to avoid them obtaining a valid discharge for payments to the 
originator. Exceptions to assignment exist where there is a contractual 
prohibition on assignment, where the assignment would change the 
nature of the obligation or where there is a judicial attachment.1232 
The non-existence of special Securitisation legislation makes the legal 
due diligence of receivables in Germany very time consuming and costly. 
c. Current Legal Obstacles 
The legal environment in Germany does not fulfil the minimum 
requirements for true sale transactions. Due to that fact rating agencies 
usually apply haircuts to German ‘true sale’ transactions and require 
higher credit enhancements. 
Besides Data Secrecy issues, there are four main legal problems with 
respect to Real Estate Securitisations in Germany: 
I. Classification of True Sale 
In Securitisation deals credit enhancement usually takes the form 
of a discounted purchase price, with the possibility that the 
originator will receive an additional payment, if the assets’ 
performance exceeds the purchaser’s funding obligations.  
Currently, there is no German court authority with respect to 
Securitisation transactions regarding the qualification criteria of the 
discount between the nominal value of the assets and the 
purchase price. The key question that is still unsolved is, if the 
asset sale the described case will be classified as a true sale or a 
secured financing with all the bankruptcy implications, and what 
an adequate sale discount is. 
In case that the assignment of receivables is not considered a true 
sale but a secured loan with the receivable assignment as 
                                                                                                                                
1231 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 55; The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 25. 
1232 Cf. Civil Code - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), §§ 399, 134, 320, 362, 364, 398, 404, 406. 
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security, then in case of originator insolvency the § 166(2) of the 
German Insolvency code applies. 1233 
In the case of the originators’ insolvency, as the assets’ owner, the 
purchaser, can request segregation of the assets, and the 
insolvency administrator does not have the right to enforce and 
collect them. However, if the purchaser is considered to be a 
secured lender, the insolvency administrator has the right to 
realise the assets for and on behalf of the insolvency estate and to 
remit the realisation proceeds to the purchaser. Not only does this 
cause a timing issue for the purchaser, who is dependent on the 
insolvency administrator for enforcing the claim, but in such cases 
the insolvency administrator is also entitled to deduct certain 
costs, which could be 9 per cent or more of the realisation 
proceeds. 
II. Uncertainty in the Insolvency/Bankruptcy Code 
As described above, even if the transaction is qualified as a true 
sale, there is a big uncertainty with regards to bankruptcy 
proceedings in the case of the originator insolvency. First of all, it 
is difficult for investors to perfect their security interest in case of 
insolvency - right of separation (Aussonderungsrecht) vs. Right ot 
separate satisfaction (Absonderungsrecht), secondly there is a 
delay in enforcement of security interest and thirdly it can be very 
expensive (up to 9% of outstanding receivables).1234 
III. Legal Separation of asset and security 
The legal separation of receivable (asset) and security interest is 
difficult. Under certain circumstances, the true sale of assets is 
possible. However, the ability to perfect the security interest after 
transfer in the case of pledged assets is hazardous. The transfer 
of the security at sale may be very expensive and unfeasible. For 
                                            
1233 Cf. Insolvency Code – Insolvenzordung (InsO) - § 166 (2). 
1234 Cf. Insolvency Code – Insolvenzordung (InsO) - § 173 (1). 
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the case of real estate it is, however, crucial to perfect the security 
interest, as this circumnavigates the § 166 (2) InsO. 
The transfer of security interest in Real Estate Securitisation 
transactions (i.e. land charges over real estate) can be done in 
two ways; either through a certificate land charge 
(Briefgrundschuld) or through the entry of the new security holder 
in the land registry (Buchgrundschuld). If there is no certificate that 
can be transferred then the entry in the land registry is the only 
alternative.1235 
This process, however, can be very burdensome, time-consuming 
and costly – depending on the underlying collateral (number of 
properties and transaction amount). 
IV. Future Cash Flow Securitisation1236 
A key element of a True Sale Securitisation is the isolation of the 
assets and cash flows from the originator' s other assets (this is 
particularly important if the originator becomes insolvent). German 
insolvency rules will not affect the transfer of claims where the 
originator has performed his contractual obligations. However, 
problems arise out of contracts constituting continuing contractual 
obligations for both parties, such as long-term lease and future 
real estate receivables. 
Under the insolvency/bankruptcy code, upon the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, the insolvency administrator may either 
terminate the contract or opt for its continuation. Irrespective of the 
insolvency administrator's decision, any assignment effected 
before the opening of insolvency proceedings will cease to be 
effective, and the purchaser no longer has an interest in the 
receivables generated thereafter.1237 
                                            
1235 Civil Code - Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), §§ 401, 1153, 1250, 1154 (3). 
1236 Cf. Kreppel (2003), p. 275. 
1237 Cf. Insolvency Code – Insolvenzordung (InsO) - §§ 103, 110. 
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Apart from the discussed obstacles, a comprehensive law governing all 
issues of Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation is missing in Germany. 
The multitude of applicable laws and provisions adds a high complexity 
and huge costs (lawyer, accountant, and tax lawyer fees) to the market 
that represent a great hindrance to the development. 
d. Potential Solution 
Potential solutions range around the creation of a specific Securitisation 
law that incorporates the following provisions: 
1. Simplified rules for transferring assets and security interests 
(including land charges). 
2. Definition of appropriate sales discounts for Asset-Securitisation 
transactions to qualify as a true sale. 
3. Stringent criteria to perfect security interest in case of originator 
bankruptcy. 
4. Clarification of §§ 103 and 110 InsO for future real estate 
receivables. 
Without a specific law and the clarification of the key issues Asset-
Securitisation and especially Real Estate Securitisation will not evolve, 
but stay a niche market. 
2. Regulatory Environment 
The German regulatory environment has set a framework for Asset-
Securitisation. However, it leaves much undesired room for interpretation. 
a. Prerequisite for a functioning Regulatory Environment 
Theoretically it must be in the policy makers’ best interest to foster the 
capital market in Germany, and thus to create a favourable regulatory 
environment for Asset-Securitisation in Germany. In this respect, the 
regulatory authorities must balance their concerns for financial 
soundness with the need for fair, prudent and transparent rules, as they 
relate to: 
• Regulated originators (banks, insurance companies) 
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• SPVs (buyers of assets and issuers of securities) 
• Investors in Asset-Securitisations (banks, insurance companies) 
• The overall financial market. 
b. Evolution/State of Regulatory Environment 1238 
The German regulatory institutions, the Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleitungsaufsicht (BAFin – German bank and insurance 
supervisory authority) and the Bundesbank (German Central Bank) have 
generally not favoured the inception and evolution of Asset-Securitisation 
as other countries in Europe have done (e.g. UK or Italy).  
The main concerns leading to this defensive attitude were: 
• The risk of issuing institutions to select only their best quality 
assets to include in transactions, thus reducing the overall quality 
of a balance sheet (‘cherry picking’). 
• Loss of control over the institution's customers. 
• The complexity of issue documentation, combined with use of 
untested legal structures, in most cases. 
• The signalling effect to financial markets – Securitisation may be 
seen as a sign of weakness of the overall banking system. 
As other markets in Europe developed it became obvious that none of 
the above issues needed to be of concern to the regulators. However, it 
took time for the understanding to grow within the German regulatory 
institutions. Progress was slow, as regulators were seeking to control any 
development closely. Hence, it took until 1997 for the first regulatory 
guidelines to come out. 
This was the Circular 4/97, dated 19 March 1997. The guideline deals 
with Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) transactions by German credit 
institutions and outlines how German credit institutions can achieve 
regulatory capital relief through the sale of own customer (loan) 
                                            
1238 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 56. 
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receivables by way of Asset-Securitisation/Asset-Backed Securities 
(ABS) transactions. 
Circular 4/97 (Banking Supervisory Guideline on ABS)1239 
The purpose of this circular was to demonstrate the authority’s general 
regulatory approach with respect to Asset Securitisation and to provide 
credit institutions with planning and legal certainty regarding some 
central questions. The overall goal was to facilitate launching such 
transactions without the prior involvement of the regulatory authority as 
has been the standard before this circular. The 1997 circular was 
amended by the circular 13/98,1240 clarifying that revolving transactions 
are not covered by the application of Circular 4/97. 
The key proposition of the guideline is that credit institutions selling their 
own receivables in Asset-Securitisation transactions do not need to 
include the receivables sold when applying banking supervisory credit 
limitation principles (in particular Own Funds-Principle I – Grundsatz I), 
provided no risk regarding such receivables is retained. 
For this relief of regulatory capital to be applicable, the following 
conditions need to be met:1241 
• There is a legally valid transfer of the receivables. 
• Recourse against the seller of the receivables, other than 
recourse based on liability for the legal existence or compliance 
with the eligibility criteria, is excluded. 
• No substitution of receivables takes place between the purchaser 
and the seller after the transfer, other than substitutions due to 
non-compliance with the contractually agreed eligibility criteria. 
• If the seller has a right to repurchase, it is limited to a rest-portfolio 
of less than 10% of the receivables transferred; the repurchase 
                                            
1239 Cf. Jeffrey (2001), p. 33. 
1240 Cf. Federal Banking Supervisory Office (1998), p. 1. 
1241 Cf. Federal Banking Supervisory Office (1997), p. 1. 
5.2  Real Estate Securitisation for Germany 519 
 
may only take place upon completion of the transaction (full 
payment to the investors) and only at the current value. 
• Neither the seller of the receivables nor any affiliate within the 
meaning of § 10a of the German Banking Act (KWG) participates 
in the financing of the special purpose vehicle during the 
transaction. 
• Any purchase of such securities in the secondary market may only 
be at the current market price; securities purchased must be 
considered for the purposes of Own Funds-Principle I. 
• Adequate measures are taken to prevent any future de facto 
obligation of the credit institution selling the receivables to 
guarantee the obligations of the special purpose vehicle in case of 
financial difficulties; 
I. There must be no corporate group, company law, capital 
or personal connection between the selling credit 
institution and the special purpose vehicle or the trustee. 
II. The name of the selling credit institution must not be 
identical or similar to the name of the special purpose 
vehicle.  
III. The sales prospectus must indicate clearly that only the 
special purpose vehicle is liable for claims of investors 
and that a guarantee obligation of the seller of the 
receivables exists only to the extent that it has been 
expressly undertaken. 
Additionally, ABS transactions must not be potentially detrimental to the 
confidential relationship between credit institution and customer, or 
subject the customer to the risk that the loan agreement could be settled 
in a manner not appropriate to the banking relationship. 
c. Current Regulatory Obstacles 
First of all, the regulatory authorities, for a long time, have overweighed 
their concerns for financial soundness relative to the need for fair, 
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prudent and transparent rules. Overall, the supervisory processes are 
very inefficient and the lack of qualified statements on current issues 
leaves market participants with a high degree of uncertainty. 
Apart from that, there are only general guidelines relating to Asset-
Backed Security transactions of credit institutions (i.e. German banks), 
leaving undesired room for interpretation, which leads to more expensive 
transactions. Moreover, the environment lacks guidelines on ABS 
transactions involving insurance companies as originators. Statements 
on the regulation of SPVs and measures to favour the overall financial 
market (including Asset-Securitisation) are missing. The current initiative 
to favour the financial markets development in Germany has stayed short 
of those goals, until now.  
d. Potential Solutions 
SPVs should be exempt from regulatory oversight. They should not be 
subject to any regulatory equity requirements. The SPV should be a self-
contained entity that has the right to perfect the investors security 
interest. It should not be restricted in issuing bonds at the capital markets 
to fund the acquisition of assets. For bankruptcy remoteness reasons the 
SPV should be restricted in its business activities. 
5.2.2.2 Sound Tax and Accounting Environment 
With the passing of the German Small Business Support Act 
(Kleinunternehmerförderungsgesetz) in July 2003 and the resulting elimination 
of trade tax risk for bank-originated receivables and bank-sponsored SPVs, the 
overall tax environment has turned into the right direction. However, there 
remain substantial tax obstacles for corporate and government Securitisations. 
This is a great hindrance for the development of Real Estate Securitisation. 
Hence, the overall tax and accounting environment is not sound and will 
currently not be of any favour to Real Estate Securitisation transactions. 
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1. Tax Environment 
a. Prerequisite 
a. There should must not be a tax levied when the an asset from the 
originator’s balance sheet is transferred to the SPV that has not 
existed before the transaction (e.g. additional VAT). 
b. Securitisation SPVs should not to be subject to double taxation 
c. If the SPV is resident on-shore, then the overall tax liabilities 
should be comparable to those in other countries on an 
international level. 
d. The institution and operation of an SPV should be tax-neutral. The 
costs should be reduced to a minimum. 
b. State of the tax environment 
Generally, with respect to tax questions in Asset-Securitisation 
transactions there exist no separate provisions or laws. The general 
taxation laws apply.  
c. Current Tax Obstacles 
There are three major obstacles to Real Estate and Asset-Securitisation 
transactions in Germany with respect to taxes and SPVs: 
I. Value Added Tax (VAT) 
There is a risk that, in certain cases, 16% VAT must be paid on 
the transferred receivables by the SPV. This may be applicable to 
the SPV if the originator has not paid VAT. The risk requires 
transactions securitising non-bank receivables to account for 16% 
additional credit enhancement.1242 
II. Trade Tax (‘Gewerbesteuer’)1243 
In true sale Securitisations the structure demands that the seller 
remains liable for the servicing and collection of the receivables 
                                            
1242 Cf. Value Added Tax Code – Umsatzsteuergesetz (UstG), § 13 (c). 
1243 Cf. Kreppel (2003), p. 275. 
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transferred to the SPV. For transactions involving German assets 
this means that the servicing in respect of receivables sold to an 
offshore SPV still takes place in Germany. 
Over the last three years, German tax authorities have taken the 
view that in Securitisation transactions the collection activities of 
the German-based originator, in its capacity as the SPV’s servicer, 
could result in the SPV being liable to German tax by virtue of 
having a permanent establishment in Germany. 
The assumption that a foreign SPV is permanently established in 
Germany not only results in the SPV’s liability for payment of 
corporate income tax on the income attributable to the permanent 
establishment, but also its liability for payment of German trade 
tax. With SPVs operating on a notional profit basis, corporate 
income tax is generally not an issue. However, the financing debt 
incurred by SPVs through the capital markets to fund the 
acquisition of assets would create a trade tax liability rendering 
true sale Securitisations uneconomical. 
Trade tax is a tax levied by the local communities. It is calculated 
on the basis of the taxable corporate income plus, amongst 
others, half of the interest and other considerations paid by 
borrowers of long-term debt (generally defined as debt exceeding 
one year). With an effective tax rate of about 16 to 19 per cent, 
adding back half the funding costs for trade tax purposes has a 
material impact on the overall tax costs for SPVs and, ultimately, 
for originators. Due to their debt obligations, SPVs have been at 
risk of having to pay trade tax, which would destroy the economic 
benefit of true sale Securitisations. In the past this made true sale 
transactions involving German assets unattractive to German 
originators. In the case of bank assets, transactions were 
executed by using synthetic structures to avoid the risk of a 
potential trade tax liability. 
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III. No adequate trusts – high Set-up Costs 
There is no adequate trust law in Germany that could be applied 
to Special Purpose Vehicles. HeSPVs in Germany are 
incorporated in the form of limited liability companies (GmbH,AG). 
This incorporation requires them to have a nominal capital of 
€25,000 or €50,000 for a GmbH or an AG, respectively. In 
comparison to other jurisdictions (e.g. the channel islands), where 
those costs are as low as €1,000, transaction costs in Germany 
are not competitive. 
As a result of those problems and the resulting tax uncertainty, most 
SPVs in German transactions are incorporated off-shore. This is for a 
number of reasons:1244 
• In order to not to be regulated as a financial institutions. 
• In order to avoid trade tax. 
• Because there is no adequate trust law for Issuing-SPVs in 
Germany. 
• Due to withholding tax payable on payments from a German-
domiciled SPVs. 
Even though it is possible to structure off-shore transactions like this, it is 
very costly and complex. Hence, it is very undesirable for real estate 
companies, and it only becomes feasible in very large transactions. 
d. Potential Solutions 
Without tax and accounting neutrality to minimize additional costs, the 
economics of Real Estate Securitisation will stay unattractive. The tax 
uncertainties have to be clarified and a comprehensive special tax law 
covering Asset-Securitisation transactions shall be constructed. 
 
                                            
1244 Cf. Taylor (1996), p. 55. 
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2. Accounting Environment 
The accounting environment is not crucial to the evolution of the market, but 
it is important to its success, as companies securitising their assets want to 
have a clear guidance on what constitutes an off-balance sheet deal. 
a. Prerequisite 
a. The accounting board should set out reasonable rules on off-
balance sheet treatment for GAAP purposes to fairly reflect the 
company's operations. 
b. The classification of a true sale transaction should be clearly 
delineated. 
b. Current Problems1245 
From an accounting perspective, a true sale means the transfer of 
economic ownership. It is a fundamental rule under German law that the 
economic ownership of an asset cannot be transferred in part. However, 
if a portfolio of receivables is sold at a discount, then this does not 
constitute transfer of full economic ownership. 
On 1 October 2002, the German Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(IDW) published a statement concerning the accounting treatment of 
asset-backed securities transactions. The statement focuses on the 
accounting treatment on the originator' s balance sheet, and, specifically, 
on whether the originator can remove the assets from its balance sheet 
as a result of their sale (off-balance sheet treatment) and how to treat a 
purchase price discount. However, the statement has stayed short of 
clear guidance. In the absence of clear court guidance, there have been 
discussions amongst the accounting community about the appropriate 
discount level that allows the transfer to qualify as a true sale. 
c. Potential Solutions 
Clarification of accounting rules and the application of adequate 
discounts to come to a true sale. 
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5.2.2.3 Functioning Investor Environment 
In order to stimulate the Real Estate Securitisation market, investments should 
be made available to a broad range of investors, including funds and private 
persons (inter alia). Restrictions with respect to investment volume (if any) 
should only be made with respect to the risk inherent in that issuance – only 
regulated institutions should be restricted by all means. Private and public 
companies are regulated and thus restricted in their investments by their 
respective markets and owners.  
A functioning investor environment is in place. There are only minor obstacles 
with respect to regulated investors, which can be neglected with the inclusion of 
international investors. There are already currently investors that are investing 
in German, European and US Securitisation issuances:1246 
• 40% of all Asset-Securitisations in Europe are bought by banks, 20% by 
funds and insurances and 20% by corporates. 
• As opposed to the US, where there are sub-investment grade buyers, in 
Europe and especially in Germany, investors only invest into high 
investment grade paper (i.e. ‘A’ – ‘AAA’). 
• Investors are primarily Bank investors. They are only investment grade 
buyers, as they are subject to high scrutiny and regulatory capital 
constraints. With the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) this will 
increase, as sub-investment grade tranches require a high amount of 
regulatory equity (up to a total deduction of equity). 
Hence, in order for a functioning investor environment to be set up, a 
development and support/vitalization of sub-investment investor environment 
apart from bank investors has to be favoured on the demand side. As this is 
important for the development, it is not a crucial prerequisite from the start, as 
there are some sub-investment grade investors in Europe and the US that 
would buy German issuances for the benefit of portfolio diversification. 
                                                                                                                                
1245 Cf. Weller and Klüwer (2004), p. B6. 
1246 Cf. The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 23. 
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5.2.2.4 Competitive Real Estate Market Framework 
The real estate market framework as it relates to the situation of real estate 
market in Germany is not favourable. 
• Real estate is a safe investment in Germany, but not generally an 
attractive investment.1247 
• Landlord-unfriendly environment with respect to residential and multi-
family real estate 
• Landlord-neutral environment with respect to commercial real estate 
• Intermediate length of lease contracts – 5 to 10 years. 
• Risk of real estate investments – especially in B- and C-markets is 
increasing, due to the overall economic situation. The overall risk-
adjusted return is relatively low. 
• High Asset prices – Low yields. 
• Low inflows into stocks – historically low yields on bonds – high inflows 
into real estate – Height of the financial cycles – flows into real estate are 
generally high – investment opportunities low 
• Economic stagnation – decreasing population – Decreasing occupation – 
Increasing vacancies – overbuilding – downcycle of the physical real 
estate cycle. 
In essence, what this suggests is that there is not necessarily a favourable push 
expected to come from the real estate environment. Yields are too low and only 
high yielding properties with good and predictable cash flows can be used for 
Securitisation. 
                                            
1247 Cf. Schulte and Matzen (2003), p. 1. 
5.2  Real Estate Securitisation for Germany 527 
 
5.2.2.5 Other Crucial Drivers 
1. Government involvement – a government must have an interest in the 
market in order for the Asset-Securitisation market to evolve and 
succeed. A strengthening of the market through active government 
support is proven. 
Historically, government support for Asset-Securitisation has been low, as 
has been discussed above. However, the interest in creating an Asset 
Securitisation market has increased during recent times. The change in 
attitude can basically be attributed to 5 trends in Germany (primarily driven 
by the banking sector): 
I. The equity base of many German banks has drastically declined during 
the last few years and banks are increasingly pressured by high ROE 
hurdles.  
II. During the same time the bank funding costs have gone up, due to a 
deterioration in credit rating – rating downgrades. 
III. Additionally, the German Landesbanks have lost their government 
support (Anstaltshaft, Gewährträgerhaftung).  
IV. The potential implications of the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
have resulted in declining loan origination. 
V. Historically unsound loan underwriting criteria and the ongoing 
economic downturn have created an increasing base of non-performing 
loans. 
This has put pressure on the overall banking system. In addition, it has lead 
to rising funding costs for the German industry and funding has increasingly 
become a constraint to the German economy. Therefore it is in the 
governments best interest to relief and safeguard the banking system and to 
transfer the risk out of the banking system to investors by the means of 
Asset-Securitisation.  
So, government support has generally increased, which is a positive sign for 
Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation. Nevertheless, the legal 
changes (i.e. trade tax) and the increased government support has only 
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related to credit institutions and their Securitisations. It has stayed short of 
support for non-banking companies. Hence, there needs to be an increasing 
support from the government side for company Securitisations in order for 
the Real Estate Securitisation to evolve and succeed. 
Apart from that direct government support by the means of market 
involvement as an originator for government assets (receivables and real 
estate) would lead to strong development of the market. 
2. Financial Crisis – there must be a strain on the overall financial system 
and especially the banking system for Real Estate/Asset-Securitisation 
to evolve as an alternative source of financing. 
As has been shown in the lender survey in Chapter 5.1, there is a strain on 
the banking system. The study has shown that this might be a strong driver 
for the evolution of Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate Securitisation. In 
this respect, the situation is comparable to the US in the mid- to late-1990’s, 
when the financial institution went deep into real estate and took a lot of 
risky loans and made a lot of bad decisions and Securitisation eventually 
resolved this problem. 
3. Credit Crunch – loan commitments must be down, funding and 
refinancing of existing loans must be burdensome for originators to 
seek other sources of funding. 
The lender survey has also shown that there is a credit crunch. Loan 
commitments are going down and lending spreads are increasing. The 
influence of Basel II does its part as well – long-term real estate lending gets 
burdened with high risk-weightings. 
4. Real Estate Market Cycle –a downturn in the financial real estate cycle 
is favouring the need for innovative funding solutions. 
A downturn in the financial real estate cycles is not observable at the 
moment. Flows into real estate are quite high – especially from the German 
open-ended property funds. 
5. Competitive Advantage of Capital Markets Funding – Funding arbitrage 
for originators, lower transaction costs & profit arbitrage for 
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investment banks are strong drivers for the inception and development 
of Securitisation. 
Right now, there is no funding arbitrage for originators achievable, except for 
prime real estate properties. Transaction costs in Germany, as explained 
above are generally higher than in other countries in Europe. The profit 
arbitrage for investment bankers is low, due to very competitive margins in 
traditional German real estate lending. Only with steadily increasing margins 
on real estate financings, the arbitrage potential will increase and thus the 
competitive advantage of capital markets funding will become a driver. 
5.2.3 Potential Core Determinants 
The described core determinants in this chapter can be identified as proposed 
determinants. The compilation results out of the international comparison and is 
not proven by any in-depth empirical study. An additional empirical study would 
have gone beyond the frame of this dissertation, and thus, this leaves room for 
future studies. 
5.2.3.1 Borrowers 
Following the categorization of core determinants out of Chapter 4.5.3, potential 
borrowers/originators/sellers of assets in the first stage of the German market 
could be: 
1. The government (federal, state of municipal government) through 
its treasury department or Government-Linked Corporations 
(Landesentwicklungsgesellschaften). In Germany, public real 
estate valued at €2.3 Trillion is still owned by the government, 
states and municipalities.1248 
2. Large Real Estate Holders/Investors – companies comparable 
to Olympia & York (US) or British Land (UK). In Germany this 
could be large open-ended or spezial funds, large public real 
estate companies (e.g. IVG) or insurance companies (e.g. 
MEAG). 
                                            
1248 Cf. Anonymous, Die Welt (06 April 2004). 
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3. Big Corporations – There is a huge amount of real estate in the 
books of German blue chip corporations. This real estate is 
optimal for Sale-Leaseback Securitisation.1249 
The reason why it has to be those Borrowers/Originators/Sellers that become 
the innovators of Real Estate Securitisation in Germany is that, due to the legal 
and tax obstacles, innovators must have large balance sheets with big assets 
and the financial capabilities to cope with the additional costs. At a later stage 
the market will open to smaller Corporates, Real Estate Developers (small and 
medium size)1250 and Real Estate Investors. As the market gets even more 
efficient Conduit Vehicles and Banks will become originators. 
5.2.3.2 Assets 
Considering the high risks, high transaction costs and the multiple obstacles for 
executing German Real Estate Securitisations, potential underlying properties 
for have to satisfy the following criteria: 
1. High grade properties ? ‘Flagship’/’Trophy’ properties (primarily retail 
and office). Only high yielding properties qualify. 
2. The real estate has to have long term leases and predictable cash flows. 
Only properties with good quality and stable income qualify. 
3. There have to be sufficient property cash flows to service the bonds and 
to account for credit enhancement. 
4. Good credit tenants – preferably government credits. 
Looking at the Types of Assets Physical Real Estate Assets (i.e. buildings and 
land), Mortgage Loans and Credit Tenant Leases would make sense. Current 
and Future Real Estate Receivables, Receivables from future residential 
development sales proceeds and Operating Companies do not work legally. 
The primary Collateral/Security in this respect will be the property (fee simple) 
as this is a clear title or a mortgage over the property, as a land charge 
                                            
1249 Cf. Schulte and Schäfers (2004), p. 529. 
1250 Cf. Schulte and Bone-Winkel (2002), p. 30. 
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(mortgage lien) is the most legitimate means to secure claims on real estate 
under the German legal system. 
The most likely underlying Property Types to be included in the first 
transactions to start off the market are Office, Multi-Family/Residential (i.e. 
apartments) or big Retail assets. Other property types might follow at a later 
stage, but to start out those three are the most likely. 
From a Property Category standpoint, the most likely categories are 
Investment Real Estate and Corporate Real Estate. Development Real Estate 
will not be feasible. 
There has been a first true sale involving a German asset in November 2003. 
The transaction was backed by a single property. The asset was comprised of a 
loan that is secured on the CentrO Oberhausen shopping centre, Germany’s 
largest shopping centre. So this deal comprises the first Real Estate 
Securitisation in Germany. The reason that it was a Single Property transaction 
hints at a similar development cycle as in the case of Singapore and the US.1251 
5.2.3.3 Motives 
The motives are dependent on the use of Real Estate Securitisation as a 
divestment vehicle (i.e. a way to monetize on the physical real estate asset) or 
as an innovative financing instrument. For non-real estate corporates in 
Germany it would make sense to use Real Estate Securitisation as a 
divestment vehicle, for real estate investors it would make sense to use it as an 
innovative financing instrument. Depending on the ultimate motivation, the 
following motives are proposed. 
1. Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment vehicle 
o Balance-Sheet Management (Off-Balance Sheet Financing) 
o Creation of liquidity through an asset divestment 
o Property Monetization 
2. Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative financing instrument 
                                            
1251 Cf. Anonymous (2003r), p. 76. 
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o Diversification of funding sources 
o Cheaper funding 
o Higher Loan-to-Value (in specific cases of Credit Tenant Lease 
Securitisation) 
o Non-recourse, long-term funding 
5.2.3.4 Transaction Schemes 
Based on the previous compilation of borrowers/originators/sellers, assets and 
motives, the following potential property-related transaction schemes can be 
derived: 
1. Physical-Asset Real Estate Securitisation/Singapore Structure: 
A structure similar to the Singapore structure featuring the Securitisation of 
physical assets, could be imaginable for German corporates that want to 
monetize on their real estate via sale-leasebacks. The real estate will be 
transferred to the SPV that holds it in the interest of the investors. 
Combining the bonds with preference shares will create a new universe of 
investment vehicles. 
2. Single Asset/Property – Single Borrower: 
Especially Single Property/Single Borrower transactions are the drivers in 
the first stage of a market. With the first Single Property – CentrO – deal this 
transaction scheme has already started the market. 
3. Sale-Leaseback/Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation  
Those transactions which are totally independent of the borrower, but that 
are dependent on the property’s tenant credit and partly on the quality of the 
property, have a great potential in Germany. Especially, for the case of 
government real estate – divestments could be structured into this 
transactions scheme. There is also a big potential demand from the 
corporate side, as sale-leaseback payments of good credit corporates could 
be securitised. 
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5.2.4 Summary 
The market for Asset-Securitisation in Germany has taken longer to evolve as 
in other countries. The German environment is truly a unique environment with 
a lot of peculiarities and historically little inclination to start Securitisation than 
other European countries. However, going forward this source of financing will 
become crucial to the success of the German financial market. 
This sub-chapter has identified all obstacles and potential solutions in the fields 
crucial to the development of Real Estate Securitisation markets. The following 
key propositions for the evolution of Real Estate Securitisation in Germany 
resulting out of this chapter can be derived: 
1. Overall acceptance of Asset-Securitisation as a legitimate funding 
instrument for banks, governments and corporations: 
a. Better communication and a greater dialog between policy makers 
and industry participants. 
b. Creation of Securitisation specific legislation. 
2. Facilitation of Real Estate Securitisations: 
a. Reduction of complexity for Securitisation transactions. 
b. Resolution of VAT and trade tax problem. Compared to alternative 
ways of funding (sale-leaseback and factoring), Securitisation of real 
estate is levied with extra trade tax that does not apply to the others. 
By all means, this is not a fair and stringent tax framework. 
3. Creation of legal certainty and an increasing predictability of legal decisions 
for lawyers, accountants and investment bankers: 
a. Legal changes have to tackle the issues described in the upper part. 
Clarification is especially needed with respect to the insolvency code. 
b. The adequate discount for a ‘true sale’ has to be determined. 
Even though most crucial drivers hint at the inception of Real Estate 
Securitisation in Germany, it is the legal, regulatory, tax and accounting 
environment that hold up that development. As long as rules for Securitisation 
transactions are not cleared and SPVs are pressured to go off-shore, the 
complexity of Securitisation transactions will not decline and the resulting 
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transaction costs will stay the biggest hindrance to the development of this 
financing instrument. 
This chapter has also identified potential core determinants. Summarizing that 
analysis the potential determinants are listed below: 
1. Borrowers/Originators/Sellers – the government, large real estate 
holders/investors, big corporations 
2. Assets – trophy properties (primarily office, retail and multi-family) with 
stable cash flows and acceptable yields. 
3. Motives – primarily cheaper funding and diversification of lending sources 
(for innovative financing) or off-balance sheet financing and monetization on 
assets (for divestment vehicle) 
4. Transaction Schemes – Physical-Asset Real Estate Securitisation 
(primarily with corporate property), Single-Property/Single Borrower 
Securitisation or Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation (primarily with 
government property) 
5.3 Chapter Summary and Recommendations 
“One of the things that you definitely need to achieve is that the real estate 
seller can have a lower cost of capital so that he will be motivated to sell into 
this regime [Real Estate Securitisation], which will create an adequate return to 
the investor.”1252 
The primary reason why ‘True Sale’ Asset-Securitisation and Real Estate 
Securitisation virtually do not exist in Germany is that there is no funding 
arbitrage available in the market. Hence, originators (i.e. the property industry) 
cannot lower their cost of capital. This can be attributed to two things: 
1. Competitiveness of Securitisation – historically margins for traditional 
real estate lending have been so low that there is no opportunity for 
arbitrage for investment bankers. 
                                            
1252 Cf. Robinson (2003), Interview 9, p. 554. 
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2. Transaction Costs – the legal and regulatory obstacles are so high that 
the cost of setting up such a transaction – if even possible – outweighs 
the benefits.  
The arbitrage to be made by originators and investment bankers, alike, is not 
big enough for the market to take off. Once this turns to become valid, the 
market will evolve. Markets need time, a favourable framework and crucial 
drivers to develop. This cannot be pressed into existence, if the market is 
deregulated and a neutral overall framework is set into place, it usually happens 
over time driven by market forces. 
The evolution of the Real Estate and Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
markets in Singapore and the US/UK respectively may be used as an analogy 
and a proxy of how the market might develop in Germany, if the right factors 
apply and the adequate measures are taken.1253 
From the real estate perspective, the drivers for the inception and evolution of a 
Real Estate Securitisation market in Germany are strongly hinting at a need for 
this development. The kinds of market conditions of the real estate financing 
industry in the US in the early 1990’s and Singapore in the late 1990’s, when 
the modern Real Estate Securitisation market started to take off is not too far off 
from the case of Germany in 2004:1254 
• Poor historic underwriting and hence a lot of bad loans in the years 
leading to the financial crisis. The problems in the banking system are 
not as bad as in the US with the Savings & Loans, but there are a lot of 
non-performing loans that are being sold in the market. Some of those 
portfolios might get securitised once the legal and regulatory constraints 
have been worked out. 
• There is a credit crunch, which has led to a higher risk sensitivity that is 
at the moment resulting in total risk avoidance (influenced by large non-
performing loan exposures, high ROE targets, the Landesbank problem 
and the anticipation of Basel II). 
                                            
1253 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554. 
1254 Cf. Corcoran (2003), Interview 12, p. 554; Choe (2003), Interview 13, p. 554. 
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• The traditional real estate lenders are not committing as much real estate 
debt as they used to and the lending rates are rising. (Figure 48 and 
Figure 49) 
• A weakening real estate market. 
The analogy between the USA in the early 1990’s and Germany in the early 
2000’s is intriguing. As a result the CMBS/Real Estate Securitisation market in 
Germany should start to take off, if the evolution obstacles can be solved. 
Evolution Obstacles 
The obstacles and problems relating to the overall framework for Asset-
Securitisation in Germany are typical for the evolution of such markets in 
Europe. The Europe part within the international comparison in Chapter 4.4 has 
shown that regulatory, legal, tax and accounting obstacles have held up the 
stringent development of Asset-Securitisation in local European markets, with 
the exception of the UK. The key problems in this regard are: 
1. Legal Obstacles with respect to: 
a. Classification of True Sale 
b. Uncertainty in the Insolvency/Bankruptcy Code 
c. Legal Separation of asset and security 
d. Missing legal basis for ‘Future Cash Flow Securitisation’ 
2. Regulatory Obstacles 
a. Only general guidelines concerning Asset-Securitisation exist – no 
specific regulations. 
b. Overweight of regulatory concern for financial soundness relative 
to the need for fair, prudent and transparent rules. 
c. Supervisory processes are very inefficient and the lack of qualified 
statements on current issues leaves market participants with a 
high degree of uncertainty. 
3. Tax Obstacles relating to the following issues 
a. Value Added Tax (VAT) 
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b. Trade Tax (Gewerbesteuer) 
c. High Set-up Costs 
4. Accounting Obstacles 
a. Uncertainty about the classification of a ‘True Sale’ 
b. Off-Balance Sheet Treatment 
A BCG analysis has come to the conclusion that the German ‘True Sale’ Asset-
Securitisation market could grow to two to three times the size of the synthetic 
Securitisation market (amounting to €60-90 bn), if there were no evolution 
obstacles prevalent and the framework was clear and certain.1255 
The institution of the True Sale Initiative (TSI – today called True Sale 
International) under the leadership of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
has started to create an awareness for the problems relating to Asset-
Securitisation. 
The participation of KfW and the resulting bad bank discussion with respect to 
the role of the KfW offers strong similarities to the USA and Japan. It sounds 
similar to the US Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in the late 1980’s/early 
1990’s and the Japanese Vehicle discussion in the late 1990’s. The comparison 
is valid as the overall tendencies can be compared and the drivers are alike, 
however, the situation in Germany never got so out of hand that there needed 
to be a liquidation institution. 
The TSI has lobbied to create a more favourable framework and especially to 
alleviate the trade tax issues for banks. The KfW’s part in this respect was to 
conciliate between the different parties and to create a platform for 
Securitisation. Until now, the TSI was successful with respect to the trade tax 
issue that was abolished for SPVs securitising bank receivables. However, the 
creation of a platform was not that easy with 13 parties at the table – all having 
their own opinion. It took 18 month for a first transaction to come out. The 
feasibility of the TSI platform is still to be proven. 
                                            
1255 Cf. The Boston Consulting Group (2004), p. 23. 
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Even though the current measures taken by the government and the TSI are 
favourable for the overall environment, they have stayed at least two steps 
short of a functioning market (especially for Real Estate Securitisation). There is 
still a huge uncertainty relating to true-sale, perfection of security interest and 
insolvency proceedings. In addition to that, there is still no clarity with respect to 
the VAT problem, and the trade tax issue is still a great obstacle and 
uncertainty for corporate Securitisations including real estate transactions. 
Recommendations for policy makers 
Out of the previous discussion the following recommendations for decision and 
policy makers can be derived: 
• Most importantly, the government has to get involved into the evolution, 
from the regulatory and legislative side as well as from the originator side 
securitising assets. 
• The legal framework has to be adapted to account for Securitisation – 
especially with respect to the treatment of Securitisation receivables in 
the insolvency code. 
• The regulatory approach to Asset-Securitisation has to be lightened and 
more flexibility should be given to the market.  
• The tax framework has to be clarified to fit Securitisation. Taxes levied on 
this kind of financing should not be higher or lower than on other 
financings. The SPVs should be tax-neutral, so that they can be 
incorporated in Germany and do not need to go off-shore. 
• The accounting board has to clarify the off-balance sheet criteria. Sale 
discounts required for credit enhancements (overcollateralisation) should 
not exclude off-balance sheet treatment. Adequate levels of discount 
have to be found. 
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6 Conclusion and Outlook 
“It is not the type of finance that is decisive, but rather the entrepreneurial vision 
that can breathe life into a project.” – Jerry Speyer 1256 
Real Estate Securitisation constitutes an alternative source of financing for the 
property industry. However, it is not the form of financing utilized that is crucial 
to the success of the project – traditional finance or Real Estate Securitisation – 
it is the ultimate feasibility of the idea and the quality of the property that are 
crucial. Hence, even if a financing method can partly substitute traditional 
financing, it can, however, not make up a miserable property quality or a bad 
project. Real Estate Securitisation is not an exit route for bad real estate. 
Compared to traditional lending, which can also account for lower grade real 
estate, Real Estate Securitisation will only work for good real estate that 
generates steady and constant cash flows. In that sense it is similar to bank 
lending, but it takes a different view than bank lending – bank lending is 
primarily concerned with the value of the property, Securitisation is primarily 
concerned with the quality of the cash flows derived out of the property. 
This dissertation has shown that alternative sources of financing for the 
property industry in Germany are increasingly important. Real Estate 
Securitisation as one instrument in that spectrum can fulfil part of that need. 
The underlying thesis has argued the case for Real Estate Securitisation as an 
alternative source of financing for the property industry. It constitutes a new 
financing instrument that diversifies borrower funding base, and hence reduces 
the risk of being too dependent on traditional bank financing in an upcoming 
credit crunch. 
This dissertation has added to academic research by creating a framework for 
Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation markets. It has also created a new 
evolution model for such markets. Taking up the hypotheses delineated in the 
introduction of this thesis, the results will be displayed in the following part: 
                                            
1256 Friedemann (2003), p. 9. 
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1. The first hypothesis holds true. There is a theoretical framework that 
can be applied to Securitisation Markets, of which Real Estate 
Securitisation Markets are a special subset. The framework described in 
Chapter 3.4, has been validated through the International Comparison in 
Chapter 4. The theoretical framework is made up of the relevant Asset-
Securitisation market, the environments influencing the respective 
market and the core determinants that are integral parts of Securitisation 
transactions. 
a. The relevant market is determined by the assets underlying the 
transactions. In the case of real estate, the relevant market is the 
Real Estate or Property Securitisation market. 
b. Generally, all Asset-Securitisation markets are influenced by the 
following environments: the Regulatory/Legal, Tax, Accounting, 
the Investor and Rating Agency Environment. Additionally in the 
case of Real Estate Securitisation the market is influenced by the 
Real Estate and Local/Country specific environment. 
c. The core determinants of an Asset-Securitisation transaction are 
the assets, the borrowers/originators/sellers of those assets and 
the motives for executing such transactions. The relevant core 
determinants for Real Estate Securitisation have been derived out 
of the international comparison and have been presented in 
Chapter 4.5.3. 
d. Drivers for the inception and development of Real Estate 
Securitisation markets can be derived from the framework. A life 
cycle model for the evolution of such markets can be constructed.  
e. Through the international comparison a set of minimal 
requirements has been worked out in order for a Real Estate 
Securitisation Market to develop.  
The minimal requirements have been applied and tested for the case of 
Germany. The results lead to the rejection of the third hypothesis. 
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2. The second hypothesis cannot be rejected, i.e. there is a need for 
Real Estate Securitisation in Germany. Commercial real estate financing 
in Germany will become more difficult and more expensive in the future. 
Hence, there is a need for new innovative real estate financing products 
that will evolve and partly substitute traditional lending sources. The 
underlying reasons are compelling and have been delineated by this 
research work: 
a. There is a credit crunch in Germany – i.e. the loan commitment of 
German Mortgage Banks is declining. This is especially true for 
lower grade/quality properties. 
b. The Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) will have a big influence on 
Real Estate Financing. The effects are increased financing costs 
due to higher risk-weightings. 
c. The withdrawal of the German Government as guarantor for the 
credit of the German ‘Landesbanks’ will lead to lower credit rating 
on their part, and hence will lead to higher lending spreads in the 
real estate lending market. 
d. The lending spreads that have traditionally been incomparably low 
in Germany are starting to rise, which opens up the field for new 
competitive products. Real Estate Securitisation is one of those 
competitive products. Rising rates will create arbitrage 
opportunities for capital markets financing compared to traditional 
credit market financing. 
e. Additionally, the changing business model of Mortgage-Banks will 
strengthen the global trend towards Asset-Securitisation, which is 
changing the market environment that is moving from credit to 
capital markets. 
Those are all indications for decreasing loan commitments and rising real 
estate lending rates. The trend for rising rates will keep on going 
upwards in the future, until the margins will level out on the European 
level in the medium term. This creates both, the need for Real Estate 
Securitisation and the right circumstances for its evolution. 
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3. The third hypothesis can be rejected, i.e. Real Estate Securitisation, 
as defined in Chapter 3, is under the current conditions not viable in 
Germany. Even though the drivers for the successful evolution of a Real 
Estate Securitisation market in Germany exist, there is still a long list of 
obstacles and unsolved problems. The drivers for the successful 
evolution as they were clearly delineated in Chapter 5.2 are: 
a. Government involvement 
b. Financial Crisis 
c. Credit Crunch 
The obstacles that hinder a favourable framework for Real Estate 
Securitisation are (as described in Chapter 5.2.2): 
a. Legal Obstacles – Classification of True Sale, Uncertainty in the 
Insolvency/Bankruptcy Code, Legal Separation of asset and 
security, Missing legal basis for ‘Future Cash Flow Securitisation’. 
b. Regulatory Obstacles – High uncertainty: only general guidelines 
concerning Asset-Securitisation, no transparent rules, inefficient 
supervisory processes. 
c. Tax Obstacles – Problems with Value Added Tax (VAT), Trade 
Tax (Gewerbesteuer), High Set-up Costs. 
d. Accounting Obstacles – Uncertainty about the classification of a 
‘True Sale’, Off-Balance Sheet Treatment. 
For the above-described obstacles and problems there are potential 
solutions. This implies the following measures, if policy makers want to 
make Real Estate Securitisation transactions possible: 
a. Most importantly, the government has to get involved into the 
evolution, from the regulatory and legislative side as well as from 
the originator side securitising assets. 
b. The legal framework has to be adapted to account for 
Securitisation – especially with respect to the treatment of 
Securitisation receivables in the insolvency code. 
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c. The regulatory approach to Asset-Securitisation has to be adapted 
and more flexibility should be given to the market.  
d. The tax framework has to be clarified to fit Securitisation. The 
trade tax privilege for Securitisation should also be extended to 
Corporate Securitisations. 
e. The accounting board has to clarify the off-balance sheet 
criteria. 
If the basic conditions/general framework can be changed in such a way as 
described above, then the following core determinants could lead the way (as 
delineated in Chapter 5.2.3): 
1. Potential German Borrowers/Originators/Sellers: 
a. The government – the government, as owner of large amounts of 
real estate, is in desperate need to raise liquidity without raising 
the national deficit above the Maastricht Criteria. 
b. Large Real Estate Holders/Investors – large open-ended or 
special funds, large public real estate companies (e.g. IVG) or 
insurance companies (e.g. MEAG), as they have the critical mass 
and enough money to take the risk for the first deals. 
c. Big Corporations – German blue chip corporations, as they that 
hold a lot of non-core real estate that is optimal for Sale-
Leaseback Securitisation. 
2. Potential German Assets 
In the first, stage potential German property assets have to be ‘trophy’ 
properties (primarily office, retail and multi-family) with stable cash flows 
and acceptable yields. 
3. Potential Motives 
a. Real Estate Securitisation as an innovative form of financing: 
primarily cheaper funding and diversification of lending sources 
(for innovative financing), or 
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b. Real Estate Securitisation as a divestment vehicle: 
off-balance sheet financing and monetization on assets (for 
divestment vehicle) 
4. Potential Transaction Schemes 
a. Physical-Asset Real Estate Securitisation (primarily with 
corporate property) 
b. Single-Property/Single Borrower Securitisation 
c. Credit Tenant Lease Securitisation (primarily with government 
property) 
The individual transaction structures for potential transactions in Germany will 
result out of the specific combinations of borrowers/originators/sellers, assets, 
motives and transaction schemes.  
Even though there is a credit crunch, rates are rising and property owners and 
developers are anxious about the future development in the traditional banking 
market in Germany, good properties and projects will still be able to get 
traditional bank financing at reasonable rates. However, an effective distribution 
of funds from both private and public real estate capital markets has an 
enormous influence on the efficiency of an overall economy. In this respect, 
international evidence shows that public markets usually exercise greater 
control over lending activities, and hence provide a more adequate distribution 
of funds than private lending markets. This reduces the amplitude of real estate 
cycles. 
Thus, this thesis can be viewed as an appeal and an encouragement for 
German policy makers and lobbyists to further the development of the Asset-
Securitisation market in general and the evolution of a favourable environment 
for a Real Estate Securitisations in specific. 
Future potential for further Research/Studies 
During the course of the dissertation multiple other fields of research related to 
Real Estate and Asset-Securitisation have come up that will need clarification 
and that represent interesting issues for further investigation of this field of 
research. To cover all of those issues would have gone far beyond the scope of 
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this dissertation. This is why they are listed below for researchers to tackle in 
the future. This list is not comprehensive, but it hints at further fields for future 
research: 
? Following the argumentation of this dissertation, research still needs to 
be done from a legal perspective. In essence, how should the specific 
laws, regulations and structures be adapted to fit the German market? 
How should they be implemented? 
? The German market needs some more consideration from the demand 
side. In this respect, it would be of interest to construct an empirical 
study to estimate the true potential of Real Estate Securitisation in 
Germany. A survey including potential originators/borrowers could lead 
to an analysis of the true motives and assets to form specific transaction 
structures. 
? Overall, from a market evolution perspective, there is research demand 
on the further evolution potential of a public real estate debt market, once 
it has reached its standardisation phase (innovation theory). 
? No study has been made on the advantageousness of Real Estate 
Securitisation on a macro-economic level. It would be interesting to 
measure the influence/success/economic advantage that the existence 
of an Asset-Securitisation or a Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securitisation market has brought to a country with a functioning 
market. 
? Also from an economic perspective, it would be of great interest to proof 
the funding advantage of Real Estate/Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securitisation and to calculate the economic advantage resulting out of 
an overall lower cost of funding for the economy. 
This dissertation can only be seen as a first step into the direction of academic 
research on Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation. This very specific field still 
leaves a lot of questions unanswered; there is only little academic coverage. In 
this respect, this thesis has provided a foundation for analyzing and 
understanding Asset- and Real Estate Securitisation markets, and for doing 
future research in this field. 
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ABCP vs. ABS Term deals  
Type Multi-Seller Conduit Private Placement Public Issue
Transaction Size $25 million-$1 billion $25 million-$150 million $100 million+ 
Execution Time 4-6 weeks 8-12 weeks 12-16 weeks 
First Time Set-up Costs Low Moderate High 
Accounting Treatment Off-Balance-Sheet Off-Balance-Sheet Off-Balance-Sheet 
Rating Requirements May be optional At least one rating required At least two ratings required
Credit Enhancement 
Overcollateralization, Cash 
Collateral Account, Letter 
of Credit, Surety Bond
Overcollateralization, Cash 
Collateral Account, Letter 
of Credit, Surety Bond
Overcollateralization, Cash 
Collateral Account, Letter of 
Credit, Surety Bond 
Liquidity Agreements Required Not Required Not Required 
Funding Rate Basis 
Spread off the CP or 
LIBOR indices, basis can 
be swapped
Floating or Fixed, basis can 
be swapped
Floating or Fixed, basis can 
be swapped 
Prepayment 
Usually no penalty for 
payments or facility 
reductions made on 
payment dates (unless an 
interest rate hedge is 
involved)
Other than "clean-up calls," 
sponsor initiated 
prepayments are not 
allowed
Other than "clean-up calls," 
sponsor initiated 
prepayments are not 
allowed 
Legal Structure 
Collateral transferred via 
"true-sale" to bankruptcy-
remote Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE)
Collateral transferred via 
"true-sale" to bankruptcy-
remote Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE)
Collateral transferred via 
"true-sale" to bankruptcy-
remote Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE)
Typical Documentation 
Transfer Agreement, 
Purchase Agreement, 
Liquidity Facility, Legal & 
Tax Opinions, Portfolio 
Audit
Offering Memorandum, 
Sale Agreement, Pooling & 
Servicing Agreement, Trust 
Indenture, Legal & Tax 
Opinions, Comfort Letter
Prospectus & Registration, 
Documents, Underwriting 
Agreement, Sale 
Agreement, Pooling & 
Servicing Agreement, Trust 
Indenture, Legal & Tax 
Opinions, Comfort Letter
Financial Covenants 
Sometimes. However, 
effects are minimal due to 
bankruptcy-remote 
structure
Sometimes. However, 
effects are minimal due to 
bankruptcy-remote 
structure
Very rarely 
Operating Flexibility High Low Low  
Chart 22: Comparison of structural features in Placement Alternatives1257 
 
 
 
                                            
1257 Cf. Roever and Fabozzi (2003), p. 18. 
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Literature Overview Singapore 
Academic Journals and Conference Papers: 
• Asset Securitisation in Singapore: A Tale of Three Vehicles1258 
• Asset-Backed Securitisation in Singapore: Value of Embedded Buy-Back 
Options – Value and Pricing of Embedded Buy-Back Options1259 
• Analysis of Credit Risk in Asset-Backed Securitisation Transactions in 
Singapore1260 
• Residential Mortgage-Backed Securitisation in Asia: The Singapore 
Experience1261 
• Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securitisation in Singapore: The 
Challenges Ahead1262 
Research Projects: 
• Real Estate Securitisation in Singapore - A timely innovation or a white 
elephant?1263 
• Real Estate Financing in Singapore: Alternative Methods1264 
• Asset Backed Securitisation.1265 
Bachelor and Master Thesis: 
• Commercial real estate Securitisation in Singapore: a case study.1266 
• Swaption approach to estimating the financing cost of Asset-Backed 
Securitisation.1267  
• Buyback options in Asset-Securitisation deals.1268  
• Valuing embedded options in Real Estate Securitisation transactions.1269 
                                            
1258 Cf. Ong, et al. (2000), p. 54. 
1259 Cf. Sing, et al. (2003), p. 173. 
1260 Cf. Sing, et al. (2004), p. 235. 
1261 Cf. Sing and Ong (2004), p. 159. 
1262 Cf. Sing, et al. (2004), p. 1. 
1263 Cf. Ong, et al. (2001), p. 1. 
1264 Cf. Ooi, et al. (2002), p. 1. 
1265 Cf. Sing, et al. (2003), p. 1. 
1266 Cf. Quek (1996), p. 1. 
1267 Cf. Yong (2002), p. 1. 
1268 Cf. Lim (2000), p. 1. 
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• Governance of Securitisation Transactions: Risk control and 
management in Real Estate Asset-Backed Securitisation deals.1270 
• Securitisation of Residential Real Estate in Singapore.1271 
• Asset Securitisation: Is it a better source of financing for property 
companies in Singapore?1272 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
1269 Cf. Tan (2000), p. 1. 
1270 Cf. Tay (2002), p. 1. 
1271 Cf. Tan (2001), p. 1. 
1272 Cf. Heng (2002), p. 1. 
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BANKS/INVESTMENT BANKS OFF-WALL STREET CONDUITS 
Archon Financial/Goldman Sachs Capital Lease Funding 
Bank of America Central Park Capital 
Bear Stearns Finova Realty Capital 
Chase Commercial Mortgage Banking GE Capital Access 
CIBC Oppenheimer GMAC Commercial Mortgage 
Citigroup/Salomon Smith Barney Greenwich Capital 
Credit Suisse First Boston Heller Capital 
Deutsche Bank Securities Impac Commercial Capital Corp. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Llama Capital Mortgage 
First Union Midland Commercial Funding 
J.P. Morgan National Cooperative Bank 
John Hancock Real Estate Finance National Realty Funding 
LaSalle National Bank NW LLC 
Lehman Brothers RF Commercial 
Merrill Lynch  
Morgan Stanley  
Paine Webber  
Prudential Mortgage Capital  
Teachers Insurance/Credit Suisse First  
Boston  
Wells Fargo Bank  
Chart 23: Conduit Lenders in the US as of 19991273 
 
                                            
1273 Peterson (1999), p. 56. 
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Milestones the US Secondary Mortgage Market 
1938 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is 
established to purchase residential mortgages insured by the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA).  
1954  
Fannie Mae is authorized to issue non-voting stock to the public to 
finance its operations. A conditional line of credit to the Treasury 
enables Fannie Mae to borrow from the public at low interest rates.  
1957  
States authorize Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC) 
to provide private mortgage insurance on conventional loans – those 
that do not carry government insurance or guarantees.  
1966  
Fannie Mae issues a series of collateralized bonds backed by 
mortgages owned by Fannie Mae, FHA and the Veterans 
Administration (VA).  
1968  
Fannie Mae is replaced by a new Fannie Mae that is a Government-
Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) authorized to buy mortgages insured by 
FHA or guaranteed by VA. The Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae) is founded, which is a federal agency 
charged with guaranteeing Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) 
backed by pools of those loans.  
1970  Ginnie Mae guarantees its first MBS.  
1970  
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) is 
founded to provide a secondary market for conventional mortgages, 
authorizing Fannie Mae to purchase such loans.  
1971  Freddie Mac issues its first guaranteed MBS.  
1974  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac adopt a standard mortgage loan 
document to be used in all 50 states for residential mortgages they 
purchase.  
1977  Bank of America issues the first private MBS.  
1978  
Maggie Mae (MGIC National Mortgage Corporation) and Pennie Mae 
(PMI Mortgage Corporation) issue the first private MBS backed by 
jumbo mortgages.  
1981  Fannie Mae issues its first guaranteed MBS.  
1981  Freddie Mac institutes a "swap program” in which a lender creates a 
pool of mortgages and then swaps it for Freddie Mac MBS.  
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1982  
Residential Funding Corporation (RFC), a private conduit, spurs the 
development of an active secondary market for jumbo mortgages by 
offering to buy multiple types of loans each business day.  
1983  Freddie Mac issues the first collateralized mortgage obligation 
(CMO), a type of multi-class MBS.  
1984  
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 
(SMMEA) authorizes shelf registration of private MBS with a double-
A or triple-A credit.  
1986  
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 promotes the use of Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) by creating the Real Estate Mortgage 
Investment Conduit (REMIC), a vehicle that minimizes tax liability for 
multi-class MBS.  
1989  
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989 (FIRREA) severs Freddie Mac’s ties to the Federal Home Loan 
Banks and gives it the same ownership structure as Fannie Mae.  
1992  
The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness 
Act establishes the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight as 
the safety and soundness regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie.  
1995  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac begin to use automated underwriting 
systems.  
1997  
The Federal Home Loan Banks begin to participate in the secondary 
mortgage market by investing in non-jumbo conventional single-
family mortgages.  
2003  The volume of outstanding mortgages securitized by the secondary 
market grows to $3.77 trillion.  
Chart 24: Milestones in the Development of the US Secondary Residential Mortgage Market 1274 
 
 
                                            
1274 Cf. Falcon (2003), p. 31. 
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